Security Protocols

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Contents

1 Theory of Agents and Messages for Security Protocols **2**
1.1 Inductive Definition of All Parts of a Message . . . 3
1.2 Inverse of keys . . . 3
1.3 The *keysFor* operator . . . 3
1.4 Inductive relation "parts" . . . 4
1.4.1 Unions . . . 5
1.4.2 Idempotence and transitivity . . . 5
1.4.3 Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages . . . 6
1.5 Inductive relation "analz" . . . 7
1.5.1 General equational properties . . . 8
1.5.2 Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages . . . 8
1.5.3 Idempotence and transitivity . . . 10
1.6 Inductive relation "synth" . . . 11
1.6.1 Unions . . . 12
1.6.2 Idempotence and transitivity . . . 12
1.6.3 Combinations of parts, analz and synth . . . 12
1.6.4 For reasoning about the Fake rule in traces . . . 13
1.7 HPair: a combination of Hash and MPair . . . 14
1.7.1 Freeness . . . 14
1.7.2 Specialized laws, proved in terms of those for Hash and MPair . . . 15
1.8 The set of key-free messages . . . 15
1.9 Tactics useful for many protocol proofs . . . 16

2 Theory of Events for Security Protocols **18**
2.1 Function *knows* . . . 19
2.2 Knowledge of Agents . . . 20
2.3 Asymmetric Keys . . . 23
2.4 Basic properties of *pubEK* and *priEK* . . . 24
2.5 "Image" equations that hold for injective functions . . . 24
2.6 Symmetric Keys . . . 25
2.7 Initial States of Agents . . . 26
2.8 Function *knows Spy* . . . 28
2.9 Fresh Nonces . . . 29
2.10 Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems . . . 29
2.11 Specialized Rewriting for Theorems About *analz* and Image . . . 29
2.12 Specialized Methods for Possibility Theorems . . . 31

3 Needham-Schroeder Shared-Key Protocol **31**
3.1 Inductive proofs about *ns_shared* . . . 32
3.1.1 Forwarding lemmas, to aid simplification . . . 32
3.1.2 Lemmas concerning the form of items passed in messages 33
3.1.3 Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys . . 34
3.1.4 The session key K uniquely identifies the message 34
3.1.5 Crucial secrecy property: Spy doesn't see the keys sent in NS2 . . . 35
3.2 Guarantees available at various stages of protocol . . . 35
3.3 Lemmas for reasoning about predicate "Issues" . . . 37
3.4 Guarantees of non-injective agreement on the session key, and of key distribution. They also express forms of freshness of certain messages, namely that agents were alive after something happened. 38

4 The Kerberos Protocol, BAN Version **40**
4.1 Lemmas for reasoning about predicate "Issues" . . . 42
4.2 Lemmas concerning the form of items passed in messages 45
4.3 Non-temporal guarantees, explicitly relying on non-occurrence of oops events - refined below by temporal guarantees . . . 47
4.4 Temporal guarantees, relying on a temporal check that insures that no oops event occurred. These are available in the sense of goal availability . . . 51
4.5 Treatment of the key distribution goal using trace inspection. All guarantees are in non-temporal form, hence non available, though their temporal form is trivial to derive. These guarantees also convey a stronger form of authentication - non-injective agreement on the session key . . . 52

5 The Kerberos Protocol, BAN Version, with Gets event **54**
5.1 Lemmas concerning the form of items passed in messages 59
5.2 Non-temporal guarantees, explicitly relying on non-occurrence of oops events - refined below by temporal guarantees . . . 62
5.3 Temporal guarantees, relying on a temporal check that insures that no oops event occurred. These are available in the sense of goal availability . . . 65
5.4 Combined guarantees of key distribution and non-injective agreement on the session keys . . . 67

6 The Kerberos Protocol, Version IV **67**
6.1 Lemmas about lists, for reasoning about Issues . . . 72
6.2 Lemmas about *authKeys* . . . 72
6.3 Forwarding Lemmas . . . 73
6.4 Lemmas for reasoning about predicate "before" . . . 75
6.5 Regularity Lemmas . . . 76
6.6 Authenticity theorems: confirm origin of sensitive messages . . . 79
6.7 Reliability: friendly agents send something if something else happened . . . 82
6.8 Unicity Theorems . . . 85
6.9 Lemmas About the Predicate *AKcryptSK* . . . 86
6.10 Secrecy Theorems . . . 89

6.11 Parties authentication: each party verifies "the identity of another party who generated some data" (quoted from Neuman and Ts'o). 95
6.12 Key distribution guarantees An agent knows a session key if he used it to issue a cipher. These guarantees also convey a stronger form of authentication - non-injective agreement on the session key 97

7 The Kerberos Protocol, Version IV 102
7.1 Lemmas about reception event . . . 106
7.2 Lemmas about `authKeys` . . . 106
7.3 Forwarding Lemmas . . . 107
7.4 Regularity Lemmas . . . 108
7.5 Authenticity theorems: confirm origin of sensitive messages . . . 111
7.6 Reliability: friendly agents send something if something else happened . . . 114
7.7 Unicity Theorems . . . 117
7.8 Lemmas About the Predicate `AKcryptSK` . . . 118
7.9 Secrecy Theorems . . . 121
7.10 2. Parties' strong authentication: non-injective agreement on the session key. The same guarantees also express key distribution, hence their names . . . 127

8 The Kerberos Protocol, Version V 130
8.1 Lemmas about lists, for reasoning about Issues . . . 134
8.2 Lemmas about `authKeys` . . . 135
8.3 Forwarding Lemmas . . . 136
8.4 Regularity Lemmas . . . 137
8.5 Authenticity theorems: confirm origin of sensitive messages . . . 138
8.6 Reliability: friendly agents send something if something else happened . . . 141
8.7 Unicity Theorems . . . 144
8.8 Lemmas About the Predicate `AKcryptSK` . . . 144
8.9 Secrecy Theorems . . . 147
8.10 Authentication . . . 152
8.11 Parties' knowledge of session keys . . . 154
8.12 Novel guarantees, never studied before . . . 157

9 The Original Otway-Rees Protocol 159
9.1 Towards Secrecy: Proofs Involving `analz` . . . 161
9.2 Authenticity properties relating to NA . . . 162
9.3 Authenticity properties relating to NB . . . 165

10 The Otway-Rees Protocol as Modified by Abadi and Needham 167
10.1 Proofs involving analz . . . 169
10.2 Authenticity properties relating to NA . . . 170
10.3 Authenticity properties relating to NB . . . 171

11 The Otway-Rees Protocol: The Faulty BAN Version 172
11.1 For reasoning about the encrypted portion of messages . . . 173
11.2 Proofs involving analz . . . 174
11.3 Attempting to prove stronger properties . . . 176

12 Bella's version of the Otway-Rees protocol **176**
12.1 Proofs involving analz 179

13 The Woo-Lam Protocol **184**

14 The Otway-Bull Recursive Authentication Protocol **186**

15 The Yahalom Protocol **195**
15.1 Regularity Lemmas for Yahalom 196
15.2 Secrecy Theorems 198
15.2.1 Security Guarantee for A upon receiving YM3 199
15.2.2 Security Guarantees for B upon receiving YM4 199
15.2.3 Towards proving secrecy of Nonce NB 200
15.2.4 The Nonce NB uniquely identifies B's message. 202
15.2.5 A nonce value is never used both as NA and as NB 202
15.3 Authenticating B to A 204
15.4 Authenticating A to B using the certificate *Crypt K (Nonce NB)* . 205

16 The Yahalom Protocol, Variant 2 **206**
16.1 Inductive Proofs 207
16.2 Crucial Secrecy Property: Spy Does Not See Key *KAB* 209
16.3 Security Guarantee for A upon receiving YM3 210
16.4 Security Guarantee for B upon receiving YM4 210
16.5 Authenticating B to A 211
16.6 Authenticating A to B 212

17 The Yahalom Protocol: A Flawed Version **213**
17.1 Regularity Lemmas for Yahalom 214
17.2 For reasoning about the encrypted portion of messages 214
17.3 Secrecy Theorems 215
17.4 Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys 215
17.5 Security Guarantee for A upon receiving YM3 216
17.6 Security Guarantees for B upon receiving YM4 217
17.7 The Flaw in the Model 217
17.8 Basic Lemmas 221
17.9 About NRO: Validity for *B* 222
17.10About NRR: Validity for *A* 223
17.11Proofs About *sub_K* 223
17.12Proofs About *con_K* 224
17.13Proving fairness 225

18 Conventional protocols: rely on conventional Message, Event and Public – Shared-key protocols **227**

19 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol (Flawed) **228**
19.1 Inductive proofs about *ns_public* 229
19.2 Authenticity properties obtained from term NS1 229
19.3 Authenticity properties obtained from term NS2 230

20 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol 232
20.1 Inductive proofs about *ns_public* . . . 233
20.2 Authenticity properties obtained from term NS1 . . . 233
20.3 Authenticity properties obtained from term NS2 . . . 234
20.4 Overall guarantee for term B . . . 235

21 The TLS Protocol: Transport Layer Security 236
21.1 Protocol Proofs . . . 240
21.2 Inductive proofs about tls . . . 241
21.2.1 Properties of items found in Notes . . . 242
21.2.2 Protocol goal: if B receives CertVerify, then A sent it . . . 243
21.2.3 Unicity results for PMS, the pre-master-secret . . . 244
21.3 Secrecy Theorems . . . 244
21.3.1 Protocol goal: serverK(Na,Nb,M) and clientK(Na,Nb,M) remain secure . . . 245
21.3.2 Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of clientK . . . 247
21.3.3 Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of serverK . . . 248
21.3.4 Protocol goals: if A receives ServerFinished, then B is present and has used the quoted values PA, PB, etc. Note that it is up to A to compare PA with what she originally sent. . . . 249
21.3.5 Protocol goal: if B receives any message encrypted with clientK then A has sent it . . . 250
21.3.6 Protocol goal: if B receives ClientFinished, and if B is able to check a CertVerify from A, then A has used the quoted values PA, PB, etc. Even this one requires A to be uncompromised. . . . 251

22 The Certified Electronic Mail Protocol by Abadi et al. 251
22.1 Proving Confidentiality Results . . . 256
22.2 The Guarantees for Sender and Recipient . . . 259

23 Conventional protocols: rely on conventional Message, Event and Public – Public-key protocols 261

24 Theory of Events for Security Protocols that use smartcards 261
24.1 Function *knows* . . . 263
24.2 Knowledge of Agents . . . 265

25 Theory of smartcards 269
25.1 Basic properties of shrK . . . 270
25.2 Function "knows" . . . 271
25.3 Fresh nonces . . . 273
25.4 Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems. . . . 273
25.5 Specialized Rewriting for Theorems About *analz* and Image . . . 274
25.6 Tactics for possibility theorems . . . 275

26 Original Shoup-Rubin protocol 276

27 Bella's modification of the Shoup-Rubin protocol 300

28 Smartcard protocols: rely on conventional Message and on new EventSC and Smartcard **325**

29 Extensions to Standard Theories **325**
29.1 Extensions to Theory *Set* . . . 325
29.2 Extensions to Theory *List* . . . 325
29.2.1 "remove l x" erase the first element of "l" equal to "x" . . . 325
29.3 Extensions to Theory *Message* . . . 325
29.3.1 declarations for tactics . . . 325
29.3.2 extract the agent number of an Agent message . . . 326
29.3.3 messages that are pairs . . . 326
29.3.4 well-foundedness of messages . . . 326
29.3.5 lemmas on keysFor . . . 327
29.3.6 lemmas on parts . . . 327
29.3.7 lemmas on synth . . . 328
29.3.8 lemmas on analz . . . 328
29.3.9 lemmas on parts, synth and analz . . . 328
29.3.10 greatest nonce used in a message . . . 329
29.3.11 sets of keys . . . 329
29.3.12 keys a priori necessary for decrypting the messages of G . . . 329
29.3.13 only the keys necessary for G are useful in analz . . . 330
29.4 Extensions to Theory *Event* . . . 330
29.4.1 general protocol properties . . . 330
29.4.2 lemma on knows . . . 331
29.4.3 knows without initState . . . 331
29.4.4 decomposition of knows into knows' and initState . . . 331
29.4.5 knows' is finite . . . 332
29.4.6 monotonicity of knows . . . 332
29.4.7 maximum knowledge an agent can have includes messages sent to the agent . . . 332
29.4.8 basic facts about *knows_max* . . . 333
29.4.9 used without initState . . . 334
29.4.10 monotonicity of used . . . 334
29.4.11 lemmas on used and knows . . . 335
29.4.12 a nonce or key in a message cannot equal a fresh nonce or key . . . 336
29.4.13 message of an event . . . 336

30 Decomposition of Analz into two parts **336**
30.1 messages that do not contribute to analz . . . 337
30.2 basic facts about *pparts* . . . 337
30.3 facts about *pparts* and *parts* . . . 338
30.4 facts about *pparts* and *analz* . . . 338
30.5 messages that contribute to analz . . . 338
30.6 basic facts about *kparts* . . . 339
30.7 facts about *kparts* and *parts* . . . 340
30.8 facts about *kparts* and *analz* . . . 340
30.9 analz is pparts + analz of kparts . . . 341

31 Protocol-Independent Confidentiality Theorem on Nonces 341
31.1 basic facts about *guard* . . . 342
31.2 guarded sets . . . 343
31.3 basic facts about *Guard* . . . 343
31.4 set obtained by decrypting a message . . . 344
31.5 number of Crypt's in a message . . . 345
31.6 basic facts about *crypt_nb* . . . 345
31.7 number of Crypt's in a message list . . . 345
31.8 basic facts about *cnb* . . . 345
31.9 list of kparts . . . 345
31.10 list corresponding to "decrypt" . . . 346
31.11 basic facts about *decrypt'* . . . 346
31.12 if the analyse of a finite guarded set gives n then it must also gives one of the keys of Ks . . . 346
31.13 if the analyse of a finite guarded set and a (possibly infinite) set of keys gives n then it must also gives Ks . . . 347

32 protocol-independent confidentiality theorem on keys 347
32.1 basic facts about *guardK* . . . 348
32.2 guarded sets . . . 348
32.3 basic facts about *GuardK* . . . 349
32.4 set obtained by decrypting a message . . . 350
32.5 number of Crypt's in a message . . . 350
32.6 basic facts about *crypt_nb* . . . 350
32.7 number of Crypt's in a message list . . . 350
32.8 basic facts about *cnb* . . . 351
32.9 list of kparts . . . 351
32.10 list corresponding to "decrypt" . . . 351
32.11 basic facts about *decrypt'* . . . 351
32.12 Basic properties of shrK . . . 353
32.13 Function "knows" . . . 354
32.14 Fresh nonces . . . 354
32.15 Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems. . . . 355
32.16 Specialized Rewriting for Theorems About *analz* and Image . . . 355
32.17 Tactics for possibility theorems . . . 356

33 lemmas on guarded messages for protocols with symmetric keys 357
33.1 Extensions to Theory *Shared* . . . 357
33.1.1 a little abbreviation . . . 357
33.1.2 agent associated to a key . . . 357
33.1.3 basic facts about *initState* . . . 358
33.1.4 sets of symmetric keys . . . 358
33.1.5 sets of good keys . . . 358
33.2 Proofs About Guarded Messages . . . 359
33.2.1 small hack . . . 359
33.2.2 guardedness results on nonces . . . 359
33.2.3 guardedness results on keys . . . 359
33.2.4 regular protocols . . . 360

34 Otway-Rees Protocol **361**
34.1 messages used in the protocol . . . 361
34.2 definition of the protocol . . . 362
34.3 declarations for tactics . . . 362
34.4 general properties of or . . . 362
34.5 or is regular . . . 363
34.6 guardedness of KAB . . . 363
34.7 guardedness of NB . . . 363

35 Yahalom Protocol **364**
35.1 messages used in the protocol . . . 364
35.2 definition of the protocol . . . 365
35.3 declarations for tactics . . . 366
35.4 general properties of ya . . . 366
35.5 guardedness of KAB . . . 366
35.6 session keys are not symmetric keys . . . 366
35.7 ya2' implies ya1' . . . 367
35.8 uniqueness of NB . . . 367
35.9 ya3' implies ya2' . . . 367
35.10 ya3' implies ya3 . . . 368
35.11 guardedness of NB . . . 368

36 Blanqui's "guard" concept: protocol-independent secrecy **369**
36.1 Extensions to Theory *Public* . . . 369
36.1.1 signature . . . 369
36.1.2 agent associated to a key . . . 370
36.1.3 basic facts about *initState* . . . 370
36.1.4 sets of private keys . . . 370
36.1.5 sets of good keys . . . 370
36.1.6 greatest nonce used in a trace, 0 if there is no nonce . . . 371
36.1.7 function giving a new nonce . . . 371
36.2 Proofs About Guarded Messages . . . 371
36.2.1 small hack necessary because priK is defined as the inverse of pubK . . . 371
36.2.2 guardedness results . . . 371
36.2.3 regular protocols . . . 372

37 Lists of Messages and Lists of Agents **372**
37.1 Implementation of Lists by Messages . . . 372
37.1.1 nil is represented by any message which is not a pair . . . 372
37.1.2 induction principle . . . 373
37.1.3 head . . . 373
37.1.4 tail . . . 373
37.1.5 length . . . 373
37.1.6 membership . . . 373
37.1.7 delete an element . . . 373
37.1.8 concatenation . . . 373
37.1.9 replacement . . . 373
37.1.10 ith element . . . 374
37.1.11 insertion . . . 374

37.1.12 truncation . . . 374
37.2 Agent Lists . . . 374
37.2.1 set of well-formed agent-list messages . . . 374
37.2.2 basic facts about agent lists . . . 374

38 Protocol P1 **375**
38.1 Protocol Definition . . . 375
38.1.1 offer chaining: B chains his offer for A with the head offer of L for sending it to C . . . 375
38.1.2 agent whose key is used to sign an offer . . . 375
38.1.3 nonce used in an offer . . . 376
38.1.4 next shop . . . 376
38.1.5 anchor of the offer list . . . 376
38.1.6 request event . . . 376
38.1.7 propose event . . . 377
38.1.8 protocol . . . 377
38.1.9 Composition of Traces . . . 377
38.1.10 Valid Offer Lists . . . 378
38.1.11 basic properties of valid . . . 378
38.1.12 offers of an offer list . . . 378
38.1.13 the originator can get the offers . . . 378
38.1.14 list of offers . . . 378
38.1.15 list of agents whose keys are used to sign a list of offers . 378
38.1.16 builds a trace from an itinerary . . . 378
38.1.17 there is a trace in which the originator receives a valid answer . . . 379
38.2 properties of protocol P1 . . . 379
38.2.1 strong forward integrity: except the last one, no offer can be modified . . . 379
38.2.2 insertion resilience: except at the beginning, no offer can be inserted . . . 380
38.2.3 truncation resilience: only shop i can truncate at offer i . 380
38.2.4 declarations for tactics . . . 380
38.2.5 get components of a message . . . 381
38.2.6 general properties of p1 . . . 381
38.2.7 private keys are safe . . . 381
38.2.8 general guardedness properties . . . 382
38.2.9 guardedness of messages . . . 382
38.2.10 Nonce uniqueness . . . 383
38.2.11 requests are guarded . . . 383
38.2.12 propositions are guarded . . . 383
38.2.13 data confidentiality: no one other than the originator can decrypt the offers . . . 384
38.2.14 non repudiability: an offer signed by B has been sent by B 385

39 Protocol P2 **386**
39.1 Protocol Definition . . . 387
39.1.1 offer chaining: B chains his offer for A with the head offer of L for sending it to C . . . 387
39.1.2 agent whose key is used to sign an offer . . . 387


39.1.3 nonce used in an offer . . . 387
39.1.4 next shop . . . 387
39.1.5 anchor of the offer list . . . 387
39.1.6 request event . . . 388
39.1.7 propose event . . . 388
39.1.8 protocol . . . 388
39.1.9 valid offer lists . . . 389
39.1.10 basic properties of valid . . . 389
39.1.11 list of offers . . . 389
39.2 Properties of Protocol P2 . . . 389
39.3 strong forward integrity: except the last one, no offer can be modified . . . 389
39.4 insertion resilience: except at the beginning, no offer can be inserted 390
39.5 truncation resilience: only shop i can truncate at offer i . . . 390
39.6 declarations for tactics . . . 391
39.7 get components of a message . . . 391
39.8 general properties of p2 . . . 391
39.9 private keys are safe . . . 392
39.10 general guardedness properties . . . 392
39.11 guardedness of messages . . . 392
39.12 Nonce uniqueness . . . 393
39.13 requests are guarded . . . 393
39.14 propositions are guarded . . . 394
39.15 data confidentiality: no one other than the originator can decrypt the offers . . . 395
39.16 forward privacy: only the originator can know the identity of the shops . . . 395
39.17 non repudiability: an offer signed by B has been sent by B . . . 395

40 Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public-Key Protocol 397
40.1 messages used in the protocol . . . 397
40.2 definition of the protocol . . . 398
40.3 declarations for tactics . . . 398
40.4 general properties of nsp . . . 398
40.5 nonce are used only once . . . 398
40.6 guardedness of NA . . . 399
40.7 guardedness of NB . . . 399
40.8 Agents' Authentication . . . 400

41 Other Protocol-Independent Results 401
41.1 protocols . . . 401
41.2 substitutions . . . 401
41.3 nonces generated by a rule . . . 402
41.4 traces generated by a protocol . . . 402
41.5 general properties . . . 403
41.6 types . . . 403
41.7 introduction of a fresh guarded nonce . . . 403
41.8 safe keys . . . 405
41.9 guardedness preservation . . . 405
41.10 monotonic keyfun . . . 405

41.11guardedness theorem 405
41.12useful properties for guardedness 406
41.13unicity 407
41.14Needham-Schroeder-Lowe 408
41.15general properties 409
41.16guardedness for NSL 409
41.17unicity for NSL 410

42 Blanqui's "guard" concept: protocol-independent secrecy 412



1 Theory of Agents and Messages for Security Protocols

theory *Message*
imports *Main*
begin

lemma *[simp] : "A ∪ (B ∪ A) = B ∪ A"*
  by *blast*

type_synonym
  key = nat

consts
  all_symmetric :: bool — true if all keys are symmetric
  invKey :: "key⇒key" — inverse of a symmetric key

specification *(invKey)*
  invKey [simp]: "invKey (invKey K) = K"
  invKey_symmetric: "all_symmetric ⟶ invKey = id"
    by *(rule exI [of _ id], auto)*

The inverse of a symmetric key is itself; that of a public key is the private key and vice versa

definition *symKeys :: "key set"* **where**
  "symKeys == {K. invKey K = K}"

datatype — We allow any number of friendly agents
  agent = Server | Friend nat | Spy

datatype
    msg = Agent agent — Agent names
        | Number nat — Ordinary integers, timestamps, ...
        | Nonce nat — Unguessable nonces
        | Key key — Crypto keys
        | Hash msg — Hashing
        | MPair msg msg — Compound messages
        | Crypt key msg — Encryption, public- or shared-key

Concrete syntax: messages appear as *{|A,B,NA|}*, etc...

syntax
  *"_MTuple" :: "['a, args] ⇒ 'a * 'b" (‹(‹indent=2 notation=‹mixfix message tuple››{|_,/ _|})›)*
syntax_consts
  "_MTuple" ⇌ MPair
translations
  "{|x, y, z|}" ⇌ "{|x, {|y, z|}|}"
  "{|x, y|}" ⇌ "CONST MPair x y"

definition *HPair :: "[msg,msg] ⇒ msg" (‹(4Hash[_] /_)› [0, 1000])* **where**
    — Message Y paired with a MAC computed with the help of X

```
    "Hash[X] Y == {|Hash{|X,Y|}, Y|}"

definition keysFor :: "msg set ⇒ key set" where
    — Keys useful to decrypt elements of a message set
  "keysFor H == invKey ‘ {K. ∃X. Crypt K X ∈ H}"
```

1.1 Inductive Definition of All Parts of a Message

```
inductive_set
  parts :: "msg set ⇒ msg set"
  for H :: "msg set"
  where
    Inj [intro]: "X ∈ H ⟹ X ∈ parts H"
  | Fst:         "{|X,Y|} ∈ parts H ⟹ X ∈ parts H"
  | Snd:         "{|X,Y|} ∈ parts H ⟹ Y ∈ parts H"
  | Body:        "Crypt K X ∈ parts H ⟹ X ∈ parts H"
```

Monotonicity

```
lemma parts_mono_aux: "⟦G ⊆ H; X ∈ parts G⟧ ⟹ X ∈ parts H"
  by (erule parts.induct) (auto dest: parts.Fst parts.Snd parts.Body)

lemma parts_mono: "G ⊆ H ⟹ parts(G) ⊆ parts(H)"
  using parts_mono_aux by blast
```

Equations hold because constructors are injective.

```
lemma Friend_image_eq [simp]: "(Friend x ∈ Friend‘A) = (x ∈A)"
  by auto

lemma Key_image_eq [simp]: "(Key x ∈ Key‘A) = (x ∈A)"
  by auto

lemma Nonce_Key_image_eq [simp]: "(Nonce x ∉ Key‘A)"
  by auto
```

1.2 Inverse of keys

```
lemma invKey_eq [simp]: "(invKey K = invKey K') = (K=K')"
  by (metis invKey)
```

1.3 The *keysFor* operator

```
lemma keysFor_empty [simp]: "keysFor {} = {}"
    unfolding keysFor_def by blast

lemma keysFor_Un [simp]: "keysFor (H ∪ H') = keysFor H ∪ keysFor H'"
    unfolding keysFor_def by blast

lemma keysFor_UN [simp]: "keysFor (⋃i ∈A. H i) = (⋃i ∈A. keysFor (H i))"
    unfolding keysFor_def by blast
```

Monotonicity

```
lemma keysFor_mono: "G ⊆ H ⟹ keysFor(G) ⊆ keysFor(H)"
  unfolding keysFor_def by blast
```

lemma *keysFor_insert_Agent [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Agent A) H) = keysFor H"*
unfolding *keysFor_def* **by** *auto*

lemma *keysFor_insert_Nonce [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Nonce N) H) = keysFor H"*
unfolding *keysFor_def* **by** *auto*

lemma *keysFor_insert_Number [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Number N) H) = keysFor H"*
unfolding *keysFor_def* **by** *auto*

lemma *keysFor_insert_Key [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Key K) H) = keysFor H"*
unfolding *keysFor_def* **by** *auto*

lemma *keysFor_insert_Hash [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Hash X) H) = keysFor H"*
unfolding *keysFor_def* **by** *auto*

lemma *keysFor_insert_MPair [simp]: "keysFor (insert {|X,Y|} H) = keysFor H"*
unfolding *keysFor_def* **by** *auto*

lemma *keysFor_insert_Crypt [simp]:*
"keysFor (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (invKey K) (keysFor H)"
unfolding *keysFor_def* **by** *auto*

lemma *keysFor_image_Key [simp]: "keysFor (Key`E) = {}"*
unfolding *keysFor_def* **by** *auto*

lemma *Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor: "Crypt K X ∈ H ⟹ invKey K ∈ keysFor H"*
unfolding *keysFor_def* **by** *blast*

1.4 Inductive relation "parts"

lemma *MPair_parts:*
"⟦{|X,Y|} ∈ parts H;
⟦X ∈ parts H; Y ∈ parts H⟧ ⟹ P⟧ ⟹ P"
by *(blast dest: parts.Fst parts.Snd)*

declare *MPair_parts [elim!] parts.Body [dest!]*

NB These two rules are UNSAFE in the formal sense, as they discard the compound message. They work well on THIS FILE. *MPair_parts* is left as SAFE because it speeds up proofs. The Crypt rule is normally kept UNSAFE to avoid breaking up certificates.

lemma *parts_increasing: "H ⊆ parts(H)"*
by *blast*

lemmas *parts_insertI = subset_insertI [THEN parts_mono, THEN subsetD]*

lemma *parts_empty_aux: "X ∈ parts{} ⟹ False"*
by *(induction rule: parts.induct) (blast+)*

lemma *parts_empty [simp]: "parts{} = {}"*
using *parts_empty_aux* **by** *blast*

lemma *parts_emptyE [elim!]: "X ∈ parts{} ⟹ P"*
by *simp*

WARNING: loops if H = Y, therefore must not be repeated!

lemma *parts_singleton: "X ∈ parts H ⟹ ∃Y ∈H. X ∈ parts {Y}"*
by *(erule parts.induct, fast+)*

1.4.1 Unions

lemma *parts_Un [simp]: "parts(G ∪ H) = parts(G) ∪ parts(H)"*
proof -
have *"X ∈ parts (G ∪ H) ⟹ X ∈ parts G ∪ parts H"* **for** *X*
by *(induction rule: parts.induct) auto*
then show *?thesis*
by *(simp add: order_antisym parts_mono subsetI)*
qed

lemma *parts_insert: "parts (insert X H) = parts {X} ∪ parts H"*
by *(metis insert_is_Un parts_Un)*

TWO inserts to avoid looping. This rewrite is better than nothing. But its behaviour can be strange.

lemma *parts_insert2:*
"parts (insert X (insert Y H)) = parts {X} ∪ parts {Y} ∪ parts H"
by *(metis Un_commute Un_empty_right Un_insert_right insert_is_Un parts_Un)*

lemma *parts_image [simp]:*
"parts (f ‘ A) = (⋃x ∈A. parts {f x})"
apply *auto*
apply *(metis (mono_tags, opaque_lifting) image_iff parts_singleton)*
apply *(metis empty_subsetI image_eqI insert_absorb insert_subset parts_mono)*
done

Added to simplify arguments to parts, analz and synth.

This allows *blast* to simplify occurrences of *parts (G ∪ H)* in the assumption.

lemmas *in_parts_UnE = parts_Un [THEN equalityD1, THEN subsetD, THEN UnE]*

declare *in_parts_UnE [elim!]*

lemma *parts_insert_subset: "insert X (parts H) ⊆ parts(insert X H)"*
by *(blast intro: parts_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])*

1.4.2 Idempotence and transitivity

lemma *parts_partsD [dest!]: "X ∈ parts (parts H) ⟹ X ∈ parts H"*
by *(erule parts.induct, blast+)*

lemma *parts_idem [simp]: "parts (parts H) = parts H"*
by *blast*

lemma *parts_subset_iff [simp]: "(parts G ⊆ parts H) = (G ⊆ parts H)"*
by *(metis parts_idem parts_increasing parts_mono subset_trans)*

lemma *parts_trans: "⟦X ∈ parts G; G ⊆ parts H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ parts H"*
by *(metis parts_subset_iff subsetD)*

Cut

lemma *parts_cut:*
"⟦Y ∈ parts (insert X G); X ∈ parts H⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ parts (G ∪ H)"
by *(blast intro: parts_trans)*

lemma *parts_cut_eq [simp]: "X ∈ parts H ⟹ parts (insert X H) = parts H"*
by *(metis insert_absorb parts_idem parts_insert)*

1.4.3 Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages

lemmas *parts_insert_eq_I = equalityI [OF subsetI parts_insert_subset]*

lemma *parts_insert_Agent [simp]:*
"parts (insert (Agent agt) H) = insert (Agent agt) (parts H)"
apply *(rule parts_insert_eq_I)*
apply *(erule parts.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *parts_insert_Nonce [simp]:*
"parts (insert (Nonce N) H) = insert (Nonce N) (parts H)"
apply *(rule parts_insert_eq_I)*
apply *(erule parts.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *parts_insert_Number [simp]:*
"parts (insert (Number N) H) = insert (Number N) (parts H)"
apply *(rule parts_insert_eq_I)*
apply *(erule parts.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *parts_insert_Key [simp]:*
"parts (insert (Key K) H) = insert (Key K) (parts H)"
apply *(rule parts_insert_eq_I)*
apply *(erule parts.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *parts_insert_Hash [simp]:*
"parts (insert (Hash X) H) = insert (Hash X) (parts H)"
apply *(rule parts_insert_eq_I)*
apply *(erule parts.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *parts_insert_Crypt [simp]:*
"parts (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (Crypt K X) (parts (insert X H))"
proof -
have *"Y ∈ parts (insert (Crypt K X) H) ⟹ Y ∈ insert (Crypt K X) (parts*

```
(insert X H))" for Y
    by (induction rule: parts.induct) auto
  then show ?thesis
    by (smt (verit) insertI1 insert_commute parts.simps parts_cut_eq parts_insert_eq_I)
qed

lemma parts_insert_MPair [simp]:
  "parts (insert {|X,Y|} H) = insert {|X,Y|} (parts (insert X (insert Y H)))"
proof -
  have "Z ∈ parts (insert {|X, Y|} H) ⟹ Z ∈ insert {|X, Y|} (parts (insert
X (insert Y H)))" for Z
    by (induction rule: parts.induct) auto
  then show ?thesis
    by (smt (verit) insertI1 insert_commute parts.simps parts_cut_eq parts_insert_eq_I)
qed

lemma parts_image_Key [simp]: "parts (Key`N) = Key`N"
  by auto
```

In any message, there is an upper bound N on its greatest nonce.

```
lemma msg_Nonce_supply: "∃N. ∀n. N≤n ⟶ Nonce n ∉ parts {msg}"
proof (induct msg)
  case (Nonce n)
  show ?case
    by simp (metis Suc_n_not_le_n)
next
  case (MPair X Y)
  then show ?case — metis works out the necessary sum itself!
    by (simp add: parts_insert2) (metis le_trans nat_le_linear)
qed auto
```

1.5 Inductive relation "analz"

Inductive definition of "analz" – what can be broken down from a set of messages, including keys. A form of downward closure. Pairs can be taken apart; messages decrypted with known keys.

```
inductive_set
  analz :: "msg set ⇒ msg set"
  for H :: "msg set"
  where
    Inj [intro,simp]: "X ∈ H ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
  | Fst:     "{|X,Y|} ∈ analz H ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
  | Snd:     "{|X,Y|} ∈ analz H ⟹ Y ∈ analz H"
  | Decrypt [dest]:
    "⟦Crypt K X ∈ analz H; Key(invKey K) ∈ analz H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
```

Monotonicity; Lemma 1 of Lowe's paper

```
lemma analz_mono_aux: "⟦G ⊆ H; X ∈ analz G⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
  by (erule analz.induct) (auto dest: analz.Fst analz.Snd)

lemma analz_mono: "G⊆H ⟹ analz(G) ⊆ analz(H)"
  using analz_mono_aux by blast
```

Making it safe speeds up proofs

lemma *MPair_analz [elim!]:*
"⟦{|X,Y|} ∈ analz H;
⟦X ∈ analz H; Y ∈ analz H⟧ ⟹ P⟧ ⟹ P"
by *(blast dest: analz.Fst analz.Snd)*

lemma *analz_increasing: "H ⊆ analz(H)"*
by *blast*

lemma *analz_into_parts: "X ∈ analz H ⟹ X ∈ parts H"*
by *(erule analz.induct) auto*

lemma *analz_subset_parts: "analz H ⊆ parts H"*
using *analz_into_parts* **by** *blast*

lemma *analz_parts [simp]: "analz (parts H) = parts H"*
using *analz_subset_parts* **by** *blast*

lemmas *not_parts_not_analz = analz_subset_parts [THEN contra_subsetD]*

lemma *parts_analz [simp]: "parts (analz H) = parts H"*
by *(metis analz_increasing analz_subset_parts parts_idem parts_mono subset_antisym)*

lemmas *analz_insertI = subset_insertI [THEN analz_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD]*

1.5.1 General equational properties

lemma *analz_empty [simp]: "analz{} = {}"*
using *analz_parts* **by** *fastforce*

Converse fails: we can analz more from the union than from the separate parts, as a key in one might decrypt a message in the other

lemma *analz_Un: "analz(G) ∪ analz(H) ⊆ analz(G ∪ H)"*
by *(intro Un_least analz_mono Un_upper1 Un_upper2)*

lemma *analz_insert: "insert X (analz H) ⊆ analz(insert X H)"*
by *(blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])*

1.5.2 Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages

lemmas *analz_insert_eq_I = equalityI [OF subsetI analz_insert]*

lemma *analz_insert_Agent [simp]:*
"analz (insert (Agent agt) H) = insert (Agent agt) (analz H)"
apply *(rule analz_insert_eq_I)*
apply *(erule analz.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *analz_insert_Nonce [simp]:*
"analz (insert (Nonce N) H) = insert (Nonce N) (analz H)"
apply *(rule analz_insert_eq_I)*
apply *(erule analz.induct, auto)*
done

```
lemma analz_insert_Number [simp]:
  "analz (insert (Number N) H) = insert (Number N) (analz H)"
  apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
  apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
  done

lemma analz_insert_Hash [simp]:
  "analz (insert (Hash X) H) = insert (Hash X) (analz H)"
  apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
  apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
  done
```

Can only pull out Keys if they are not needed to decrypt the rest

```
lemma analz_insert_Key [simp]:
  "K ∉ keysFor (analz H) ⟹
          analz (insert (Key K) H) = insert (Key K) (analz H)"
  unfolding keysFor_def
  apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
  apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
  done

lemma analz_insert_MPair [simp]:
  "analz (insert {|X,Y|} H) = insert {|X,Y|} (analz (insert X (insert Y H)))"
proof -
  have "Z ∈ analz (insert {|X, Y|} H) ⟹ Z ∈ insert {|X, Y|} (analz (insert
X (insert Y H)))" for Z
    by (induction rule: analz.induct) auto
  moreover have "Z ∈ analz (insert X (insert Y H)) ⟹ Z ∈ analz (insert
{|X, Y|} H)" for Z
    by (induction rule: analz.induct) (use analz.Inj in blast)+
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by auto
qed
```

Can pull out encrypted message if the Key is not known

```
lemma analz_insert_Crypt:
  "Key (invKey K) ∉ analz H
      ⟹ analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (Crypt K X) (analz H)"
  apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
  apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
  done

lemma analz_insert_Decrypt:
  assumes "Key (invKey K) ∈ analz H"
  shows "analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert
X H))"
proof -
  have "Y ∈ analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) ⟹ Y ∈ insert (Crypt K X) (analz
(insert X H))" for Y
    by (induction rule: analz.induct) auto
  moreover
  have "Y ∈ analz (insert X H) ⟹ Y ∈ analz (insert (Crypt K X) H)" for
Y
```

```
  proof (induction rule: analz.induct)
    case (Inj X)
    then show ?case
      by (metis analz.Decrypt analz.Inj analz_insertI assms insert_iff)
  qed auto
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by auto
qed
```

Case analysis: either the message is secure, or it is not! Effective, but can cause subgoals to blow up! Use with *if_split*; apparently *split_tac* does not cope with patterns such as *analz (insert (Crypt K X) H)*

```
lemma analz_Crypt_if [simp]:
  "analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) =
          (if (Key (invKey K) ∈ analz H)
           then insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H))
           else insert (Crypt K X) (analz H))"
  by (simp add: analz_insert_Crypt analz_insert_Decrypt)
```

This rule supposes "for the sake of argument" that we have the key.

```
lemma analz_insert_Crypt_subset:
  "analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) ⊆
           insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H))"
  apply (rule subsetI)
  apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
  done


lemma analz_image_Key [simp]: "analz (Key‘N) = Key‘N"
  apply auto
  apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
  done
```

1.5.3 Idempotence and transitivity

```
lemma analz_analzD [dest!]: "X ∈ analz (analz H) ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
  by (erule analz.induct, blast+)

lemma analz_idem [simp]: "analz (analz H) = analz H"
  by blast

lemma analz_subset_iff [simp]: "(analz G ⊆ analz H) = (G ⊆ analz H)"
  by (metis analz_idem analz_increasing analz_mono subset_trans)

lemma analz_trans: "⟦X ∈ analz G;  G ⊆ analz H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
  by (drule analz_mono, blast)
```

Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe

```
lemma analz_cut: "⟦Y ∈ analz (insert X H);  X ∈ analz H⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ analz
H"
  by (erule analz_trans, blast)
```

This rewrite rule helps in the simplification of messages that involve the forwarding of unknown components (X). Without it, removing occurrences of X

can be very complicated.

```
lemma analz_insert_eq: "X ∈ analz H ⟹ analz (insert X H) = analz H"
  by (metis analz_cut analz_insert_eq_I insert_absorb)
```

A congruence rule for "analz"

```
lemma analz_subset_cong:
  "⟦analz G ⊆ analz G'; analz H ⊆ analz H'⟧
     ⟹ analz (G ∪ H) ⊆ analz (G' ∪ H')"
  by (metis Un_mono analz_Un analz_subset_iff subset_trans)

lemma analz_cong:
  "⟦analz G = analz G'; analz H = analz H'⟧
     ⟹ analz (G ∪ H) = analz (G' ∪ H')"
  by (intro equalityI analz_subset_cong, simp_all)

lemma analz_insert_cong:
  "analz H = analz H' ⟹ analz(insert X H) = analz(insert X H')"
  by (force simp only: insert_def intro!: analz_cong)
```

If there are no pairs or encryptions then analz does nothing

```
lemma analz_trivial:
  "⟦∀X Y. {|X,Y|} ∉ H;  ∀X K. Crypt K X ∉ H⟧ ⟹ analz H = H"
  apply safe
   apply (erule analz.induct, blast+)
  done
```

1.6 Inductive relation "synth"

Inductive definition of "synth" – what can be built up from a set of messages. A form of upward closure. Pairs can be built, messages encrypted with known keys. Agent names are public domain. Numbers can be guessed, but Nonces cannot be.

```
inductive_set
  synth :: "msg set => msg set"
  for H :: "msg set"
  where
    Inj    [intro]:   "X ∈ H ⟹ X ∈ synth H"
  | Agent  [intro]:   "Agent agt ∈ synth H"
  | Number [intro]:   "Number n  ∈ synth H"
  | Hash   [intro]:   "X ∈ synth H ⟹ Hash X ∈ synth H"
  | MPair  [intro]:   "⟦X ∈ synth H;  Y ∈ synth H⟧ ⟹ {|X,Y|} ∈ synth H"
  | Crypt  [intro]:   "⟦X ∈ synth H;  Key(K) ∈ H⟧ ⟹ Crypt K X ∈ synth H"
```

Monotonicity

```
lemma synth_mono: "G⊆H ⟹ synth(G) ⊆ synth(H)"
  by (auto, erule synth.induct, auto)
```

NO *Agent_synth*, as any Agent name can be synthesized. The same holds for *Number*

```
inductive_simps synth_simps [iff]:
  "Nonce n ∈ synth H"
```

```
  "Key K ∈ synth H"
  "Hash X ∈ synth H"
  "{|X,Y|} ∈ synth H"
  "Crypt K X ∈ synth H"

lemma synth_increasing: "H ⊆ synth(H)"
  by blast
```

1.6.1 Unions

Converse fails: we can synth more from the union than from the separate parts, building a compound message using elements of each.

```
lemma synth_Un: "synth(G) ∪ synth(H) ⊆ synth(G ∪ H)"
  by (intro Un_least synth_mono Un_upper1 Un_upper2)

lemma synth_insert: "insert X (synth H) ⊆ synth(insert X H)"
  by (blast intro: synth_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
```

1.6.2 Idempotence and transitivity

```
lemma synth_synthD [dest!]: "X ∈ synth (synth H) ⟹ X ∈ synth H"
  by (erule synth.induct, auto)

lemma synth_idem: "synth (synth H) = synth H"
  by blast

lemma synth_subset_iff [simp]: "(synth G ⊆ synth H) = (G ⊆ synth H)"
  by (metis subset_trans synth_idem synth_increasing synth_mono)

lemma synth_trans: "⟦X ∈ synth G;  G ⊆ synth H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ synth H"
  by (drule synth_mono, blast)
```

Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe

```
lemma synth_cut: "⟦Y ∈ synth (insert X H);  X ∈ synth H⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ synth
H"
  by (erule synth_trans, blast)

lemma Crypt_synth_eq [simp]:
  "Key K ∉ H ⟹ (Crypt K X ∈ synth H) = (Crypt K X ∈ H)"
  by blast


lemma keysFor_synth [simp]:
  "keysFor (synth H) = keysFor H ∪ invKey`{K. Key K ∈ H}"
  unfolding keysFor_def by blast
```

1.6.3 Combinations of parts, analz and synth

```
lemma parts_synth [simp]: "parts (synth H) = parts H ∪ synth H"
proof -
  have "X ∈ parts (synth H) ⟹ X ∈ parts H ∪ synth H" for X
    by (induction X rule: parts.induct) (auto intro: parts.intros)
  then show ?thesis
    by (meson parts_increasing parts_mono subsetI antisym sup_least synth_increasing)
```

qed

lemma *analz_analz_Un [simp]: "analz (analz G ∪ H) = analz (G ∪ H)"*
using *analz_cong* **by** *blast*

lemma *analz_synth_Un [simp]: "analz (synth G ∪ H) = analz (G ∪ H) ∪ synth G"*
proof -
have *"X ∈ analz (synth G ∪ H) ⟹ X ∈ analz (G ∪ H) ∪ synth G"* **for** *X*
by *(induction X rule: analz.induct) (auto intro: analz.intros)*
then show *?thesis*
by *(metis analz_subset_iff le_sup_iff subsetI subset_antisym synth_subset_iff)*
qed

lemma *analz_synth [simp]: "analz (synth H) = analz H ∪ synth H"*
by *(metis Un_empty_right analz_synth_Un)*

1.6.4 For reasoning about the Fake rule in traces

lemma *parts_insert_subset_Un: "X ∈ G ⟹ parts(insert X H) ⊆ parts G ∪ parts H"*
by *(metis UnCI Un_upper2 insert_subset parts_Un parts_mono)*

More specifically for Fake. See also *Fake_parts_sing* below

lemma *Fake_parts_insert:*
"X ∈ synth (analz H) ⟹
parts (insert X H) ⊆ synth (analz H) ∪ parts H"
by *(metis Un_commute analz_increasing insert_subset parts_analz parts_mono*

parts_synth synth_mono synth_subset_iff)

lemma *Fake_parts_insert_in_Un:*
"⟦Z ∈ parts (insert X H); X ∈ synth (analz H)⟧
⟹ Z ∈ synth (analz H) ∪ parts H"
by *(metis Fake_parts_insert subsetD)*

H is sometimes *Key ‘ KK ∪ spies evs*, so can't put *G = H*.

lemma *Fake_analz_insert:*
"X ∈ synth (analz G) ⟹
analz (insert X H) ⊆ synth (analz G) ∪ analz (G ∪ H)"
by *(metis UnCI Un_commute Un_upper1 analz_analz_Un analz_mono analz_synth_Un insert_subset)*

lemma *analz_conj_parts [simp]:*
"(X ∈ analz H ∧ X ∈ parts H) = (X ∈ analz H)"
by *(blast intro: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])*

lemma *analz_disj_parts [simp]:*
"(X ∈ analz H ∨ X ∈ parts H) = (X ∈ parts H)"
by *(blast intro: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])*

Without this equation, other rules for synth and analz would yield redundant cases

lemma *MPair_synth_analz [iff]:*

```
  "{|X,Y|} ∈ synth (analz H) ⟷ X ∈ synth (analz H) ∧ Y ∈ synth (analz H)"
  by blast

lemma Crypt_synth_analz:
  "⟦Key K ∈ analz H;  Key (invKey K) ∈ analz H⟧
      ⟹ (Crypt K X ∈ synth (analz H)) = (X ∈ synth (analz H))"
  by blast

lemma Hash_synth_analz [simp]:
  "X ∉ synth (analz H)
      ⟹ (Hash{|X,Y|} ∈ synth (analz H)) = (Hash{|X,Y|} ∈ analz H)"
  by blast
```

1.7 HPair: a combination of Hash and MPair

1.7.1 Freeness

```
lemma Agent_neq_HPair: "Agent A ≠ Hash[X] Y"
  unfolding HPair_def by simp

lemma Nonce_neq_HPair: "Nonce N ≠ Hash[X] Y"
  unfolding HPair_def by simp

lemma Number_neq_HPair: "Number N ≠ Hash[X] Y"
  unfolding HPair_def by simp

lemma Key_neq_HPair: "Key K ≠ Hash[X] Y"
  unfolding HPair_def by simp

lemma Hash_neq_HPair: "Hash Z ≠ Hash[X] Y"
  unfolding HPair_def by simp

lemma Crypt_neq_HPair: "Crypt K X' ≠ Hash[X] Y"
  unfolding HPair_def by simp

lemmas HPair_neqs = Agent_neq_HPair Nonce_neq_HPair Number_neq_HPair
  Key_neq_HPair Hash_neq_HPair Crypt_neq_HPair

declare HPair_neqs [iff]
declare HPair_neqs [symmetric, iff]

lemma HPair_eq [iff]: "(Hash[X'] Y' = Hash[X] Y) = (X' = X ∧ Y'=Y)"
  by (simp add: HPair_def)

lemma MPair_eq_HPair [iff]:
  "({|X',Y'|} = Hash[X] Y) = (X' = Hash{|X,Y|} ∧ Y'=Y)"
  by (simp add: HPair_def)

lemma HPair_eq_MPair [iff]:
  "(Hash[X] Y = {|X',Y'|}) = (X' = Hash{|X,Y|} ∧ Y'=Y)"
  by (auto simp add: HPair_def)
```

1.7.2 Specialized laws, proved in terms of those for Hash and MPair

lemma *keysFor_insert_HPair [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Hash[X] Y) H) = keysFor H"*
by *(simp add: HPair_def)*

lemma *parts_insert_HPair [simp]:*
"parts (insert (Hash[X] Y) H) =
insert (Hash[X] Y) (insert (Hash{|X,Y|}) (parts (insert Y H)))"
by *(simp add: HPair_def)*

lemma *analz_insert_HPair [simp]:*
"analz (insert (Hash[X] Y) H) =
insert (Hash[X] Y) (insert (Hash{|X,Y|}) (analz (insert Y H)))"
by *(simp add: HPair_def)*

lemma *HPair_synth_analz [simp]:*
"X ∉ synth (analz H)
⟹ (Hash[X] Y ∈ synth (analz H)) =
(Hash {|X, Y|} ∈ analz H ∧ Y ∈ synth (analz H))"
by *(auto simp add: HPair_def)*

We do NOT want Crypt... messages broken up in protocols!!

declare *parts.Body [rule del]*

Rewrites to push in Key and Crypt messages, so that other messages can be pulled out using the *analz_insert* rules

lemmas *pushKeys =*
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Agent C"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Nonce N"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Number N"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Hash X"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "MPair X Y"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Crypt X K'"]
for *K C N X Y K'*

lemmas *pushCrypts =*
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Agent C"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Agent C"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Nonce N"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Number N"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Hash X'"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "MPair X' Y"]
for *X K C N X' Y*

Cannot be added with *[simp]* – messages should not always be re-ordered.

lemmas *pushes = pushKeys pushCrypts*

1.8 The set of key-free messages

inductive_set
keyfree :: "msg set"
where
Agent: "Agent A ∈ keyfree"

```
  | Number: "Number N ∈ keyfree"
  | Nonce:  "Nonce N ∈ keyfree"
  | Hash:   "Hash X ∈ keyfree"
  | MPair:  "⟦X ∈ keyfree;  Y ∈ keyfree⟧ ⟹ {|X,Y|} ∈ keyfree"
  | Crypt:  "⟦X ∈ keyfree⟧ ⟹ Crypt K X ∈ keyfree"


declare keyfree.intros [intro]

inductive_cases keyfree_KeyE: "Key K ∈ keyfree"
inductive_cases keyfree_MPairE: "{|X,Y|} ∈ keyfree"
inductive_cases keyfree_CryptE: "Crypt K X ∈ keyfree"

lemma parts_keyfree: "parts (keyfree) ⊆ keyfree"
  by (clarify, erule parts.induct, auto elim!: keyfree_KeyE keyfree_MPairE
keyfree_CryptE)


lemma analz_keyfree_into_Un: "⟦X ∈ analz (G ∪ H); G ⊆ keyfree⟧ ⟹ X ∈
parts G ∪ analz H"
proof (induction rule: analz.induct)
  case (Decrypt K X)
  then show ?case
    by (metis Un_iff analz.Decrypt in_mono keyfree_KeyE parts.Body parts_keyfree
parts_mono)
qed (auto dest: parts.Body)
```

1.9 Tactics useful for many protocol proofs

ML

```
  <
(*Analysis of Fake cases.  Also works for messages that forward unknown parts,
  but this application is no longer necessary if analz_insert_eq is used.
  DEPENDS UPON "X" REFERRING TO THE FRADULENT MESSAGE *)

fun impOfSubs th = th RSN (2, @{thm rev_subsetD})

(*Apply rules to break down assumptions of the form
  Y ∈ parts(insert X H)  and  Y ∈ analz(insert X H)
*)
fun Fake_insert_tac ctxt =
    dresolve_tac ctxt [impOfSubs @{thm Fake_analz_insert},
                  impOfSubs @{thm Fake_parts_insert}] THEN'
    eresolve_tac ctxt [asm_rl, @{thm synth.Inj}];

fun Fake_insert_simp_tac ctxt i =
  REPEAT (Fake_insert_tac ctxt i) THEN asm_full_simp_tac ctxt i;

fun atomic_spy_analz_tac ctxt =
  SELECT_GOAL
   (Fake_insert_simp_tac ctxt 1 THEN
    IF_UNSOLVED
      (Blast.depth_tac
        (ctxt addIs [@{thm analz_insertI}, impOfSubs @{thm analz_subset_parts}])
```

```
4 1));

fun spy_analz_tac ctxt i =
  DETERM
   (SELECT_GOAL
     (EVERY
      [  (*push in occurrences of X...*)
       (REPEAT o CHANGED)
         (Rule_Insts.res_inst_tac ctxt [((("x", 1), Position.none), "X")] []
           (@{thm insert_commute} RS ssubst) 1),
       (*...allowing further simplifications*)
       simp_tac ctxt 1,
       REPEAT (FIRSTGOAL (resolve_tac ctxt [allI,impI,notI,conjI,iffI])),
       DEPTH_SOLVE (atomic_spy_analz_tac ctxt 1)]) i);
>
```

By default only `o_apply` is built-in. But in the presence of eta-expansion this means that some terms displayed as $f \circ g$ will be rewritten, and others will not!

declare *o_def [simp]*

lemma *Crypt_notin_image_Key [simp]: "Crypt K X ∉ Key ‘ A"*
  by *auto*

lemma *Hash_notin_image_Key [simp] :"Hash X ∉ Key ‘ A"*
  by *auto*

lemma *synth_analz_mono: "G⊆H ⟹ synth (analz(G)) ⊆ synth (analz(H))"*
  by *(iprover intro: synth_mono analz_mono)*

lemma *Fake_analz_eq [simp]:*
  "X ∈ synth(analz H) ⟹ synth (analz (insert X H)) = synth (analz H)"
  by *(metis Fake_analz_insert Un_absorb Un_absorb1 Un_commute*
      subset_insertI synth_analz_mono synth_increasing synth_subset_iff)

Two generalizations of `analz_insert_eq`

lemma *gen_analz_insert_eq [rule_format]:*
  "X ∈ analz H ⟹ ∀G. H ⊆ G ⟶ analz (insert X G) = analz G"
  by *(blast intro: analz_cut analz_insertI analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])*

lemma *synth_analz_insert_eq:*
  "⟦X ∈ synth (analz H); H ⊆ G⟧
     ⟹ (Key K ∈ analz (insert X G)) ⟷ (Key K ∈ analz G)"
proof *(induction arbitrary: G rule: synth.induct)*
  case *(Inj X)*
  then show *?case*
    using *gen_analz_insert_eq* **by** *presburger*
qed *(simp_all add: subset_eq)*

lemma *Fake_parts_sing:*
  "X ∈ synth (analz H) ⟹ parts{X} ⊆ synth (analz H) ∪ parts H"
  by *(metis Fake_parts_insert empty_subsetI insert_mono parts_mono subset_trans)*

```
lemmas Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un = Fake_parts_sing [THEN [2] rev_subsetD]

method_setup spy_analz = ‹
    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o spy_analz_tac)›
  "for proving the Fake case when analz is involved"

method_setup atomic_spy_analz = ‹
    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o atomic_spy_analz_tac)›
  "for debugging spy_analz"

method_setup Fake_insert_simp = ‹
    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o Fake_insert_simp_tac)›
  "for debugging spy_analz"

end
```

2 Theory of Events for Security Protocols

```
theory Event imports Message begin

consts  — Initial states of agents — a parameter of the construction
  initState :: "agent ⇒ msg set"

datatype
  event = Says  agent agent msg
        | Gets  agent       msg
        | Notes agent       msg

consts
  bad    :: "agent set"                          — compromised agents
```

Spy has access to his own key for spoof messages, but Server is secure

```
specification (bad)
  Spy_in_bad     [iff]: "Spy ∈ bad"
  Server_not_bad [iff]: "Server ∉ bad"
    by (rule exI [of _ "{Spy}"], simp)

primrec knows :: "agent ⇒ event list ⇒ msg set"
where
  knows_Nil:   "knows A [] = initState A"
| knows_Cons:
    "knows A (ev # evs) =
       (if A = Spy then
        (case ev of
           Says A' B X ⇒ insert X (knows Spy evs)
         | Gets A' X ⇒ knows Spy evs
         | Notes A' X  ⇒
             if A' ∈ bad then insert X (knows Spy evs) else knows Spy evs)
        else
        (case ev of
           Says A' B X ⇒
             if A'=A then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
         | Gets A' X    ⇒
```

```
        if A'=A then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
    | Notes A' X    ⇒
        if A'=A then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs))"
```

The constant "spies" is retained for compatibility's sake

abbreviation *(input)*
```
  spies  :: "event list ⇒ msg set" where
  "spies ≡ knows Spy"
```

Set of items that might be visible to somebody: complement of the set of fresh items

primrec *used :: "event list ⇒ msg set"*
where
```
  used_Nil:   "used []         = (UN B. parts (initState B))"
| used_Cons:  "used (ev # evs) =
                      (case ev of
                         Says A B X ⇒ parts {X} ∪ used evs
                       | Gets A X   ⇒ used evs
                       | Notes A X  ⇒ parts {X} ∪ used evs)"
```
— The case for *Gets* seems anomalous, but *Gets* always follows *Says* in real protocols. Seems difficult to change. See *Gets_correct* in theory *Guard/Extensions.thy*.

lemma *Notes_imp_used: "Notes A X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ used evs"*
  by *(induct evs) (auto split: event.split)*

lemma *Says_imp_used: "Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ used evs"*
  by *(induct evs) (auto split: event.split)*

2.1 Function *knows*

lemmas *parts_insert_knows_A = parts_insert [of _ "knows A evs"]* **for** *A evs*

lemma *knows_Spy_Says [simp]:*
```
  "knows Spy (Says A B X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy evs)"
  by simp
```

Letting the Spy see "bad" agents' notes avoids redundant case-splits on whether *A = Spy* and whether *A ∈ bad*

lemma *knows_Spy_Notes [simp]:*
```
  "knows Spy (Notes A X # evs) =
          (if A∈bad then insert X (knows Spy evs) else knows Spy evs)"
  by simp
```

lemma *knows_Spy_Gets [simp]: "knows Spy (Gets A X # evs) = knows Spy evs"*
  by *simp*

lemma *knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Says:*
```
  "knows Spy evs ⊆ knows Spy (Says A B X # evs)"
  by (simp add: subset_insertI)
```

lemma *knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Notes:*
```
  "knows Spy evs ⊆ knows Spy (Notes A X # evs)"
  by force
```

lemma *knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Gets:*
"knows Spy evs ⊆ knows Spy (Gets A X # evs)"
by *(simp add: subset_insertI)*

Spy sees what is sent on the traffic

lemma *Says_imp_knows_Spy:*
"Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
by *(induct evs) (auto split: event.split)*

lemma *Notes_imp_knows_Spy [rule_format]:*
"Notes A X ∈ set evs ⟹ A ∈ bad ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
by *(induct evs) (auto split: event.split)*

Elimination rules: derive contradictions from old Says events containing items known to be fresh

lemmas *Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy =*
Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, elim_format]

lemmas *knows_Spy_partsEs =*
Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy parts.Body [elim_format]

lemmas *Says_imp_analz_Spy = Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj]*

Compatibility for the old "spies" function

lemmas *spies_partsEs = knows_Spy_partsEs*
lemmas *Says_imp_spies = Says_imp_knows_Spy*
lemmas *parts_insert_spies = parts_insert_knows_A [of _ Spy]*

2.2 Knowledge of Agents

lemma *knows_subset_knows_Says: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Says A' B X # evs)"*
by *(simp add: subset_insertI)*

lemma *knows_subset_knows_Notes: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Notes A' X # evs)"*
by *(simp add: subset_insertI)*

lemma *knows_subset_knows_Gets: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Gets A' X # evs)"*
by *(simp add: subset_insertI)*

Agents know what they say

lemma *Says_imp_knows [rule_format]: "Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ knows A evs"*
by *(induct evs) (force split: event.split)+*

Agents know what they note

lemma *Notes_imp_knows [rule_format]: "Notes A X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ knows A evs"*
by *(induct evs) (force split: event.split)+*

Agents know what they receive

lemma *Gets_imp_knows_agents [rule_format]:*

```
    "A ≠ Spy ⟹ Gets A X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ knows A evs"
  by (induct evs) (force split: event.split)+
```

What agents DIFFERENT FROM Spy know was either said, or noted, or got, or known initially

```
lemma knows_imp_Says_Gets_Notes_initState:
  "⟦X ∈ knows A evs; A ≠ Spy⟧ ⟹
     ∃B. Says A B X ∈ set evs ∨ Gets A X ∈ set evs ∨ Notes A X ∈ set evs
∨ X ∈ initState A"
  by(induct evs) (auto split: event.split_asm if_split_asm)
```

What the Spy knows – for the time being – was either said or noted, or known initially

```
lemma knows_Spy_imp_Says_Notes_initState:
  "X ∈ knows Spy evs ⟹
    ∃A B. Says A B X ∈ set evs ∨ Notes A X ∈ set evs ∨ X ∈ initState Spy"
  by(induct evs) (auto split: event.split_asm if_split_asm)

lemma parts_knows_Spy_subset_used: "parts (knows Spy evs) ⊆ used evs"
  by (induct evs) (auto simp: parts_insert_knows_A split: event.split_asm
if_split_asm)

lemmas usedI = parts_knows_Spy_subset_used [THEN subsetD, intro]

lemma initState_into_used: "X ∈ parts (initState B) ⟹ X ∈ used evs"
  by (induct evs) (auto simp: parts_insert_knows_A split: event.split)
```

New simprules to replace the primitive ones for *used* and *knows*

```
lemma used_Says [simp]: "used (Says A B X # evs) = parts{X} ∪ used evs"
  by simp

lemma used_Notes [simp]: "used (Notes A X # evs) = parts{X} ∪ used evs"
  by simp

lemma used_Gets [simp]: "used (Gets A X # evs) = used evs"
  by simp

lemma used_nil_subset: "used [] ⊆ used evs"
  using initState_into_used by auto
```

NOTE REMOVAL: the laws above are cleaner, as they don't involve "case"

```
declare knows_Cons [simp del]
        used_Nil [simp del] used_Cons [simp del]
```

For proving theorems of the form `X ∉ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶ P` New events added by induction to "evs" are discarded. Provided this information isn't needed, the proof will be much shorter, since it will omit complicated reasoning about *analz*.

```
lemmas analz_mono_contra =
       knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Says [THEN analz_mono, THEN contra_subsetD]
       knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Notes [THEN analz_mono, THEN contra_subsetD]
       knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Gets [THEN analz_mono, THEN contra_subsetD]
```

```
lemma knows_subset_knows_Cons: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (e # evs)"
  by (cases e, auto simp: knows_Cons)

lemma initState_subset_knows: "initState A ⊆ knows A evs"
  by (induct evs) (use knows_subset_knows_Cons in fastforce)+
```

For proving *new_keys_not_used*

```
lemma keysFor_parts_insert:
     "⟦K ∈ keysFor (parts (insert X G));  X ∈ synth (analz H)⟧
      ⟹ K ∈ keysFor (parts (G ∪ H)) | Key (invKey K) ∈ parts H"
by (force
    dest!: parts_insert_subset_Un [THEN keysFor_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
           analz_subset_parts [THEN keysFor_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
    intro: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD] parts_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])


lemmas analz_impI = impI [where P = "Y ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"] for Y evs

ML
‹
fun analz_mono_contra_tac ctxt =
  resolve_tac ctxt @{thms analz_impI} THEN'
  REPEAT1 o (dresolve_tac ctxt @{thms analz_mono_contra})
  THEN' (mp_tac ctxt)
›

method_setup analz_mono_contra = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (REPEAT_FIRST (analz_mono_contra_tac
ctxt)))›
    "for proving theorems of the form X ∉ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶ P"
```

Useful for case analysis on whether a hash is a spoof or not

```
lemmas syan_impI = impI [where P = "Y ∉ synth (analz (knows Spy evs))"]
for Y evs

ML
‹
fun synth_analz_mono_contra_tac ctxt =
  resolve_tac ctxt @{thms syan_impI} THEN'
  REPEAT1 o
    (dresolve_tac ctxt
     [@{thm knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Says} RS @{thm synth_analz_mono} RS
@{thm contra_subsetD},
      @{thm knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Notes} RS @{thm synth_analz_mono} RS
@{thm contra_subsetD},
      @{thm knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Gets} RS @{thm synth_analz_mono} RS
@{thm contra_subsetD}])
  THEN'
  mp_tac ctxt
›

method_setup synth_analz_mono_contra = ‹
```

```
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (REPEAT_FIRST (synth_analz_mono_contra_tac
ctxt)))›
    "for proving theorems of the form X ∉ synth (analz (knows Spy evs)) ⟶
P"

end


theory Public
imports Event
begin

lemma invKey_K: "K ∈ symKeys ⟹ invKey K = K"
by (simp add: symKeys_def)
```

2.3 Asymmetric Keys

```
datatype keymode = Signature | Encryption

consts
  publicKey :: "[keymode,agent] ⇒ key"

abbreviation
  pubEK :: "agent ⇒ key" where
  "pubEK == publicKey Encryption"

abbreviation
  pubSK :: "agent ⇒ key" where
  "pubSK == publicKey Signature"

abbreviation
  privateKey :: "[keymode, agent] ⇒ key" where
  "privateKey b A == invKey (publicKey b A)"

abbreviation

  priEK :: "agent ⇒ key" where
  "priEK A == privateKey Encryption A"

abbreviation
  priSK :: "agent ⇒ key" where
  "priSK A == privateKey Signature A"
```

These abbreviations give backward compatibility. They represent the simple situation where the signature and encryption keys are the same.

```
abbreviation (input)
  pubK :: "agent ⇒ key" where
  "pubK A == pubEK A"

abbreviation (input)
  priK :: "agent ⇒ key" where
  "priK A == invKey (pubEK A)"
```

By freeness of agents, no two agents have the same key. Since `True` ≠ `False`,

no agent has identical signing and encryption keys

specification *(publicKey)*
injective_publicKey:
"publicKey b A = publicKey c A' ⟹ b=c ∧ A=A'"
apply *(rule exI [of _*
*"λb A. 2 * case_agent 0 (λn. n + 2) 1 A + case_keymode 0 1 b"])*
apply *(auto simp add: inj_on_def split: agent.split keymode.split)*
apply *presburger*
apply *presburger*
done

axiomatization where

privateKey_neq_publicKey [iff]: "privateKey b A ≠ publicKey c A'"

lemmas *publicKey_neq_privateKey = privateKey_neq_publicKey [THEN not_sym]*
declare *publicKey_neq_privateKey [iff]*

2.4 Basic properties of *pubEK* and *priEK*

lemma *publicKey_inject [iff]: "(publicKey b A = publicKey c A') = (b=c ∧ A=A')"*
by *(blast dest!: injective_publicKey)*

lemma *not_symKeys_pubK [iff]: "publicKey b A ∉ symKeys"*
by *(simp add: symKeys_def)*

lemma *not_symKeys_priK [iff]: "privateKey b A ∉ symKeys"*
by *(simp add: symKeys_def)*

lemma *symKey_neq_priEK: "K ∈ symKeys ⟹ K ≠ priEK A"*
by *auto*

lemma *symKeys_neq_imp_neq: "(K ∈ symKeys) ≠ (K' ∈ symKeys) ⟹ K ≠ K'"*
by *blast*

lemma *symKeys_invKey_iff [iff]: "(invKey K ∈ symKeys) = (K ∈ symKeys)"*
unfolding *symKeys_def* **by** *auto*

lemma *analz_symKeys_Decrypt:*
"⟦Crypt K X ∈ analz H; K ∈ symKeys; Key K ∈ analz H⟧
⟹ X ∈ analz H"
by *(auto simp add: symKeys_def)*

2.5 "Image" equations that hold for injective functions

lemma *invKey_image_eq [simp]: "(invKey x ∈ invKey‘A) = (x ∈ A)"*
by *auto*

lemma *publicKey_image_eq [simp]:*
"(publicKey b x ∈ publicKey c ‘ AA) = (b=c ∧ x ∈ AA)"
by *auto*

lemma *privateKey_notin_image_publicKey [simp]: "privateKey b x ∉ publicKey c ‘ AA"*
by *auto*

lemma *privateKey_image_eq [simp]:*
"(privateKey b A ∈ invKey ‘ publicKey c ‘ AS) = (b=c ∧ A∈AS)"
by *auto*

lemma *publicKey_notin_image_privateKey [simp]: "publicKey b A ∉ invKey ‘ publicKey c ‘ AS"*
by *auto*

2.6 Symmetric Keys

For some protocols, it is convenient to equip agents with symmetric as well as asymmetric keys. The theory *Shared* assumes that all keys are symmetric.

consts
shrK :: "agent => key" — long-term shared keys

specification *(shrK)*
inj_shrK: "inj shrK"
— No two agents have the same long-term key
apply *(rule exI [of _ "case_agent 0 (λn. n + 2) 1"])*
apply *(simp add: inj_on_def split: agent.split)*
done

axiomatization where
sym_shrK [iff]: "shrK X ∈ symKeys" — All shared keys are symmetric

Injectiveness: Agents’ long-term keys are distinct.

lemmas *shrK_injective = inj_shrK [THEN inj_eq]*
declare *shrK_injective [iff]*

lemma *invKey_shrK [simp]: "invKey (shrK A) = shrK A"*
by *(simp add: invKey_K)*

lemma *analz_shrK_Decrypt:*
"⟦Crypt (shrK A) X ∈ analz H; Key(shrK A) ∈ analz H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
by *auto*

lemma *analz_Decrypt’:*
"⟦Crypt K X ∈ analz H; K ∈ symKeys; Key K ∈ analz H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
by *(auto simp add: invKey_K)*

lemma *priK_neq_shrK [iff]: "shrK A ≠ privateKey b C"*
by *(simp add: symKeys_neq_imp_neq)*

lemmas *shrK_neq_priK = priK_neq_shrK [THEN not_sym]*
declare *shrK_neq_priK [simp]*

lemma *pubK_neq_shrK [iff]: "shrK A ≠ publicKey b C"*

by *(simp add: symKeys_neq_imp_neq)*

lemmas *shrK_neq_pubK = pubK_neq_shrK [THEN not_sym]*
declare *shrK_neq_pubK [simp]*

lemma *priEK_noteq_shrK [simp]: "priEK A ≠ shrK B"*
by *auto*

lemma *publicKey_notin_image_shrK [simp]: "publicKey b x ∉ shrK ‘ AA"*
by *auto*

lemma *privateKey_notin_image_shrK [simp]: "privateKey b x ∉ shrK ‘ AA"*
by *auto*

lemma *shrK_notin_image_publicKey [simp]: "shrK x ∉ publicKey b ‘ AA"*
by *auto*

lemma *shrK_notin_image_privateKey [simp]: "shrK x ∉ invKey ‘ publicKey b ‘ AA"*
by *auto*

lemma *shrK_image_eq [simp]: "(shrK x ∈ shrK ‘ AA) = (x ∈ AA)"*
by *auto*

For some reason, moving this up can make some proofs loop!

declare *invKey_K [simp]*

2.7 Initial States of Agents

Note: for all practical purposes, all that matters is the initial knowledge of the Spy. All other agents are automata, merely following the protocol.

overloading
  initState ≡ *initState*
begin

primrec *initState* **where**

  initState_Server:
    "initState Server   =
       {Key (priEK Server), Key (priSK Server)} ∪
       (Key ‘ range pubEK) ∪ (Key ‘ range pubSK) ∪ (Key ‘ range shrK)"

| initState_Friend:
    "initState (Friend i) =
       {Key (priEK(Friend i)), Key (priSK(Friend i)), Key (shrK(Friend i))}
∪
       (Key ‘ range pubEK) ∪ (Key ‘ range pubSK)"

| initState_Spy:
    "initState Spy   =
       (Key ‘ invKey ‘ pubEK ‘ bad) ∪ (Key ‘ invKey ‘ pubSK ‘ bad) ∪
       (Key ‘ shrK ‘ bad) ∪
       (Key ‘ range pubEK) ∪ (Key ‘ range pubSK)"

end

These lemmas allow reasoning about *used evs* rather than *knows Spy evs*, which is useful when there are private Notes. Because they depend upon the definition of *initState*, they cannot be moved up.

lemma *used_parts_subset_parts [rule_format]:*
"∀*X* ∈ *used evs*. *parts* {*X*} ⊆ *used evs*"
apply *(induct evs)*
prefer *2*
apply *(simp add: used_Cons split: event.split)*
apply *(metis Un_iff empty_subsetI insert_subset le_supI1 le_supI2 parts_subset_iff)*

Base case

apply *(auto dest!: parts_cut simp add: used_Nil)*
done

lemma *MPair_used_D:* "{|*X*,*Y*|} ∈ *used H* ⟹ *X* ∈ *used H* ∧ *Y* ∈ *used H*"
by *(drule used_parts_subset_parts, simp, blast)*

There was a similar theorem in Event.thy, so perhaps this one can be moved up if proved directly by induction.

lemma *MPair_used [elim!]:*
"⟦{|*X*,*Y*|} ∈ *used H*;
⟦*X* ∈ *used H*; *Y* ∈ *used H*⟧ ⟹ *P*⟧
⟹ *P*"
by *(blast dest: MPair_used_D)*

Rewrites should not refer to *initState (Friend i)* because that expression is not in normal form.

lemma *keysFor_parts_initState [simp]: "keysFor (parts (initState C)) = {}"*
unfolding *keysFor_def*
apply *(induct_tac "C")*
apply *(auto intro: range_eqI)*
done

lemma *Crypt_notin_initState: "Crypt K X ∉ parts (initState B)"*
by *(induct B, auto)*

lemma *Crypt_notin_used_empty [simp]: "Crypt K X ∉ used []"*
by *(simp add: Crypt_notin_initState used_Nil)*

lemma *shrK_in_initState [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ initState A"*
by *(induct_tac "A", auto)*

lemma *shrK_in_knows [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ knows A evs"*
by *(simp add: initState_subset_knows [THEN subsetD])*

lemma *shrK_in_used [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ used evs"*
by *(rule initState_into_used, blast)*

lemma *Key_not_used [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ K ∉ range shrK"*
by *blast*

lemma *shrK_neq: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ shrK B ≠ K"*
by *blast*

lemmas *neq_shrK = shrK_neq [THEN not_sym]*
declare *neq_shrK [simp]*

2.8 Function *knows Spy*

lemma *not_SignatureE [elim!]: "b ≠ Signature ⟹ b = Encryption"*
by *(cases b, auto)*

Agents see their own private keys!

lemma *priK_in_initState [iff]: "Key (privateKey b A) ∈ initState A"*
by *(cases A, auto)*

Agents see all public keys!

lemma *publicKey_in_initState [iff]: "Key (publicKey b A) ∈ initState B"*
by *(cases B, auto)*

All public keys are visible

lemma *spies_pubK [iff]: "Key (publicKey b A) ∈ spies evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(auto simp add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)*
done

lemmas *analz_spies_pubK = spies_pubK [THEN analz.Inj]*
declare *analz_spies_pubK [iff]*

Spy sees private keys of bad agents!

lemma *Spy_spies_bad_privateKey [intro!]:*
"A ∈ bad ⟹ Key (privateKey b A) ∈ spies evs"
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(auto simp add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)*
done

Spy sees long-term shared keys of bad agents!

lemma *Spy_spies_bad_shrK [intro!]:*
"A ∈ bad ⟹ Key (shrK A) ∈ spies evs"
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(simp_all add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)*
done

lemma *publicKey_into_used [iff] :"Key (publicKey b A) ∈ used evs"*
apply *(rule initState_into_used)*
apply *(rule publicKey_in_initState [THEN parts.Inj])*

done

lemma *privateKey_into_used [iff]: "Key (privateKey b A) ∈ used evs"*
apply(*rule initState_into_used*)
apply(*rule priK_in_initState [THEN parts.Inj]*)
done

lemma *Crypt_Spy_analz_bad:*
"⟦Crypt (shrK A) X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs); A ∈ bad⟧
⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by *force*

2.9 Fresh Nonces

lemma *Nonce_notin_initState [iff]: "Nonce N ∉ parts (initState B)"*
by *(induct_tac "B", auto)*

lemma *Nonce_notin_used_empty [simp]: "Nonce N ∉ used []"*
by *(simp add: used_Nil)*

2.10 Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems

In any trace, there is an upper bound N on the greatest nonce in use

lemma *Nonce_supply_lemma: "∃N. ∀n. N≤n ⟶ Nonce n ∉ used evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rule_tac x = 0* **in** *exI)*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: used_Cons split: event.split)*
apply *safe*
apply *(rule msg_Nonce_supply [THEN exE], blast elim!: add_leE)+*
done

lemma *Nonce_supply1: "∃N. Nonce N ∉ used evs"*
by *(rule Nonce_supply_lemma [THEN exE], blast)*

lemma *Nonce_supply: "Nonce (SOME N. Nonce N ∉ used evs) ∉ used evs"*
apply *(rule Nonce_supply_lemma [THEN exE])*
apply *(rule someI, fast)*
done

2.11 Specialized Rewriting for Theorems About `analz` and Image

lemma *insert_Key_singleton: "insert (Key K) H = Key ‘ {K} ∪ H"*
by *blast*

lemma *insert_Key_image: "insert (Key K) (Key‘KK ∪ C) = Key ‘ (insert K KK)*
∪ C"
by *blast*

lemma *Crypt_imp_keysFor :"⟦Crypt K X ∈ H; K ∈ symKeys⟧ ⟹ K ∈ keysFor*
H"

by *(drule Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor, simp)*

Lemma for the trivial direction of the if-and-only-if of the Session Key Compromise Theorem

lemma *analz_image_freshK_lemma:*
```
     "(Key K ∈ analz (Key‘nE ∪ H)) ⟶ (K ∈ nE | Key K ∈ analz H)  ⟹
         (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘nE ∪ H)) = (K ∈ nE | Key K ∈ analz H)"
```
by *(blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])*

lemmas *analz_image_freshK_simps =*
simp_thms mem_simps — these two allow its use with *only:*
disj_comms
image_insert [THEN sym] image_Un [THEN sym] empty_subsetI insert_subset
analz_insert_eq Un_upper2 [THEN analz_mono, THEN subsetD]
insert_Key_singleton
Key_not_used insert_Key_image Un_assoc [THEN sym]

ML ‹
```
structure Public =
struct

val analz_image_freshK_ss =
  context
  |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms image_insert image_Un}
  |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms imp_disjL}    (*reduces blow-up*)
  |> Simplifier.add_simps @{thms analz_image_freshK_simps}
  |> Simplifier.simpset_of

(*Tactic for possibility theorems*)
fun possibility_tac ctxt =
    REPEAT (*omit used_Says so that Nonces start from different traces!*)
    (ALLGOALS (simp_tac (ctxt |> Simplifier.set_unsafe_solver safe_solver |>
Simplifier.del_simp @{thm used_Says}))
     THEN
     REPEAT_FIRST (eq_assume_tac ORELSE'
                   resolve_tac ctxt [refl, conjI, @{thm Nonce_supply}]))

(*For harder protocols (such as Recur) where we have to set up some
  nonces and keys initially*)
fun basic_possibility_tac ctxt =
    REPEAT
    (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (ctxt |> Simplifier.set_unsafe_solver safe_solver))
     THEN
     REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt [refl, conjI]))

end
```
›

method_setup *analz_freshK =* ‹
```
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt =>
     (SIMPLE_METHOD
      (EVERY [REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms allI ballI impI}),
          REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms analz_image_freshK_lemma}),
          ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (put_simpset Public.analz_image_freshK_ss
```

```
ctxt))])))›
    "for proving the Session Key Compromise theorem"
```

2.12 Specialized Methods for Possibility Theorems

```
method_setup possibility = ‹
    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD o Public.possibility_tac)›
    "for proving possibility theorems"

method_setup basic_possibility = ‹
    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD o Public.basic_possibility_tac)›
    "for proving possibility theorems"

end
```

3 Needham-Schroeder Shared-Key Protocol

```
theory NS_Shared imports Public begin
```

From page 247 of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1989). A Logic of Authentication. Proc. Royal Soc. 426

```
definition

  Issues :: "[agent, agent, msg, event list] ⇒ bool"
            (‹_ Issues _ with _ on _›) where
   "A Issues B with X on evs =
      (∃Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs ∧ X ∈ parts {Y} ∧
        X ∉ parts (spies (takeWhile (λz. z  ≠ Says A B Y) (rev evs))))"


inductive_set ns_shared :: "event list set"
 where

  Nil:  "[] ∈ ns_shared"

| Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ ns_shared;  X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧
         ⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ ns_shared"


| NS1:  "⟦evs1 ∈ ns_shared;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
         ⟹ Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA|} # evs1  ∈  ns_shared"


| NS2:  "⟦evs2 ∈ ns_shared;  Key KAB ∉ used evs2;  KAB ∈ symKeys;
          Says A' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA|} ∈ set evs2⟧
         ⟹ Says Server A
               (Crypt (shrK A)
                  {|Nonce NA, Agent B, Key KAB,
                    (Crypt (shrK B) {|Key KAB, Agent A|})|})
               # evs2 ∈ ns_shared"


| NS3:  "⟦evs3 ∈ ns_shared;  A ≠ Server;
```

```
          Says S A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs3;
          Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA|} ∈ set evs3⟧
         ⟹ Says A B X # evs3 ∈ ns_shared"


| NS4:  "⟦evs4 ∈ ns_shared;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs4;  K ∈ symKeys;
          Says A' B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs4⟧
         ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) # evs4 ∈ ns_shared"


| NS5:  "⟦evs5 ∈ ns_shared;  K ∈ symKeys;
          Says B' A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs5;
          Says S  A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X|})
            ∈ set evs5⟧
         ⟹ Says A B (Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|}) # evs5 ∈ ns_shared"


| Oops: "⟦evso ∈ ns_shared;  Says B A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evso;
          Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X|})
              ∈ set evso⟧
         ⟹ Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evso ∈ ns_shared"


declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body  [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
```

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

```
lemma "⟦A ≠ Server; Key K ∉ used []; K ∈ symKeys⟧
       ⟹ ∃N. ∃evs ∈ ns_shared.
                     Says A B (Crypt K {|Nonce N, Nonce N|}) ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] ns_shared.Nil
       [THEN ns_shared.NS1, THEN ns_shared.NS2, THEN ns_shared.NS3,
        THEN ns_shared.NS4, THEN ns_shared.NS5])
apply (possibility, simp add: used_Cons)
done
```

3.1 Inductive proofs about *ns_shared*

3.1.1 Forwarding lemmas, to aid simplification

For reasoning about the encrypted portion of message NS3

```
lemma NS3_msg_in_parts_spies:
     "Says S A (Crypt KA {|N, B, K, X|}) ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by blast
```

For reasoning about the Oops message

```
lemma Oops_parts_spies:
     "Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, B, K, X|}) ∈ set evs
           ⟹ K ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by blast
```

Theorems of the form *X ∉ parts (knows Spy evs)* imply that NOBODY sends messages containing *X*

Spy never sees another agent's shared key! (unless it's bad at start)

```
lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ ns_shared ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies,
simp_all, blast+)
done

lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ ns_shared ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto
```

Nobody can have used non-existent keys!

```
lemma new_keys_not_used [simp]:
    "⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
     ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies,
simp_all)
```

Fake, NS2, NS4, NS5

```
apply (force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert, blast+)
done
```

3.1.2 Lemmas concerning the form of items passed in messages

Describes the form of K, X and K' when the Server sends this message.

```
lemma Says_Server_message_form:
     "⟦Says Server A (Crypt K' {|N, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs;
       evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ K ∉ range shrK ∧
          X = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|}) ∧
          K' = shrK A"
by (erule rev_mp, erule ns_shared.induct, auto)
```

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server

```
lemma A_trusts_NS2:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies,
auto)
done

lemma cert_A_form:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ K ∉ range shrK ∧  X = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|})"
by (blast dest!: A_trusts_NS2 Says_Server_message_form)
```

EITHER describes the form of X when the following message is sent, OR reduces it to the Fake case. Use *Says_Server_message_form* if applicable.

```
lemma Says_S_message_form:
     "⟦Says S A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs;
       evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ (K ∉ range shrK ∧ X = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|}))
          ∨ X ∈ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy analz_shrK_Decrypt cert_A_form analz.Inj)
```

NOT useful in this form, but it says that session keys are not used to encrypt messages containing other keys, in the actual protocol. We require that agents should behave like this subsequently also.

```
lemma  "⟦evs ∈ ns_shared;  Kab ∉ range shrK⟧ ⟹
         (Crypt KAB X) ∈ parts (spies evs) ∧
         Key K ∈ parts {X} ⟶ Key K ∈ parts (spies evs)"
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies,
simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (blast dest: parts_insert_subset_Un)
```

Base, NS4 and NS5

```
apply auto
done
```

3.1.3 Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys

The equality makes the induction hypothesis easier to apply

```
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
 "evs ∈ ns_shared ⟹
   ∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
             (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (spies evs))) =
             (K ∈ KK ∨ Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (erule ns_shared.induct)
apply (drule_tac [8] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (erule_tac [5] Says_S_message_form [THEN disjE], analz_freshK, spy_analz)
```

NS2, NS3

```
apply blast+
done
```

```
lemma analz_insert_freshK:
     "⟦evs ∈ ns_shared;  KAB ∉ range shrK⟧ ⟹
       (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs))) =
       (K = KAB ∨ Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
```

3.1.4 The session key K uniquely identifies the message

In messages of this form, the session key uniquely identifies the rest

```
lemma unique_session_keys:
     "⟦Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs;
       Says Server A' (Crypt (shrK A') {|NA', Agent B', Key K, X'|}) ∈ set evs;
       evs ∈ ns_shared⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ NA=NA' ∧ B=B' ∧ X = X'"
by (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule ns_shared.induct, simp_all, blast+)
```

3.1.5 Crucial secrecy property: Spy doesn't see the keys sent in NS2

Beware of `[rule_format]` and the universal quantifier!

```
lemma secrecy_lemma:
     "⟦Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K,
                                       Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|}|})
             ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ (∀NB. Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs) ⟶
         Key K ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [4] Says_S_message_form)
apply (erule_tac [5] disjE)
apply (simp_all add: analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK pushes split_ifs,
spy_analz)
```

NS2

```
apply blast
```

NS3

```
apply (blast dest!: Crypt_Spy_analz_bad A_trusts_NS2
             dest:  Says_imp_knows_Spy analz.Inj unique_session_keys)
```

Oops

```
apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys)
done
```

Final version: Server's message in the most abstract form

```
lemma Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:
     "⟦Says Server A (Crypt K' {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs;
       ∀NB. Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: Says_Server_message_form secrecy_lemma)
```

3.2 Guarantees available at various stages of protocol

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server

```
lemma B_trusts_NS3:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ ∃NA. Says Server A
                (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K,
                                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|}|})
```

```
            ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies,
auto)
done
```

```
lemma A_trusts_NS4_lemma [rule_format]:
   "evs ∈ ns_shared ⟹
      Key K ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶
      Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs ⟶
      Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
      Says B A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (analz_mono_contra, simp_all, blast)
```

NS2: contradiction from the assumptions *Key K ∉ used evs2* and *Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs2)*

```
apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

NS4

```
apply (metis B_trusts_NS3 Crypt_Spy_analz_bad Says_imp_analz_Spy Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy
analz.Fst unique_session_keys)
done
```

This version no longer assumes that K is secure

```
lemma A_trusts_NS4:
     "⟦Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       ∀NB. Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
by (blast intro: A_trusts_NS4_lemma
          dest: A_trusts_NS2 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
```

If the session key has been used in NS4 then somebody has forwarded component X in some instance of NS4. Perhaps an interesting property, but not needed (after all) for the proofs below.

```
theorem NS4_implies_NS3 [rule_format]:
  "evs ∈ ns_shared ⟹
     Key K ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶
     Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs ⟶
     Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
     (∃A'. Says A' B X ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force)
apply (drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply analz_mono_contra
apply (simp_all add: ex_disj_distrib, blast)
```

NS2

```
apply (blast dest!: new_keys_not_used Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

NS4

```
apply (metis B_trusts_NS3 Crypt_Spy_analz_bad Says_imp_analz_Spy Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy
analz.Fst unique_session_keys)
done


lemma B_trusts_NS5_lemma [rule_format]:
  "⟦B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_shared⟧ ⟹
     Key K ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶
     Says Server A
          (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K,
                            Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|}|}) ∈ set evs ⟶
     Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
     Says A B (Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force)
apply (drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (analz_mono_contra, simp_all, blast)
```

NS2

```
apply (blast dest!: new_keys_not_used Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

NS5

```
apply (blast dest!: A_trusts_NS2
             dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj]
                   unique_session_keys Crypt_Spy_analz_bad)
done
```

Very strong Oops condition reveals protocol's weakness

```
lemma B_trusts_NS5:
     "⟦Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       ∀NA NB. Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ Says A B (Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs"
by (blast intro: B_trusts_NS5_lemma
          dest: B_trusts_NS3 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
```

Unaltered so far wrt original version

3.3 Lemmas for reasoning about predicate "Issues"

```
lemma spies_Says_rev: "spies (evs @ [Says A B X]) = insert X (spies evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (rename_tac [2] a b)
apply (induct_tac [2] "a", auto)
done

lemma spies_Gets_rev: "spies (evs @ [Gets A X]) = spies evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (rename_tac [2] a b)
apply (induct_tac [2] "a", auto)
done

lemma spies_Notes_rev: "spies (evs @ [Notes A X]) =
```

```
          (if A∈bad then insert X (spies evs) else spies evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (rename_tac [2] a b)
apply (induct_tac [2] "a", auto)
done

lemma spies_evs_rev: "spies evs = spies (rev evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (rename_tac [2] a b)
apply (induct_tac [2] "a")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: spies_Says_rev spies_Gets_rev spies_Notes_rev)
done

lemmas parts_spies_evs_revD2 = spies_evs_rev [THEN equalityD2, THEN parts_mono]

lemma spies_takeWhile: "spies (takeWhile P evs) ⊆ spies evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (rename_tac [2] a b)
apply (induct_tac [2] "a", auto)
```

Resembles `used_subset_append` in theory Event.

```
done

lemmas parts_spies_takeWhile_mono = spies_takeWhile [THEN parts_mono]
```

3.4 Guarantees of non-injective agreement on the session key, and of key distribution. They also express forms of freshness of certain messages, namely that agents were alive after something happened.

```
lemma B_Issues_A:
     "⟦ Says B A (Crypt K (Nonce Nb)) ∈ set evs;
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ ns_shared ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt K (Nonce Nb)) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (simp_all)
```

fake

```
apply blast
apply (simp_all add: takeWhile_tail)
```

NS3 remains by pure coincidence!

```
apply (force dest!: A_trusts_NS2 Says_Server_message_form)
```

NS4 would be the non-trivial case can be solved by Nb being used

```
apply (blast dest: parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD]
```

```
                    parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD])
done
```

Tells A that B was alive after she sent him the session key. The session key must be assumed confidential for this deduction to be meaningful, but that assumption can be relaxed by the appropriate argument.

Precisely, the theorem guarantees (to A) key distribution of the session key to B. It also guarantees (to A) non-injective agreement of B with A on the session key. Both goals are available to A in the sense of Goal Availability.

```
lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_B:
     "⟦Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Key K ∉ analz(knows Spy evs);
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) on evs"
by (blast intro: A_trusts_NS4_lemma B_Issues_A dest: A_trusts_NS2)

lemma A_trusts_NS5:
  "⟦ Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts(spies evs);
     Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts(spies evs);
     Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
     A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ ns_shared ⟧
 ⟹ Says A B (Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule ns_shared.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

NS2

```
apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

NS3

```
apply (metis NS3_msg_in_parts_spies parts_cut_eq)
```

NS5, the most important case, can be solved by unicity

```
apply (metis A_trusts_NS2 Crypt_Spy_analz_bad Says_imp_analz_Spy Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy
analz.Fst analz.Snd unique_session_keys)
done

lemma A_Issues_B:
     "⟦ Says A B (Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs;
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ ns_shared ⟧
    ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|}) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
```

apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule ns_shared.induct, analz_mono_contra)*
apply *(simp_all)*

fake

apply *blast*
apply *(simp_all add: takeWhile_tail)*

NS3 remains by pure coincidence!

apply *(force dest!: A_trusts_NS2 Says_Server_message_form)*

NS5 is the non-trivial case and cannot be solved as in *B_Issues_A*! because NB is not fresh. We need *A_trusts_NS5*, proved for this very purpose

apply *(blast dest: A_trusts_NS5 parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD]*
parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD])
done

Tells B that A was alive after B issued NB.

Precisely, the theorem guarantees (to B) key distribution of the session key to A. It also guarantees (to B) non-injective agreement of A with B on the session key. Both goals are available to B in the sense of Goal Availability.

lemma *B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A:*
"⟦Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ ns_shared⟧
⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB|}) on evs"
by *(blast intro: A_Issues_B B_trusts_NS5_lemma dest: B_trusts_NS3)*

end

4 The Kerberos Protocol, BAN Version

theory *Kerberos_BAN* **imports** *Public* **begin**

From page 251 of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1989). A Logic of Authentication. Proc. Royal Soc. 426

Confidentiality (secrecy) and authentication properties are also given in a termporal version: strong guarantees in a little abstracted - but very realistic - model.

consts

sesKlife :: nat

authlife :: nat

The ticket should remain fresh for two journeys on the network at least

specification *(sesKlife)*
sesKlife_LB [iff]: "2 ≤ sesKlife"

```
    by blast
```

The authenticator only for one journey

```
specification (authlife)
  authlife_LB [iff]:    "authlife ≠ 0"
    by blast

abbreviation
  CT :: "event list ⇒ nat" where
  "CT == length "

abbreviation
  expiredK :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredK T evs == sesKlife + T < CT evs"

abbreviation
  expiredA :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredA T evs == authlife + T < CT evs"


definition

  Issues :: "[agent, agent, msg, event list] ⇒ bool"
            (<_ Issues _ with _ on _>) where
   "A Issues B with X on evs =
      (∃Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs ∧ X ∈ parts {Y} ∧
        X ∉ parts (spies (takeWhile (λz. z  ≠ Says A B Y) (rev evs))))"

definition

  before :: "[event, event list] ⇒ event list" (<before _ on _>)
  where "before ev on evs = takeWhile (λz. z ≠ ev) (rev evs)"

definition

  Unique :: "[event, event list] ⇒ bool" (<Unique _ on _>)
  where "Unique ev on evs = (ev ∉ set (tl (dropWhile (λz. z ≠ ev) evs)))"


inductive_set bankerberos :: "event list set"
 where

   Nil:  "[] ∈ bankerberos"

 | Fake: "⟦ evsf ∈ bankerberos;  X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf)) ⟧
         ⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ bankerberos"


 | BK1:  "⟦ evs1 ∈ bankerberos ⟧
         ⟹ Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} # evs1
               ∈  bankerberos"


 | BK2:  "⟦ evs2 ∈ bankerberos;  Key K ∉ used evs2; K ∈ symKeys;
```

```
           Says A' Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs2 ⟧
        ⟹ Says Server A
             (Crypt (shrK A)
                {|Number (CT evs2), Agent B, Key K,
                  (Crypt (shrK B) {|Number (CT evs2), Agent A, Key K|})|})
             # evs2 ∈ bankerberos"


 | BK3:  "⟦ evs3 ∈ bankerberos;
           Says S A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
             ∈ set evs3;
           Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs3;
           ¬ expiredK Tk evs3 ⟧
        ⟹ Says A B {|Ticket, Crypt K {|Agent A, Number (CT evs3)|} |}
             # evs3 ∈ bankerberos"


 | BK4:  "⟦ evs4 ∈ bankerberos;
           Says A' B {|(Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}),
                       (Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}) |} ∈ set evs4;
           ¬ expiredK Tk evs4;  ¬ expiredA Ta evs4 ⟧
        ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) # evs4
             ∈ bankerberos"


 | Oops: "⟦ evso ∈ bankerberos;
          Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
             ∈ set evso;
           expiredK Tk evso ⟧
        ⟹ Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} # evso ∈ bankerberos"


declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]
```

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end.

```
lemma "⟦Key K ∉ used []; K ∈ symKeys⟧
      ⟹ ∃Timestamp. ∃evs ∈ bankerberos.
           Says B A (Crypt K (Number Timestamp))
             ∈ set evs"
apply (cut_tac sesKlife_LB)
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2]
          bankerberos.Nil [THEN bankerberos.BK1, THEN bankerberos.BK2,
                           THEN bankerberos.BK3, THEN bankerberos.BK4])
apply (possibility, simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: used_Cons)
done
```

4.1 Lemmas for reasoning about predicate "Issues"

```
lemma spies_Says_rev: "spies (evs @ [Says A B X]) = insert X (spies evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
```

apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a", auto)*
done

lemma *spies_Gets_rev: "spies (evs @ [Gets A X]) = spies evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a", auto)*
done

lemma *spies_Notes_rev: "spies (evs @ [Notes A X]) =*
(if A∈bad then insert X (spies evs) else spies evs)"
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a", auto)*
done

lemma *spies_evs_rev: "spies evs = spies (rev evs)"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a")*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: spies_Says_rev spies_Gets_rev spies_Notes_rev)*
done

lemmas *parts_spies_evs_revD2 = spies_evs_rev [THEN equalityD2, THEN parts_mono]*

lemma *spies_takeWhile: "spies (takeWhile P evs) ⊆ spies evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a", auto)*

Resembles *used_subset_append* in theory Event.

done

lemmas *parts_spies_takeWhile_mono = spies_takeWhile [THEN parts_mono]*

Lemmas for reasoning about predicate "before"

lemma *used_Says_rev: "used (evs @ [Says A B X]) = parts {X} ∪ (used evs)"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *simp*
apply *(rename_tac a b)*
apply *(induct_tac "a")*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *used_Notes_rev: "used (evs @ [Notes A X]) = parts {X} ∪ (used evs)"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *simp*
apply *(rename_tac a b)*
apply *(induct_tac "a")*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *used_Gets_rev: "used (evs @ [Gets B X]) = used evs"*

```
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply auto
done

lemma used_evs_rev: "used evs = used (rev evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply (simp add: used_Says_rev)
apply (simp add: used_Gets_rev)
apply (simp add: used_Notes_rev)
done

lemma used_takeWhile_used [rule_format]:
      "x ∈ used (takeWhile P X) ⟶ x ∈ used X"
apply (induct_tac "X")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply (simp_all add: used_Nil)
apply (blast dest!: initState_into_used)+
done

lemma set_evs_rev: "set evs = set (rev evs)"
apply auto
done

lemma takeWhile_void [rule_format]:
      "x ∉ set evs ⟶ takeWhile (λz. z ≠ x) evs = evs"
apply auto
done
```

Forwarding Lemma for reasoning about the encrypted portion of message BK3

```
lemma BK3_msg_in_parts_spies:
     "Says S A (Crypt KA {|Timestamp, B, K, X|}) ∈ set evs
      ⟹ X ∈ parts (spies evs)"
apply blast
done

lemma Oops_parts_spies:
     "Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Timestamp, B, K, X|}) ∈ set evs
      ⟹ K ∈ parts (spies evs)"
apply blast
done
```

Spy never sees another agent's shared key! (unless it's bad at start)

```
lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ bankerberos ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Oops_parts_spies)
```

```
apply (frule_tac [5] BK3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast+)
done


lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ bankerberos ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
apply auto
done

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
     "⟦ Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs);
                evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧ ⟹ A∈bad"
apply (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)
done

lemmas Spy_analz_shrK_D = analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD, THEN Spy_see_shrK_D,
dest!]
```

Nobody can have used non-existent keys!

```
lemma new_keys_not_used [simp]:
    "⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ bankerberos⟧
     ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Oops_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] BK3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)
```

BK2, BK3, BK4

```
apply (force dest!: analz_shrK_Decrypt)+
done
```

4.2 Lemmas concerning the form of items passed in messages

Describes the form of K, X and K' when the Server sends this message.

```
lemma Says_Server_message_form:
     "⟦ Says Server A (Crypt K' {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
        ∈ set evs; evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ K' = shrK A ∧ K ∉ range shrK ∧
         Ticket = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}) ∧
         Key K ∉ used(before
                 Says Server A (Crypt K' {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
                 on evs) ∧
         Tk = CT(before
                 Says Server A (Crypt K' {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
                 on evs)"
unfolding before_def
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerberos.induct, simp_all add: takeWhile_tail)
```

```
apply auto
 apply (metis length_rev set_rev takeWhile_void used_evs_rev)+
done
```

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server PROVIDED that A is NOT compromised! This allows A to verify freshness of the session key.

```
lemma Kab_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
       ⟹ Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|})
            ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Oops_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] BK3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast)
done
```

If the TICKET appears then it originated with the Server

FRESHNESS OF THE SESSION KEY to B

```
lemma ticket_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
       ⟹ Says Server A
            (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K,
                              Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}|})
           ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Oops_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] BK3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast)
done
```

EITHER describes the form of X when the following message is sent, OR reduces it to the Fake case. Use *Says_Server_message_form* if applicable.

```
lemma Says_S_message_form:
     "⟦ Says S A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|})
           ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
 ⟹ (K ∉ range shrK ∧ X = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}))
          | X ∈ analz (spies evs)"
apply (case_tac "A ∈ bad")
apply (force dest!: Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj])
apply (frule Says_imp_spies [THEN parts.Inj])
apply (blast dest!: Kab_authentic Says_Server_message_form)
done
```

Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys

```
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "evs ∈ bankerberos ⟹
   ∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
```

```
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (spies evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (drule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (erule_tac [5] Says_S_message_form [THEN disjE], analz_freshK, spy_analz,
auto)
done


lemma analz_insert_freshK:
     "⟦ evs ∈ bankerberos;  KAB ∉ range shrK ⟧ ⟹
      (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs))) =
      (K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
done
```

The session key K uniquely identifies the message

```
lemma unique_session_keys:
     "⟦ Says Server A
           (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs;
        Says Server A'
          (Crypt (shrK A') {|Number Tk', Agent B', Key K, X'|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ Tk=Tk' ∧ B=B' ∧ X = X'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Oops_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] BK3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

BK2: it can't be a new key

```
apply blast
done

lemma Server_Unique:
     "⟦ Says Server A
           (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧ ⟹
   Unique Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
   on evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule bankerberos.induct, simp_all add: Unique_def)
apply blast
done
```

4.3 Non-temporal guarantees, explicitly relying on non-occurrence of oops events - refined below by temporal guarantees

Non temporal treatment of confidentiality

Lemma: the session key sent in msg BK2 would be lost by oops if the spy could see it!

```
lemma lemma_conf [rule_format (no_asm)]:
```

```
    "⟦ A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
 ⟹ Says Server A
        (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K,
                          Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}|})
       ∈ set evs ⟶
    Key K ∈ analz (spies evs) ⟶ Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_S_message_form [THEN disjE])
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK pushes)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

BK2

```
apply (blast intro: parts_insertI)
```

BK3

```
apply (case_tac "Aa ∈ bad")
 prefer 2 apply (blast dest: Kab_authentic unique_session_keys)
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj] Crypt_Spy_analz_bad elim!:
MPair_analz)
```

Oops

```
apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys)
done
```

Confidentiality for the Server: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg BK2 as long as they have not expired.

```
lemma Confidentiality_S:
     "⟦ Says Server A
          (Crypt K' {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|}) ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (frule Says_Server_message_form, assumption)
apply (blast intro: lemma_conf)
done
```

Confidentiality for Alice

```
lemma Confidentiality_A:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Kab_authentic Confidentiality_S)
done
```

Confidentiality for Bob

```
lemma Confidentiality_B:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
```

```
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (blast dest!: ticket_authentic Confidentiality_S)
done
```

Non temporal treatment of authentication

Lemmas *lemma_A* and *lemma_B* in fact are common to both temporal and non-temporal treatments

```
lemma lemma_A [rule_format]:
     "⟦ A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹
         Key K ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶
         Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|})
         ∈ set evs ⟶
          Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|} ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
         Says A B {|X, Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|}
             ∈ set evs"
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Oops_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_S_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [6] BK3_msg_in_parts_spies, analz_mono_contra)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

BK2

```
apply (force dest: Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor)
```

BK3

```
apply (blast dest: Kab_authentic unique_session_keys)
done
```

```
lemma lemma_B [rule_format]:
     "⟦ B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶
          Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|})
          ∈ set evs ⟶
          Crypt K (Number Ta) ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
          Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Oops_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_S_message_form)
apply (drule_tac [6] BK3_msg_in_parts_spies, analz_mono_contra)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

BK2

```
apply (force dest: Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor)
```

BK4

```
apply (blast dest: ticket_authentic unique_session_keys
                   Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj] Crypt_Spy_analz_bad)
done
```

The "r" suffix indicates theorems where the confidentiality assumptions are relaxed by the corresponding arguments.

Authentication of A to B

```
lemma B_authenticates_A_r:
     "⟦ Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}  ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
                    Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest!: ticket_authentic
          intro!: lemma_A
          elim!: Confidentiality_S [THEN [2] rev_notE])
done
```

Authentication of B to A

```
lemma A_authenticates_B_r:
     "⟦ Crypt K (Number Ta) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest!: Kab_authentic
          intro!: lemma_B elim!: Confidentiality_S [THEN [2] rev_notE])
done

lemma B_authenticates_A:
     "⟦ Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}  ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
                    Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest!: ticket_authentic intro!: lemma_A)
done

lemma A_authenticates_B:
     "⟦ Crypt K (Number Ta) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest!: Kab_authentic intro!: lemma_B)
done
```

4.4 Temporal guarantees, relying on a temporal check that insures that no oops event occurred. These are available in the sense of goal availability

Temporal treatment of confidentiality

Lemma: the session key sent in msg BK2 would be EXPIRED if the spy could see it!

```
lemma lemma_conf_temporal [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "⟦ A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
  ⟹ Says Server A
         (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K,
                           Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}|})
        ∈ set evs ⟶
      Key K ∈ analz (spies evs) ⟶ expiredK Tk evs"
apply (erule bankerberos.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_S_message_form [THEN disjE])
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: less_SucI analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK
pushes)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

BK2

```
apply (blast intro: parts_insertI less_SucI)
```

BK3

```
apply (metis Crypt_Spy_analz_bad Kab_authentic Says_imp_analz_Spy
          Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy analz.Snd less_SucI unique_session_keys)
```

Oops: PROOF FAILS if unsafe intro below

```
apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys intro!: less_SucI)
done
```

Confidentiality for the Server: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg BK2 as long as they have not expired.

```
lemma Confidentiality_S_temporal:
     "⟦ Says Server A
          (Crypt K' {|Number T, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs;
        ¬ expiredK T evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (frule Says_Server_message_form, assumption)
apply (blast intro: lemma_conf_temporal)
done
```

Confidentiality for Alice

```
lemma Confidentiality_A_temporal:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Number T, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredK T evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos
```

```
     ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Kab_authentic Confidentiality_S_temporal)
done
```

Confidentiality for Bob

```
lemma Confidentiality_B_temporal:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredK Tk evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos
     ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (blast dest!: ticket_authentic Confidentiality_S_temporal)
done
```

Temporal treatment of authentication

Authentication of A to B

```
lemma B_authenticates_A_temporal:
     "⟦ Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}
        ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredK Tk evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
                   Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest!: ticket_authentic
          intro!: lemma_A
          elim!: Confidentiality_S_temporal [THEN [2] rev_notE])
done
```

Authentication of B to A

```
lemma A_authenticates_B_temporal:
     "⟦ Crypt K (Number Ta) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|}
        ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredK Tk evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest!: Kab_authentic
          intro!: lemma_B elim!: Confidentiality_S_temporal [THEN [2] rev_notE])
done
```

4.5 Treatment of the key distribution goal using trace inspection. All guarantees are in non-temporal form, hence non available, though their temporal form is trivial to derive. These guarantees also convey a stronger form of authentication - non-injective agreement on the session key

```
lemma B_Issues_A:
     "⟦ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs;
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
```

```
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt K (Number Ta)) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerberos.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

fake

```
apply blast
```

K4 obviously is the non-trivial case

```
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
apply (blast dest: ticket_authentic parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD]
parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD] intro: A_authenticates_B_temporal)
done

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_B:
     "⟦ Crypt K (Number Ta) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt K (Number Ta)) on evs"
apply (blast dest!: A_authenticates_B B_Issues_A)
done


lemma A_Issues_B:
     "⟦ Says A B {|Ticket, Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|}
           ∈ set evs;
         Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
   ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerberos.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

fake

```
apply blast
```

K3 is the non trivial case

```
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
apply auto
apply (blast dest: Kab_authentic Says_Server_message_form parts_spies_takeWhile_mono
[THEN subsetD] parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD]
```

```
            intro!: B_authenticates_A)
done


lemma B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A:
     "⟦ Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}  ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerberos ⟧
   ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}) on evs"
apply (blast dest: B_authenticates_A A_Issues_B)
done
```

end

5 The Kerberos Protocol, BAN Version, with Gets event

theory *Kerberos_BAN_Gets* **imports** *Public* **begin**

From page 251 of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1989). A Logic of Authentication. Proc. Royal Soc. 426

Confidentiality (secrecy) and authentication properties rely on temporal checks: strong guarantees in a little abstracted - but very realistic - model.

consts

```
    sesKlife   :: nat


    authlife :: nat
```

The ticket should remain fresh for two journeys on the network at least

The Gets event causes longer traces for the protocol to reach its end

specification *(sesKlife)*
```
  sesKlife_LB [iff]: "4 ≤ sesKlife"
```
  by *blast*

The authenticator only for one journey

The Gets event causes longer traces for the protocol to reach its end

specification *(authlife)*
```
  authlife_LB [iff]:    "2 ≤ authlife"
```
  by *blast*

abbreviation
```
  CT :: "event list ⇒ nat"
```
where

```
  "CT == length"

abbreviation
  expiredK :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredK T evs == sesKlife + T < CT evs"

abbreviation
  expiredA :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredA T evs == authlife + T < CT evs"


definition

  before :: "[event, event list] ⇒ event list" (‹before _ on _›)
  where "before ev on evs = takeWhile (λz. z ≠ ev) (rev evs)"

definition

  Unique :: "[event, event list] ⇒ bool" (‹Unique _ on _›)
  where "Unique ev on evs = (ev ∉ set (tl (dropWhile (λz. z ≠ ev) evs)))"


inductive_set bankerb_gets :: "event list set"
 where

   Nil:  "[] ∈ bankerb_gets"

 | Fake: "⟦ evsf ∈ bankerb_gets;  X ∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsf)) ⟧
         ⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ bankerb_gets"

 | Reception: "⟦ evsr∈ bankerb_gets; Says A B X ∈ set evsr ⟧
               ⟹ Gets B X # evsr ∈ bankerb_gets"

 | BK1:  "⟦ evs1 ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
         ⟹ Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} # evs1
               ∈  bankerb_gets"


 | BK2:  "⟦ evs2 ∈ bankerb_gets;  Key K ∉ used evs2; K ∈ symKeys;
            Gets Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs2 ⟧
         ⟹ Says Server A
               (Crypt (shrK A)
                  {|Number (CT evs2), Agent B, Key K,
                    (Crypt (shrK B) {|Number (CT evs2), Agent A, Key K|})|})
               # evs2 ∈ bankerb_gets"


 | BK3:  "⟦ evs3 ∈ bankerb_gets;
            Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
              ∈ set evs3;
            Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs3;
            ¬ expiredK Tk evs3 ⟧
         ⟹ Says A B {|Ticket, Crypt K {|Agent A, Number (CT evs3)|} |}
              # evs3 ∈ bankerb_gets"
```

```
 | BK4:  "⟦ evs4 ∈ bankerb_gets;
             Gets B {|(Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}),
                         (Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}) |} ∈ set evs4;
             ¬ expiredK Tk evs4;  ¬ expiredA Ta evs4 ⟧
          ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) # evs4
               ∈ bankerb_gets"


 | Oops: "⟦ evso ∈ bankerb_gets;
          Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
               ∈ set evso;
             expiredK Tk evso ⟧
          ⟹ Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} # evso ∈ bankerb_gets"


declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]
declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]
```

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end.

```
lemma "⟦Key K ∉ used []; K ∈ symKeys⟧
       ⟹ ∃Timestamp. ∃evs ∈ bankerb_gets.
            Says B A (Crypt K (Number Timestamp))
                 ∈ set evs"
apply (cut_tac sesKlife_LB)
apply (cut_tac authlife_LB)
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2]
           bankerb_gets.Nil [THEN bankerb_gets.BK1, THEN bankerb_gets.Reception,
                             THEN bankerb_gets.BK2, THEN bankerb_gets.Reception,
                             THEN bankerb_gets.BK3, THEN bankerb_gets.Reception,
                             THEN bankerb_gets.BK4])
apply (possibility, simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: used_Cons)
done
```

Lemmas about reception invariant: if a message is received it certainly was sent

```
lemma Gets_imp_Says :
     "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set
evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy:
     "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧  ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)
done

lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy_parts[dest]:
```

```
    "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧ ⟹ X ∈ parts (knows Spy
evs)"
apply (blast dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj])
done

lemma Gets_imp_knows:
     "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧ ⟹ X ∈ knows B evs"
by (metis Gets_imp_knows_Spy Gets_imp_knows_agents)

lemma Gets_imp_knows_analz:
    "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows B evs)"
apply (blast dest: Gets_imp_knows [THEN analz.Inj])
done
```

Lemmas for reasoning about predicate "before"

```
lemma used_Says_rev: "used (evs @ [Says A B X]) = parts {X} ∪ (used evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply auto
done

lemma used_Notes_rev: "used (evs @ [Notes A X]) = parts {X} ∪ (used evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply auto
done

lemma used_Gets_rev: "used (evs @ [Gets B X]) = used evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply auto
done

lemma used_evs_rev: "used evs = used (rev evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply (simp add: used_Says_rev)
apply (simp add: used_Gets_rev)
apply (simp add: used_Notes_rev)
done

lemma used_takeWhile_used [rule_format]:
     "x ∈ used (takeWhile P X) ⟶ x ∈ used X"
apply (induct_tac "X")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
```

```
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply (simp_all add: used_Nil)
apply (blast dest!: initState_into_used)+
done

lemma set_evs_rev: "set evs = set (rev evs)"
apply auto
done

lemma takeWhile_void [rule_format]:
      "x ∉ set evs ⟶ takeWhile (λz. z ≠ x) evs = evs"
apply auto
done
```

Forwarding Lemma for reasoning about the encrypted portion of message BK3

```
lemma BK3_msg_in_parts_knows_Spy:
     "⟦Gets A (Crypt KA {|Timestamp, B, K, X|}) ∈ set evs; evs ∈ bankerb_gets
⟧
      ⟹ X ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)"
apply blast
done

lemma Oops_parts_knows_Spy:
     "Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Timestamp, B, K, X|}) ∈ set evs
      ⟹ K ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)"
apply blast
done
```

Spy never sees another agent's shared key! (unless it's bad at start)

```
lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A
∈ bad)"
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Oops_parts_knows_Spy)
apply (frule_tac [6] BK3_msg_in_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)
done


lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A
∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
     "⟦ Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
                 evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧ ⟹ A∈bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)

lemmas Spy_analz_shrK_D = analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD, THEN Spy_see_shrK_D,
dest!]
```

Nobody can have used non-existent keys!

```
lemma new_keys_not_used [simp]:
```

```
    "⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ bankerb_gets⟧
     ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Oops_parts_knows_Spy)
apply (frule_tac [6] BK3_msg_in_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)
```

BK2, BK3, BK4

```
apply (force dest!: analz_shrK_Decrypt)+
done
```

5.1 Lemmas concerning the form of items passed in messages

Describes the form of K, X and K' when the Server sends this message.

```
lemma Says_Server_message_form:
     "⟦ Says Server A (Crypt K' {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
        ∈ set evs; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹ K' = shrK A ∧ K ∉ range shrK ∧
          Ticket = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}) ∧
          Key K ∉ used(before
                  Says Server A (Crypt K' {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
                  on evs) ∧
          Tk = CT(before
                  Says Server A (Crypt K' {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
                  on evs)"
unfolding before_def
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct, simp_all)
```

We need this simplification only for Message 2

```
apply (simp (no_asm) add: takeWhile_tail)
apply auto
```

Two subcases of Message 2. Subcase: used before

```
apply (blast dest: used_evs_rev [THEN equalityD2, THEN contra_subsetD]
                   used_takeWhile_used)
```

subcase: CT before

```
apply (fastforce dest!: set_evs_rev [THEN equalityD2, THEN contra_subsetD,
THEN takeWhile_void])
done
```

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server PROVIDED that A is NOT compromised! This allows A to verify freshness of the session key.

```
lemma Kab_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|}
```

```
          ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
       ⟹ Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|})
            ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Oops_parts_knows_Spy)
apply (frule_tac [6] BK3_msg_in_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast)
done
```

If the TICKET appears then it originated with the Server

FRESHNESS OF THE SESSION KEY to B

```
lemma ticket_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says Server A
           (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K,
                             Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}|})
         ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Oops_parts_knows_Spy)
apply (frule_tac [6] BK3_msg_in_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast)
done
```

EITHER describes the form of X when the following message is sent, OR reduces it to the Fake case. Use *Says_Server_message_form* if applicable.

```
lemma Gets_Server_message_form:
     "⟦ Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|})
           ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
 ⟹ (K ∉ range shrK ∧ X = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}))
         | X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (case_tac "A ∈ bad")
apply (force dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj])
apply (blast dest!: Kab_authentic Says_Server_message_form)
done
```

Reliability guarantees: honest agents act as we expect

```
lemma BK3_imp_Gets:
   "⟦ Says A B {|Ticket, Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs;
      A ∉ bad; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
    ⟹ ∃ Tk. Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
      ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma BK4_imp_Gets:
   "⟦ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs;
      B ∉ bad; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
```

```
  ⟹ ∃ Tk. Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
                   Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Gets_A_knows_K:
  "[| Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|}) ∈ set evs;
     evs ∈ bankerb_gets |]
 ⟹ Key K ∈ analz (knows A evs)"
apply (force dest: Gets_imp_knows_analz)
done

lemma Gets_B_knows_K:
  "[| Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
              Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs;
     evs ∈ bankerb_gets |]
 ⟹ Key K ∈ analz (knows B evs)"
apply (force dest: Gets_imp_knows_analz)
done
```

Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys

```
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟹
   ∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key`KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply (drule_tac [8] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (erule_tac [6] Gets_Server_message_form [THEN disjE], analz_freshK,
spy_analz, auto)
done


lemma analz_insert_freshK:
     "[| evs ∈ bankerb_gets;  KAB ∉ range shrK |] ⟹
      (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs))) =
      (K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
```

The session key K uniquely identifies the message

```
lemma unique_session_keys:
     "[| Says Server A
           (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs;
         Says Server A'
          (Crypt (shrK A') {|Number Tk', Agent B', Key K, X'|}) ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ bankerb_gets |] ⟹ A=A' ∧ Tk=Tk' ∧ B=B' ∧ X = X'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Oops_parts_knows_Spy)
apply (frule_tac [6] BK3_msg_in_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

BK2: it can't be a new key

apply *blast*
done

lemma *unique_session_keys_Gets:*
"⟦ *Gets A*
(Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs;
Gets A
(Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk', Agent B', Key K, X'|}) ∈ set evs;
A ∉ bad; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧ ⟹ *Tk=Tk' ∧ B=B' ∧ X = X'"*
apply *(blast dest!: Kab_authentic unique_session_keys)*
done

lemma *Server_Unique:*
"⟦ *Says Server A*
(Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|}) ∈ set evs;
evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧ ⟹
Unique Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|})
on evs"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule bankerb_gets.induct, simp_all add: Unique_def)*
apply *blast*
done

5.2 Non-temporal guarantees, explicitly relying on non-occurrence of oops events - refined below by temporal guarantees

Non temporal treatment of confidentiality

Lemma: the session key sent in msg BK2 would be lost by oops if the spy could see it!

lemma *lemma_conf [rule_format (no_asm)]:*
"⟦ *A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ bankerb_gets* ⟧
⟹ *Says Server A*
(Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K,
Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}|})
∈ set evs ⟶
Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶ *Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∈ set evs"*
apply *(erule bankerb_gets.induct)*
apply *(frule_tac [8] Says_Server_message_form)*
apply *(frule_tac [6] Gets_Server_message_form [THEN disjE])*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK pushes)*

Fake

apply *spy_analz*

BK2

apply *(blast intro: parts_insertI)*

BK3

```
apply (case_tac "Aa ∈ bad")
 prefer 2 apply (blast dest: Kab_authentic unique_session_keys)
apply (blast dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj] Crypt_Spy_analz_bad
elim!: MPair_analz)
```

Oops

```
apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys)
done
```

Confidentiality for the Server: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg BK2 as long as they have not expired.

```
lemma Confidentiality_S:
     "⟦ Says Server A
          (Crypt K' {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|}) ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (frule Says_Server_message_form, assumption)
apply (blast intro: lemma_conf)
done
```

Confidentiality for Alice

```
lemma Confidentiality_A:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: Kab_authentic Confidentiality_S)
```

Confidentiality for Bob

```
lemma Confidentiality_B:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}
          ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: ticket_authentic Confidentiality_S)
```

Non temporal treatment of authentication

Lemmas *lemma_A* and *lemma_B* in fact are common to both temporal and non-temporal treatments

```
lemma lemma_A [rule_format]:
     "⟦ A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹
        Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶
        Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|})
        ∈ set evs ⟶
         Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
        Says A B {|X, Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|}
            ∈ set evs"
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Oops_parts_knows_Spy)
```

```
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_Server_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [7] BK3_msg_in_parts_knows_Spy, analz_mono_contra)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

BK2

```
apply (force dest: Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor)
```

BK3

```
apply (blast dest: Kab_authentic unique_session_keys)
done
lemma lemma_B [rule_format]:
     "⟦ B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶
          Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|})
          ∈ set evs ⟶
          Crypt K (Number Ta) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
          Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Oops_parts_knows_Spy)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_Server_message_form)
apply (drule_tac [7] BK3_msg_in_parts_knows_Spy, analz_mono_contra)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

BK2

```
apply (force dest: Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor)
```

BK4

```
apply (blast dest: ticket_authentic unique_session_keys
                   Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj] Crypt_Spy_analz_bad)
done
```

The "r" suffix indicates theorems where the confidentiality assumptions are relaxed by the corresponding arguments.

Authentication of A to B

```
lemma B_authenticates_A_r:
     "⟦ Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}  ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
                    Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: ticket_authentic
          intro!: lemma_A
          elim!: Confidentiality_S [THEN [2] rev_notE])
```

Authentication of B to A

```
lemma A_authenticates_B_r:
     "⟦ Crypt K (Number Ta) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Notes Spy {|Number Tk, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: Kab_authentic
          intro!: lemma_B elim!: Confidentiality_S [THEN [2] rev_notE])

lemma B_authenticates_A:
     "⟦ Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}  ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
                   Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest!: ticket_authentic intro!: lemma_A)
done

lemma A_authenticates_B:
     "⟦ Crypt K (Number Ta) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest!: Kab_authentic intro!: lemma_B)
done
```

5.3 Temporal guarantees, relying on a temporal check that insures that no oops event occurred. These are available in the sense of goal availability

Temporal treatment of confidentiality

Lemma: the session key sent in msg BK2 would be EXPIRED if the spy could see it!

```
lemma lemma_conf_temporal [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "⟦ A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
  ⟹ Says Server A
         (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K,
                           Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}|})
        ∈ set evs ⟶
      Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶ expiredK Tk evs"
apply (erule bankerb_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_Server_message_form [THEN disjE])
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: less_SucI analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK
pushes)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

BK2

```
apply (blast intro: parts_insertI less_SucI)
```

BK3

```
apply (case_tac "Aa ∈ bad")
 prefer 2 apply (blast dest: Kab_authentic unique_session_keys)
apply (blast dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj] Crypt_Spy_analz_bad
elim!: MPair_analz intro: less_SucI)
```

Oops: PROOF FAILS if unsafe intro below

```
apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys intro!: less_SucI)
done
```

Confidentiality for the Server: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg BK2 as long as they have not expired.

```
lemma Confidentiality_S_temporal:
     "⟦ Says Server A
          (Crypt K' {|Number T, Agent B, Key K, X|}) ∈ set evs;
        ¬ expiredK T evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (frule Says_Server_message_form, assumption)
apply (blast intro: lemma_conf_temporal)
done
```

Confidentiality for Alice

```
lemma Confidentiality_A_temporal:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Number T, Agent B, Key K, X|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        ¬ expiredK T evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: Kab_authentic Confidentiality_S_temporal)
```

Confidentiality for Bob

```
lemma Confidentiality_B_temporal:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}
          ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        ¬ expiredK Tk evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets
      ⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: ticket_authentic Confidentiality_S_temporal)
```

Temporal treatment of authentication

Authentication of A to B

```
lemma B_authenticates_A_temporal:
     "⟦ Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|}
        ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        ¬ expiredK Tk evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
                   Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: ticket_authentic
```

```
        intro!: lemma_A
        elim!: Confidentiality_S_temporal [THEN [2] rev_notE])
```

Authentication of B to A

```
lemma A_authenticates_B_temporal:
     "⟦ Crypt K (Number Ta) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, X|}
        ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        ¬ expiredK Tk evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: Kab_authentic
          intro!: lemma_B elim!: Confidentiality_S_temporal [THEN [2] rev_notE])
```

5.4 Combined guarantees of key distribution and non-injective agreement on the session keys

```
lemma B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A:
     "⟦ Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
                Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs;
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
    ⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Number Tk, Agent A, Key K|},
                 Crypt K {|Agent A, Number Ta|}|} ∈ set evs
     ∧  Key K ∈ analz (knows A evs)"
apply (blast dest: B_authenticates_A BK3_imp_Gets Gets_A_knows_K)
done

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_B:
     "⟦ Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Number Tk, Agent B, Key K, Ticket|}) ∈ set
evs;
        Gets A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs;
        Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ bankerb_gets ⟧
    ⟹ Says B A (Crypt K (Number Ta)) ∈ set evs
    ∧   Key K ∈ analz (knows B evs)"
apply (blast dest: A_authenticates_B BK4_imp_Gets Gets_B_knows_K)
done
```

end

6 The Kerberos Protocol, Version IV

theory *KerberosIV* **imports** *Public* **begin**

The "u" prefix indicates theorems referring to an updated version of the protocol. The "r" suffix indicates theorems where the confidentiality assumptions are relaxed by the corresponding arguments.

abbreviation

```
  Kas :: agent where "Kas == Server"
```

abbreviation

```
  Tgs :: agent where "Tgs == Friend 0"
```

axiomatization where

```
  Tgs_not_bad [iff]: "Tgs ∉ bad"
```

— Tgs is secure — we already know that Kas is secure

definition

```
    authKeys :: "event list ⇒ key set" where
    "authKeys evs = {authK. ∃A Peer Ta. Says Kas A
                         (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Peer, Number Ta,
               (Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, Key authK, Number
Ta|})
                    |}) ∈ set evs}"
```

definition

```
  Issues :: "[agent, agent, msg, event list] ⇒ bool"
            (<_ Issues _ with _ on _> [50, 0, 0, 50] 50) where
   "(A Issues B with X on evs) =
      (∃Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs ∧ X ∈ parts {Y} ∧
        X ∉ parts (spies (takeWhile (λz. z ≠ Says A B Y) (rev evs))))"
```

definition

```
  before :: "[event, event list] ⇒ event list" (<before _ on _> [0, 50] 50)
  where "(before ev on evs) = takeWhile (λz. z ≠ ev) (rev evs)"
```

definition

```
  Unique :: "[event, event list] ⇒ bool" (<Unique _ on _> [0, 50] 50)
  where "(Unique ev on evs) = (ev ∉ set (tl (dropWhile (λz. z ≠ ev) evs)))"
```

consts

```
    authKlife   :: nat

    servKlife   :: nat

    authlife    :: nat

    replylife   :: nat
```

specification (*authKlife*)

```
  authKlife_LB [iff]: "2 ≤ authKlife"
    by blast
```

```
specification (servKlife)
  servKlife_LB [iff]: "2 + authKlife ≤ servKlife"
    by blast

specification (authlife)
  authlife_LB [iff]: "Suc 0 ≤ authlife"
    by blast

specification (replylife)
  replylife_LB [iff]: "Suc 0 ≤ replylife"
    by blast

abbreviation

  CT :: "event list ⇒ nat" where
  "CT == length"

abbreviation
  expiredAK :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredAK Ta evs == authKlife + Ta < CT evs"

abbreviation
  expiredSK :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredSK Ts evs == servKlife + Ts < CT evs"

abbreviation
  expiredA :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredA T evs == authlife + T < CT evs"

abbreviation
  valid :: "[nat, nat] ⇒ bool" (<valid _ wrt _> [0, 50] 50) where
  "valid T1 wrt T2 == T1 ≤ replylife + T2"




definition AKcryptSK :: "[key, key, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "AKcryptSK authK servK evs ==
     ∃A B Ts.
       Says Tgs A (Crypt authK
                     {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                       Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number
Ts|} |})
         ∈ set evs"

inductive_set kerbIV :: "event list set"
  where

   Nil:  "[] ∈ kerbIV"

 | Fake: "⟦ evsf ∈ kerbIV;  X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf)) ⟧
          ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ kerbIV"
```

```
| K1:  "⟦ evs1 ∈ kerbIV ⟧
       ⟹ Says A Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number (CT evs1)|} # evs1
       ∈ kerbIV"
```

```
| K2:  "⟦ evs2 ∈ kerbIV; Key authK ∉ used evs2; authK ∈ symKeys;
         Says A' Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number T1|} ∈ set evs2 ⟧
       ⟹ Says Kas A
            (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number (CT evs2),
                  (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK,
                      Number (CT evs2)|})|}) # evs2 ∈ kerbIV"
```

```
| K3:  "⟦ evs3 ∈ kerbIV;
         Says A Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number T1|} ∈ set evs3;
         Says Kas' A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
           authTicket|}) ∈ set evs3;
         valid Ta wrt T1
       ⟧
       ⟹ Says A Tgs {|authTicket,
                      (Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number (CT evs3)|}),
                      Agent B|} # evs3 ∈ kerbIV"
```

```
| K4:  "⟦ evs4 ∈ kerbIV; Key servK ∉ used evs4; servK ∈ symKeys;
         B ≠ Tgs;  authK ∈ symKeys;
         Says A' Tgs {|
          (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK,
                              Number Ta|}),
          (Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}), Agent B|}
            ∈ set evs4;
         ¬ expiredAK Ta evs4;
         ¬ expiredA T2 evs4;
         servKlife + (CT evs4) ≤ authKlife + Ta
       ⟧
       ⟹ Says Tgs A
            (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number (CT evs4),
                          Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK,
                                           Number (CT evs4)|} |})
            # evs4 ∈ kerbIV"
```

```
| K5:  "⟦ evs5 ∈ kerbIV; authK ∈ symKeys; servK ∈ symKeys;
          Says A Tgs
              {|authTicket, Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|},
                Agent B|}
            ∈ set evs5;
          Says Tgs' A
           (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
              ∈ set evs5;
          valid Ts wrt T2 ⟧
        ⟹ Says A B {|servTicket,
                     Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number (CT evs5)|} |}
            # evs5 ∈ kerbIV"
```

```
 | K6:  "⟦ evs6 ∈ kerbIV;
          Says A' B {|
            (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}),
            (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|})|}
          ∈ set evs6;
          ¬ expiredSK Ts evs6;
          ¬ expiredA T3 evs6
       ⟧
        ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3))
            # evs6 ∈ kerbIV"
```

```
| Oops1: "⟦ evsO1 ∈ kerbIV;  A ≠ Spy;
            Says Kas A
              (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
                                authTicket|})  ∈ set evsO1;
            expiredAK Ta evsO1 ⟧
        ⟹ Says A Spy {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, Key authK|}
            # evsO1 ∈ kerbIV"
```

```
| Oops2: "⟦ evsO2 ∈ kerbIV;  A ≠ Spy;
            Says Tgs A
              (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
                 ∈ set evsO2;
            expiredSK Ts evsO2 ⟧
        ⟹ Says A Spy {|Agent A, Agent B, Number Ts, Key servK|}
            # evsO2 ∈ kerbIV"
```

declare *Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest]*
declare *parts.Body [dest]*
declare *analz_into_parts [dest]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]*

6.1 Lemmas about lists, for reasoning about Issues

lemma *spies_Says_rev: "spies (evs @ [Says A B X]) = insert X (spies evs)"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] a, auto)*
done

lemma *spies_Gets_rev: "spies (evs @ [Gets A X]) = spies evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] a, auto)*
done

lemma *spies_Notes_rev: "spies (evs @ [Notes A X]) =*
(if A∈bad then insert X (spies evs) else spies evs)"
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] a, auto)*
done

lemma *spies_evs_rev: "spies evs = spies (rev evs)"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] a)*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: spies_Says_rev spies_Gets_rev spies_Notes_rev)*
done

lemmas *parts_spies_evs_revD2 = spies_evs_rev [THEN equalityD2, THEN parts_mono]*

lemma *spies_takeWhile: "spies (takeWhile P evs) ⊆ spies evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a", auto)*

Resembles *used_subset_append* in theory Event.

done

lemmas *parts_spies_takeWhile_mono = spies_takeWhile [THEN parts_mono]*

6.2 Lemmas about *authKeys*

lemma *authKeys_empty: "authKeys [] = {}"*
unfolding *authKeys_def*
apply *(simp (no_asm))*
done

```
lemma authKeys_not_insert:
 "(∀A Ta akey Peer.
   ev ≠ Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|akey, Agent Peer, Ta,
              (Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, akey, Ta|})|}))
       ⟹ authKeys (ev # evs) = authKeys evs"
  unfolding authKeys_def by auto

lemma authKeys_insert:
  "authKeys
     (Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent Peer, Number Ta,
      (Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, Key K, Number Ta|})|}) # evs)
       = insert K (authKeys evs)"
  unfolding authKeys_def by auto

lemma authKeys_simp:
   "K ∈ authKeys
    (Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K', Agent Peer, Number Ta,
     (Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, Key K', Number Ta|})|}) # evs)
        ⟹ K = K' | K ∈ authKeys evs"
  unfolding authKeys_def by auto

lemma authKeysI:
   "Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
     (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key K, Number Ta|})|}) ∈ set evs
        ⟹ K ∈ authKeys evs"
  unfolding authKeys_def by auto

lemma authKeys_used: "K ∈ authKeys evs ⟹ Key K ∈ used evs"
by (simp add: authKeys_def, blast)
```

6.3 Forwarding Lemmas

–For reasoning about the encrypted portion of message K3–

```
lemma K3_msg_in_parts_spies:
     "Says Kas' A (Crypt KeyA {|authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|})
               ∈ set evs ⟹ authTicket ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by blast

lemma Oops_range_spies1:
     "⟦ Says Kas A (Crypt KeyA {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|})
           ∈ set evs ;
        evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧ ⟹ authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ symKeys"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, auto)
done
```

–For reasoning about the encrypted portion of message K5–

```
lemma K5_msg_in_parts_spies:
     "Says Tgs' A (Crypt authK {|servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|})
               ∈ set evs ⟹ servTicket ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by blast
```

lemma *Oops_range_spies2:*
```
     "⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|})
           ∈ set evs ;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧ ⟹ servK ∉ range shrK ∧ servK ∈ symKeys"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbIV.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *Says_ticket_parts:*
```
     "Says S A (Crypt K {|SesKey, B, TimeStamp, Ticket|}) ∈ set evs
      ⟹ Ticket ∈ parts (spies evs)"
```
by *blast*

lemma *Spy_see_shrK [simp]:*
```
     "evs ∈ kerbIV ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
```
apply *(erule kerbIV.induct)*
apply *(frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)*
apply *(frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)*
apply *(blast+)*
done

lemma *Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:*
```
     "evs ∈ kerbIV ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
```
by *auto*

lemma *Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:*
```
     "⟦ Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs);  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧ ⟹ A∈bad"
```
by *(blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)*

lemmas *Spy_analz_shrK_D = analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD, THEN Spy_see_shrK_D, dest!]*

Nobody can have used non-existent keys!

lemma *new_keys_not_used [simp]:*
```
    "⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ kerbIV⟧
     ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbIV.induct)*
apply *(frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)*
apply *(frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *(force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)*

Others

apply *(force dest!: analz_shrK_Decrypt)+*
done

lemma *new_keys_not_analzd:*
```
 "⟦evs ∈ kerbIV; K ∈ symKeys; Key K ∉ used evs⟧
  ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (analz (spies evs))"
```
by *(blast dest: new_keys_not_used intro: keysFor_mono [THEN subsetD])*

6.4 Lemmas for reasoning about predicate "before"

```
lemma used_Says_rev: "used (evs @ [Says A B X]) = parts {X} ∪ (used evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply auto
done

lemma used_Notes_rev: "used (evs @ [Notes A X]) = parts {X} ∪ (used evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply auto
done

lemma used_Gets_rev: "used (evs @ [Gets B X]) = used evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply auto
done

lemma used_evs_rev: "used evs = used (rev evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply (simp add: used_Says_rev)
apply (simp add: used_Gets_rev)
apply (simp add: used_Notes_rev)
done

lemma used_takeWhile_used [rule_format]:
      "x ∈ used (takeWhile P X) ⟶ x ∈ used X"
apply (induct_tac "X")
apply simp
apply (rename_tac a b)
apply (induct_tac "a")
apply (simp_all add: used_Nil)
apply (blast dest!: initState_into_used)+
done

lemma set_evs_rev: "set evs = set (rev evs)"
by auto

lemma takeWhile_void [rule_format]:
      "x ∉ set evs ⟶ takeWhile (λz. z ≠ x) evs = evs"
by auto
```

6.5 Regularity Lemmas

These concern the form of items passed in messages

Describes the form of all components sent by Kas

```
lemma Says_Kas_message_form:
     "⟦ Says Kas A (Crypt K {|Key authK, Agent Peer, Number Ta, authTicket|})
           ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧ ⟹
  K = shrK A ∧ Peer = Tgs ∧
  authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ authKeys evs ∧ authK ∈ symKeys ∧
  authTicket = (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|})
∧
  Key authK ∉ used(before
           Says Kas A (Crypt K {|Key authK, Agent Peer, Number Ta, authTicket|})
                 on evs) ∧
  Ta = CT (before
           Says Kas A (Crypt K {|Key authK, Agent Peer, Number Ta, authTicket|})
           on evs)"
unfolding before_def
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm) add: authKeys_def authKeys_insert, blast, blast)
```

K2

```
apply (simp (no_asm) add: takeWhile_tail)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (metis Key_not_used authKeys_used length_rev set_rev takeWhile_void
used_evs_rev)
apply blast+
done
```

```
lemma SesKey_is_session_key:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs_B) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs_B, Key SesKey, Number T|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs); Tgs_B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ SesKey ∉ range shrK"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast)
done

lemma authTicket_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
                 Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
           ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
```

```
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake, K4

```
apply (blast+)
done
```

```
lemma authTicket_crypt_authK:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ authK ∈ authKeys evs"
apply (frule authTicket_authentic, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm) add: authKeys_def)
apply blast
done
```

Describes the form of servK, servTicket and authK sent by Tgs

```
lemma Says_Tgs_message_form:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
           ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ B ≠ Tgs ∧
     authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ authKeys evs ∧ authK ∈ symKeys ∧
     servK ∉ range shrK ∧ servK ∉ authKeys evs ∧ servK ∈ symKeys ∧
     servTicket = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|})
∧
     Key servK ∉ used (before
       Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
                       on evs) ∧
     Ts = CT(before
       Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
             on evs) "
unfolding before_def
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (simp_all add: authKeys_insert authKeys_not_insert authKeys_empty authKeys_simp,
blast)
```

We need this simplification only for Message 4

```
apply (simp (no_asm) add: takeWhile_tail)
apply auto
```

Five subcases of Message 4

```
apply (blast dest!: SesKey_is_session_key)
apply (blast dest: authTicket_crypt_authK)
apply (blast dest!: authKeys_used Says_Kas_message_form)
```

subcase: used before

```
apply (metis used_evs_rev used_takeWhile_used)
```

subcase: CT before

```
apply (metis length_rev set_evs_rev takeWhile_void)
done

lemma authTicket_form:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, authTicket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         A ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
    ⟹ authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ symKeys ∧
       authTicket = Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Ta|}"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
apply (blast+)
done
```

This form holds also over an authTicket, but is not needed below.

```
lemma servTicket_form:
     "⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|}
             ∈ parts (spies evs);
           Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
           evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
         ⟹ servK ∉ range shrK ∧ servK ∈ symKeys ∧
    (∃A. servTicket = Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|})"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast)
done
```

Essentially the same as *authTicket_form*

```
lemma Says_kas_message_form:
     "⟦ Says Kas' A (Crypt (shrK A)
              {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ symKeys ∧
          authTicket =
                  Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Ta|}
           | authTicket ∈ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: analz_shrK_Decrypt authTicket_form
                Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj])

lemma Says_tgs_message_form:
 "⟦ Says Tgs' A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|})
       ∈ set evs;  authK ∈ symKeys;
     evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ servK ∉ range shrK ∧
      (∃A. servTicket =
              Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|})
       | servTicket ∈ analz (spies evs)"
by (metis Says_imp_analz_Spy Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy analz.Decrypt analz.Snd
invKey_K servTicket_form)
```

6.6 Authenticity theorems: confirm origin of sensitive messages

lemma *authK_authentic:*
```
"⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|})
      ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbIV.induct)*
apply *(frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)*
apply *(frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *blast*

K4

apply *(blast dest!: authTicket_authentic [THEN Says_Kas_message_form])*
done

If a certain encrypted message appears then it originated with Tgs

lemma *servK_authentic:*
```
"⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
   authK ∉ range shrK;
   evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
⟹ ∃A. Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
    ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)*
apply *(frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)*
apply *(frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *blast*

K2

apply *blast*

K4

apply *auto*
done

lemma *servK_authentic_bis:*
```
"⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
   B ≠ Tgs;
   evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
⟹ ∃A. Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
```

```
       ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

K4

```
apply blast
done
```

Authenticity of servK for B

```
lemma servTicket_authentic_Tgs:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs); B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃authK.
       Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                    Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|})
       ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
apply blast+
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection

```
lemma K4_imp_K2:
"⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
      ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ kerbIV⟧
   ⟹ ∃Ta. Says Kas A
        (Crypt (shrK A)
         {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
        ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, auto)
apply (blast dest!: Says_imp_spies [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst, THEN authTicket_authentic])
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection

```
lemma u_K4_imp_K2:
"⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
      ∈ set evs; evs ∈ kerbIV⟧
   ⟹ ∃Ta. (Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
```

```
           ∈ set evs
         ∧ servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, auto)
apply (blast dest!: Says_imp_spies [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst, THEN authTicket_authentic])
done

lemma servTicket_authentic_Kas:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ ∃authK Ta.
       Says Kas A
         (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
            Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
        ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: servTicket_authentic_Tgs K4_imp_K2)

lemma u_servTicket_authentic_Kas:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ ∃authK Ta. Says Kas A (Crypt(shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
             ∈ set evs
           ∧ servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta"
by (blast dest!: servTicket_authentic_Tgs u_K4_imp_K2)

lemma servTicket_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃Ta authK.
     Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
                   Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number
Ta|}|})
       ∈ set evs
     ∧ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                   Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|})
       ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest: servTicket_authentic_Tgs K4_imp_K2)

lemma u_servTicket_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃Ta authK.
     (Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
                   Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number
Ta|}|})
       ∈ set evs
     ∧ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
```

```
                Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|})
       ∈ set evs
     ∧ servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta)"
by (blast dest: servTicket_authentic_Tgs u_K4_imp_K2)

lemma u_NotexpiredSK_NotexpiredAK:
     "⟦ ¬ expiredSK Ts evs; servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ expiredAK Ta evs"
  by (metis le_less_trans)
```

6.7 Reliability: friendly agents send something if something else happened

```
lemma K3_imp_K2:
     "⟦ Says A Tgs
            {|authTicket, Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B|}
          ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ ∃Ta. Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A)
                    {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|})
                 ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast, blast)
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies [THEN parts.Inj, THEN authK_authentic])
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection. An authK is encrypted by one and only one Shared key. A servK is encrypted by one and only one authK.

```
lemma Key_unique_SesKey:
     "⟦ Crypt K  {|Key SesKey,  Agent B, T, Ticket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt K' {|Key SesKey,  Agent B', T', Ticket'|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);  Key SesKey ∉ analz (spies evs);
        evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ K=K' ∧ B=B' ∧ T=T' ∧ Ticket=Ticket'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake, K2, K4

```
apply (blast+)
done

lemma Tgs_authenticates_A:
  "⟦  Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
      Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
      Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
```

```
 ⟹ ∃ B. Says A Tgs {|
          Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|},
          Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B |} ∈ set evs"
apply (drule authTicket_authentic, assumption, rotate_tac 4)
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

K2

```
apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

K3

```
apply (blast dest: Key_unique_SesKey)
```

K5

```
apply (metis K3_imp_K2 Key_unique_SesKey Spy_see_shrK parts.Body parts.Fst

             Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj])
done

lemma Says_K5:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                                    servTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
         Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
         A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ Says A B {|servTicket, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
apply blast
```

K3

```
apply (blast dest: authK_authentic Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form)
```

K4

```
apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

K5

```
apply (blast dest: Key_unique_SesKey)
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection

```
lemma unique_CryptKey:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B)  {|Agent A,  Agent B,  Key SesKey, T|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Agent B', Key SesKey, T'|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);  Key SesKey ∉ analz (spies evs);
        evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ T=T'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake, K2, K4

```
apply (blast+)
done
```

```
lemma Says_K6:
     "⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                                  servTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
apply blast
apply (metis Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor invKey_K new_keys_not_used)
apply (clarify)
apply (frule Says_Tgs_message_form, assumption)
apply (metis K3_msg_in_parts_spies parts.Fst Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj]

            unique_CryptKey)
done
```

Needs a unicity theorem, hence moved here

```
lemma servK_authentic_ter:
 "⟦ Says Kas A
    (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
     Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
       ∈ parts (spies evs);
     Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
     evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
       ∈ set evs"
apply (frule Says_Kas_message_form, assumption)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
```

```
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast)
```

K2

```
apply (blast dest!: servK_authentic Says_Tgs_message_form authKeys_used)
```

K4 remain

```
apply (blast dest!: unique_CryptKey)
done
```

6.8 Unicity Theorems

The session key, if secure, uniquely identifies the Ticket whether authTicket or servTicket. As a matter of fact, one can read also Tgs in the place of B.

```
lemma unique_authKeys:
     "⟦ Says Kas A
              (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, X|}) ∈ set evs;
        Says Kas A'
              (Crypt Ka' {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta', X'|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ Ka=Ka' ∧ Ta=Ta' ∧ X=X'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

K2

```
apply blast
done
```

servK uniquely identifies the message from Tgs

```
lemma unique_servKeys:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A
              (Crypt K {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, X|}) ∈ set evs;
        Says Tgs A'
              (Crypt K' {|Key servK, Agent B', Ts', X'|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ K=K' ∧ Ts=Ts' ∧ X=X'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

K4

```
apply blast
done
```

Revised unicity theorems

```
lemma Kas_Unique:
     "⟦ Says Kas A
```

```
             (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧ ⟹
   Unique (Says Kas A (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, authTicket|}))
   on evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule kerbIV.induct, simp_all add: Unique_def)
apply blast
done

lemma Tgs_Unique:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A
             (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧ ⟹
  Unique (Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|}))
  on evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule kerbIV.induct, simp_all add: Unique_def)
apply blast
done
```

6.9 Lemmas About the Predicate *AKcryptSK*

```
lemma not_AKcryptSK_Nil [iff]: "¬ AKcryptSK authK servK []"
by (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)

lemma AKcryptSKI:
 "⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, X |}) ∈ set evs;
     evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧ ⟹ AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
apply (blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form)
done

lemma AKcryptSK_Says [simp]:
   "AKcryptSK authK servK (Says S A X # evs) =
     (Tgs = S ∧
      (∃B Ts. X = Crypt authK
                {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
|})
     | AKcryptSK authK servK evs)"
by (auto simp add: AKcryptSK_def)



lemma Auth_fresh_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ Key authK ∉ used evs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast)
done


lemma Serv_fresh_not_AKcryptSK:
```

```
 "Key servK ∉ used evs ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
  unfolding AKcryptSK_def by blast

lemma authK_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, tk|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK K authK evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

K2: by freshness

```
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
```

K4

```
apply (blast+)
done
```

A secure serverkey cannot have been used to encrypt others

```
lemma servK_not_AKcryptSK:
 "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key SK, Number Ts|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
     Key SK ∉ analz (spies evs);  SK ∈ symKeys;
     B ≠ Tgs;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK SK K evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast)
```

K4

```
apply (metis Auth_fresh_not_AKcryptSK Crypt_imp_keysFor new_keys_not_used
parts.Fst parts.Snd Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj] unique_CryptKey)
done
```

Long term keys are not issued as servKeys

```
lemma shrK_not_AKcryptSK:
     "evs ∈ kerbIV ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK K (shrK A) evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, auto)
done
```

The Tgs message associates servK with authK and therefore not with any other key authK.

```
lemma Says_Tgs_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, X |}) 
```

```
          ∈ set evs;
        authK' ≠ authK;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK' servK evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
apply (blast dest: unique_servKeys)
done
```

Equivalently

```
lemma not_different_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ AKcryptSK authK servK evs;
        authK' ≠ authK;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK' servK evs  ∧ servK ∈ symKeys"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
apply (blast dest: unique_servKeys Says_Tgs_message_form)
done

lemma AKcryptSK_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ AKcryptSK authK servK evs;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK servK K evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
apply (metis Auth_fresh_not_AKcryptSK Says_imp_spies authK_not_AKcryptSK
             authKeys_used authTicket_crypt_authK parts.Fst parts.Inj)
done
```

The only session keys that can be found with the help of session keys are those sent by Tgs in step K4.

We take some pains to express the property as a logical equivalence so that the simplifier can apply it.

```
lemma Key_analz_image_Key_lemma:
     "P ⟶ (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ H)) ⟶ (K∈KK | Key K ∈ analz H)
      ⟹
      P ⟶ (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ H)) = (K∈KK | Key K ∈ analz H)"
by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN subsetD])


lemma AKcryptSK_analz_insert:
     "⟦ AKcryptSK K K' evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ Key K' ∈ analz (insert (Key K) (spies evs))"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def, clarify)
apply (drule Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz_insertI], auto)
done

lemma authKeys_are_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ K ∈ authKeys evs ∪ range shrK;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ ∀SK. ¬ AKcryptSK SK K evs ∧ K ∈ symKeys"
apply (simp add: authKeys_def AKcryptSK_def)
apply (blast dest: Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form)
done

lemma not_authKeys_not_AKcryptSK:
```

```
     "⟦ K ∉ authKeys evs;
        K ∉ range shrK; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ ∀SK. ¬ AKcryptSK K SK evs"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
apply (blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form)
done
```

6.10 Secrecy Theorems

For the Oops2 case of the next theorem

```
lemma Oops2_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ evs ∈ kerbIV;
        Says Tgs A (Crypt authK
                    {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
          ∈ set evs ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK servK SK evs"
by (blast dest: AKcryptSKI AKcryptSK_not_AKcryptSK)
```

Big simplification law for keys SK that are not crypted by keys in KK It helps prove three, otherwise hard, facts about keys. These facts are exploited as simplification laws for analz, and also "limit the damage" in case of loss of a key to the spy. See ESORICS98. [simplified by LCP]

```
lemma Key_analz_image_Key [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "evs ∈ kerbIV ⟹
      (∀SK KK. SK ∈ symKeys ∧ KK ⊆ -(range shrK) ⟶
       (∀K ∈ KK. ¬ AKcryptSK K SK evs)   ⟶
       (Key SK ∈ analz (Key`KK ∪ (spies evs))) =
       (SK ∈ KK | Key SK ∈ analz (spies evs)))"
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [10] Oops_range_spies2)
apply (frule_tac [9] Oops_range_spies1)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_tgs_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_kas_message_form)
apply (safe del: impI intro!: Key_analz_image_Key_lemma [THEN impI])
```

Case-splits for Oops1 and message 5: the negated case simplifies using the induction hypothesis

```
apply (case_tac [11] "AKcryptSK authK SK evsO1")
apply (case_tac [8] "AKcryptSK servK SK evs5")
apply (simp_all del: image_insert
        add: analz_image_freshK_simps AKcryptSK_Says shrK_not_AKcryptSK
             Oops2_not_AKcryptSK Auth_fresh_not_AKcryptSK
       Serv_fresh_not_AKcryptSK Says_Tgs_AKcryptSK Spy_analz_shrK)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

K2

```
apply blast
```

K3

```
apply blast
```

K4

apply *(blast dest!: authK_not_AKcryptSK)*

K5

apply *(case_tac "Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs5) ")*

If servK is compromised then the result follows directly...

apply *(simp (no_asm_simp) add: analz_insert_eq Un_upper2 [THEN analz_mono, THEN subsetD])*

...therefore servK is uncompromised.

The AKcryptSK servK SK evs5 case leads to a contradiction.

apply *(blast elim!: servK_not_AKcryptSK [THEN [2] rev_notE] del: allE ballE)*

Another K5 case

apply *blast*

Oops1

apply *simp*
apply *(blast dest!: AKcryptSK_analz_insert)*
done

First simplification law for analz: no session keys encrypt authentication keys or shared keys.

lemma *analz_insert_freshK1:*
"⟦ *evs ∈ kerbIV; K ∈ authKeys evs ∪ range shrK;*
SesKey ∉ range shrK ⟧
⟹ *(Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key SesKey) (spies evs))) =*
(K = SesKey | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply *(frule authKeys_are_not_AKcryptSK, assumption)*
apply *(simp del: image_insert*
add: analz_image_freshK_simps add: Key_analz_image_Key)
done

Second simplification law for analz: no service keys encrypt any other keys.

lemma *analz_insert_freshK2:*
"⟦ *evs ∈ kerbIV; servK ∉ (authKeys evs); servK ∉ range shrK;*
K ∈ symKeys ⟧
⟹ *(Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key servK) (spies evs))) =*
(K = servK | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply *(frule not_authKeys_not_AKcryptSK, assumption, assumption)*
apply *(simp del: image_insert*
add: analz_image_freshK_simps add: Key_analz_image_Key)
done

Third simplification law for analz: only one authentication key encrypts a certain service key.

lemma *analz_insert_freshK3:*
"⟦ *AKcryptSK authK servK evs;*
authK' ≠ authK; authK' ∉ range shrK; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧

```
        ⟹ (Key servK ∈ analz (insert (Key authK') (spies evs))) =
                (servK = authK' | Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (drule_tac authK' = authK' in not_different_AKcryptSK, blast, assumption)
apply (simp del: image_insert
            add: analz_image_freshK_simps add: Key_analz_image_Key)
done

lemma analz_insert_freshK3_bis:
 "⟦ Says Tgs A
            (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
       ∈ set evs;
     authK ≠ authK'; authK' ∉ range shrK; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
       ⟹ (Key servK ∈ analz (insert (Key authK') (spies evs))) =
                (servK = authK' | Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (frule AKcryptSKI, assumption)
apply (simp add: analz_insert_freshK3)
done
```

a weakness of the protocol

```
lemma authK_compromises_servK:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A
              (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
          ∈ set evs;  authK ∈ symKeys;
        Key authK ∈ analz (spies evs); evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs)"
  by (metis Says_imp_analz_Spy analz.Fst analz_Decrypt')

lemma servK_notin_authKeysD:
     "⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts,
                      Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|}|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ servK ∉ authKeys evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (simp add: authKeys_def)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
apply (blast+)
done
```

If Spy sees the Authentication Key sent in msg K2, then the Key has expired.

```
lemma Confidentiality_Kas_lemma [rule_format]:
     "⟦ authK ∈ symKeys; A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ Says Kas A
               (Crypt (shrK A)
                  {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
             ∈ set evs ⟶
           Key authK ∈ analz (spies evs) ⟶
           expiredAK Ta evs"
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
```

```
apply (frule_tac [10] Oops_range_spies2)
apply (frule_tac [9] Oops_range_spies1)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_tgs_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_kas_message_form)
apply (safe del: impI conjI impCE)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: Says_Kas_message_form less_SucI analz_insert_eq
not_parts_not_analz analz_insert_freshK1 pushes)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

K2

```
apply blast
```

K4

```
apply blast
```

Level 8: K5

```
apply (blast dest: servK_notin_authKeysD Says_Kas_message_form intro: less_SucI)
```

Oops1

```
apply (blast dest!: unique_authKeys intro: less_SucI)
```

Oops2

```
apply (blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form Says_Kas_message_form)
done
```

```
lemma Confidentiality_Kas:
     "⟦ Says Kas A
              (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|})
           ∈ set evs;
         ¬ expiredAK Ta evs;
         A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: Says_Kas_message_form Confidentiality_Kas_lemma)
```

If Spy sees the Service Key sent in msg K4, then the Key has expired.

```
lemma Confidentiality_lemma [rule_format]:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A
            (Crypt authK
               {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                 Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|})
           ∈ set evs;
        Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        servK ∈ symKeys;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs) ⟶
         expiredSK Ts evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (rule_tac [9] impI)+
```

— The Oops1 case is unusual: must simplify *Authkey ∉ analz (knows Spy (ev # evs))*, not letting *analz_mono_contra* weaken it to *Authkey ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)*, for we then conclude *authK ≠ authKa*.
apply *analz_mono_contra*
apply *(frule_tac [10] Oops_range_spies2)*
apply *(frule_tac [9] Oops_range_spies1)*
apply *(frule_tac [7] Says_tgs_message_form)*
apply *(frule_tac [5] Says_kas_message_form)*
apply *(safe del: impI conjI impCE)*
apply *(simp_all add: less_SucI new_keys_not_analzd Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form analz_insert_eq not_parts_not_analz analz_insert_freshK1 analz_insert_freshK2 analz_insert_freshK3_bis pushes)*

Fake

apply *spy_analz*

K2

apply *(blast intro: parts_insertI less_SucI)*

K4

apply *(blast dest: authTicket_authentic Confidentiality_Kas)*

K5

apply *(metis Says_imp_spies Says_ticket_parts Tgs_not_bad analz_insert_freshK2 less_SucI parts.Inj servK_notin_authKeysD unique_CryptKey)*

Oops1

apply *(blast dest: Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form intro: less_SucI)*

Oops2

apply *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies [THEN parts.Inj] Key_unique_SesKey intro: less_SucI)*
done

In the real world Tgs can't check wheter authK is secure!

lemma *Confidentiality_Tgs:*
```
"⟦ Says Tgs A
         (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
    ∈ set evs;
   Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
   ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
   A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
```
by *(blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form Confidentiality_lemma)*

In the real world Tgs CAN check what Kas sends!

lemma *Confidentiality_Tgs_bis:*
```
"⟦ Says Kas A
          (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|})
    ∈ set evs;
   Says Tgs A
```

```
            (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
          ∈ set evs;
        ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
     ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest!: Confidentiality_Kas Confidentiality_Tgs)
```

Most general form

```
lemmas Confidentiality_Tgs_ter = authTicket_authentic [THEN Confidentiality_Tgs_bis]
```

```
lemmas Confidentiality_Auth_A = authK_authentic [THEN Confidentiality_Kas]
```

Needs a confidentiality guarantee, hence moved here. Authenticity of servK for A

```
lemma servK_authentic_bis_r:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
      ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest: authK_authentic Confidentiality_Auth_A servK_authentic_ter)
```

```
lemma Confidentiality_Serv_A:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
     ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (drule authK_authentic, assumption, assumption)
apply (blast dest: Confidentiality_Kas Says_Kas_message_form servK_authentic_ter
Confidentiality_Tgs_bis)
done
```

```
lemma Confidentiality_B:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredSK Ts evs; ¬ expiredAK Ta evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
     ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (frule authK_authentic)
apply (frule_tac [3] Confidentiality_Kas)
apply (frule_tac [6] servTicket_authentic, auto)
apply (blast dest!: Confidentiality_Tgs_bis dest: Says_Kas_message_form servK_authentic
unique_servKeys unique_authKeys)
done
```

```
lemma u_Confidentiality_B:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: u_servTicket_authentic u_NotexpiredSK_NotexpiredAK Confidentiality_Tgs_bis)
```

6.11 Parties authentication: each party verifies "the identity of another party who generated some data" (quoted from Neuman and Ts'o).

These guarantees don't assess whether two parties agree on the same session key: sending a message containing a key doesn't a priori state knowledge of the key.

Tgs_authenticates_A can be found above

```
lemma A_authenticates_Tgs:
 "⟦ Says Kas A
    (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
     Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
       ∈ parts (spies evs);
     Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
     evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
       ∈ set evs"
apply (frule Says_Kas_message_form, assumption)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] K5_msg_in_parts_spies)
apply (frule_tac [5] K3_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all, blast)
```

K2

```
apply (blast dest!: servK_authentic Says_Tgs_message_form authKeys_used)
```

K4

```
apply (blast dest!: unique_CryptKey)
done
```

```
lemma B_authenticates_A:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|},
               Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|} ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest: servTicket_authentic_Tgs intro: Says_K5)
```

The second assumption tells B what kind of key servK is.

lemma *B_authenticates_A_r:*
```
"⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
      ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
      ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
      ∈ parts (spies evs);
    ¬ expiredSK Ts evs; ¬ expiredAK Ta evs;
    B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|},
              Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} |} ∈ set evs"
```
by *(blast intro: Says_K5 dest: Confidentiality_B servTicket_authentic_Tgs)*

u_B_authenticates_A would be the same as *B_authenticates_A* because the servK confidentiality assumption is yet unrelaxed

lemma *u_B_authenticates_A_r:*
```
"⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
      ∈ parts (spies evs);
    ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
    B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|},
              Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} |} ∈ set evs"
```
by *(blast intro: Says_K5 dest: u_Confidentiality_B servTicket_authentic_Tgs)*

lemma *A_authenticates_B:*
```
"⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
      ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
      ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
    A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs"
```
by *(blast dest: authK_authentic servK_authentic Says_Kas_message_form Key_unique_SesKey K4_imp_K2 intro: Says_K6)*

lemma *A_authenticates_B_r:*
```
"⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
      ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
      ∈ parts (spies evs);
    ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
    A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(frule authK_authentic)*
apply *(frule_tac [3] Says_Kas_message_form)*
apply *(frule_tac [4] Confidentiality_Kas)*
apply *(frule_tac [7] servK_authentic)*
prefer *8* **apply** *blast*

```
apply (erule_tac [9] exE)
apply (frule_tac [9] K4_imp_K2)
apply assumption+
apply (blast dest: Key_unique_SesKey intro!: Says_K6 dest: Confidentiality_Tgs
)
done
```

6.12 Key distribution guarantees An agent knows a session key if he used it to issue a cipher. These guarantees also convey a stronger form of authentication - non-injective agreement on the session key

```
lemma Kas_Issues_A:
   "⟦ Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set
evs;
      evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ Kas Issues A with (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|})

          on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

K2

```
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
apply (blast dest: authK_authentic parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD]
parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD])
done

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_Kas:
  "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
     A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ Kas Issues A with (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|})

          on evs"
by (blast dest: authK_authentic Kas_Issues_A)

lemma honest_never_says_newer_timestamp_in_auth:
     "⟦ (CT evs) ≤ T; A ∉ bad; Number T ∈ parts {X}; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
     ⟹ ∀ B Y.  Says A B {|Y, X|} ∉ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct)
apply force+
done

lemma honest_never_says_current_timestamp_in_auth:
     "⟦ (CT evs) = T; Number T ∈ parts {X}; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
```

```
    ⟹ ∀ A B Y. A ∉ bad ⟶ Says A B {|Y, X|} ∉ set evs"
  by (metis eq_imp_le honest_never_says_newer_timestamp_in_auth)

lemma A_trusts_secure_authenticator:
    "⟦ Crypt K {|Agent A, Number T|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Key K ∉ analz (spies evs); evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
⟹ ∃ B X. Says A Tgs {|X, Crypt K {|Agent A, Number T|}, Agent B|} ∈ set evs
∨
          Says A B {|X, Crypt K {|Agent A, Number T|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all add: all_conj_distrib)
apply blast+
done

lemma A_Issues_Tgs:
  "⟦ Says A Tgs {|authTicket, Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B|}
       ∈ set evs;
     Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
     A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ A Issues Tgs with (Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

fake

```
apply blast
```

K3

```
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
apply auto
apply (force dest!: authK_authentic Says_Kas_message_form)
apply (drule parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD, THEN parts_spies_evs_revD2
[THEN subsetD]])
apply (drule A_trusts_secure_authenticator, assumption, assumption)
apply (simp add: honest_never_says_current_timestamp_in_auth)
done

lemma Tgs_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A:
  "⟦  Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
      Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
     Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
     A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
```

6.12 Key distribution guarantees An agent knows a session key if he used it to issue a cipher. These guarantees also

```
 ⟹ A Issues Tgs with (Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}) on evs"
by (blast dest: A_Issues_Tgs Tgs_authenticates_A)

lemma Tgs_Issues_A:
    "⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket
|})
         ∈ set evs;
       Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ Tgs Issues A with
          (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket |}) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

K4

```
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)

apply (metis knows_Spy_partsEs(2) parts.Fst usedI used_evs_rev used_takeWhile_used)
done

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_Tgs:
"⟦Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
  Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃A. Tgs Issues A with
          (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket |}) on evs"
by (blast dest: Tgs_Issues_A servK_authentic_bis)



lemma B_Issues_A:
     "⟦ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs;
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt servK (Number T3)) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
apply blast
```

K6 requires numerous lemmas

```
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
apply (blast dest: servTicket_authentic parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD]
parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD] intro: Says_K6)
done

lemma B_Issues_A_r:
     "⟦ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs;
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         ¬ expiredSK Ts evs; ¬ expiredAK Ta evs;
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt servK (Number T3)) on evs"
by (blast dest!: Confidentiality_B B_Issues_A)

lemma u_B_Issues_A_r:
     "⟦ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs;
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt servK (Number T3)) on evs"
by (blast dest!: u_Confidentiality_B B_Issues_A)

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_B:
     "⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt servK (Number T3)) on evs"
by (blast dest!: A_authenticates_B B_Issues_A)

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_B_r:
     "⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt servK (Number T3)) on evs"
by (blast dest!: A_authenticates_B_r Confidentiality_Serv_A B_Issues_A)


lemma A_Issues_B:
     "⟦ Says A B {|servTicket, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|}
           ∈ set evs;
         Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
```

```
        B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
apply clarify
```

K5

```
apply auto
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
```

Level 15: case analysis necessary because the assumption doesn't state the form of servTicket. The guarantee becomes stronger.

```
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz_Decrypt']
                   K3_imp_K2 servK_authentic_ter
                   parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD]
                   parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD]
             intro: Says_K5)
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
done

lemma A_Issues_B_r:
     "⟦ Says A B {|servTicket, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
        B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}) on evs"
by (blast dest!: Confidentiality_Serv_A A_Issues_B)

lemma B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
  ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}) on evs"
by (blast dest: B_authenticates_A A_Issues_B)

lemma B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A_r:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
```

```
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredSK Ts evs; ¬ expiredAK Ta evs;
        B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
   ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}) on evs"
by (blast dest: B_authenticates_A Confidentiality_B A_Issues_B)
```

u_B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A would be the same as B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A because the servK confidentiality assumption is yet unrelaxed

```
lemma u_B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A_r:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
        B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV ⟧
   ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}) on evs"
by (blast dest: u_B_authenticates_A_r u_Confidentiality_B A_Issues_B)
```

end

7 The Kerberos Protocol, Version IV

theory *KerberosIV_Gets* **imports** *Public* **begin**

The "u" prefix indicates theorems referring to an updated version of the protocol. The "r" suffix indicates theorems where the confidentiality assumptions are relaxed by the corresponding arguments.

abbreviation

```
  Kas :: agent where "Kas == Server"
```

abbreviation

```
  Tgs :: agent where "Tgs == Friend 0"
```

axiomatization where

```
  Tgs_not_bad [iff]: "Tgs ∉ bad"
```

— Tgs is secure — we already know that Kas is secure

definition

```
    authKeys :: "event list ⇒ key set" where
    "authKeys evs = {authK. ∃A Peer Ta. Says Kas A
                          (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Peer, Number Ta,
              (Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, Key authK, Number
Ta|})
                   |}) ∈ set evs}"
```

definition

```
  Unique :: "[event, event list] ⇒ bool" (‹Unique _ on _› [0, 50] 50)
  where "(Unique ev on evs) = (ev ∉ set (tl (dropWhile (λz. z ≠ ev) evs)))"
```

consts

```
    authKlife   :: nat

    servKlife   :: nat

    authlife   :: nat

    replylife   :: nat
```

specification *(authKlife)*
```
  authKlife_LB [iff]: "2 ≤ authKlife"
    by blast
```

specification *(servKlife)*
```
  servKlife_LB [iff]: "2 + authKlife ≤ servKlife"
    by blast
```

specification *(authlife)*
```
  authlife_LB [iff]: "Suc 0 ≤ authlife"
    by blast
```

specification *(replylife)*
```
  replylife_LB [iff]: "Suc 0 ≤ replylife"
    by blast
```

abbreviation

```
  CT :: "event list ⇒ nat" where
  "CT == length"
```

abbreviation
```
  expiredAK :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredAK Ta evs == authKlife + Ta < CT evs"
```

abbreviation
```
  expiredSK :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredSK Ts evs == servKlife + Ts < CT evs"
```

abbreviation
```
  expiredA :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredA T evs == authlife + T < CT evs"
```

abbreviation
```
  valid :: "[nat, nat] ⇒ bool" (<valid _ wrt _> [0, 50] 50) where
  "valid T1 wrt T2 == T1 ≤ replylife + T2"
```

```
definition AKcryptSK :: "[key, key, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "AKcryptSK authK servK evs ==
     ∃A B Ts.
       Says Tgs A (Crypt authK
                     {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                       Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number
Ts|} |})
         ∈ set evs"

inductive_set "kerbIV_gets" :: "event list set"
  where

   Nil:  "[] ∈ kerbIV_gets"

 | Fake: "⟦ evsf ∈ kerbIV_gets;  X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf)) ⟧
          ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ kerbIV_gets"

 | Reception: "⟦ evsr ∈ kerbIV_gets;  Says A B X ∈ set evsr ⟧
               ⟹ Gets B X # evsr ∈ kerbIV_gets"


 | K1:   "⟦ evs1 ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
          ⟹ Says A Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number (CT evs1)|} # evs1
          ∈ kerbIV_gets"




 | K2:  "⟦ evs2 ∈ kerbIV_gets; Key authK ∉ used evs2; authK ∈ symKeys;
            Gets Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number T1|} ∈ set evs2 ⟧
          ⟹ Says Kas A
               (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number (CT evs2),
                     (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK,
                         Number (CT evs2)|})|}) # evs2 ∈ kerbIV_gets"




 | K3:  "⟦ evs3 ∈ kerbIV_gets;
            Says A Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number T1|} ∈ set evs3;
            Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
              authTicket|}) ∈ set evs3;
            valid Ta wrt T1
         ⟧
          ⟹ Says A Tgs {|authTicket,
                         (Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number (CT evs3)|}),
                         Agent B|} # evs3 ∈ kerbIV_gets"
```

```
| K4:  "⟦ evs4 ∈ kerbIV_gets; Key servK ∉ used evs4; servK ∈ symKeys;
          B ≠ Tgs;  authK ∈ symKeys;
          Gets Tgs {|
           (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK,
                               Number Ta|}),
           (Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}), Agent B|}
             ∈ set evs4;
          ¬ expiredAK Ta evs4;
          ¬ expiredA T2 evs4;
          servKlife + (CT evs4) ≤ authKlife + Ta
       ⟧
        ⟹ Says Tgs A
             (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number (CT evs4),
                            Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK,
                                             Number (CT evs4)|} |})
             # evs4 ∈ kerbIV_gets"
```

```
| K5:  "⟦ evs5 ∈ kerbIV_gets; authK ∈ symKeys; servK ∈ symKeys;
          Says A Tgs
              {|authTicket, Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|},
                Agent B|}
            ∈ set evs5;
          Gets A
           (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
             ∈ set evs5;
          valid Ts wrt T2 ⟧
        ⟹ Says A B {|servTicket,
                     Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number (CT evs5)|} |}
           # evs5 ∈ kerbIV_gets"
```

```
 | K6:  "⟦ evs6 ∈ kerbIV_gets;
          Gets B {|
            (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}),
            (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|})|}
          ∈ set evs6;
          ¬ expiredSK Ts evs6;
          ¬ expiredA T3 evs6
       ⟧
        ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3))
            # evs6 ∈ kerbIV_gets"
```

```
| Oops1: "⟦ evsO1 ∈ kerbIV_gets;  A ≠ Spy;
            Says Kas A
              (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
                                authTicket|})  ∈ set evsO1;
            expiredAK Ta evsO1 ⟧
         ⟹ Says A Spy {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, Key authK|}
             # evsO1 ∈ kerbIV_gets"
```

```
| Oops2: "⟦ evsO2 ∈ kerbIV_gets;  A ≠ Spy;
            Says Tgs A
              (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
                 ∈ set evsO2;
            expiredSK Ts evsO2 ⟧
         ⟹ Says A Spy {|Agent A, Agent B, Number Ts, Key servK|}
             # evsO2 ∈ kerbIV_gets"
```

```
declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]
```

7.1 Lemmas about reception event

```
lemma Gets_imp_Says :
     "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set
evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy:
     "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧  ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)


declare Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest]

lemma Gets_imp_knows:
     "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧  ⟹ X ∈ knows B evs"
by (metis Gets_imp_knows_Spy Gets_imp_knows_agents)
```

7.2 Lemmas about `authKeys`

```
lemma authKeys_empty: "authKeys [] = {}"
by (simp add: authKeys_def)
```

```
lemma authKeys_not_insert:
 "(∀A Ta akey Peer.
   ev ≠ Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|akey, Agent Peer, Ta,
              (Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, akey, Ta|})|}))
       ⟹ authKeys (ev # evs) = authKeys evs"
  unfolding authKeys_def by auto

lemma authKeys_insert:
  "authKeys
     (Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent Peer, Number Ta,
      (Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, Key K, Number Ta|})|}) # evs)
       = insert K (authKeys evs)"
  unfolding authKeys_def by auto

lemma authKeys_simp:
   "K ∈ authKeys
    (Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K', Agent Peer, Number Ta,
     (Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, Key K', Number Ta|})|}) # evs)
        ⟹ K = K' | K ∈ authKeys evs"
  unfolding authKeys_def by auto

lemma authKeysI:
   "Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
     (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key K, Number Ta|})|}) ∈ set evs
        ⟹ K ∈ authKeys evs"
  unfolding authKeys_def by auto

lemma authKeys_used: "K ∈ authKeys evs ⟹ Key K ∈ used evs"
by (simp add: authKeys_def, blast)
```

7.3 Forwarding Lemmas

```
lemma Says_ticket_parts:
     "Says S A (Crypt K {|SesKey, B, TimeStamp, Ticket|}) ∈ set evs
      ⟹ Ticket ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by blast

lemma Gets_ticket_parts:
     "⟦Gets A (Crypt K {|SesKey, Peer, Ta, Ticket|}) ∈ set evs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets
⟧
      ⟹ Ticket ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj])

lemma Oops_range_spies1:
     "⟦ Says Kas A (Crypt KeyA {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|})
           ∈ set evs ;
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹ authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ symKeys"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, auto)
done

lemma Oops_range_spies2:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|})
           ∈ set evs ;
```

```
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹ servK ∉ range shrK ∧ servK ∈ symKeys"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, auto)
done


lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
apply (blast+)
done

lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
     "⟦ Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs);  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹ A∈bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)
lemmas Spy_analz_shrK_D = analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD, THEN Spy_see_shrK_D,
dest!]
```

Nobody can have used non-existent keys!

```
lemma new_keys_not_used [simp]:
    "⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets⟧
     ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)
```

Others

```
apply (force dest!: analz_shrK_Decrypt)+
done


lemma new_keys_not_analzd:
 "⟦evs ∈ kerbIV_gets; K ∈ symKeys; Key K ∉ used evs⟧
  ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (analz (spies evs))"
by (blast dest: new_keys_not_used intro: keysFor_mono [THEN subsetD])
```

7.4 Regularity Lemmas

These concern the form of items passed in messages

Describes the form of all components sent by Kas

```
lemma Says_Kas_message_form:
```

```
    "⟦ Says Kas A (Crypt K {|Key authK, Agent Peer, Number Ta, authTicket|})
          ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹
  K = shrK A  ∧ Peer = Tgs ∧
  authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ authKeys evs ∧ authK ∈ symKeys ∧
  authTicket = (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|})"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm) add: authKeys_def authKeys_insert)
apply blast+
done


lemma SesKey_is_session_key:
    "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs_B) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs_B, Key SesKey, Number T|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs); Tgs_B ∉ bad;
       evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
     ⟹ SesKey ∉ range shrK"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast)
done

lemma authTicket_authentic:
    "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
       evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
     ⟹ Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
                Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
          ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake, K4

```
apply (blast+)
done

lemma authTicket_crypt_authK:
    "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
       evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
     ⟹ authK ∈ authKeys evs"
apply (frule authTicket_authentic, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm) add: authKeys_def)
apply blast
done

lemma Says_Tgs_message_form:
    "⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
          ∈ set evs;
       evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
```

```
  ⟹ B ≠ Tgs ∧
     authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ authKeys evs ∧ authK ∈ symKeys ∧
     servK ∉ range shrK ∧ servK ∉ authKeys evs ∧ servK ∈ symKeys ∧
     servTicket = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|})"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (simp_all add: authKeys_insert authKeys_not_insert authKeys_empty authKeys_simp,
blast, auto)
```

Three subcases of Message 4

```
apply (blast dest!: SesKey_is_session_key)
apply (blast dest: authTicket_crypt_authK)
apply (blast dest!: authKeys_used Says_Kas_message_form)
done
```

```
lemma authTicket_form:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, authTicket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
    ⟹ authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ symKeys ∧
       authTicket = Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Ta|}"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
apply blast+
done
```

This form holds also over an authTicket, but is not needed below.

```
lemma servTicket_form:
     "⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|}
              ∈ parts (spies evs);
           Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
           evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
         ⟹ servK ∉ range shrK ∧ servK ∈ symKeys ∧
    (∃A. servTicket = Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|})"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast)
done
```

Essentially the same as *authTicket_form*

```
lemma Says_kas_message_form:
     "⟦ Gets A (Crypt (shrK A)
              {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ symKeys ∧
         authTicket =
                 Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Ta|}
```

```
         | authTicket ∈ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: analz_shrK_Decrypt authTicket_form
               Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj])

lemma Says_tgs_message_form:
 "⟦ Gets A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|})
      ∈ set evs;  authK ∈ symKeys;
    evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
  ⟹ servK ∉ range shrK ∧
     (∃A. servTicket =
            Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|})
      | servTicket ∈ analz (spies evs)"
apply (frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj], auto)
 apply (force dest!: servTicket_form)
apply (frule analz_into_parts)
apply (frule servTicket_form, auto)
done
```

7.5 Authenticity theorems: confirm origin of sensitive messages

```
lemma authK_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|})
           ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

K4

```
apply (blast dest!: authTicket_authentic [THEN Says_Kas_message_form])
done
```

If a certain encrypted message appears then it originated with Tgs

```
lemma servK_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        authK ∉ range shrK;
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ ∃A. Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
      ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake

apply *blast*

K2

apply *blast*

K4

apply *auto*
done

lemma *servK_authentic_bis:*
```
     "⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
         B ≠ Tgs;
         evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ ∃A. Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
       ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)*
apply *(frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)*
apply *(frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *blast*

K4

apply *blast*
done

Authenticity of servK for B

lemma *servTicket_authentic_Tgs:*
```
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs); B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ ∃authK.
       Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                   Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|})
       ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbIV_gets.induct)*
apply *(frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)*
apply *(frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)*
apply *blast+*
done

Anticipated here from next subsection

lemma *K4_imp_K2:*
```
"⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
      ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets⟧
```

```
   ⟹ ∃Ta. Says Kas A
        (Crypt (shrK A)
         {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
        ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all, auto)
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst, THEN
authTicket_authentic])
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection

```
lemma u_K4_imp_K2:
"⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
     ∈ set evs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets⟧
   ⟹ ∃Ta. (Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
             ∈ set evs
          ∧ servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all, auto)
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst, THEN
authTicket_authentic])
done

lemma servTicket_authentic_Kas:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
  ⟹ ∃authK Ta.
       Says Kas A
         (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
            Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
        ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: servTicket_authentic_Tgs K4_imp_K2)

lemma u_servTicket_authentic_Kas:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
  ⟹ ∃authK Ta. Says Kas A (Crypt(shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
             ∈ set evs
           ∧ servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta"
by (blast dest!: servTicket_authentic_Tgs u_K4_imp_K2)

lemma servTicket_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
```

```
 ⟹ ∃Ta authK.
     Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
                   Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number
Ta|}|})
       ∈ set evs
     ∧ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                   Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|})
       ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest: servTicket_authentic_Tgs K4_imp_K2)

lemma u_servTicket_authentic:
     "[| Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbIV_gets |]
 ⟹ ∃Ta authK.
     (Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
                   Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number
Ta|}|})
       ∈ set evs
     ∧ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                   Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|})
       ∈ set evs
     ∧ servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta)"
by (blast dest: servTicket_authentic_Tgs u_K4_imp_K2)

lemma u_NotexpiredSK_NotexpiredAK:
     "[| ¬ expiredSK Ts evs; servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta |]
      ⟹ ¬ expiredAK Ta evs"
by (blast dest: leI le_trans dest: leD)
```

7.6 Reliability: friendly agents send something if something else happened

```
lemma K3_imp_K2:
     "[| Says A Tgs
            {|authTicket, Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B|}
          ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets |]
      ⟹ ∃Ta. Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A)
                    {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|})
                  ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast, blast)
apply (blast dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN authK_authentic])
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection. An authK is encrypted by one and only one Shared key. A servK is encrypted by one and only one authK.

```
lemma Key_unique_SesKey:
     "[| Crypt K  {|Key SesKey,  Agent B, T, Ticket|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt K' {|Key SesKey,  Agent B', T', Ticket'|}
```

```
          ∈ parts (spies evs);  Key SesKey ∉ analz (spies evs);
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
     ⟹ K=K' ∧ B=B' ∧ T=T' ∧ Ticket=Ticket'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake, K2, K4

```
apply (blast+)
done
```

```
lemma Tgs_authenticates_A:
  "⟦  Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
      Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
      Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ ∃ B. Says A Tgs {|
          Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|},
          Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B |} ∈ set evs"
apply (drule authTicket_authentic, assumption, rotate_tac 4)
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [9] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

K2

```
apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

K3

```
apply (blast dest: Key_unique_SesKey)
```

K5

If authKa were compromised, so would be authK

```
apply (case_tac "Key authKa ∈ analz (spies evs5)")
apply (force dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Decrypt,
THEN analz.Fst])
```

Besides, since authKa originated with Kas anyway...

```
apply (clarify, drule K3_imp_K2, assumption, assumption)
apply (clarify, drule Says_Kas_message_form, assumption)
```

...it cannot be a shared key*. Therefore *servK_authentic* applies. Contradition: Tgs used authK as a servkey, while Kas used it as an authkey

```
apply (blast dest: servK_authentic Says_Tgs_message_form)
done
```

```
lemma Says_K5:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                                  servTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
  ⟹ Says A B {|servTicket, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [9] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
apply blast
```

K3

```
apply (blast dest: authK_authentic Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form)
```

K4

```
apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

K5

```
apply (blast dest: Key_unique_SesKey)
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection

```
lemma unique_CryptKey:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B)  {|Agent A,  Agent B,  Key SesKey, T|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Agent B', Key SesKey, T'|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);  Key SesKey ∉ analz (spies evs);
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ T=T'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake, K2, K4

```
apply (blast+)
done
```

```
lemma Says_K6:
     "⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                                  servTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs"
```

```
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
apply blast
apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor, clarify)
apply (frule Says_Tgs_message_form, assumption, clarify)
apply (blast dest: unique_CryptKey)
done
```

Needs a unicity theorem, hence moved here

```
lemma servK_authentic_ter:
 "⟦ Says Kas A
    (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
     Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
       ∈ parts (spies evs);
     Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
     evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
       ∈ set evs"
apply (frule Says_Kas_message_form, assumption)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast)
```

K2 and K4 remain

```
prefer 2 apply (blast dest!: unique_CryptKey)
apply (blast dest!: servK_authentic Says_Tgs_message_form authKeys_used)
done
```

7.7 Unicity Theorems

The session key, if secure, uniquely identifies the Ticket whether authTicket or servTicket. As a matter of fact, one can read also Tgs in the place of B.

```
lemma unique_authKeys:
     "⟦ Says Kas A
              (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, X|}) ∈ set evs;
        Says Kas A'
              (Crypt Ka' {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta', X'|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ Ka=Ka' ∧ Ta=Ta' ∧ X=X'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

K2

```
apply blast
done
```

servK uniquely identifies the message from Tgs

```
lemma unique_servKeys:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A
              (Crypt K {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, X|}) ∈ set evs;
        Says Tgs A'
              (Crypt K' {|Key servK, Agent B', Ts', X'|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ K=K' ∧ Ts=Ts' ∧ X=X'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

K4

```
apply blast
done
```

Revised unicity theorems

```
lemma Kas_Unique:
     "⟦ Says Kas A
              (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹
   Unique (Says Kas A (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta, authTicket|}))
   on evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule kerbIV_gets.induct, simp_all add: Unique_def)
apply blast
done

lemma Tgs_Unique:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A
              (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹
  Unique (Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts, servTicket|}))
  on evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule kerbIV_gets.induct, simp_all add: Unique_def)
apply blast
done
```

7.8 Lemmas About the Predicate *AKcryptSK*

```
lemma not_AKcryptSK_Nil [iff]: "¬ AKcryptSK authK servK []"
by (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)

lemma AKcryptSKI:
 "⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, X |}) ∈ set evs;
     evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧ ⟹ AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
apply (blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form)
done
```

```
lemma AKcryptSK_Says [simp]:
   "AKcryptSK authK servK (Says S A X # evs) =
     (Tgs = S ∧
      (∃B Ts. X = Crypt authK
                {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
|})
     | AKcryptSK authK servK evs)"
by (auto simp add: AKcryptSK_def)


lemma Auth_fresh_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ Key authK ∉ used evs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast)
done


lemma Serv_fresh_not_AKcryptSK:
 "Key servK ∉ used evs ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
  unfolding AKcryptSK_def by blast

lemma authK_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, tk|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK K authK evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

Reception

```
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
```

K2: by freshness

```
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
```

K4

```
by (blast+)
```

A secure serverkey cannot have been used to encrypt others

```
lemma servK_not_AKcryptSK:
 "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key SK, Number Ts|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
    Key SK ∉ analz (spies evs);  SK ∈ symKeys;
    B ≠ Tgs;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
  ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK SK K evs"
```

```
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast)
```

Reception

```
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
```

K4 splits into distinct subcases

```
apply auto
```

servK can't have been enclosed in two certificates

```
prefer 2 apply (blast dest: unique_CryptKey)
```

servK is fresh and so could not have been used, by *new_keys_not_used*

```
by (force dest!: Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
```

Long term keys are not issued as servKeys

```
lemma shrK_not_AKcryptSK:
     "evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK K (shrK A) evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
by (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, auto)
```

The Tgs message associates servK with authK and therefore not with any other key authK.

```
lemma Says_Tgs_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, X |})
           ∈ set evs;
        authK' ≠ authK;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK' servK evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
by (blast dest: unique_servKeys)
```

Equivalently

```
lemma not_different_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ AKcryptSK authK servK evs;
        authK' ≠ authK;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK' servK evs  ∧ servK ∈ symKeys"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
by (blast dest: unique_servKeys Says_Tgs_message_form)

lemma AKcryptSK_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ AKcryptSK authK servK evs;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK servK K evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts)
```

Reception

```
prefer 3 apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
apply (simp_all, safe)
```

K4 splits into subcases

```
prefer 4 apply (blast dest!: authK_not_AKcryptSK)
```

servK is fresh and so could not have been used, by *new_keys_not_used*

```
 prefer 2
 apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
```

Others by freshness

```
by (blast+)
```

The only session keys that can be found with the help of session keys are those sent by Tgs in step K4.

We take some pains to express the property as a logical equivalence so that the simplifier can apply it.

```
lemma Key_analz_image_Key_lemma:
     "P ⟶ (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ H)) ⟶ (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz H)
      ⟹
      P ⟶ (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ H)) = (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz H)"
by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN subsetD])


lemma AKcryptSK_analz_insert:
     "⟦ AKcryptSK K K' evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Key K' ∈ analz (insert (Key K) (spies evs))"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def, clarify)
by (drule Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz_insertI], auto)

lemma authKeys_are_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ K ∈ authKeys evs ∪ range shrK;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ ∀SK. ¬ AKcryptSK SK K evs ∧ K ∈ symKeys"
apply (simp add: authKeys_def AKcryptSK_def)
by (blast dest: Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form)

lemma not_authKeys_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ K ∉ authKeys evs;
        K ∉ range shrK; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ ∀SK. ¬ AKcryptSK K SK evs"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
by (blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form)
```

7.9 Secrecy Theorems

For the Oops2 case of the next theorem

```
lemma Oops2_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ evs ∈ kerbIV_gets;
        Says Tgs A (Crypt authK
                    {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
          ∈ set evs ⟧
```

```
     ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK servK SK evs"
by (blast dest: AKcryptSKI AKcryptSK_not_AKcryptSK)
```

Big simplification law for keys SK that are not crypted by keys in KK It helps prove three, otherwise hard, facts about keys. These facts are exploited as simplification laws for analz, and also "limit the damage" in case of loss of a key to the spy. See ESORICS98.

```
lemma Key_analz_image_Key [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟹
      (∀SK KK. SK ∈ symKeys ∧ KK ⊆ -(range shrK) ⟶
       (∀K ∈ KK. ¬ AKcryptSK K SK evs)   ⟶
       (Key SK ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (spies evs))) =
       (SK ∈ KK | Key SK ∈ analz (spies evs)))"
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [11] Oops_range_spies2)
apply (frule_tac [10] Oops_range_spies1)
apply (frule_tac [8] Says_tgs_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [6] Says_kas_message_form)
apply (safe del: impI intro!: Key_analz_image_Key_lemma [THEN impI])
```

Case-splits for Oops1 and message 5: the negated case simplifies using the induction hypothesis

```
apply (case_tac [12] "AKcryptSK authK SK evsO1")
apply (case_tac [9] "AKcryptSK servK SK evs5")
apply (simp_all del: image_insert
        add: analz_image_freshK_simps AKcryptSK_Says shrK_not_AKcryptSK
             Oops2_not_AKcryptSK Auth_fresh_not_AKcryptSK
       Serv_fresh_not_AKcryptSK Says_Tgs_AKcryptSK Spy_analz_shrK)
```

— 18 seconds on a 1.8GHz machine??

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

Reception

```
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
```

K2

```
apply blast
```

K3

```
apply blast
```

K4

```
apply (blast dest!: authK_not_AKcryptSK)
```

K5

```
apply (case_tac "Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs5) ")
```

If servK is compromised then the result follows directly...

```
apply (simp (no_asm_simp) add: analz_insert_eq Un_upper2 [THEN analz_mono,
THEN subsetD])
```

...therefore servK is uncompromised.

The AKcryptSK servK SK evs5 case leads to a contradiction.

apply *(blast elim!: servK_not_AKcryptSK [THEN [2] rev_notE] del: allE ballE)*

Another K5 case

apply *blast*

Oops1

apply *simp*
by *(blast dest!: AKcryptSK_analz_insert)*

First simplification law for analz: no session keys encrypt authentication keys or shared keys.

lemma *analz_insert_freshK1:*
```
"⟦ evs ∈ kerbIV_gets;  K ∈ authKeys evs ∪ range shrK;
   SesKey ∉ range shrK ⟧
 ⟹ (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key SesKey) (spies evs))) =
    (K = SesKey | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
```
apply *(frule authKeys_are_not_AKcryptSK, assumption)*
apply *(simp del: image_insert*
add: analz_image_freshK_simps add: Key_analz_image_Key)
done

Second simplification law for analz: no service keys encrypt any other keys.

lemma *analz_insert_freshK2:*
```
"⟦ evs ∈ kerbIV_gets;  servK ∉ (authKeys evs); servK ∉ range shrK;
   K ∈ symKeys ⟧
 ⟹ (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key servK) (spies evs))) =
    (K = servK | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
```
apply *(frule not_authKeys_not_AKcryptSK, assumption, assumption)*
apply *(simp del: image_insert*
add: analz_image_freshK_simps add: Key_analz_image_Key)
done

Third simplification law for analz: only one authentication key encrypts a certain service key.

lemma *analz_insert_freshK3:*
```
"⟦ AKcryptSK authK servK evs;
   authK' ≠ authK; authK' ∉ range shrK; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ (Key servK ∈ analz (insert (Key authK') (spies evs))) =
      (servK = authK' | Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs))"
```
apply *(drule_tac authK' = authK'* **in** *not_different_AKcryptSK, blast, assumption)*
apply *(simp del: image_insert*
add: analz_image_freshK_simps add: Key_analz_image_Key)
done

lemma *analz_insert_freshK3_bis:*
```
"⟦ Says Tgs A
     (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
   ∈ set evs;
   authK ≠ authK'; authK' ∉ range shrK; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
```

```
        ⟹ (Key servK ∈ analz (insert (Key authK') (spies evs))) =
              (servK = authK' | Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (frule AKcryptSKI, assumption)
by (simp add: analz_insert_freshK3)
```

a weakness of the protocol

```
lemma authK_compromises_servK:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A
              (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
           ∈ set evs;  authK ∈ symKeys;
         Key authK ∈ analz (spies evs); evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs)"
by (force dest: Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Decrypt, THEN analz.Fst])

lemma servK_notin_authKeysD:
     "⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts,
                      Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|}|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
         B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ servK ∉ authKeys evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (simp add: authKeys_def)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [8] Gets_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [6] Gets_ticket_parts, simp_all)
by (blast+)
```

If Spy sees the Authentication Key sent in msg K2, then the Key has expired.

```
lemma Confidentiality_Kas_lemma [rule_format]:
     "⟦ authK ∈ symKeys; A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
      ⟹ Says Kas A
               (Crypt (shrK A)
                  {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
             ∈ set evs ⟶
           Key authK ∈ analz (spies evs) ⟶
           expiredAK Ta evs"
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply (frule_tac [11] Oops_range_spies2)
apply (frule_tac [10] Oops_range_spies1)
apply (frule_tac [8] Says_tgs_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [6] Says_kas_message_form)
apply (safe del: impI conjI impCE)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: Says_Kas_message_form less_SucI analz_insert_eq
not_parts_not_analz analz_insert_freshK1 pushes)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

K2

```
apply blast
```

K4

apply *blast*

Level 8: K5

apply *(blast dest: servK_notin_authKeysD Says_Kas_message_form intro: less_SucI)*

Oops1

apply *(blast dest!: unique_authKeys intro: less_SucI)*

Oops2

by *(blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form Says_Kas_message_form)*

lemma *Confidentiality_Kas:*
```
"⟦ Says Kas A
         (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|})
      ∈ set evs;
    ¬ expiredAK Ta evs;
    A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
  ⟹ Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
```
by *(blast dest: Says_Kas_message_form Confidentiality_Kas_lemma)*

If Spy sees the Service Key sent in msg K4, then the Key has expired.

lemma *Confidentiality_lemma [rule_format]:*
```
"⟦ Says Tgs A
       (Crypt authK
          {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts,
            Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|})
      ∈ set evs;
    Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
    servK ∈ symKeys;
    A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
  ⟹ Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs) ⟶
      expiredSK Ts evs"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbIV_gets.induct)*
apply *(rule_tac [10] impI)+*
— The Oops1 case is unusual: must simplify *Authkey ∉ analz (knows Spy (ev # evs))*, not letting *analz_mono_contra* weaken it to *Authkey ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)*, for we then conclude *authK ≠ authKa*.
apply *analz_mono_contra*
apply *(frule_tac [11] Oops_range_spies2)*
apply *(frule_tac [10] Oops_range_spies1)*
apply *(frule_tac [8] Says_tgs_message_form)*
apply *(frule_tac [6] Says_kas_message_form)*
apply *(safe del: impI conjI impCE)*
apply *(simp_all add: less_SucI new_keys_not_analzd Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form analz_insert_eq not_parts_not_analz analz_insert_freshK1 analz_insert_freshK2 analz_insert_freshK3_bis pushes)*

Fake

apply *spy_analz*

K2

apply *(blast intro: parts_insertI less_SucI)*

K4

apply *(blast dest: authTicket_authentic Confidentiality_Kas)*

Oops2

prefer *3*
apply *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies [THEN parts.Inj] Key_unique_SesKey intro: less_SucI)*

Oops1

prefer *2*
apply *(blast dest: Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form intro: less_SucI)*

K5. Not clear how this step could be integrated with the main simplification step.
Done in KerberosV.thy

apply *clarify*
apply *(erule_tac V = "Says Aa Tgs X ∈ set evs" **for** X evs **in** thin_rl)*
apply *(frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN servK_notin_authKeysD])*
apply *(assumption, assumption, blast, assumption)*
apply *(simp add: analz_insert_freshK2)*
apply *(blast dest: Key_unique_SesKey intro: less_SucI)*
done

In the real world Tgs can't check wheter authK is secure!

lemma *Confidentiality_Tgs:*
```
"⟦ Says Tgs A
         (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
      ∈ set evs;
   Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
   ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
   A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
```
by *(blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form Confidentiality_lemma)*

In the real world Tgs CAN check what Kas sends!

lemma *Confidentiality_Tgs_bis:*
```
"⟦ Says Kas A
          (Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|})
      ∈ set evs;
   Says Tgs A
        (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
      ∈ set evs;
   ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
   A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
```
by *(blast dest!: Confidentiality_Kas Confidentiality_Tgs)*

Most general form

lemmas *Confidentiality_Tgs_ter = authTicket_authentic [THEN Confidentiality_Tgs_bis]*

lemmas *Confidentiality_Auth_A = authK_authentic [THEN Confidentiality_Kas]*

Needs a confidentiality guarantee, hence moved here. Authenticity of servK for A

lemma *servK_authentic_bis_r:*
```
"⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
⟹Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
   ∈ set evs"
```
by *(blast dest: authK_authentic Confidentiality_Auth_A servK_authentic_ter)*

lemma *Confidentiality_Serv_A:*
```
"⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
   A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
```
by *(metis Confidentiality_Auth_A Confidentiality_Tgs K4_imp_K2 authK_authentic authTicket_form servK_authentic unique_authKeys)*

lemma *u_Confidentiality_B:*
```
"⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
   A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
```
by *(blast dest: u_servTicket_authentic u_NotexpiredSK_NotexpiredAK Confidentiality_Tgs_bis)*

7.10 2. Parties' strong authentication: non-injective agreement on the session key. The same guarantees also express key distribution, hence their names

Authentication here still is weak agreement - of B with A

lemma *A_authenticates_B:*
```
"⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
   Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|}
     ∈ parts (spies evs);
   Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
   A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs"
```
by *(blast dest: authK_authentic servK_authentic Says_Kas_message_form Key_unique_SesKey K4_imp_K2 intro: Says_K6)*

lemma *shrK_in_initState_Server[iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ initState Kas"*
by *(induct_tac "A", auto)*

lemma *shrK_in_knows_Server [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ knows Kas evs"*
by *(simp add: initState_subset_knows [THEN subsetD])*

lemma *A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_Kas:*
"⟦ Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set evs;
A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
⟹ Says Kas A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta, authTicket|}) ∈ set evs
∧ Key authK ∈ analz(knows Kas evs)"
by *(force dest!: authK_authentic Says_imp_knows [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Decrypt, THEN analz.Fst])*

lemma *K3_imp_Gets_evs:*
"⟦ Says A Tgs {|Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|},
Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B|}
∈ set evs; A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
⟹ Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta,
Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|})
∈ set evs"
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbIV_gets.induct)*
apply *auto*
apply *(blast dest: authTicket_form)*
done

lemma *Tgs_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A:*
"⟦ Gets Tgs {|
Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|},
Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B |} ∈ set evs;
Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
⟹ ∃ B. Says A Tgs {|
Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|},
Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B |} ∈ set evs
∧ Key authK ∈ analz (knows A evs)"
apply *(frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst], assumption)*
apply *(drule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd, THEN parts.Fst], assumption)*
apply *(drule Tgs_authenticates_A, assumption+, simp)*
apply *(force dest!: K3_imp_Gets_evs Gets_imp_knows [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Decrypt, THEN analz.Fst])*
done

lemma *K4_imp_Gets:*
"⟦ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
∈ set evs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
⟹ ∃ Ta X.
Gets Tgs {|Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}, X|}

```
       ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_Tgs:
 "⟦  Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|})
       ∈ set evs;
     Gets A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
       ∈ set evs;
     Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); A ∉ bad;
     evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ Says Tgs A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|})
       ∈ set evs
  ∧ Key authK ∈ analz (knows Tgs evs)
  ∧ Key servK ∈ analz (knows Tgs evs)"
apply (drule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj], assumption)
apply (drule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj], assumption)
apply (frule authK_authentic, assumption+)
apply (drule servK_authentic_ter, assumption+)
apply (frule K4_imp_Gets, assumption, erule exE, erule exE)
apply (drule Gets_imp_knows [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Fst, THEN analz.Decrypt,
THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Fst], assumption, force)
apply (metis Says_imp_knows analz.Fst analz.Inj analz_symKeys_Decrypt authTicket_form)
done

lemma K5_imp_Gets:
  "⟦ Says A B {|servTicket, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|} ∈ set evs;
     A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ ∃ authK Ts authTicket T2.
     Gets A (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|}) ∈ set
evs
 ∧ Says A Tgs {|authTicket, Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B|}  ∈
set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma K3_imp_Gets:
  "⟦ Says A Tgs {|authTicket, Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B|}
       ∈ set evs;
     A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ ∃ Ta. Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|})
∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A:
     "⟦ Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|},
                Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|} ∈ set evs;
```

```
       Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
       A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ Says A B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|},
              Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|} ∈ set evs
  ∧ Key servK ∈ analz (knows A evs)"
apply (frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst, THEN servTicket_authentic_Tgs
assumption+)
apply (drule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd], assumption)
apply (erule exE, drule Says_K5, assumption+)
apply (frule K5_imp_Gets, assumption+)
apply clarify
apply (drule K3_imp_Gets, assumption+)
apply (erule exE)
apply (frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN authK_authentic, THEN
Says_Kas_message_form], assumption+, clarify)
apply (force dest!: Gets_imp_knows [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Decrypt, THEN
analz.Fst])
done


lemma K6_imp_Gets:
  "⟦ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs;
     B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
⟹ ∃ Ts X. Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|},X|}
       ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbIV_gets.induct)
apply auto
done


lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_B:
  "⟦ Gets A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts, servTicket|},
              Crypt servK (Number T3)|} ∈ set evs;
     Gets A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, authTicket|})
           ∈ set evs;
     Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
     A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbIV_gets ⟧
 ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs
   ∧ Key servK ∈ analz (knows B evs)"
apply (frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst], assumption)
apply (drule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd], assumption)
apply (drule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj], assumption)
apply (drule A_authenticates_B, assumption+)
apply (force dest!: K6_imp_Gets Gets_imp_knows [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Fst,
THEN analz.Decrypt, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Fst])
done

end
```

8 The Kerberos Protocol, Version V

```
theory KerberosV imports Public begin
```

The "u" prefix indicates theorems referring to an updated version of the protocol. The "r" suffix indicates theorems where the confidentiality assumptions are relaxed by the corresponding arguments.

abbreviation
```
Kas :: agent where
"Kas == Server"
```

abbreviation
```
Tgs :: agent where
"Tgs == Friend 0"
```

axiomatization where
```
Tgs_not_bad [iff]: "Tgs ∉ bad"
```
— Tgs is secure — we already know that Kas is secure

definition

```
authKeys :: "event list ⇒ key set" where
"authKeys evs = {authK. ∃A Peer Ta.
    Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Peer, Ta|},
                 Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, Key authK, Ta|}
               |} ∈ set evs}"
```

definition

```
Issues :: "[agent, agent, msg, event list] ⇒ bool"
          (‹_ Issues _ with _ on _›) where
 "A Issues B with X on evs =
    (∃Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs ∧ X ∈ parts {Y} ∧
      X ∉ parts (spies (takeWhile (λz. z ≠ Says A B Y) (rev evs))))"
```

consts

```
authKlife   :: nat

servKlife   :: nat

authlife    :: nat

replylife   :: nat
```

specification *(authKlife)*
```
authKlife_LB [iff]: "2 ≤ authKlife"
```
by *blast*

specification *(servKlife)*
```
servKlife_LB [iff]: "2 + authKlife ≤ servKlife"
```
by *blast*

```
specification (authlife)
  authlife_LB [iff]: "Suc 0 ≤ authlife"
    by blast

specification (replylife)
  replylife_LB [iff]: "Suc 0 ≤ replylife"
    by blast

abbreviation

  CT :: "event list ⇒ nat" where
  "CT == length"

abbreviation
  expiredAK :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredAK T evs == authKlife + T < CT evs"

abbreviation
  expiredSK :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredSK T evs == servKlife + T < CT evs"

abbreviation
  expiredA :: "[nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "expiredA T evs == authlife + T < CT evs"

abbreviation
  valid :: "[nat, nat] ⇒ bool"  (<valid _ wrt _>) where
  "valid T1 wrt T2 == T1 ≤ replylife + T2"




definition AKcryptSK :: "[key, key, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "AKcryptSK authK servK evs ==
     ∃A B tt.
       Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, tt|},
                    Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, tt|} |}
         ∈ set evs"

inductive_set kerbV :: "event list set"
  where

   Nil:  "[] ∈ kerbV"

 | Fake: "⟦ evsf ∈ kerbV;  X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf)) ⟧
          ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ kerbV"



 | KV1:   "⟦ evs1 ∈ kerbV ⟧
          ⟹ Says A Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number (CT evs1)|} # evs1
          ∈ kerbV"
```

```
| KV2:  "⟦ evs2 ∈ kerbV; Key authK ∉ used evs2; authK ∈ symKeys;
           Says A' Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number T1|} ∈ set evs2 ⟧
         ⟹ Says Kas A {|
          Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number (CT evs2)|},
        Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number (CT evs2)|}

                        |} # evs2 ∈ kerbV"


| KV3:  "⟦ evs3 ∈ kerbV; A ≠ Kas; A ≠ Tgs;
           Says A Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number T1|} ∈ set evs3;
           Says Kas' A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
                        authTicket|} ∈ set evs3;
           valid Ta wrt T1
        ⟧
         ⟹ Says A Tgs {|authTicket,
                         (Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number (CT evs3)|}),
                         Agent B|} # evs3 ∈ kerbV"

| KV4:  "⟦ evs4 ∈ kerbV; Key servK ∉ used evs4; servK ∈ symKeys;
           B ≠ Tgs;  authK ∈ symKeys;
           Says A' Tgs {|
            (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK,
                                Number Ta|}),
            (Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}), Agent B|}
              ∈ set evs4;
           ¬ expiredAK Ta evs4;
           ¬ expiredA T2 evs4;
           servKlife + (CT evs4) ≤ authKlife + Ta
        ⟧
         ⟹ Says Tgs A {|
             Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number (CT evs4)|},
  Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number (CT evs4)|}
                        |} # evs4 ∈ kerbV"


| KV5:  "⟦ evs5 ∈ kerbV; authK ∈ symKeys; servK ∈ symKeys;
           A ≠ Kas; A ≠ Tgs;
           Says A Tgs
               {|authTicket, Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|},
                 Agent B|}
             ∈ set evs5;
           Says Tgs' A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|},
                         servTicket|}
              ∈ set evs5;
           valid Ts wrt T2 ⟧
         ⟹ Says A B {|servTicket,
                       Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number (CT evs5)|} |}
            # evs5 ∈ kerbV"

 | KV6:  "⟦ evs6 ∈ kerbV; B ≠ Kas; B ≠ Tgs;
```

```
          Says A' B {|
            (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}),
            (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|})|}
          ∈ set evs6;
          ¬ expiredSK Ts evs6;
          ¬ expiredA T3 evs6
        ⟧
        ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number Ta2))
            # evs6 ∈ kerbV"


| Oops1:"⟦ evsO1 ∈ kerbV;  A ≠ Spy;
           Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
                        authTicket|}  ∈ set evsO1;
           expiredAK Ta evsO1 ⟧
        ⟹ Notes Spy {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number Ta, Key authK|}
            # evsO1 ∈ kerbV"


| Oops2: "⟦ evsO2 ∈ kerbV;  A ≠ Spy;
           Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|},
                        servTicket|}  ∈ set evsO2;
           expiredSK Ts evsO2 ⟧
        ⟹ Notes Spy {|Agent A, Agent B, Number Ts, Key servK|}
            # evsO2 ∈ kerbV"
```

declare *Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest]*
declare *parts.Body [dest]*
declare *analz_into_parts [dest]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]*

8.1 Lemmas about lists, for reasoning about Issues

lemma *spies_Says_rev: "spies (evs @ [Says A B X]) = insert X (spies evs)"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a", auto)*
done

lemma *spies_Gets_rev: "spies (evs @ [Gets A X]) = spies evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a", auto)*
done

lemma *spies_Notes_rev: "spies (evs @ [Notes A X]) =*
(if A∈bad then insert X (spies evs) else spies evs)"
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a", auto)*

done

lemma *spies_evs_rev: "spies evs = spies (rev evs)"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a")*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: spies_Says_rev spies_Gets_rev spies_Notes_rev)*
done

lemmas *parts_spies_evs_revD2 = spies_evs_rev [THEN equalityD2, THEN parts_mono]*

lemma *spies_takeWhile: "spies (takeWhile P evs) ⊆ spies evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rename_tac [2] a b)*
apply *(induct_tac [2] "a", auto)*

Resembles *used_subset_append* in theory Event.

done

lemmas *parts_spies_takeWhile_mono = spies_takeWhile [THEN parts_mono]*

8.2 Lemmas about *authKeys*

lemma *authKeys_empty: "authKeys [] = {}"*
by *(simp add: authKeys_def)*

lemma *authKeys_not_insert:*
"(∀A Ta akey Peer.
ev ≠ Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|akey, Agent Peer, Ta|},
Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, akey, Ta|} |}
⟹ authKeys (ev # evs) = authKeys evs"
by *(auto simp add: authKeys_def)*

lemma *authKeys_insert:*
"authKeys
(Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent Peer, Number Ta|},
Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, Key K, Number Ta|} |} # evs)
= insert K (authKeys evs)"
by *(auto simp add: authKeys_def)*

lemma *authKeys_simp:*
"K ∈ authKeys
(Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K', Agent Peer, Number Ta|},
Crypt (shrK Peer) {|Agent A, Agent Peer, Key K', Number Ta|} |} # evs)
⟹ K = K' | K ∈ authKeys evs"
by *(auto simp add: authKeys_def)*

lemma *authKeysI:*
"Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key K, Number Ta|} |} ∈ set evs
⟹ K ∈ authKeys evs"
by *(auto simp add: authKeys_def)*

lemma *authKeys_used: "K ∈ authKeys evs ⟹ Key K ∈ used evs"*

by *(auto simp add: authKeys_def)*

8.3 Forwarding Lemmas

lemma *Says_ticket_parts:*
```
     "Says S A {|Crypt K {|SesKey, B, TimeStamp|}, Ticket|}
                ∈ set evs ⟹ Ticket ∈ parts (spies evs)"
```
by *blast*

lemma *Says_ticket_analz:*
```
     "Says S A {|Crypt K {|SesKey, B, TimeStamp|}, Ticket|}
                ∈ set evs ⟹ Ticket ∈ analz (spies evs)"
```
by *(blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd])*

lemma *Oops_range_spies1:*
```
     "[| Says Kas A {|Crypt KeyA {|Key authK, Peer, Ta|}, authTicket|}
           ∈ set evs ;
         evs ∈ kerbV |] ⟹ authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ symKeys"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *Oops_range_spies2:*
```
     "[| Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|}, servTicket|}
           ∈ set evs ;
         evs ∈ kerbV |] ⟹ servK ∉ range shrK ∧ servK ∈ symKeys"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *Spy_see_shrK [simp]:*
```
     "evs ∈ kerbV ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
```
apply *(erule kerbV.induct)*
apply *(frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)*
apply *(frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)*
apply *(blast+)*
done

lemma *Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:*
```
     "evs ∈ kerbV ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
```
by *auto*

lemma *Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:*
```
     "[| Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs);  evs ∈ kerbV |] ⟹ A∈bad"
```
by *(blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)*

lemmas *Spy_analz_shrK_D = analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD, THEN Spy_see_shrK_D, dest!]*

Nobody can have used non-existent keys!

lemma *new_keys_not_used [simp]:*
```
    "[|Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ kerbV|]
```

```
     ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)
```

Others

```
apply (force dest!: analz_shrK_Decrypt)+
done
```

```
lemma new_keys_not_analzd:
 "⟦evs ∈ kerbV; K ∈ symKeys; Key K ∉ used evs⟧
  ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (analz (spies evs))"
by (blast dest: new_keys_not_used intro: keysFor_mono [THEN subsetD])
```

8.4 Regularity Lemmas

These concern the form of items passed in messages

Describes the form of all components sent by Kas

```
lemma Says_Kas_message_form:
     "⟦ Says Kas A {|Crypt K {|Key authK, Agent Peer, Ta|}, authTicket|}
           ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ authKeys evs ∧ authK ∈ symKeys ∧

  authTicket = (Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Ta|}) ∧
               K = shrK A  ∧ Peer = Tgs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm) add: authKeys_def authKeys_insert)
apply blast+
done
```

```
lemma SesKey_is_session_key:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs_B) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs_B, Key SesKey, Number T|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs); Tgs_B ∉ bad;
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ SesKey ∉ range shrK"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast)
done
```

```
lemma authTicket_authentic:
```

```
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Ta|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta|},
                     Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Ta|}|}
           ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake, K4

```
apply (blast+)
done
```

```
lemma authTicket_crypt_authK:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ authK ∈ authKeys evs"
by (metis authKeysI authTicket_authentic)
```

Describes the form of servK, servTicket and authK sent by Tgs

```
lemma Says_Tgs_message_form:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|}, servTicket|}
          ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
   ⟹ B ≠ Tgs ∧
      servK ∉ range shrK ∧ servK ∉ authKeys evs ∧ servK ∈ symKeys ∧
      servTicket = (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|}) ∧
      authK ∉ range shrK ∧ authK ∈ authKeys evs ∧ authK ∈ symKeys"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (simp_all add: authKeys_insert authKeys_not_insert authKeys_empty authKeys_simp,
blast, auto)
```

Three subcases of Message 4

```
apply (blast dest!: authKeys_used Says_Kas_message_form)
apply (blast dest!: SesKey_is_session_key)
apply (blast dest: authTicket_crypt_authK)
done
```

8.5 Authenticity theorems: confirm origin of sensitive messages

```
lemma authK_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ ∃ AT. Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta|}, AT|}
           ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
```

```
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)
apply blast+
done
```

If a certain encrypted message appears then it originated with Tgs

```
lemma servK_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        authK ∉ range shrK;
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃A ST. Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|}, ST|}
       ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)
apply blast+
done

lemma servK_authentic_bis:
     "⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        B ≠ Tgs;
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃A ST. Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|}, ST|}
       ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast+)
done
```

Authenticity of servK for B

```
lemma servTicket_authentic_Tgs:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃authK.
       Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|},
                    Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|}|}
       ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast+)
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection

```
lemma K4_imp_K2:
```

```
"⟦ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}, servTicket|}
      ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ kerbV⟧
   ⟹ ∃Ta. Says Kas A
        {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
          Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|} |}
        ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all, auto)
apply (metis MPair_analz Says_imp_analz_Spy analz_conj_parts authTicket_authentic)
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection

```
lemma u_K4_imp_K2:
"⟦ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}, servTicket|}  ∈
set evs; evs ∈ kerbV⟧
   ⟹ ∃Ta. Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
            Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|} |}
            ∈ set evs
         ∧ servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all, auto)
apply (blast dest!: Says_imp_spies [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst, THEN authTicket_authentic])
done

lemma servTicket_authentic_Kas:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ ∃authK Ta.
       Says Kas A
         {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|} |}
        ∈ set evs"
by (metis K4_imp_K2 servTicket_authentic_Tgs)

lemma u_servTicket_authentic_Kas:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
         evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ ∃authK Ta.
       Says Kas A
         {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
           Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|} |}
        ∈ set evs ∧
      servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta"
by (metis servTicket_authentic_Tgs u_K4_imp_K2)

lemma servTicket_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
```

```
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃Ta authK.
     Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
                  Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number
Ta|} |}  ∈ set evs
     ∧ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|},
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|}
       ∈ set evs"
by (metis K4_imp_K2 servTicket_authentic_Tgs)

lemma u_servTicket_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);  B ≠ Tgs;  B ∉ bad;
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃Ta authK.
     Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
                  Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number
Ta|}|} ∈ set evs
     ∧ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|},
                 Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|}
       ∈ set evs
     ∧ servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta"
by (metis servTicket_authentic_Tgs u_K4_imp_K2)

lemma u_NotexpiredSK_NotexpiredAK:
     "⟦ ¬ expiredSK Ts evs; servKlife + Ts ≤ authKlife + Ta ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ expiredAK Ta evs"
by (metis order_le_less_trans)
```

8.6 Reliability: friendly agents send something if something else happened

```
lemma K3_imp_K2:
     "⟦ Says A Tgs
            {|authTicket, Crypt authK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B|}
          ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ ∃Ta AT. Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta|},

                                  AT|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast, blast)
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst, THEN authK_authentic])
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection. An authK is encrypted by one and only one Shared key. A servK is encrypted by one and only one authK.

```
lemma Key_unique_SesKey:
     "⟦ Crypt K  {|Key SesKey,  Agent B, T|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt K' {|Key SesKey,  Agent B', T'|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);  Key SesKey ∉ analz (spies evs);
```

```
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
     ⟹ K=K' ∧ B=B' ∧ T=T'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake, K2, K4

```
apply (blast+)
done
```

This inevitably has an existential form in version V

```
lemma Says_K5:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|},
                                    servTicket|} ∈ set evs;
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ ∃ ST. Says A B {|ST, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
apply blast
```

K3

```
apply (blast dest: authK_authentic Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form)
```

K4

```
apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

K5

```
apply (blast dest: Key_unique_SesKey)
done
```

Anticipated here from next subsection

```
lemma unique_CryptKey:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B)  {|Agent A,  Agent B,  Key SesKey, T|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Agent B', Key SesKey, T'|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);  Key SesKey ∉ analz (spies evs);
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
     ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ T=T'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
```

```
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake, K2, K4

```
apply (blast+)
done
```

```
lemma Says_K6:
     "⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|},
                      servTicket|} ∈ set evs;
         Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
         A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
       ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs"
apply (frule Says_Tgs_message_form, assumption, clarify)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply simp_all
```

fake

```
apply blast
```

K4

```
apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

K6

```
apply (metis MPair_parts Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy unique_CryptKey)
done
```

Needs a unicity theorem, hence moved here

```
lemma servK_authentic_ter:
 "⟦ Says Kas A
       {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta|}, authTicket|} ∈ set evs;
     Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|}
       ∈ parts (spies evs);
     Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
     evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|},
                 Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Ts|} |}
       ∈ set evs"
apply (frule Says_Kas_message_form, assumption)
apply clarify
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast)
```

K2 and K4 remain

```
apply (blast dest!: servK_authentic Says_Tgs_message_form authKeys_used)
apply (blast dest!: unique_CryptKey)
done
```

8.7 Unicity Theorems

The session key, if secure, uniquely identifies the Ticket whether authTicket or servTicket. As a matter of fact, one can read also Tgs in the place of B.

```
lemma unique_authKeys:
     "⟦ Says Kas A
              {|Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta|}, X|} ∈ set evs;
        Says Kas A'
              {|Crypt Ka' {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Ta'|}, X'|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ Ka=Ka' ∧ Ta=Ta' ∧ X=X'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)
apply blast+
done
```

servK uniquely identifies the message from Tgs

```
lemma unique_servKeys:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A
              {|Crypt K {|Key servK, Agent B, Ts|}, X|} ∈ set evs;
        Says Tgs A'
              {|Crypt K' {|Key servK, Agent B', Ts'|}, X'|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ kerbV ⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ K=K' ∧ Ts=Ts' ∧ X=X'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)
apply blast+
done
```

8.8 Lemmas About the Predicate *AKcryptSK*

```
lemma not_AKcryptSK_Nil [iff]: "¬ AKcryptSK authK servK []"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
done

lemma AKcryptSKI:
 "⟦ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, tt|}, X |} ∈ set evs;
     evs ∈ kerbV ⟧ ⟹ AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
by (metis AKcryptSK_def Says_Tgs_message_form)

lemma AKcryptSK_Says [simp]:
   "AKcryptSK authK servK (Says S A X # evs) =
     (S = Tgs ∧
      (∃B tt. X = {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, tt|},
                   Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, tt|} |})
```

```
     | AKcryptSK authK servK evs)"
by (auto simp add: AKcryptSK_def)

lemma AKcryptSK_Notes [simp]:
   "AKcryptSK authK servK (Notes A X # evs) =
      AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
by (auto simp add: AKcryptSK_def)


lemma Auth_fresh_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ Key authK ∉ used evs; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast)
done


lemma Serv_fresh_not_AKcryptSK:
 "Key servK ∉ used evs ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK servK evs"
by (auto simp add: AKcryptSK_def)

lemma authK_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, tk|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK K authK evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all)
```

Fake,K2,K4

```
apply (auto simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
done
```

A secure serverkey cannot have been used to encrypt others

```
lemma servK_not_AKcryptSK:
 "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key SK, tt|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
     Key SK ∉ analz (spies evs);  SK ∈ symKeys;
     B ≠ Tgs;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK SK K evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, simp_all, blast)
```

K4

```
apply (metis Auth_fresh_not_AKcryptSK MPair_parts Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy
authKeys_used authTicket_crypt_authK unique_CryptKey)
done
```

Long term keys are not issued as servKeys

```
lemma shrK_not_AKcryptSK:
     "evs ∈ kerbV ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK K (shrK A) evs"
unfolding AKcryptSK_def
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts, auto)
done
```

The Tgs message associates servK with authK and therefore not with any other key authK.

```
lemma Says_Tgs_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, tt|}, X |}
          ∈ set evs;
        authK' ≠ authK;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK' servK evs"
by (metis AKcryptSK_def unique_servKeys)

lemma AKcryptSK_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ AKcryptSK authK servK evs;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK servK K evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all, safe)
```

K4 splits into subcases

```
prefer 4 apply (blast dest!: authK_not_AKcryptSK)
```

servK is fresh and so could not have been used, by *new_keys_not_used*

```
 prefer 2
 apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
```

Others by freshness

```
apply (blast+)
done

lemma not_different_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ AKcryptSK authK servK evs;
        authK' ≠ authK;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK authK' servK evs  ∧ servK ∈ symKeys"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
apply (blast dest: unique_servKeys Says_Tgs_message_form)
done
```

The only session keys that can be found with the help of session keys are those sent by Tgs in step K4.

We take some pains to express the property as a logical equivalence so that the simplifier can apply it.

```
lemma Key_analz_image_Key_lemma:
```

```
     "P ⟶ (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ H)) ⟶ (K∈KK ∨ Key K ∈ analz H)
      ⟹
      P ⟶ (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ H)) = (K∈KK ∨ Key K ∈ analz H)"
by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN subsetD])


lemma AKcryptSK_analz_insert:
     "⟦ AKcryptSK K K' evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Key K' ∈ analz (insert (Key K) (spies evs))"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def, clarify)
apply (drule Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz_insertI], auto)
done

lemma authKeys_are_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ K ∈ authKeys evs ∪ range shrK;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ ∀SK. ¬ AKcryptSK SK K evs ∧ K ∈ symKeys"
apply (simp add: authKeys_def AKcryptSK_def)
apply (blast dest: Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form)
done

lemma not_authKeys_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ K ∉ authKeys evs;
        K ∉ range shrK; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ ∀SK. ¬ AKcryptSK K SK evs"
apply (simp add: AKcryptSK_def)
apply (blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form)
done
```

8.9 Secrecy Theorems

For the Oops2 case of the next theorem

```
lemma Oops2_not_AKcryptSK:
     "⟦ evs ∈ kerbV;
        Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK
                     {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}, servTicket|}
          ∈ set evs ⟧
      ⟹ ¬ AKcryptSK servK SK evs"
by (blast dest: AKcryptSKI AKcryptSK_not_AKcryptSK)
```

Big simplification law for keys SK that are not crypted by keys in KK It helps prove three, otherwise hard, facts about keys. These facts are exploited as simplification laws for analz, and also "limit the damage" in case of loss of a key to the spy. See ESORICS98.

```
lemma Key_analz_image_Key [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "evs ∈ kerbV ⟹
      (∀SK KK. SK ∈ symKeys ∧ KK ⊆ -(range shrK) ⟶
       (∀K ∈ KK. ¬ AKcryptSK K SK evs)   ⟶
       (Key SK ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (spies evs))) =
       (SK ∈ KK | Key SK ∈ analz (spies evs)))"
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [10] Oops_range_spies2)
apply (frule_tac [9] Oops_range_spies1)
```

```
apply (drule_tac [7] Says_ticket_analz)

apply (drule_tac [5] Says_ticket_analz)
apply (safe del: impI intro!: Key_analz_image_Key_lemma [THEN impI])
```

Case-splits for Oops1 and message 5: the negated case simplifies using the induction hypothesis

```
apply (case_tac [9] "AKcryptSK authK SK evsO1")
apply (case_tac [7] "AKcryptSK servK SK evs5")
apply (simp_all del: image_insert
          add: analz_image_freshK_simps AKcryptSK_Says shrK_not_AKcryptSK
               Oops2_not_AKcryptSK Auth_fresh_not_AKcryptSK
               Serv_fresh_not_AKcryptSK Says_Tgs_AKcryptSK Spy_analz_shrK)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

K2

```
apply blast
```

Cases K3 and K5 solved by the simplifier thanks to the ticket being in analz - this strategy is new wrt version IV

K4

```
apply (blast dest!: authK_not_AKcryptSK)
```

Oops1

```
apply (metis AKcryptSK_analz_insert insert_Key_singleton)
done
```

First simplification law for analz: no session keys encrypt authentication keys or shared keys.

```
lemma analz_insert_freshK1:
     "⟦ evs ∈ kerbV;  K ∈ authKeys evs ∪ range shrK;
        SesKey ∉ range shrK ⟧
      ⟹ (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key SesKey) (spies evs))) =
         (K = SesKey | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (frule authKeys_are_not_AKcryptSK, assumption)
apply (simp del: image_insert
            add: analz_image_freshK_simps add: Key_analz_image_Key)
done
```

Second simplification law for analz: no service keys encrypt any other keys.

```
lemma analz_insert_freshK2:
     "⟦ evs ∈ kerbV;  servK ∉ (authKeys evs); servK ∉ range shrK;
        K ∈ symKeys ⟧
      ⟹ (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key servK) (spies evs))) =
         (K = servK | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (frule not_authKeys_not_AKcryptSK, assumption, assumption)
apply (simp del: image_insert
            add: analz_image_freshK_simps add: Key_analz_image_Key)
done
```

Third simplification law for analz: only one authentication key encrypts a certain service key.

```
lemma analz_insert_freshK3:
 "⟦ AKcryptSK authK servK evs;
    authK' ≠ authK; authK' ∉ range shrK; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
        ⟹ (Key servK ∈ analz (insert (Key authK') (spies evs))) =
                (servK = authK' | Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (drule_tac authK' = authK' in not_different_AKcryptSK, blast, assumption)
apply (simp del: image_insert
            add: analz_image_freshK_simps add: Key_analz_image_Key)
done

lemma analz_insert_freshK3_bis:
 "⟦ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}, servTicket|}
        ∈ set evs;
     authK ≠ authK'; authK' ∉ range shrK; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
        ⟹ (Key servK ∈ analz (insert (Key authK') (spies evs))) =
                (servK = authK' | Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (frule AKcryptSKI, assumption)
apply (simp add: analz_insert_freshK3)
done
```

a weakness of the protocol

```
lemma authK_compromises_servK:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}, servTicket|}
        ∈ set evs;  authK ∈ symKeys;
         Key authK ∈ analz (spies evs); evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs)"
  by (metis Says_imp_analz_Spy analz.Fst analz_Decrypt')
```

lemma `servK_notin_authKeysD` not needed in version V

If Spy sees the Authentication Key sent in msg K2, then the Key has expired.

```
lemma Confidentiality_Kas_lemma [rule_format]:
     "⟦ authK ∈ symKeys; A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Says Kas A
                {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|},
            Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key authK, Number Ta|}|}
              ∈ set evs ⟶
            Key authK ∈ analz (spies evs) ⟶
            expiredAK Ta evs"
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [10] Oops_range_spies2)
apply (frule_tac [9] Oops_range_spies1)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_analz)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_analz)
apply (safe del: impI conjI impCE)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: Says_Kas_message_form less_SucI analz_insert_eq
not_parts_not_analz analz_insert_freshK1 pushes)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

K2

apply *blast*

K4

apply *blast*

Oops1

apply *(blast dest!: unique_authKeys intro: less_SucI)*

Oops2

apply *(blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form Says_Kas_message_form)*
done

lemma *Confidentiality_Kas:*
```
"⟦ Says Kas A
        {|Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|}, authTicket|}
     ∈ set evs;
   ¬ expiredAK Ta evs;
   A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
```
apply *(blast dest: Says_Kas_message_form Confidentiality_Kas_lemma)*
done

If Spy sees the Service Key sent in msg K4, then the Key has expired.

lemma *Confidentiality_lemma [rule_format]:*
```
"⟦ Says Tgs A
      {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|},
        Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}|}
     ∈ set evs;
   Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
   servK ∈ symKeys;
   A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ Key servK ∈ analz (spies evs) ⟶
     expiredSK Ts evs"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct)*
apply *(rule_tac [9] impI)+*
— The Oops1 case is unusual: must simplify *Authkey ∉ analz (knows Spy (ev # evs))*, not letting *analz_mono_contra* weaken it to *Authkey ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)*, for we then conclude *authK ≠ authKa*.
apply *analz_mono_contra*
apply *(frule_tac [10] Oops_range_spies2)*
apply *(frule_tac [9] Oops_range_spies1)*
apply *(frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_analz)*
apply *(frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_analz)*
apply *(safe del: impI conjI impCE)*
apply *(simp_all add: less_SucI new_keys_not_analzd Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form analz_insert_eq not_parts_not_analz analz_insert_freshK1 analz_insert_freshK2 analz_insert_freshK3_bis pushes)*

Fake

apply *spy_analz*

K2

```
  apply (blast intro: parts_insertI less_SucI)
```

K4

```
 apply (blast dest: authTicket_authentic Confidentiality_Kas)
```

Oops1

```
apply (blast dest: Says_Kas_message_form Says_Tgs_message_form intro: less_SucI)
```

Oops2

```
apply (metis Suc_le_eq linorder_linear linorder_not_le msg.simps(2) unique_servKeys)
done
```

In the real world Tgs can't check wheter authK is secure!

```
lemma Confidentiality_Tgs:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A
              {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}, servTicket|}
          ∈ set evs;
        Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: Says_Tgs_message_form Confidentiality_lemma)
```

In the real world Tgs CAN check what Kas sends!

```
lemma Confidentiality_Tgs_bis:
     "⟦ Says Kas A
               {|Crypt Ka {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|}, authTicket|}
          ∈ set evs;
        Says Tgs A
             {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}, servTicket|}
          ∈ set evs;
        ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest!: Confidentiality_Kas Confidentiality_Tgs)
```

Most general form

```
lemmas Confidentiality_Tgs_ter = authTicket_authentic [THEN Confidentiality_Tgs_bis]
```

```
lemmas Confidentiality_Auth_A = authK_authentic [THEN exE, THEN Confidentiality_Kas]
```

Needs a confidentiality guarantee, hence moved here. Authenticity of servK for A

```
lemma servK_authentic_bis_r:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|},
                Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|} |}
       ∈ set evs"
```

```
by (metis Confidentiality_Kas authK_authentic servK_authentic_ter)

lemma Confidentiality_Serv_A:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (drule authK_authentic, assumption, assumption)
apply (blast dest: Confidentiality_Kas Says_Kas_message_form servK_authentic_ter
Confidentiality_Tgs_bis)
done

lemma Confidentiality_B:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredSK Ts evs; ¬ expiredAK Ta evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (frule authK_authentic)
apply (erule_tac [3] exE)
apply (frule_tac [3] Confidentiality_Kas)
apply (frule_tac [6] servTicket_authentic, auto)
apply (blast dest!: Confidentiality_Tgs_bis dest: Says_Kas_message_form servK_authentic
unique_servKeys unique_authKeys)
done

lemma u_Confidentiality_B:
     "⟦ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: u_servTicket_authentic u_NotexpiredSK_NotexpiredAK Confidentiality_Tgs_bis)
```

8.10 Authentication

Each party verifies "the identity of another party who generated some data" (quoted from Neuman and Ts'o).

These guarantees don't assess whether two parties agree on the same session key: sending a message containing a key doesn't a priori state knowledge of the key.

These didn't have existential form in version IV

```
lemma B_authenticates_A:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
```

```
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ ∃ ST. Says A B {|ST, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} |} ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest: servTicket_authentic_Tgs intro: Says_K5)
```

The second assumption tells B what kind of key servK is.

```
lemma B_authenticates_A_r:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         ¬ expiredSK Ts evs; ¬ expiredAK Ta evs;
         B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ ∃ ST. Says A B {|ST, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} |} ∈ set evs"
by (blast intro: Says_K5 dest: Confidentiality_B servTicket_authentic_Tgs)
```

`u_B_authenticates_A` would be the same as `B_authenticates_A` because the servK confidentiality assumption is yet unrelaxed

```
lemma u_B_authenticates_A_r:
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
         B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ ∃ ST. Says A B {|ST, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} |} ∈ set evs"
by (blast intro: Says_K5 dest: u_Confidentiality_B servTicket_authentic_Tgs)

lemma A_authenticates_B:
     "⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs"
  by (metis authK_authentic Oops_range_spies1 Says_K6 servK_authentic u_K4_imp_K2
unique_authKeys)

lemma A_authenticates_B_r:
     "⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         ¬ expiredAK Ta evs; ¬ expiredSK Ts evs;
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs"
apply (frule authK_authentic)
apply (erule_tac [3] exE)
```

```
apply (frule_tac [3] Says_Kas_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [4] Confidentiality_Kas)
apply (frule_tac [7] servK_authentic)
apply auto
apply (metis Confidentiality_Tgs K4_imp_K2 Says_K6 unique_authKeys)
done
```

8.11 Parties' knowledge of session keys

An agent knows a session key if he used it to issue a cipher. These guarantees can be interpreted both in terms of key distribution and of non-injective agreement on the session key.

```
lemma Kas_Issues_A:
   "⟦ Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta|}, authTicket|} ∈ set
evs;
      evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ Kas Issues A with (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta|})
         on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
```

K2

```
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
apply (metis MPair_parts parts.Body parts_idem parts_spies_takeWhile_mono
parts_trans spies_evs_rev usedI)
done

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_Kas:
  "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
     A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
 ⟹ Kas Issues A with (Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Peer, Ta|})
         on evs"
by (blast dest!: authK_authentic Kas_Issues_A)

lemma Tgs_Issues_A:
    "⟦ Says Tgs A {|Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}, servTicket|}
         ∈ set evs;
       Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs);  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ Tgs Issues A with
         (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
```

```
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)

apply (blast dest: servK_authentic parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD]
      parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD] authTicket_authentic
      Says_Kas_message_form)
done

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_Tgs:
     "⟦ Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ ∃A. Tgs Issues A with
          (Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}) on evs"
by (blast dest: Tgs_Issues_A servK_authentic_bis)

lemma B_Issues_A:
     "⟦ Says B A (Crypt servK (Number T3)) ∈ set evs;
        Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt servK (Number T3)) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: all_conj_distrib)
apply blast
```

K6 requires numerous lemmas

```
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
apply (blast intro: Says_K6 dest: servTicket_authentic
        parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD]
        parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD])
done

lemma A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_B:
     "⟦ Crypt servK (Number T3) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt authK {|Key servK, Agent B, Number Ts|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|Key authK, Agent Tgs, Number Ta|}
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Key authK ∉ analz (spies evs); Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad; B ≠ Tgs; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
      ⟹ B Issues A with (Crypt servK (Number T3)) on evs"
by (blast dest!: A_authenticates_B B_Issues_A)
```

But can prove a less general fact conerning only authenticators!

```
lemma honest_never_says_newer_timestamp_in_auth:
```

```
     "⟦ (CT evs) ≤ T; Number T ∈ parts {X}; A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
     ⟹ Says A B {|Y, X|} ∉ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma honest_never_says_current_timestamp_in_auth:
     "⟦ (CT evs) = T; Number T ∈ parts {X}; A ∉ bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
     ⟹ Says A B {|Y, X|} ∉ set evs"
by (metis honest_never_says_newer_timestamp_in_auth le_refl)


lemma A_Issues_B:
     "⟦ Says A B {|ST, Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}|} ∈ set evs;
         Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
         B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
   ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}) on evs"
unfolding Issues_def
apply (rule exI)
apply (rule conjI, assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm))
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (frule_tac [5] Says_ticket_parts)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

K5

```
apply auto
apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)
```

Level 15: case study necessary because the assumption doesn't state the form of servTicket. The guarantee becomes stronger.

```
prefer 2 apply (simp add: takeWhile_tail)


apply (frule K3_imp_K2, assumption, assumption, erule exE, erule exE)
apply (case_tac "Key authK ∈ analz (spies evs5)")
 apply (metis Says_imp_analz_Spy analz.Fst analz_Decrypt')
apply (frule K3_imp_K2, assumption, assumption, erule exE, erule exE)
apply (drule Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Fst])
apply (frule servK_authentic_ter, blast, assumption+)
apply (drule parts_spies_takeWhile_mono [THEN subsetD])
apply (drule parts_spies_evs_revD2 [THEN subsetD])
```

Says_K5 closes the proof in version IV because it is clear which servTicket an authenticator appears with in msg 5. In version V an authenticator can appear with any item that the spy could replace the servTicket with

```
apply (frule Says_K5, blast)
```

We need to state that an honest agent wouldn't send the wrong timestamp within an authenticator, wathever it is paired with

```
apply (auto simp add: honest_never_says_current_timestamp_in_auth)
```

done

lemma *B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A:*
```
     "⟦ Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key servK, Number Ts|}
           ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Key servK ∉ analz (spies evs);
         B ≠ Tgs; A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
   ⟹ A Issues B with (Crypt servK {|Agent A, Number T3|}) on evs"
```
by *(blast dest: B_authenticates_A A_Issues_B)*

8.12 Novel guarantees, never studied before

Because honest agents always say the right timestamp in authenticators, we can prove unicity guarantees based exactly on timestamps. Classical unicity guarantees are based on nonces. Of course assuming the agent to be different from the Spy, rather than not in bad, would suffice below. Similar guarantees must also hold of Kerberos IV.

Notice that an honest agent can send the same timestamp on two different traces of the same length, but not on the same trace!

lemma *unique_timestamp_authenticator1:*
```
     "⟦ Says A Kas {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Number T1|} ∈ set evs;
         Says A Kas' {|Agent A, Agent Tgs', Number T1|} ∈ set evs;
         A ∉bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ Kas=Kas' ∧ Tgs=Tgs'"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct)*
apply *(auto simp add: honest_never_says_current_timestamp_in_auth)*
done

lemma *unique_timestamp_authenticator2:*
```
     "⟦ Says A Tgs {|AT, Crypt AK {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B|} ∈ set evs;
     Says A Tgs' {|AT', Crypt AK' {|Agent A, Number T2|}, Agent B'|} ∈ set evs;
         A ∉bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ Tgs=Tgs' ∧ AT=AT' ∧ AK=AK' ∧ B=B'"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct)*
apply *(auto simp add: honest_never_says_current_timestamp_in_auth)*
done

lemma *unique_timestamp_authenticator3:*
```
     "⟦ Says A B {|ST, Crypt SK {|Agent A, Number T|}|} ∈ set evs;
         Says A B' {|ST', Crypt SK' {|Agent A, Number T|}|} ∈ set evs;
         A ∉bad; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ B=B' ∧ ST=ST' ∧ SK=SK'"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct)*
apply *(auto simp add: honest_never_says_current_timestamp_in_auth)*
done

The second part of the message is treated as an authenticator by the last simplification step, even if it is not an authenticator!

lemma *unique_timestamp_authticket:*
"⟦ *Says Kas A {|X, Crypt (shrK Tgs) {|Agent A, Agent Tgs, Key AK, T|}|} ∈ set evs;*
Says Kas A' {|X', Crypt (shrK Tgs') {|Agent A', Agent Tgs', Key AK', T|}|} ∈ set evs;
evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
⟹ *A=A' ∧ X=X' ∧ Tgs=Tgs' ∧ AK=AK'"*
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct)*
apply *(auto simp add: honest_never_says_current_timestamp_in_auth)*
done

The second part of the message is treated as an authenticator by the last simplification step, even if it is not an authenticator!

lemma *unique_timestamp_servticket:*
"⟦ *Says Tgs A {|X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key SK, T|}|} ∈ set evs;*
Says Tgs A' {|X', Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Agent B', Key SK', T|}|} ∈ set evs;
evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
⟹ *A=A' ∧ X=X' ∧ B=B' ∧ SK=SK'"*
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct)*
apply *(auto simp add: honest_never_says_current_timestamp_in_auth)*
done

lemma *Kas_never_says_newer_timestamp:*
"⟦ *(CT evs) ≤ T; Number T ∈ parts {X}; evs ∈ kerbV* ⟧
⟹ *∀ A. Says Kas A X ∉ set evs"*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct, auto)*
done

lemma *Kas_never_says_current_timestamp:*
"⟦ *(CT evs) = T; Number T ∈ parts {X}; evs ∈ kerbV* ⟧
⟹ *∀ A. Says Kas A X ∉ set evs"*
by *(metis Kas_never_says_newer_timestamp eq_imp_le)*

lemma *unique_timestamp_msg2:*
"⟦ *Says Kas A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key AK, Agent Tgs, T|}, AT|} ∈ set evs;*
Says Kas A' {|Crypt (shrK A') {|Key AK', Agent Tgs', T|}, AT'|} ∈ set evs;
evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
⟹ *A=A' ∧ AK=AK' ∧ Tgs=Tgs' ∧ AT=AT'"*
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule kerbV.induct)*
apply *(auto simp add: Kas_never_says_current_timestamp)*
done

lemma *Tgs_never_says_newer_timestamp:*
"⟦ *(CT evs) ≤ T; Number T ∈ parts {X}; evs ∈ kerbV* ⟧
⟹ *∀ A. Says Tgs A X ∉ set evs"*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*

```
apply (erule kerbV.induct, auto)
done

lemma Tgs_never_says_current_timestamp:
     "⟦ (CT evs) = T; Number T ∈ parts {X}; evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
     ⟹ ∀ A. Says Tgs A X ∉ set evs"
by (metis Tgs_never_says_newer_timestamp eq_imp_le)

lemma unique_timestamp_msg4:
     "⟦ Says Tgs A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key SK, Agent B, T|}, ST|} ∈ set evs;
       Says Tgs A' {|Crypt (shrK A') {|Key SK', Agent B', T|}, ST'|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ kerbV ⟧
  ⟹ A=A' ∧ SK=SK' ∧ B=B' ∧ ST=ST'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule kerbV.induct)
apply (auto simp add: Tgs_never_says_current_timestamp)
done

end
```

9 The Original Otway-Rees Protocol

```
theory OtwayRees imports Public begin
```

From page 244 of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1989). A Logic of Authentication. Proc. Royal Soc. 426

This is the original version, which encrypts Nonce NB.

```
inductive_set otway :: "event list set"
  where
   Nil:  "[] ∈ otway"
   — Initial trace is empty
 | Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ otway;  X ∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsf)) ⟧
          ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ otway"
   — The spy can say almost anything.
 | Reception: "⟦evsr ∈ otway;  Says A B X ∈set evsr⟧ ⟹ Gets B X # evsr
∈ otway"
   — A message that has been sent can be received by the intended recipient.
 | OR1:  "⟦evs1 ∈ otway;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
          ⟹ Says A B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                       Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|} |}
                # evs1 ∈ otway"
  — Alice initiates a protocol run
 | OR2:  "⟦evs2 ∈ otway;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
             Gets B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|} ∈ set evs2⟧
          ⟹ Says B Server
                 {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X,
                   Crypt (shrK B)
                     {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
                # evs2 ∈ otway"
   — Bob's response to Alice's message. Note that NB is encrypted.
 | OR3:  "⟦evs3 ∈ otway;  Key KAB ∉ used evs3;
             Gets Server
                  {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
```

```
                  Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|},
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
            ∈ set evs3⟧
        ⟹ Says Server B
             {|Nonce NA,
               Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Key KAB|},
               Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key KAB|}|}
           # evs3 ∈ otway"
```

— The Server receives Bob's message and checks that the three NAs match. Then he sends a new session key to Bob with a packet for forwarding to Alice

```
 | OR4:  "⟦evs4 ∈ otway;  B ≠ Server;
          Says B Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X',
                          Crypt (shrK B)
                                {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
            ∈ set evs4;
          Gets B {|Nonce NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}
            ∈ set evs4⟧
        ⟹ Says B A {|Nonce NA, X|} # evs4 ∈ otway"
```

— Bob receives the Server's (?) message and compares the Nonces with those in the message he previously sent the Server. Need *B ≠ Server* because we allow messages to self.

```
 | Oops: "⟦evso ∈ otway;
          Says Server B {|Nonce NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}
            ∈ set evso⟧
        ⟹ Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evso ∈ otway"
```

— This message models possible leaks of session keys. The nonces identify the protocol run

```
declare Says_imp_analz_Spy [dest]
declare parts.Body  [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
```

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

```
lemma "⟦B ≠ Server; Key K ∉ used []⟧
      ⟹ ∃evs ∈ otway.
            Says B A {|Nonce NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Key K|}|}
              ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] otway.Nil
                  [THEN otway.OR1, THEN otway.Reception,
                   THEN otway.OR2, THEN otway.Reception,
                   THEN otway.OR3, THEN otway.Reception, THEN otway.OR4])

apply (possibility, simp add: used_Cons)
done

lemma Gets_imp_Says [dest!]:
     "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ otway⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, auto)
done
```

```
lemma OR2_analz_knows_Spy:
     "⟦Gets B {|N, Agent A, Agent B, X|} ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
  by blast

lemma OR4_analz_knows_Spy:
     "⟦Gets B {|N, X, Crypt (shrK B) X'|} ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
  by blast


lemmas OR2_parts_knows_Spy =
    OR2_analz_knows_Spy [THEN analz_into_parts]
```

Theorems of the form `X ∉ parts (knows Spy evs)` imply that NOBODY sends messages containing X!

Spy never sees a good agent's shared key!

```
lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ otway ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by (erule otway.induct, force,
    drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)


lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ otway ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
     "⟦Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ otway⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)
```

9.1 Towards Secrecy: Proofs Involving *analz*

Describes the form of K and NA when the Server sends this message. Also for Oops case.

```
lemma Says_Server_message_form:
     "⟦Says Server B {|NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ K ∉ range shrK ∧ (∃i. NA = Nonce i) ∧ (∃j. NB = Nonce j)"
by (erule rev_mp, erule otway.induct, simp_all)
```

Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys

The equality makes the induction hypothesis easier to apply

```
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
 "evs ∈ otway ⟹
   ∀K KK. KK ⊆ -(range shrK) ⟶
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule otway.induct)
```

```
apply (frule_tac [8] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (drule_tac [7] OR4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (drule_tac [5] OR2_analz_knows_Spy, analz_freshK, spy_analz, auto)
done

lemma analz_insert_freshK:
  "⟦evs ∈ otway;  KAB ∉ range shrK⟧ ⟹
      (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs))) =
      (K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
```

The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's message.

```
lemma unique_session_keys:
     "⟦Says Server B {|NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, K|}|}   ∈ set evs;
        Says Server B' {|NA',X',Crypt (shrK B') {|NB',K|}|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ otway⟧ ⟹ X=X' ∧ B=B' ∧ NA=NA' ∧ NB=NB'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, simp_all)
apply blast+  — OR3 and OR4
done
```

9.2 Authenticity properties relating to NA

Only OR1 can have caused such a part of a message to appear.

```
lemma Crypt_imp_OR1 [rule_format]:
 "⟦A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
  ⟹ Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
     Says A B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
       ∈ set evs"
by (erule otway.induct, force,
    drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)

lemma Crypt_imp_OR1_Gets:
     "⟦Gets B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad; evs ∈ otway⟧
       ⟹ Says A B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                     Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
            ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest: Crypt_imp_OR1)
```

The Nonce NA uniquely identifies A's message

```
lemma unique_NA:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent C|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        evs ∈ otway;  A ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ B = C"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, force,
       drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)
done
```

It is impossible to re-use a nonce in both OR1 and OR2. This holds because OR2 encrypts Nonce NB. It prevents the attack that can occur in the over-simplified version of this protocol: see *OtwayRees_Bad*.

```
lemma no_nonce_OR1_OR2:
   "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
      A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
    ⟹ Crypt (shrK A) {|NA', NA, Agent A', Agent A|} ∉ parts (knows Spy evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, force,
       drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)
done
```

Crucial property: If the encrypted message appears, and A has used NA to start a run, then it originated with the Server!

```
lemma NA_Crypt_imp_Server_msg [rule_format]:
     "⟦A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ Says A B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                   Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs ⟶
         Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)
         ⟶ (∃NB. Says Server B
                       {|NA,
                         Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
                         Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule otway.induct, force,
       drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast)
  subgoal — OR1: by freshness
    by blast
  subgoal — OR3
    by (blast dest!: no_nonce_OR1_OR2 intro: unique_NA)
  subgoal — OR4
    by (blast intro!: Crypt_imp_OR1)
done
```

Corollary: if A receives B's OR4 message and the nonce NA agrees then the key really did come from the Server! CANNOT prove this of the bad form of this protocol, even though we can prove *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*

```
lemma A_trusts_OR4:
     "⟦Says A  B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                   Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs;
        Says B' A {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
     A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
  ⟹ ∃NB. Says Server B
               {|NA,
                 Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
                 Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|}
                 ∈ set evs"
by (blast intro!: NA_Crypt_imp_Server_msg)
```

Crucial secrecy property: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg OR3 Does not in itself guarantee security: an attack could violate the premises, e.g. by having *A = Spy*

```
lemma secrecy_lemma:
```

```
"⟦A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
 ⟹ Says Server B
       {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
         Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs ⟶
     Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs ⟶
     Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
 apply (erule otway.induct, force, simp_all)
 subgoal — Fake
   by spy_analz
 subgoal — OR2
   by (drule OR2_analz_knows_Spy) (auto simp: analz_insert_eq)
 subgoal — OR3
   by (auto simp add: analz_insert_freshK pushes)
 subgoal — OR4
   by (drule OR4_analz_knows_Spy) (auto simp: analz_insert_eq)
 subgoal — Oops
   by (auto simp add: Says_Server_message_form analz_insert_freshK unique_session_keys)
 done

theorem Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:
     "⟦Says Server B
          {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
                Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest: Says_Server_message_form secrecy_lemma)
```

This form is an immediate consequence of the previous result. It is similar to the assertions established by other methods. It is equivalent to the previous result in that the Spy already has `analz` and `synth` at his disposal. However, the conclusion `Key K ∉ knows Spy evs` appears not to be inductive: all the cases other than Fake are trivial, while Fake requires `Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)`.

```
lemma Spy_not_know_encrypted_key:
     "⟦Says Server B
          {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
                Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ knows Spy evs"
by (blast dest: Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
```

A's guarantee. The Oops premise quantifies over NB because A cannot know what it is.

```
lemma A_gets_good_key:
     "⟦Says A  B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                   Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs;
        Says B' A {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
        ∀NB. Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: A_trusts_OR4 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
```

9.3 Authenticity properties relating to NB

Only OR2 can have caused such a part of a message to appear. We do not know anything about X: it does NOT have to have the right form.

```
lemma Crypt_imp_OR2:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|NA, NB, Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ ∃X. Says B Server
                 {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, X,
                   Crypt (shrK B) {|NA, NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
                 ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, force,
       drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)
done
```

The Nonce NB uniquely identifies B's message

```
lemma unique_NB:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|NA, NB, Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ parts(knows Spy evs);
        Crypt (shrK B) {|NC, NB, Agent C, Agent B|} ∈ parts(knows Spy evs);
          evs ∈ otway;  B ∉ bad⟧
        ⟹ NC = NA ∧ C = A"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, force,
       drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
apply blast+  — Fake, OR2
done
```

If the encrypted message appears, and B has used Nonce NB, then it originated with the Server! Quite messy proof.

```
lemma NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg [rule_format]:
 "⟦B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
  ⟹ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)
      ⟶ (∀X'. Says B Server
                     {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, X',
                       Crypt (shrK B) {|NA, NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
           ∈ set evs
           ⟶ Says Server B
                {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
                      Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|}
                ∈ set evs)"
apply simp
apply (erule otway.induct, force, simp_all)
  subgoal — Fake
    by blast
  subgoal — OR2
    by (force dest!: OR2_parts_knows_Spy)
  subgoal — OR3
    by (blast dest: unique_NB dest!: no_nonce_OR1_OR2)  — OR3
  subgoal — OR4
    by (blast dest!: Crypt_imp_OR2)
done
```

Guarantee for B: if it gets a message with matching NB then the Server has sent the correct message.

```
theorem B_trusts_OR3:
     "⟦Says B Server {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, X',
                       Crypt (shrK B) {|NA, NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
         ∈ set evs;
       Gets B {|NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
       B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ Says Server B
            {|NA,
              Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
              Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|}
              ∈ set evs"
by (blast intro!: NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg)
```

The obvious combination of *B_trusts_OR3* with *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*

```
lemma B_gets_good_key:
     "⟦Says B Server {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, X',
                       Crypt (shrK B) {|NA, NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
         ∈ set evs;
       Gets B {|NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
       Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: B_trusts_OR3 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)


lemma OR3_imp_OR2:
     "⟦Says Server B
             {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
               Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
       B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
  ⟹ ∃X. Says B Server {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, X,
                         Crypt (shrK B) {|NA, NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
             ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, simp_all)
apply (blast dest!: Crypt_imp_OR2)+
done
```

After getting and checking OR4, agent A can trust that B has been active. We could probably prove that X has the expected form, but that is not strictly necessary for authentication.

```
theorem A_auths_B:
     "⟦Says B' A {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
       Says A  B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                   Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
  ⟹ ∃NB X. Says B Server {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, X,
                            Crypt (shrK B)  {|NA, NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
               ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: A_trusts_OR4 OR3_imp_OR2)
```

end

10 The Otway-Rees Protocol as Modified by Abadi and Needham

theory *OtwayRees_AN* **imports** *Public* **begin**

This simplified version has minimal encryption and explicit messages.

Note that the formalization does not even assume that nonces are fresh. This is because the protocol does not rely on uniqueness of nonces for security, only for freshness, and the proof script does not prove freshness properties.

From page 11 of Abadi and Needham (1996). Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols. IEEE Trans. SE 22 (1)

inductive_set *otway :: "event list set"*
  where
   Nil: — The empty trace
        "[] ∈ otway"

 | *Fake:* — The Spy may say anything he can say. The sender field is correct, but agents don't use that information.
          "⟦evsf ∈ otway; X ∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsf))⟧
           ⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ otway"

 | *Reception:* — A message that has been sent can be received by the intended recipient.
                "⟦evsr ∈ otway; Says A B X ∈set evsr⟧
                 ⟹ Gets B X # evsr ∈ otway"

 | *OR1:* — Alice initiates a protocol run
          "evs1 ∈ otway
           ⟹ Says A B {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA|} # evs1 ∈ otway"

 | *OR2:* — Bob's response to Alice's message.
          "⟦evs2 ∈ otway;
              Gets B {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA|} ∈set evs2⟧
           ⟹ Says B Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}
                 # evs2 ∈ otway"

 | *OR3:* — The Server receives Bob's message. Then he sends a new session key to Bob with a packet for forwarding to Alice.
          "⟦evs3 ∈ otway; Key KAB ∉ used evs3;
              Gets Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}
                ∈set evs3⟧
           ⟹ Says Server B
                {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key KAB|},
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key KAB|}|}
               # evs3 ∈ otway"

 | *OR4:* — Bob receives the Server's (?) message and compares the Nonces with those in the message he previously sent the Server. Need *B ≠ Server* because we allow messages to self.

```
"⟦evs4 ∈ otway;  B ≠ Server;
    Says B Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈set evs4;
    Gets B {|X, Crypt(shrK B){|Nonce NB,Agent A,Agent B,Key K|}|}
      ∈set evs4⟧
 ⟹ Says B A X # evs4 ∈ otway"
```

| *Oops:* — This message models possible leaks of session keys. The nonces identify the protocol run.

```
"⟦evso ∈ otway;
    Says Server B
             {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|},
               Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
      ∈set evso⟧
 ⟹ Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evso ∈ otway"
```

declare *Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]*
declare *parts.Body [dest]*
declare *analz_into_parts [dest]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]*

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

lemma *"⟦B ≠ Server; Key K ∉ used []⟧*
⟹ ∃evs ∈ otway.
Says B A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|})
∈ set evs"
apply *(intro exI bexI)*
apply *(rule_tac [2] otway.Nil*
[THEN otway.OR1, THEN otway.Reception,
THEN otway.OR2, THEN otway.Reception,
THEN otway.OR3, THEN otway.Reception, THEN otway.OR4])
apply *(possibility, simp add: used_Cons)*
done

lemma *Gets_imp_Says [dest!]:*
"⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ otway⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
by *(erule rev_mp, erule otway.induct, auto)*

For reasoning about the encrypted portion of messages

lemma *OR4_analz_knows_Spy:*
"⟦Gets B {|X, Crypt(shrK B) X'|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ otway⟧
⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by *blast*

Theorems of the form *X ∉ parts (knows Spy evs)* imply that NOBODY sends messages containing X!

Spy never sees a good agent's shared key!

lemma *Spy_see_shrK [simp]:*
"evs ∈ otway ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by *(erule otway.induct, simp_all, blast+)*

lemma *Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:*

```
    "evs ∈ otway ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
    "⟦Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ otway⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)
```

10.1 Proofs involving analz

Describes the form of K and NA when the Server sends this message.

```
lemma Says_Server_message_form:
    "⟦Says Server B
          {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|},
            Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
         ∈ set evs;
       evs ∈ otway⟧
     ⟹ K ∉ range shrK ∧ (∃i. NA = Nonce i) ∧ (∃j. NB = Nonce j)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, auto)
done
```

Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys

The equality makes the induction hypothesis easier to apply

```
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
 "evs ∈ otway ⟹
   ∀K KK. KK ⊆ -(range shrK) ⟶
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key`KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule otway.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (drule_tac [7] OR4_analz_knows_Spy, analz_freshK, spy_analz, auto)
done

lemma analz_insert_freshK:
  "⟦evs ∈ otway;  KAB ∉ range shrK⟧ ⟹
      (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs))) =
      (K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
```

The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's message.

```
lemma unique_session_keys:
    "⟦Says Server B
         {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, K|},
           Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, K|}|}
        ∈ set evs;
      Says Server B'
        {|Crypt (shrK A') {|NA', Agent A', Agent B', K|},
          Crypt (shrK B') {|NB', Agent A', Agent B', K|}|}
        ∈ set evs;
      evs ∈ otway⟧
    ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ NA=NA' ∧ NB=NB'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule otway.induct, simp_all)
```

apply *blast+* — OR3 and OR4
done

10.2 Authenticity properties relating to NA

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server!

lemma *NA_Crypt_imp_Server_msg [rule_format]:*
```
"⟦A ∉ bad;  A ≠ B;  evs ∈ otway⟧
 ⟹ Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)
   ⟶ (∃NB. Says Server B
                {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|},
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
               ∈ set evs)"
```
apply *(erule otway.induct, force)*
apply *(simp_all add: ex_disj_distrib)*
apply *blast+* — Fake, OR3
done

Corollary: if A receives B's OR4 message then it originated with the Server. Freshness may be inferred from nonce NA.

lemma *A_trusts_OR4:*
```
"⟦Says B' A (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}) ∈ set evs;
   A ∉ bad;  A ≠ B;  evs ∈ otway⟧
 ⟹ ∃NB. Says Server B
             {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|},
               Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
            ∈ set evs"
```
by *(blast intro!: NA_Crypt_imp_Server_msg)*

Crucial secrecy property: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg OR3 Does not in itself guarantee security: an attack could violate the premises, e.g. by having *A = Spy*

lemma *secrecy_lemma:*
```
"⟦A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
 ⟹ Says Server B
      {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|},
        Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
     ∈ set evs ⟶
     Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs ⟶
     Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
```
apply *(erule otway.induct, force)*
apply *(frule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form)*
apply *(drule_tac [6] OR4_analz_knows_Spy)*
apply *(simp_all add: analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK pushes)*
apply *spy_analz* — Fake
apply *(blast dest: unique_session_keys)+* — OR3, OR4, Oops
done

lemma *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:*
```
"⟦Says Server B
       {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|},
         Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
```

```
          ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
     ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
  by (metis secrecy_lemma)
```

A's guarantee. The Oops premise quantifies over NB because A cannot know what it is.

```
lemma A_gets_good_key:
     "⟦Says B' A (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}) ∈ set evs;
        ∀NB. Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  A ≠ B;  evs ∈ otway⟧
     ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
  by (metis A_trusts_OR4 secrecy_lemma)
```

10.3 Authenticity properties relating to NB

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server!

```
lemma NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg [rule_format]:
 "⟦B ∉ bad;  A ≠ B;  evs ∈ otway⟧
  ⟹ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)
     ⟶ (∃NA. Says Server B
                  {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|},
                    Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
                  ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule otway.induct, force, simp_all add: ex_disj_distrib)
apply blast+  — Fake, OR3
done
```

Guarantee for B: if it gets a well-formed certificate then the Server has sent the correct message in round 3.

```
lemma B_trusts_OR3:
     "⟦Says S B {|X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
        B ∉ bad;  A ≠ B;  evs ∈ otway⟧
     ⟹ ∃NA. Says Server B
                  {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|},
                    Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
                  ∈ set evs"
by (blast intro!: NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg)
```

The obvious combination of *B_trusts_OR3* with *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*

```
lemma B_gets_good_key:
     "⟦Gets B {|X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|}
         ∈ set evs;
        ∀NA. Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  A ≠ B;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest: B_trusts_OR3 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)

end
```

11 The Otway-Rees Protocol: The Faulty BAN Version

theory *OtwayRees_Bad* **imports** *Public* **begin**

The FAULTY version omitting encryption of Nonce NB, as suggested on page 247 of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1988). A Logic of Authentication. Proc. Royal Soc. 426

This file illustrates the consequences of such errors. We can still prove impressive-looking properties such as *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*, yet the protocol is open to a middleperson attack. Attempting to prove some key lemmas indicates the possibility of this attack.

inductive_set *otway :: "event list set"*
  where
   Nil: — The empty trace
        "[] ∈ otway"

 | *Fake:* — The Spy may say anything he can say. The sender field is correct, but agents don't use that information.
          "⟦evsf ∈ otway; X ∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsf))⟧
           ⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ otway"

 | *Reception:* — A message that has been sent can be received by the intended recipient.
               "⟦evsr ∈ otway; Says A B X ∈set evsr⟧
                ⟹ Gets B X # evsr ∈ otway"

 | *OR1:* — Alice initiates a protocol run
          "⟦evs1 ∈ otway; Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
           ⟹ Says A B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                         Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
              # evs1 ∈ otway"

 | *OR2:* — Bob's response to Alice's message. This variant of the protocol does NOT encrypt NB.
          "⟦evs2 ∈ otway; Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
             Gets B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|} ∈ set evs2⟧
           ⟹ Says B Server
                {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X, Nonce NB,
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
               # evs2 ∈ otway"

 | *OR3:* — The Server receives Bob's message and checks that the three NAs match. Then he sends a new session key to Bob with a packet for forwarding to Alice.
          "⟦evs3 ∈ otway; Key KAB ∉ used evs3;
             Gets Server
                {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                  Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|},
                  Nonce NB,
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
              ∈ set evs3⟧
           ⟹ Says Server B

```
                {|Nonce NA,
                  Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Key KAB|},
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key KAB|}|}
               # evs3 ∈ otway"
```

| OR4: — Bob receives the Server's (?) message and compares the Nonces with those in the message he previously sent the Server. Need *B ≠ Server* because we allow messages to self.

```
        "⟦evs4 ∈ otway;  B ≠ Server;
            Says B Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X', Nonce NB,
                            Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
              ∈ set evs4;
            Gets B {|Nonce NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}
              ∈ set evs4⟧
         ⟹ Says B A {|Nonce NA, X|} # evs4 ∈ otway"
```

| Oops: — This message models possible leaks of session keys. The nonces identify the protocol run.

```
        "⟦evso ∈ otway;
            Says Server B {|Nonce NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}
              ∈ set evso⟧
         ⟹ Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evso ∈ otway"
```

declare *Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]*
declare *parts.Body [dest]*
declare *analz_into_parts [dest]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]*

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

lemma *"⟦B ≠ Server; Key K ∉ used []⟧*
*   ⟹ ∃NA. ∃evs ∈ otway.*
*   Says B A {|Nonce NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Key K|}|}*
*   ∈ set evs"*
apply *(intro exI bexI)*
apply *(rule_tac [2] otway.Nil*
*   [THEN otway.OR1, THEN otway.Reception,*
*   THEN otway.OR2, THEN otway.Reception,*
*   THEN otway.OR3, THEN otway.Reception, THEN otway.OR4])*
apply *(possibility, simp add: used_Cons)*
done

lemma *Gets_imp_Says [dest!]:*
*   "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ otway⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule otway.induct, auto)*
done

11.1 For reasoning about the encrypted portion of messages

lemma *OR2_analz_knows_Spy:*
*   "⟦Gets B {|N, Agent A, Agent B, X|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ otway⟧*
*   ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"*

by *blast*

lemma *OR4_analz_knows_Spy:*
```
"⟦Gets B {|N, X, Crypt (shrK B) X'|} ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ otway⟧
 ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
```
by *blast*

lemma *Oops_parts_knows_Spy:*
```
"Says Server B {|NA, X, Crypt K' {|NB,K|}|} ∈ set evs
 ⟹ K ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)"
```
by *blast*

Forwarding lemma: see comments in OtwayRees.thy

lemmas *OR2_parts_knows_Spy =*
OR2_analz_knows_Spy [THEN analz_into_parts]

Theorems of the form *X ∉ parts (knows Spy evs)* imply that NOBODY sends messages containing X!

Spy never sees a good agent's shared key!

lemma *Spy_see_shrK [simp]:*
```
"evs ∈ otway ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
```
by *(erule otway.induct, force,*
drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)

lemma *Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:*
```
"evs ∈ otway ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
```
by *auto*

lemma *Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:*
```
"⟦Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ otway⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
```
by *(blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)*

11.2 Proofs involving analz

Describes the form of K and NA when the Server sends this message. Also for Oops case.

lemma *Says_Server_message_form:*
```
"⟦Says Server B {|NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
    evs ∈ otway⟧
 ⟹ K ∉ range shrK ∧ (∃i. NA = Nonce i) ∧ (∃j. NB = Nonce j)"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule otway.induct, simp_all)*
done

Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys

The equality makes the induction hypothesis easier to apply

lemma *analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:*
```
"evs ∈ otway ⟹
  ∀K KK. KK ⊆ -(range shrK) ⟶
         (Key K ∈ analz (Key`KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
```

```
          (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule otway.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (drule_tac [7] OR4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (drule_tac [5] OR2_analz_knows_Spy, analz_freshK, spy_analz, auto)
done

lemma analz_insert_freshK:
  "⟦evs ∈ otway;  KAB ∉ range shrK⟧ ⟹
      (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs))) =
      (K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
```

The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's message.

```
lemma unique_session_keys:
     "⟦Says Server B {|NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, K|}|}   ∈ set evs;
        Says Server B' {|NA',X',Crypt (shrK B') {|NB',K|}|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ otway⟧ ⟹ X=X' ∧ B=B' ∧ NA=NA' ∧ NB=NB'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, simp_all)
apply blast+  — OR3 and OR4
done
```

Crucial secrecy property: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg OR3 Does not in itself guarantee security: an attack could violate the premises, e.g. by having `A = Spy`

```
lemma secrecy_lemma:
 "⟦A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
  ⟹ Says Server B
       {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
         Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs ⟶
      Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs ⟶
      Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (erule otway.induct, force)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (drule_tac [6] OR4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (drule_tac [4] OR2_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (simp_all add: analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK pushes)
apply spy_analz  — Fake
apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys)+  — OR3, OR4, Oops
done


lemma Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:
     "⟦Says Server B
         {|NA, Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
               Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest: Says_Server_message_form secrecy_lemma)
```

11.3 Attempting to prove stronger properties

Only OR1 can have caused such a part of a message to appear. The premise `A ≠ B` prevents OR2's similar-looking cryptogram from being picked up. Original Otway-Rees doesn't need it.

```
lemma Crypt_imp_OR1 [rule_format]:
     "⟦A ∉ bad;  A ≠ B;  evs ∈ otway⟧
      ⟹ Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
          Says A B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                     Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|}  ∈ set evs"
by (erule otway.induct, force,
    drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)
```

Crucial property: If the encrypted message appears, and A has used NA to start a run, then it originated with the Server! The premise `A ≠ B` allows use of `Crypt_imp_OR1`

Only it is FALSE. Somebody could make a fake message to Server substituting some other nonce NA' for NB.

```
lemma "⟦A ∉ bad;  A ≠ B;  evs ∈ otway⟧
       ⟹ Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
           Says A B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                      Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
            ∈ set evs ⟶
           (∃B NB. Says Server B
                {|NA,
                  Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|},
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule otway.induct, force,
       drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
apply blast  — Fake
apply blast  — OR1: it cannot be a new Nonce, contradiction.
```

OR3 and OR4

```
apply (simp_all add: ex_disj_distrib)
 prefer 2 apply (blast intro!: Crypt_imp_OR1)  — OR4
```

OR3

```
apply clarify
```

```
oops

end
```

12 Bella's version of the Otway-Rees protocol

```
theory OtwayReesBella imports Public begin
```

Bella's modifications to a version of the Otway-Rees protocol taken from the BAN paper only concern message 7. The updated protocol makes the goal of key

distribution of the session key available to A. Investigating the principle of Goal Availability undermines the BAN claim about the original protocol, that "this protocol does not make use of Kab as an encryption key, so neither principal can know whether the key is known to the other". The updated protocol makes no use of the session key to encrypt but informs A that B knows it.

```
inductive_set orb :: "event list set"
 where

  Nil:  "[]∈ orb"

| Fake: "⟦evsa∈ orb;  X∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsa))⟧
        ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsa ∈ orb"

| Reception: "⟦evsr∈ orb;  Says A B X ∈ set evsr⟧
             ⟹ Gets B X # evsr ∈ orb"

| OR1:  "⟦evs1∈ orb;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
         ⟹ Says A B {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B,
                      Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
              # evs1 ∈ orb"

| OR2:  "⟦evs2∈ orb;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
           Gets B {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X|} ∈ set evs2⟧
        ⟹ Says B Server
             {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X,
           Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
              # evs2 ∈ orb"

| OR3:  "⟦evs3∈ orb;  Key KAB ∉ used evs3;
          Gets Server
             {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B,
               Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|},
               Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent
B|}|}
          ∈ set evs3⟧
        ⟹ Says Server B {|Nonce M,
                    Crypt (shrK B) {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Key KAB|},
                                     Nonce NB, Key KAB|}|}
              # evs3 ∈ orb"



| OR4:  "⟦evs4∈ orb; B ≠ Server; ∀ p q. X ≠ {|p, q|};
          Says B Server {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X',
                Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent
B|}|}
            ∈ set evs4;
          Gets B {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) {|X, Nonce NB, Key KAB|}|}
            ∈ set evs4⟧
        ⟹ Says B A {|Nonce M, X|} # evs4 ∈ orb"


| Oops: "⟦evso∈ orb;
```

```
          Says Server B {|Nonce M,
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Key KAB|},
                                   Nonce NB, Key KAB|}|}
            ∈ set evso⟧
 ⟹ Notes Spy {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key KAB|} # evso
    ∈ orb"


declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
```

Fragile proof, with backtracking in the possibility call.

```
lemma possibility_thm: "⟦A ≠ Server; B ≠ Server; Key K ∉ used[]⟧
      ⟹  ∃ evs ∈ orb.
     Says B A {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] orb.Nil
                  [THEN orb.OR1, THEN orb.Reception,
                   THEN orb.OR2, THEN orb.Reception,
                   THEN orb.OR3, THEN orb.Reception, THEN orb.OR4])
apply (possibility, simp add: used_Cons)
done


lemma Gets_imp_Says :
     "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ orb⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule orb.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy:
     "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ orb⟧  ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)

declare Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest]

lemma Gets_imp_knows:
     "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ orb⟧  ⟹ X ∈ knows B evs"
by (metis Gets_imp_knows_Spy Gets_imp_knows_agents)

lemma OR2_analz_knows_Spy:
   "⟦Gets B {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ orb⟧
    ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj])

lemma OR4_parts_knows_Spy:
   "⟦Gets B {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) {|X, Nonce Nb, Key Kab|}|}  ∈ set evs;
      evs ∈ orb⟧   ⟹ X ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)"
by blast

lemma Oops_parts_knows_Spy:
```

```
    "Says Server B {|Nonce M, Crypt K' {|X, Nonce Nb, K|}|} ∈ set evs
     ⟹ K ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)"
by blast

lemmas OR2_parts_knows_Spy =
    OR2_analz_knows_Spy [THEN analz_into_parts]

ML
‹
fun parts_explicit_tac ctxt i =
    forward_tac ctxt [@{thm Oops_parts_knows_Spy}] (i+7) THEN
    forward_tac ctxt [@{thm OR4_parts_knows_Spy}]  (i+6) THEN
    forward_tac ctxt [@{thm OR2_parts_knows_Spy}]  (i+4)
›

method_setup parts_explicit = ‹
    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o parts_explicit_tac)›
  "to explicitly state that some message components belong to parts knows Spy"


lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
    "evs ∈ orb ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by (erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all, blast+)

lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
"evs ∈ orb ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
     "⟦Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ orb⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)

lemma new_keys_not_used [simp]:
   "⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ orb⟧  ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (knows
Spy evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all)
apply (force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)
apply (blast+)
done
```

12.1 Proofs involving analz

Describes the form of K and NA when the Server sends this message. Also for Oops case.

```
lemma Says_Server_message_form:
"⟦Says Server B  {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) {|X, Nonce Nb, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;

     evs ∈ orb⟧
 ⟹ K ∉ range shrK ∧ (∃ A Na. X=(Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key K|}))"
by (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, simp_all)

lemma Says_Server_imp_Gets:
```

```
 "⟦Says Server B {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key K|},
                                              Nonce Nb, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
    evs ∈ orb⟧
  ⟹  Gets Server {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B,
                   Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|},
                 Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce Nb, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent
B|}|}
         ∈ set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, simp_all)


lemma A_trusts_OR1:
"⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ parts (knows Spy
evs);
    A ∉ bad; evs ∈ orb⟧
 ⟹ Says A B {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Nonce
M, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all)
apply blast
done


lemma B_trusts_OR2:
 "⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce Nb, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|}
     ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  B ∉ bad; evs ∈ orb⟧
  ⟹ (∃ X. Says B Server {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X,
              Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce Nb, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|}|}

          ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all)
apply (blast+)
done


lemma B_trusts_OR3:
"⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|X, Nonce Nb, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
   B ∉ bad; evs ∈ orb⟧
⟹ ∃ M. Says Server B {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) {|X, Nonce Nb, Key K|}|}
        ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all)
apply (blast+)
done

lemma Gets_Server_message_form:
"⟦Gets B {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) {|X, Nonce Nb, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
    evs ∈ orb⟧
 ⟹ (K ∉ range shrK ∧ (∃ A Na. X = (Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key K|})))

            | X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (metis B_trusts_OR3 Crypt_Spy_analz_bad Gets_imp_Says MPair_analz MPair_parts
         Says_Server_message_form Says_imp_analz_Spy Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy)

lemma unique_Na: "⟦Says A B  {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce
Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs;
```

```
        Says A B' {|Nonce M', Agent A, Agent B', Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na,
Nonce M', Agent A, Agent B'|}|} ∈ set evs;
    A ∉ bad; evs ∈ orb⟧ ⟹ B=B' ∧ M=M'"
by (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, simp_all, blast+)

lemma unique_Nb: "⟦Says B Server {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X, Crypt (shrK
B) {|Nonce Nb, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs;
        Says B Server {|Nonce M', Agent A', Agent B, X', Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce
Nb,Nonce M', Nonce M', Agent A', Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs;
    B ∉ bad; evs ∈ orb⟧ ⟹   M=M' ∧ A=A' ∧ X=X'"
by (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, simp_all, blast+)

lemma analz_image_freshCryptK_lemma:
"(Crypt K X ∈ analz (Key`nE ∪ H)) ⟶ (Crypt K X ∈ analz H) ⟹
       (Crypt K X ∈ analz (Key`nE ∪ H)) = (Crypt K X ∈ analz H)"
by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])

ML
‹
structure OtwayReesBella =
struct

val analz_image_freshK_ss =
  context
   |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms image_insert image_Un}
   |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms imp_disjL}    (*reduces blow-up*)
   |> Simplifier.add_simps @{thms analz_image_freshK_simps}
   |> Simplifier.simpset_of

end
›

method_setup analz_freshCryptK = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt =>
     (SIMPLE_METHOD
      (EVERY [REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms allI ballI impI}),
          REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms analz_image_freshCryptK_lemma}),
          ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac
            (put_simpset OtwayReesBella.analz_image_freshK_ss ctxt))])))›
  "for proving useful rewrite rule"


method_setup disentangle = ‹
    Scan.succeed
     (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD
      (REPEAT_FIRST (eresolve_tac ctxt [asm_rl, conjE, disjE]
                  ORELSE' hyp_subst_tac ctxt)))›
  "for eliminating conjunctions, disjunctions and the like"



lemma analz_image_freshCryptK [rule_format]:
"evs ∈ orb ⟹
     Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶
```

```
       (∀ KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
             (Crypt K X ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
             (Crypt K X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)))"
apply (erule orb.induct)
apply (analz_mono_contra)
apply (frule_tac [7] Gets_Server_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [9] Says_Server_message_form)
apply disentangle
apply (drule_tac [5] Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd, THEN
analz.Snd, THEN  analz.Snd])
prefer 8 apply clarify
apply (analz_freshCryptK, spy_analz, fastforce)
done


lemma analz_insert_freshCryptK:
"⟦evs ∈ orb;  Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs);
         Seskey ∉ range shrK⟧ ⟹
         (Crypt K X ∈ analz (insert (Key Seskey) (knows Spy evs))) =
         (Crypt K X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshCryptK analz_image_freshK_simps)


lemma analz_hard:
"⟦Says A B {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B,
             Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈set evs;

   Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key K|} ∈ analz (knows Spy evs);
   A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ orb⟧
 ⟹  Says B A {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule orb.induct)
apply (frule_tac [7] Gets_Server_message_form)
apply (frule_tac [9] Says_Server_message_form)
apply disentangle
```

letting the simplifier solve OR2

```
apply (drule_tac [5] Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd, THEN
analz.Snd, THEN analz.Snd])
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: analz_insert_eq pushes split_ifs)
apply (spy_analz)
```

OR1

```
apply blast
```

Oops

```
prefer 4 apply (blast dest: analz_insert_freshCryptK)
```

OR4 - ii

```
prefer 3 apply blast
```

OR3

```
apply (blast dest:
       A_trusts_OR1 unique_Na Key_not_used analz_insert_freshCryptK)
```

OR4 - i

```
apply clarify
apply (simp add: pushes split_ifs)
apply (case_tac "Aaa∈bad")
apply (blast dest: analz_insert_freshCryptK)
apply clarify
apply simp
apply (case_tac "Ba∈bad")
apply (frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Decrypt,
THEN analz.Fst] , assumption)
apply (simp (no_asm_simp))
apply clarify
apply (frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy
             [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd, THEN B_trusts_OR3],
       assumption, assumption, assumption, erule exE)
apply (frule Says_Server_imp_Gets
            [THEN Gets_imp_knows_Spy, THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd,
            THEN parts.Snd, THEN parts.Snd, THEN parts.Fst, THEN A_trusts_OR1],
       assumption, assumption, assumption, assumption)
apply (blast dest: Says_Server_imp_Gets B_trusts_OR2 unique_Na unique_Nb)
done


lemma Gets_Server_message_form':
"⟦Gets B {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) {|X, Nonce Nb, Key K|}|}  ∈ set evs;
   B ∉ bad; evs ∈ orb⟧
  ⟹ K ∉ range shrK ∧ (∃ A Na. X = (Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key K|}))"
by (blast dest!: B_trusts_OR3 Says_Server_message_form)


lemma OR4_imp_Gets:
"⟦Says B A {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
   B ∉ bad; evs ∈ orb⟧
 ⟹ (∃ Nb. Gets B {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key
K|},
                                            Nonce Nb, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all)
prefer 3 apply (blast dest: Gets_Server_message_form')
apply blast+
done


lemma A_keydist_to_B:
"⟦Says A B {|Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B,
            Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B|}|} ∈set evs;

   Gets A {|Nonce M, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Na, Key K|}|} ∈ set evs;
   A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ orb⟧
  ⟹ Key K ∈ analz (knows B evs)"
apply (drule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd], assumption)
apply (drule analz_hard, assumption, assumption, assumption, assumption)
```

apply *(drule OR4_imp_Gets, assumption, assumption)*
apply *(fastforce dest!: Gets_imp_knows [THEN analz.Inj] analz.Decrypt)*
done

Other properties as for the original protocol

end

13 The Woo-Lam Protocol

theory *WooLam* **imports** *Public* **begin**

Simplified version from page 11 of Abadi and Needham (1996). Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols. IEEE Trans. S.E. 22(1), pages 6-15.
Note: this differs from the Woo-Lam protocol discussed by Lowe (1996): Some New Attacks upon Security Protocols. Computer Security Foundations Workshop

inductive_set *woolam :: "event list set"*
where

Nil: "[] ∈ woolam"

| Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ woolam; X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧
⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ woolam"

| WL1: "evs1 ∈ woolam ⟹ Says A B (Agent A) # evs1 ∈ woolam"

| WL2: "⟦evs2 ∈ woolam; Says A' B (Agent A) ∈ set evs2⟧
⟹ Says B A (Nonce NB) # evs2 ∈ woolam"

| WL3: "⟦evs3 ∈ woolam;
Says A B (Agent A) ∈ set evs3;
Says B' A (Nonce NB) ∈ set evs3⟧
⟹ Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) # evs3 ∈ woolam"

| WL4: "⟦evs4 ∈ woolam;
Says A' B X ∈ set evs4;
Says A'' B (Agent A) ∈ set evs4⟧
⟹ Says B Server {|Agent A, Agent B, X|} # evs4 ∈ woolam"

| WL5: "⟦evs5 ∈ woolam;
Says B' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)|}
∈ set evs5⟧
⟹ Says Server B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NB|})

```
                # evs5 ∈ woolam"

declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body  [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]


lemma "∃NB. ∃evs ∈ woolam.
            Says Server B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] woolam.Nil
                  [THEN woolam.WL1, THEN woolam.WL2, THEN woolam.WL3,
                   THEN woolam.WL4, THEN woolam.WL5], possibility)
done




lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ woolam ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by (erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)

lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ woolam ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
     "⟦Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ woolam⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)




lemma NB_Crypt_imp_Alice_msg:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ woolam⟧
      ⟹ ∃B. Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)


lemma Server_trusts_WL4 [dest]:
     "⟦Says B' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)|}
          ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ woolam⟧
```

```
      ⟹ ∃B. Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
by (blast intro!: NB_Crypt_imp_Alice_msg)
```

```
lemma Server_sent_WL5 [dest]:
     "⟦Says Server B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, NB|}) ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ woolam⟧
      ⟹ ∃B'. Says B' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) NB|}
             ∈ set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)
```

```
lemma NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg [rule_format]:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ woolam⟧
      ⟹ Says Server B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, NB|}) ∈ set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)
```

```
lemma B_trusts_WL5:
     "⟦Says S B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ woolam⟧
      ⟹ ∃B. Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg)
```

```
lemma B_said_WL2:
     "⟦Says B A (Nonce NB) ∈ set evs;  B ≠ Spy;  evs ∈ woolam⟧
      ⟹ ∃A'. Says A' B (Agent A) ∈ set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)
```

```
lemma "⟦A ∉ bad;  B ≠ Spy;  evs ∈ woolam⟧
  ⟹ Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs) ∧
     Says B A (Nonce NB) ∈ set evs
     ⟶ Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast, auto)
oops

end
```

14 The Otway-Bull Recursive Authentication Protocol

```
theory Recur imports Public begin
```

End marker for message bundles

```
abbreviation
```

```
  END :: "msg" where
  "END == Number 0"


inductive_set
  respond :: "event list ⇒ (msg*msg*key)set"
  for evs :: "event list"
  where
   One:  "Key KAB ∉ used evs
          ⟹ (Hash[Key(shrK A)] {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA, END|},
              {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key KAB, Agent B, Nonce NA|}, END|},
              KAB)   ∈ respond evs"


 | Cons: "⟦(PA, RA, KAB) ∈ respond evs;
             Key KBC ∉ used evs;  Key KBC ∉ parts {RA};
             PA = Hash[Key(shrK A)] {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA, P|}⟧
          ⟹ (Hash[Key(shrK B)] {|Agent B, Agent C, Nonce NB, PA|},
              {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Key KBC, Agent C, Nonce NB|},
                Crypt (shrK B) {|Key KAB, Agent A, Nonce NB|},
                RA|},
              KBC)
             ∈ respond evs"



inductive_set
  responses :: "event list => msg set"
  for evs :: "event list"
  where

   Nil:  "END ∈ responses evs"

 | Cons: "⟦RA ∈ responses evs;  Key KAB ∉ used evs⟧
          ⟹ {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Key KAB, Agent A, Nonce NB|},
                RA|}  ∈ responses evs"


inductive_set recur :: "event list set"
  where

   Nil:  "[] ∈ recur"


 | Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ recur;  X ∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsf))⟧
          ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ recur"


 | RA1:  "⟦evs1 ∈ recur;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
          ⟹ Says A B (Hash[Key(shrK A)] {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA, END|})
              # evs1 ∈ recur"


 | RA2:  "⟦evs2 ∈ recur;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
```

```
           Says A' B PA ∈ set evs2⟧
         ⟹ Says B C (Hash[Key(shrK B)] {|Agent B, Agent C, Nonce NB, PA|})
             # evs2 ∈ recur"


 | RA3:  "⟦evs3 ∈ recur;  Says B' Server PB ∈ set evs3;
           (PB,RB,K) ∈ respond evs3⟧
         ⟹ Says Server B RB # evs3 ∈ recur"


 | RA4:  "⟦evs4 ∈ recur;
           Says B  C {|XH, Agent B, Agent C, Nonce NB,
                       XA, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA, P|} ∈ set evs4;
           Says C' B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Key KBC, Agent C, Nonce NB|},
                       Crypt (shrK B) {|Key KAB, Agent A, Nonce NB|},
                       RA|} ∈ set evs4⟧
         ⟹ Says B A RA # evs4 ∈ recur"
```

```
declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body  [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
```

Simplest case: Alice goes directly to the server

```
lemma "Key K ∉ used []
      ⟹ ∃NA. ∃evs ∈ recur.
            Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent Server, Nonce NA|},
                  END|}  ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] recur.Nil [THEN recur.RA1,
                               THEN recur.RA3 [OF _ _ respond.One]])
apply (possibility, simp add: used_Cons)
done
```

Case two: Alice, Bob and the server

```
lemma "⟦Key K ∉ used []; Key K' ∉ used []; K ≠ K';
        Nonce NA ∉ used []; Nonce NB ∉ used []; NA < NB⟧
      ⟹ ∃NA. ∃evs ∈ recur.
       Says B A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent B, Nonce NA|},
                  END|}  ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2]
         recur.Nil
          [THEN recur.RA1 [of _ NA],
           THEN recur.RA2 [of _ NB],
           THEN recur.RA3 [OF _ _ respond.One
                                [THEN respond.Cons [of _ _ K _ K']]],
           THEN recur.RA4], possibility)
apply (auto simp add: used_Cons)
done
```

```
lemma "⟦Key K ∉ used []; Key K' ∉ used [];
          Key K'' ∉ used []; K ≠ K'; K' ≠ K''; K ≠ K'';
          Nonce NA ∉ used []; Nonce NB ∉ used []; Nonce NC ∉ used [];
          NA < NB; NB < NC⟧
       ⟹ ∃K. ∃NA. ∃evs ∈ recur.
            Says B A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent B, Nonce NA|},
                       END|}  ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2]
          recur.Nil [THEN recur.RA1,
                     THEN recur.RA2, THEN recur.RA2,
                     THEN recur.RA3
                          [OF _ _ respond.One
                                  [THEN respond.Cons, THEN respond.Cons]],
                     THEN recur.RA4, THEN recur.RA4])
apply basic_possibility
apply (tactic "DEPTH_SOLVE (swap_res_tac context [refl, conjI, disjCI] 1)")
done


lemma respond_imp_not_used: "(PA,RB,KAB) ∈ respond evs ⟹ Key KAB ∉ used
evs"
by (erule respond.induct, simp_all)

lemma Key_in_parts_respond [rule_format]:
   "⟦Key K ∈ parts {RB};  (PB,RB,K') ∈ respond evs⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ used evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule respond.induct)
apply (auto dest: Key_not_used respond_imp_not_used)
done
```

Simple inductive reasoning about responses

```
lemma respond_imp_responses:
     "(PA,RB,KAB) ∈ respond evs ⟹ RB ∈ responses evs"
apply (erule respond.induct)
apply (blast intro!: respond_imp_not_used responses.intros)+
done




lemmas RA2_analz_spies = Says_imp_spies [THEN analz.Inj]

lemma RA4_analz_spies:
     "Says C' B {|Crypt K X, X', RA|} ∈ set evs ⟹ RA ∈ analz (spies evs)"
by blast




lemmas RA2_parts_spies =  RA2_analz_spies [THEN analz_into_parts]
lemmas RA4_parts_spies =  RA4_analz_spies [THEN analz_into_parts]
```

```
lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ recur ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
apply (erule recur.induct, auto)
```

RA3. It's ugly to call auto twice, but it seems necessary.

```
apply (auto dest: Key_in_parts_respond simp add: parts_insert_spies)
done

lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ recur ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
     "⟦Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ recur⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)
```

```
lemma resp_analz_image_freshK_lemma:
     "⟦RB ∈ responses evs;
        ∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
                  (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ H)) =
                  (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz H)⟧
     ⟹ ∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
                  (Key K ∈ analz (insert RB (Key‘KK ∪ H))) =
                  (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (insert RB H))"
apply (erule responses.induct)
apply (simp_all del: image_insert
                add: analz_image_freshK_simps, auto)
done
```

Version for the protocol. Proof is easy, thanks to the lemma.

```
lemma raw_analz_image_freshK:
 "evs ∈ recur ⟹
   ∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (spies evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (erule recur.induct)
apply (drule_tac [4] RA2_analz_spies,
       drule_tac [5] respond_imp_responses,
       drule_tac [6] RA4_analz_spies, analz_freshK, spy_analz)
```

RA3

```
apply (simp_all add: resp_analz_image_freshK_lemma)
done
```

```
lemmas resp_analz_image_freshK =
       resp_analz_image_freshK_lemma [OF _ raw_analz_image_freshK]

lemma analz_insert_freshK:
     "⟦evs ∈ recur;  KAB ∉ range shrK⟧
      ⟹ (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs))) =
          (K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
by (simp del: image_insert
         add: analz_image_freshK_simps raw_analz_image_freshK)
```

Everything that's hashed is already in past traffic.

```
lemma Hash_imp_body:
     "⟦Hash {|Key(shrK A), X|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        evs ∈ recur;  A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ X ∈ parts (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule recur.induct,
       drule_tac [6] RA4_parts_spies,
       drule_tac [5] respond_imp_responses,
       drule_tac [4] RA2_parts_spies)
```

RA3 requires a further induction

```
apply (erule_tac [5] responses.induct, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (blast intro: parts_insertI)
done
```

```
lemma unique_NA:
  "⟦Hash {|Key(shrK A), Agent A, B, NA, P|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
     Hash {|Key(shrK A), Agent A, B',NA, P'|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
     evs ∈ recur;  A ∉ bad⟧
    ⟹ B=B' ∧ P=P'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule recur.induct,
       drule_tac [5] respond_imp_responses)
apply (force, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
apply (erule_tac [3] responses.induct)
```

RA1,2: creation of new Nonce

```
apply simp_all
apply (blast dest!: Hash_imp_body)+
done
```

```
lemma shrK_in_analz_respond [simp]:
     "⟦RB ∈ responses evs;  evs ∈ recur⟧
  ⟹ (Key (shrK B) ∈ analz (insert RB (spies evs))) = (B∈bad)"
apply (erule responses.induct)
apply (simp_all del: image_insert
                add: analz_image_freshK_simps resp_analz_image_freshK, auto)

done


lemma resp_analz_insert_lemma:
     "⟦Key K ∈ analz (insert RB H);
         ∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
                   (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ H)) =
                   (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz H);
         RB ∈ responses evs⟧
      ⟹ (Key K ∈ parts{RB} | Key K ∈ analz H)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule responses.induct)
apply (simp_all del: image_insert parts_image
              add: analz_image_freshK_simps resp_analz_image_freshK_lemma)
```

Simplification using two distinct treatments of "image"

```
apply (simp add: parts_insert2, blast)
done

lemmas resp_analz_insert =
       resp_analz_insert_lemma [OF _ raw_analz_image_freshK]
```

The last key returned by respond indeed appears in a certificate

```
lemma respond_certificate:
     "(Hash[Key(shrK A)] {|Agent A, B, NA, P|}, RA, K) ∈ respond evs
      ⟹ Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, B, NA|} ∈ parts {RA}"
apply (ind_cases "(Hash[Key (shrK A)] {|Agent A, B, NA, P|}, RA, K) ∈ respond
evs")
apply simp_all
done


lemma unique_lemma [rule_format]:
     "(PB,RB,KXY) ∈ respond evs ⟹
      ∀A B N. Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent B, N|} ∈ parts {RB} ⟶
      (∀A' B' N'. Crypt (shrK A') {|Key K, Agent B', N'|} ∈ parts {RB} ⟶
      (A'=A ∧ B'=B) | (A'=B ∧ B'=A))"
apply (erule respond.induct)
apply (simp_all add: all_conj_distrib)
apply (blast dest: respond_certificate)
done

lemma unique_session_keys:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent B, N|} ∈ parts {RB};
         Crypt (shrK A') {|Key K, Agent B', N'|} ∈ parts {RB};
         (PB,RB,KXY) ∈ respond evs⟧
      ⟹ (A'=A ∧ B'=B) | (A'=B ∧ B'=A)"
```

by *(rule unique_lemma, auto)*

lemma *respond_Spy_not_see_session_key [rule_format]:*
```
"⟦(PB,RB,KAB) ∈ respond evs;  evs ∈ recur⟧
 ⟹ ∀A A' N. A ∉ bad ∧ A' ∉ bad ⟶
     Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent A', N|} ∈ parts{RB} ⟶
     Key K ∉ analz (insert RB (spies evs))"
```
apply *(erule respond.induct)*
apply *(frule_tac [2] respond_imp_responses)*
apply *(frule_tac [2] respond_imp_not_used)*
apply *(simp_all del: image_insert parts_image*
add: analz_image_freshK_simps split_ifs shrK_in_analz_respond
resp_analz_image_freshK parts_insert2)

Base case of respond

apply *blast*

Inductive step of respond

apply *(intro allI conjI impI, simp_all)*

by unicity, either `B = Aa` or `B = A'`, a contradiction if `B ∈ bad`

apply *(blast dest: unique_session_keys respond_certificate)*
apply *(blast dest!: respond_certificate)*
apply *(blast dest!: resp_analz_insert)*
done

lemma *Spy_not_see_session_key:*
```
"⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent A', N|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
   A ∉ bad;  A' ∉ bad;  evs ∈ recur⟧
 ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (spies evs)"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule recur.induct)*
apply *(drule_tac [4] RA2_analz_spies,*
frule_tac [5] respond_imp_responses,
drule_tac [6] RA4_analz_spies,
simp_all add: split_ifs analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK)

Fake

apply *spy_analz*

RA2

apply *blast*

RA3

apply *(simp add: parts_insert_spies)*
apply *(metis Key_in_parts_respond parts.Body parts.Fst resp_analz_insert*
respond_Spy_not_see_session_key usedI)

RA4

apply *blast*
done

The response never contains Hashes

lemma *Hash_in_parts_respond:*
"⟦*Hash* {|*Key (shrK B), M*|} ∈ *parts (insert RB H);*
(PB,RB,K) ∈ *respond evs*⟧
⟹ *Hash* {|*Key (shrK B), M*|} ∈ *parts H*"
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule respond_imp_responses [THEN responses.induct], auto)*
done

Only RA1 or RA2 can have caused such a part of a message to appear. This result is of no use to B, who cannot verify the Hash. Moreover, it can say nothing about how recent A's message is. It might later be used to prove B's presence to A at the run's conclusion.

lemma *Hash_auth_sender [rule_format]:*
"⟦*Hash* {|*Key(shrK A), Agent A, Agent B, NA, P*|} ∈ *parts(spies evs);*
A ∉ *bad; evs* ∈ *recur*⟧
⟹ *Says A B (Hash[Key(shrK A)]* {|*Agent A, Agent B, NA, P*|}*)* ∈ *set evs*"
unfolding *HPair_def*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule recur.induct,*
drule_tac [6] RA4_parts_spies,
drule_tac [4] RA2_parts_spies,
simp_all)

Fake, RA3

apply *(blast dest: Hash_in_parts_respond)+*
done

Certificates can only originate with the Server.

lemma *Cert_imp_Server_msg:*
"⟦*Crypt (shrK A) Y* ∈ *parts (spies evs);*
A ∉ *bad; evs* ∈ *recur*⟧
⟹ ∃*C RC. Says Server C RC* ∈ *set evs* ∧
Crypt (shrK A) Y ∈ *parts {RC}*"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule recur.induct, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *blast*

RA1

apply *blast*

RA2: it cannot be a new Nonce, contradiction.

apply *blast*

RA3. Pity that the proof is so brittle: this step requires the rewriting, which however would break all other steps.

apply *(simp add: parts_insert_spies, blast)*

RA4

apply *blast*
done

end

15 The Yahalom Protocol

theory *Yahalom* **imports** *Public* **begin**

From page 257 of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1989). A Logic of Authentication. Proc. Royal Soc. 426
This theory has the prototypical example of a secrecy relation, KeyCryptNonce.

inductive_set *yahalom :: "event list set"*
  where

```
   Nil:  "[] ∈ yahalom"

 | Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ yahalom;  X ∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsf))⟧
         ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ yahalom"

 | Reception: "⟦evsr ∈ yahalom;  Says A B X ∈ set evsr⟧
              ⟹ Gets B X # evsr ∈ yahalom"

 | YM1:  "⟦evs1 ∈ yahalom;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
         ⟹ Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} # evs1 ∈ yahalom"

 | YM2:  "⟦evs2 ∈ yahalom;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
            Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ set evs2⟧
         ⟹ Says B Server
                {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
           # evs2 ∈ yahalom"

 | YM3:  "⟦evs3 ∈ yahalom;  Key KAB ∉ used evs3;  KAB ∈ symKeys;
            Gets Server
                 {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
              ∈ set evs3⟧
         ⟹ Says Server A
                 {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key KAB, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                   Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key KAB|}|}
           # evs3 ∈ yahalom"

 | YM4:
```

— Alice receives the Server's (?) message, checks her Nonce, and uses the new session key to send Bob his Nonce. The premise *A ≠ Server* is needed for *Says_Server_not_range*. Alice can check that K is symmetric by its length.

```
         "⟦evs4 ∈ yahalom;  A ≠ Server;  K ∈ symKeys;
```

```
            Gets A {|Crypt(shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, X|}
               ∈ set evs4;
            Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ set evs4|]
         ⟹ Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} # evs4 ∈ yahalom"


 | Oops: "[|evso ∈ yahalom;
            Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A)
                                {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                              X|}  ∈ set evso|]
         ⟹ Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evso ∈ yahalom"


definition KeyWithNonce :: "[key, nat, event list] ⇒ bool" where
  "KeyWithNonce K NB evs ==
     ∃A B na X.
       Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, Nonce NB|}, X|}
         ∈ set evs"


declare Says_imp_analz_Spy [dest]
declare parts.Body  [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
```

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

```
lemma "[|A ≠ Server; K ∈ symKeys; Key K ∉ used []|]
      ⟹ ∃X NB. ∃evs ∈ yahalom.
            Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] yahalom.Nil
                  [THEN yahalom.YM1, THEN yahalom.Reception,
                   THEN yahalom.YM2, THEN yahalom.Reception,
                   THEN yahalom.YM3, THEN yahalom.Reception,
                   THEN yahalom.YM4])
apply (possibility, simp add: used_Cons)
done
```

15.1 Regularity Lemmas for Yahalom

```
lemma Gets_imp_Says:
     "[|Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ yahalom|] ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule yahalom.induct, auto)
```

Must be proved separately for each protocol

```
lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy:
     "[|Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ yahalom|]  ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)


lemmas Gets_imp_analz_Spy = Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj]
declare Gets_imp_analz_Spy [dest]
```

Lets us treat YM4 using a similar argument as for the Fake case.

```
lemma YM4_analz_knows_Spy:
```

```
     "⟦Gets A {|Crypt (shrK A) Y, X|} ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by blast

lemmas YM4_parts_knows_Spy =
       YM4_analz_knows_Spy [THEN analz_into_parts]
```

For Oops

```
lemma YM4_Key_parts_knows_Spy:
     "Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|B,K,NA,NB|}, X|} ∈ set evs
      ⟹ K ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)"
  by (metis parts.Body parts.Fst parts.Snd  Says_imp_knows_Spy parts.Inj)
```

Theorems of the form `X ∉ parts (knows Spy evs)` imply that NOBODY sends messages containing X!

Spy never sees a good agent's shared key!

```
lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ yahalom ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by (erule yahalom.induct, force,
    drule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)

lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ yahalom ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
     "⟦Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ yahalom⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)
```

Nobody can have used non-existent keys! Needed to apply `analz_insert_Key`

```
lemma new_keys_not_used [simp]:
    "⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ yahalom⟧
     ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert, auto)
done
```

Earlier, all protocol proofs declared this theorem. But only a few proofs need it, e.g. Yahalom and Kerberos IV.

```
lemma new_keys_not_analzd:
 "⟦K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ yahalom; Key K ∉ used evs⟧
  ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (analz (knows Spy evs))"
by (blast dest: new_keys_not_used intro: keysFor_mono [THEN subsetD])
```

Describes the form of K when the Server sends this message. Useful for Oops as well as main secrecy property.

```
lemma Says_Server_not_range [simp]:
```

```
     "⟦Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|}, X|}
          ∈ set evs;   evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ K ∉ range shrK"
by (erule rev_mp, erule yahalom.induct, simp_all)
```

15.2 Secrecy Theorems

Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys

```
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
 "evs ∈ yahalom ⟹
   ∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule yahalom.induct,
       drule_tac [7] YM4_analz_knows_Spy, analz_freshK, spy_analz, blast)
apply (simp only: Says_Server_not_range analz_image_freshK_simps)
apply safe
done

lemma analz_insert_freshK:
     "⟦evs ∈ yahalom;  KAB ∉ range shrK⟧ ⟹
      (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs))) =
      (K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
```

The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's message.

```
lemma unique_session_keys:
     "⟦Says Server A
         {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|}, X|} ∈ set evs;
       Says Server A'
         {|Crypt (shrK A') {|Agent B', Key K, na', nb'|}, X'|} ∈ set evs;
       evs ∈ yahalom⟧
     ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ na=na' ∧ nb=nb'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, simp_all)
```

YM3, by freshness, and YM4

```
apply blast+
done
```

Crucial secrecy property: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg YM3

```
lemma secrecy_lemma:
     "⟦A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Says Server A
            {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},
              Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
           ∈ set evs ⟶
         Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ∉ set evs ⟶
         Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       drule_tac [6] YM4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (simp_all add: pushes analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK)
  subgoal — Fake by spy_analz
```

```
  subgoal — YM3 by blast
  subgoal — Oops by  (blast dest: unique_session_keys)
done
```

Final version

```
lemma Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:
     "⟦Says Server A
           {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},
             Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest: secrecy_lemma)
```

15.2.1 Security Guarantee for A upon receiving YM3

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server

```
lemma A_trusts_YM3:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
       ⟹ Says Server A
            {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},
              Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
           ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

Fake, YM3

```
apply blast+
done
```

The obvious combination of *A_trusts_YM3* with *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*

```
lemma A_gets_good_key:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
  by (metis A_trusts_YM3 secrecy_lemma)
```

15.2.2 Security Guarantees for B upon receiving YM4

B knows, by the first part of A's message, that the Server distributed the key for A and B. But this part says nothing about nonces.

```
lemma B_trusts_YM4_shrK:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ ∃NA NB. Says Server A
                   {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K,
                                      Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                     Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
```

```
                    ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

Fake, YM3

```
apply blast+
done
```

B knows, by the second part of A's message, that the Server distributed the key quoting nonce NB. This part says nothing about agent names. Secrecy of NB is crucial. Note that *Nonce NB ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)* must be the FIRST antecedent of the induction formula.

```
lemma B_trusts_YM4_newK [rule_format]:
     "⟦Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Nonce NB ∉ analz (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ ∃A B NA. Says Server A
                    {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                      Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
                    ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy)
         apply (analz_mono_contra, simp_all)
  subgoal — Fake by blast
  subgoal — YM3 by blast
```

YM4. A is uncompromised because NB is secure A's certificate guarantees the existence of the Server message

```
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Crypt_Spy_analz_bad
             dest: Says_imp_spies
                   parts.Inj [THEN parts.Fst, THEN A_trusts_YM3])
done
```

15.2.3 Towards proving secrecy of Nonce NB

Lemmas about the predicate KeyWithNonce

```
lemma KeyWithNonceI:
 "Says Server A
          {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, Nonce NB|}, X|}
        ∈ set evs ⟹ KeyWithNonce K NB evs"
  unfolding KeyWithNonce_def by blast

lemma KeyWithNonce_Says [simp]:
   "KeyWithNonce K NB (Says S A X # evs) =
      (Server = S ∧
       (∃B n X'. X = {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, n, Nonce NB|}, X'|})
       | KeyWithNonce K NB evs)"
by (simp add: KeyWithNonce_def, blast)


lemma KeyWithNonce_Notes [simp]:
   "KeyWithNonce K NB (Notes A X # evs) = KeyWithNonce K NB evs"
```

```
by (simp add: KeyWithNonce_def)

lemma KeyWithNonce_Gets [simp]:
   "KeyWithNonce K NB (Gets A X # evs) = KeyWithNonce K NB evs"
by (simp add: KeyWithNonce_def)
```

A fresh key cannot be associated with any nonce (with respect to a given trace).

```
lemma fresh_not_KeyWithNonce:
     "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ ¬ KeyWithNonce K NB evs"
  unfolding KeyWithNonce_def by blast
```

The Server message associates K with NB' and therefore not with any other nonce NB.

```
lemma Says_Server_KeyWithNonce:
 "⟦Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, Nonce NB'|}, X|}
       ∈ set evs;
     NB ≠ NB';  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
  ⟹ ¬ KeyWithNonce K NB evs"
  unfolding KeyWithNonce_def by (blast dest: unique_session_keys)
```

The only nonces that can be found with the help of session keys are those distributed as nonce NB by the Server. The form of the theorem recalls *analz_image_freshK*, but it is much more complicated.

As with *analz_image_freshK*, we take some pains to express the property as a logical equivalence so that the simplifier can apply it.

```
lemma Nonce_secrecy_lemma:
     "P ⟶ (X ∈ analz (G ∪ H)) ⟶ (X ∈ analz H)  ⟹
      P ⟶ (X ∈ analz (G ∪ H)) = (X ∈ analz H)"
by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN subsetD])

lemma Nonce_secrecy:
     "evs ∈ yahalom ⟹
      (∀KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
           (∀K ∈ KK. K ∈ symKeys ⟶ ¬ KeyWithNonce K NB evs)   ⟶
           (Nonce NB ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
           (Nonce NB ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)))"
apply (erule yahalom.induct,
       frule_tac [7] YM4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (safe del: allI impI intro!: Nonce_secrecy_lemma [THEN impI, THEN allI])
apply (simp_all del: image_insert image_Un
       add: analz_image_freshK_simps split_ifs
            all_conj_distrib ball_conj_distrib
            analz_image_freshK fresh_not_KeyWithNonce
            imp_disj_not1
            Says_Server_KeyWithNonce)
```

For Oops, simplification proves *NBa ≠ NB*. By *Says_Server_KeyWithNonce*, we get ¬ *KeyWithNonce K NB evs*; then simplification can apply the induction hypothesis with *KK = {K}*.

subgoal — Fake **by** *spy_analz*
subgoal — YM2 **by** *blast*
subgoal — YM3 **by** *blast*

subgoal — YM4: If *A ∈ bad* then *NBa* is known, therefore *NBa ≠ NB*.
by *(metis A_trusts_YM3 Gets_imp_analz_Spy Gets_imp_knows_Spy KeyWithNonce_def Spy_analz_shrK analz.Fst analz.Snd analz_shrK_Decrypt parts.Fst parts.Inj)*
done

Version required below: if NB can be decrypted using a session key then it was distributed with that key. The more general form above is required for the induction to carry through.

lemma *single_Nonce_secrecy:*
```
"⟦Says Server A
    {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key KAB, na, Nonce NB'|}, X|}
   ∈ set evs;
   NB ≠ NB';  KAB ∉ range shrK;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
 ⟹ (Nonce NB ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs))) =
    (Nonce NB ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
```
by *(simp_all del: image_insert image_Un imp_disjL add: analz_image_freshK_simps split_ifs Nonce_secrecy Says_Server_KeyWithNonce)*

15.2.4 The Nonce NB uniquely identifies B's message.

lemma *unique_NB:*
```
"⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
   Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NA', nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
  evs ∈ yahalom;  B ∉ bad;  B' ∉ bad⟧
 ⟹ NA' = NA ∧ A' = A ∧ B' = B"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule yahalom.induct, force, frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)*

Fake, and YM2 by freshness

apply *blast+*
done

Variant useful for proving secrecy of NB. Because nb is assumed to be secret, we no longer must assume B, B' not bad.

lemma *Says_unique_NB:*
```
"⟦Says C S   {|X,  Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|}|}
     ∈ set evs;
   Gets S' {|X', Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NA', nb|}|}
     ∈ set evs;
   nb ∉ analz (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
 ⟹ NA' = NA ∧ A' = A ∧ B' = B"
```
by *(blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Crypt_Spy_analz_bad dest: Says_imp_spies unique_NB parts.Inj analz.Inj)*

15.2.5 A nonce value is never used both as NA and as NB

lemma *no_nonce_YM1_YM2:*
```
"⟦Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NB, nb'|} ∈ parts(knows Spy evs);
   Nonce NB ∉ analz (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
 ⟹ Crypt (shrK B)  {|Agent A, na, Nonce NB|} ∉ parts(knows Spy evs)"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule yahalom.induct, force,*

```
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy)
apply (analz_mono_contra, simp_all)
```

Fake, YM2

```
apply blast+
done
```

The Server sends YM3 only in response to YM2.

```
lemma Says_Server_imp_YM2:
     "⟦Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, k, na, nb|}, X|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Gets Server {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, na, nb|}|}
           ∈ set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule yahalom.induct, auto)
```

A vital theorem for B, that nonce NB remains secure from the Spy.

```
theorem Spy_not_see_NB :
     "⟦Says B Server
                {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
         (∀k. Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, k|} ∉ set evs);
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Nonce NB ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (simp_all add: split_ifs pushes new_keys_not_analzd analz_insert_eq
                     analz_insert_freshK)
```

subgoal — Fake **by** *spy_analz*

subgoal — YM1: NB=NA is impossible anyway, but NA is secret because it is fresh! **by** *blast*

subgoal — YM2 **by** *blast*

subgoal — YM3: because no NB can also be an NA

by *(blast dest!: no_nonce_YM1_YM2 dest: Gets_imp_Says Says_unique_NB)*

subgoal — YM4: key K is visible to Spy, contradicting session key secrecy theorem

— Case analysis on whether Aa is bad; use *Says_unique_NB* to identify message components: *Aa = A*, *Ba = B*

```
    apply clarify
    apply (blast dest!: Says_unique_NB analz_shrK_Decrypt
                        parts.Inj [THEN parts.Fst, THEN A_trusts_YM3]
                 dest: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_spies Says_Server_imp_YM2
                       Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
    done
```

subgoal — Oops case: if the nonce is betrayed now, show that the Oops event is covered by the quantified Oops assumption.

```
    apply clarsimp
    apply (metis Says_Server_imp_YM2 Gets_imp_Says Says_Server_not_range Says_unique_NB
no_nonce_YM1_YM2 parts.Snd single_Nonce_secrecy spies_partsEs(1))
    done
done
```

B's session key guarantee from YM4. The two certificates contribute to a single conclusion about the Server's message. Note that the "Notes Spy" assumption

must quantify over ∀ POSSIBLE keys instead of our particular K. If this run is broken and the spy substitutes a certificate containing an old key, B has no means of telling.

```
lemma B_trusts_YM4:
     "⟦Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|},
                Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs;
        Says B Server
          {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
        ∀k. Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, k|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Says Server A
                {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K,
                                   Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
           ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest: Spy_not_see_NB Says_unique_NB
                Says_Server_imp_YM2 B_trusts_YM4_newK)
```

The obvious combination of *B_trusts_YM4* with *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*

```
lemma B_gets_good_key:
     "⟦Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|},
                Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs;
        Says B Server
          {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
        ∀k. Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, k|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
  by (metis B_trusts_YM4 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
```

15.3 Authenticating B to A

The encryption in message YM2 tells us it cannot be faked.

```
lemma B_Said_YM2 [rule_format]:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ B ∉ bad ⟶
          Says B Server {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|}|}
            ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
done
```

If the server sends YM3 then B sent YM2

```
lemma YM3_auth_B_to_A_lemma:
     "⟦Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, nb|}, X|}
       ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ B ∉ bad ⟶
```

```
          Says B Server {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|}|}
            ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule yahalom.induct, simp_all)
```

YM3, YM4

```
apply (blast dest!: B_Said_YM2)+
done
```

If A receives YM3 then B has used nonce NA (and therefore is alive)

```
theorem YM3_auth_B_to_A:
     "[|Gets A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, nb|}, X|}
          ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom|]
      ⟹ Says B Server {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|}|}
       ∈ set evs"
  by (metis A_trusts_YM3 Gets_imp_analz_Spy YM3_auth_B_to_A_lemma analz.Fst
        not_parts_not_analz)
```

15.4 Authenticating A to B using the certificate *Crypt K (Nonce NB)*

Assuming the session key is secure, if both certificates are present then A has said NB. We can't be sure about the rest of A's message, but only NB matters for freshness.

```
theorem A_Said_YM3_lemma [rule_format]:
     "evs ∈ yahalom
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶
          Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
          Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
          B ∉ bad ⟶
          (∃X. Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy)
apply (analz_mono_contra, simp_all)
  subgoal — Fake by blast
  subgoal — YM3 because the message Crypt K (Nonce NB) could not exist
     by (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
   subgoal — YM4: was Crypt K (Nonce NB) the very last message? If not, use the
induction hypothesis, otherwise by unicity of session keys
     by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says A_trusts_YM3 B_trusts_YM4_shrK Crypt_Spy_analz_bad
           dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj] unique_session_keys)
done
```

If B receives YM4 then A has used nonce NB (and therefore is alive). Moreover, A associates K with NB (thus is talking about the same run). Other premises guarantee secrecy of K.

```
theorem YM4_imp_A_Said_YM3 [rule_format]:
     "[|Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|},
                 Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs;
        Says B Server
          {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
```

```
        (∀NA k. Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, k|} ∉ set evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
     ⟹ ∃X. Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs"
by (metis A_Said_YM3_lemma B_gets_good_key Gets_imp_analz_Spy YM4_parts_knows_Spy
analz.Fst not_parts_not_analz)
```

end

16 The Yahalom Protocol, Variant 2

theory *Yahalom2* **imports** *Public* **begin**

This version trades encryption of NB for additional explicitness in YM3. Also in YM3, care is taken to make the two certificates distinct.

From page 259 of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1989). A Logic of Authentication. Proc. Royal Soc. 426

This theory has the prototypical example of a secrecy relation, KeyCryptNonce.

```
inductive_set yahalom :: "event list set"
  where

   Nil:  "[] ∈ yahalom"


 | Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ yahalom;  X ∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsf))⟧
         ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ yahalom"


 | Reception: "⟦evsr ∈ yahalom;  Says A B X ∈ set evsr⟧
              ⟹ Gets B X # evsr ∈ yahalom"


 | YM1:  "⟦evs1 ∈ yahalom;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
         ⟹ Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} # evs1 ∈ yahalom"


 | YM2:  "⟦evs2 ∈ yahalom;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
            Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ set evs2⟧
         ⟹ Says B Server
                 {|Agent B, Nonce NB, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}|}
          # evs2 ∈ yahalom"


 | YM3:  "⟦evs3 ∈ yahalom;  Key KAB ∉ used evs3;
            Gets Server {|Agent B, Nonce NB,
                          Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}|}
              ∈ set evs3⟧
         ⟹ Says Server A
              {|Nonce NB,
                Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key KAB, Nonce NA|},
                Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key KAB, Nonce NB|}|}
                # evs3 ∈ yahalom"
```

```
| YM4:  "⟦evs4 ∈ yahalom;
          Gets A {|Nonce NB, Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|},
                   X|}  ∈ set evs4;
          Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ set evs4⟧
        ⟹ Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} # evs4 ∈ yahalom"


| Oops: "⟦evso ∈ yahalom;
          Says Server A {|Nonce NB,
                          Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|},
                          X|}  ∈ set evso⟧
        ⟹ Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evso ∈ yahalom"


declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body  [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
```

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

```
lemma "Key K ∉ used []
      ⟹ ∃X NB. ∃evs ∈ yahalom.
            Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] yahalom.Nil
                  [THEN yahalom.YM1, THEN yahalom.Reception,
                   THEN yahalom.YM2, THEN yahalom.Reception,
                   THEN yahalom.YM3, THEN yahalom.Reception,
                   THEN yahalom.YM4])
apply (possibility, simp add: used_Cons)
done

lemma Gets_imp_Says:
    "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ yahalom⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule yahalom.induct, auto)
```

Must be proved separately for each protocol

```
lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy:
    "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ yahalom⟧  ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)

declare Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
```

16.1 Inductive Proofs

Result for reasoning about the encrypted portion of messages. Lets us treat YM4 using a similar argument as for the Fake case.

```
lemma YM4_analz_knows_Spy:
    "⟦Gets A {|NB, Crypt (shrK A) Y, X|} ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
     ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by blast
```

```
lemmas YM4_parts_knows_Spy =
       YM4_analz_knows_Spy [THEN analz_into_parts]
```

Spy never sees a good agent's shared key!

```
lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ yahalom ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by (erule yahalom.induct, force,
    drule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)

lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ yahalom ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
     "⟦Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ yahalom⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)
```

Nobody can have used non-existent keys! Needed to apply *analz_insert_Key*

```
lemma new_keys_not_used [simp]:
    "⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ yahalom⟧
     ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
subgoal — Fake by (force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)
subgoal — YM3by blast
subgoal — YM4 by (fastforce dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj])
done
```

Describes the form of K when the Server sends this message. Useful for Oops as well as main secrecy property.

```
lemma Says_Server_message_form:
     "⟦Says Server A {|nb', Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|}, X|}
         ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ K ∉ range shrK"
by (erule rev_mp, erule yahalom.induct, simp_all)
```

```
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
 "evs ∈ yahalom ⟹
   ∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule yahalom.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (drule_tac [7] YM4_analz_knows_Spy, analz_freshK, spy_analz, blast)
done

lemma analz_insert_freshK:
```

```
    "⟦evs ∈ yahalom;  KAB ∉ range shrK⟧ ⟹
     (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs))) =
     (K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
```

The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's message

```
lemma unique_session_keys:
    "⟦Says Server A
        {|nb, Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|}, X|} ∈ set evs;
      Says Server A'
        {|nb', Crypt (shrK A') {|Agent B', Key K, na'|}, X'|} ∈ set evs;
      evs ∈ yahalom⟧
    ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ na=na' ∧ nb=nb'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, simp_all)
```

YM3, by freshness

```
apply blast
done
```

16.2 Crucial Secrecy Property: Spy Does Not See Key *KAB*

```
lemma secrecy_lemma:
    "⟦A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
     ⟹ Says Server A
           {|nb, Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|},
                 Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, nb|}|}
         ∈ set evs ⟶
        Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ∉ set evs ⟶
        Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force, frule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form,
       drule_tac [6] YM4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (simp_all add: pushes analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK, spy_analz)
apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys)+
done
```

Final version

```
lemma Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:
    "⟦Says Server A
           {|nb, Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|},
                 Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, nb|}|}
        ∈ set evs;
      Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
      A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
     ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest: secrecy_lemma Says_Server_message_form)
```

This form is an immediate consequence of the previous result. It is similar to the assertions established by other methods. It is equivalent to the previous result in that the Spy already has *analz* and *synth* at his disposal. However, the conclusion *Key K ∉ knows Spy evs* appears not to be inductive: all the cases other than Fake are trivial, while Fake requires *Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)*.

```
lemma Spy_not_know_encrypted_key:
```

```
     "⟦Says Server A
           {|nb, Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|},
                 Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, nb|}|}
        ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ knows Spy evs"
by (blast dest: Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
```

16.3 Security Guarantee for A upon receiving YM3

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server. May now apply *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*, subject to its conditions.

```
lemma A_trusts_YM3:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ ∃nb. Says Server A
                  {|nb, Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|},
                        Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, nb|}|}
                ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

Fake, YM3

```
apply blast+
done
```

The obvious combination of *A_trusts_YM3* with *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*

```
theorem A_gets_good_key:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        ∀nb. Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: A_trusts_YM3 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
```

16.4 Security Guarantee for B upon receiving YM4

B knows, by the first part of A's message, that the Server distributed the key for A and B, and has associated it with NB.

```
lemma B_trusts_YM4_shrK:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, Nonce NB|}
           ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
  ⟹ ∃NA. Says Server A
            {|Nonce NB,
              Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|},
              Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, Nonce NB|}|}
            ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

Fake, YM3

apply *blast+*
done

With this protocol variant, we don't need the 2nd part of YM4 at all: Nonce NB is available in the first part.

What can B deduce from receipt of YM4? Stronger and simpler than Yahalom because we do not have to show that NB is secret.

lemma *B_trusts_YM4:*
```
"⟦Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, Nonce NB|},  X|}
      ∈ set evs;
   A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
⟹ ∃NA. Says Server A
         {|Nonce NB,
           Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|},
           Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, Nonce NB|}|}
        ∈ set evs"
```
by *(blast dest!: B_trusts_YM4_shrK)*

The obvious combination of *B_trusts_YM4* with *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*

theorem *B_gets_good_key:*
```
"⟦Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, Nonce NB|}, X|}
      ∈ set evs;
   ∀na. Notes Spy {|na, Nonce NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs;
   A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
 ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
```
by *(blast dest!: B_trusts_YM4 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)*

16.5 Authenticating B to A

The encryption in message YM2 tells us it cannot be faked.

lemma *B_Said_YM2:*
```
"⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
   B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
 ⟹ ∃NB. Says B Server {|Agent B, Nonce NB,
                         Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}|}
              ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule yahalom.induct, force,*
frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)

Fake, YM2

apply *blast+*
done

If the server sends YM3 then B sent YM2, perhaps with a different NB

lemma *YM3_auth_B_to_A_lemma:*
```
"⟦Says Server A {|nb, Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|}, X|}
      ∈ set evs;
   B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
 ⟹ ∃nb'. Says B Server {|Agent B, nb',
```

```
                                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}}
                        ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, simp_all)
```

Fake, YM2, YM3

```
apply (blast dest!: B_Said_YM2)+
done
```

If A receives YM3 then B has used nonce NA (and therefore is alive)

```
theorem YM3_auth_B_to_A:
     "[[Gets A {|nb, Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|}, X|}
           ∈ set evs;
         A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom]]
 ⟹ ∃nb'. Says B Server
                  {|Agent B, nb', Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}|}
                ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: A_trusts_YM3 YM3_auth_B_to_A_lemma)
```

16.6 Authenticating A to B

using the certificate *Crypt K (Nonce NB)*

Assuming the session key is secure, if both certificates are present then A has said NB. We can't be sure about the rest of A's message, but only NB matters for freshness. Note that *Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)* must be the FIRST antecedent of the induction formula.

This lemma allows a use of *unique_session_keys* in the next proof, which otherwise is extremely slow.

```
lemma secure_unique_session_keys:
     "[[Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|} ∈ analz (spies evs);
        Crypt (shrK A') {|Agent B', Key K, na'|} ∈ analz (spies evs);
        Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ yahalom]]
     ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B'"
by (blast dest!: A_trusts_YM3 dest: unique_session_keys Crypt_Spy_analz_bad)


lemma Auth_A_to_B_lemma [rule_format]:
     "evs ∈ yahalom
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶
         K ∈ symKeys ⟶
         Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, Nonce NB|}
           ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
         B ∉ bad ⟶
         (∃X. Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy)
apply (analz_mono_contra, simp_all)
  subgoal — Fake by blast
  subgoal — YM3 because the message Crypt K (Nonce NB) could not exist
    by (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
```

subgoal — YM4: was *Crypt K (Nonce NB)* the very last message? If not, use the induction hypothesis, otherwise by unicity of session keys
by *(blast dest!: B_trusts_YM4_shrK dest: secure_unique_session_keys)*
done

If B receives YM4 then A has used nonce NB (and therefore is alive). Moreover, A associates K with NB (thus is talking about the same run). Other premises guarantee secrecy of K.

theorem *YM4_imp_A_Said_YM3 [rule_format]:*
```
"⟦Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Agent B, Key K, Nonce NB|},
           Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs;
   (∀NA. Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} ∉ set evs);
   K ∈ symKeys;  A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
 ⟹ ∃X. Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs"
```
by *(blast intro: Auth_A_to_B_lemma*
dest: Spy_not_see_encrypted_key B_trusts_YM4_shrK)

end

17 The Yahalom Protocol: A Flawed Version

theory *Yahalom_Bad* **imports** *Public* **begin**

Demonstrates of why Oops is necessary. This protocol can be attacked because it doesn't keep NB secret, but without Oops it can be "verified" anyway. The issues are discussed in lcp's LICS 2000 invited lecture.

inductive_set *yahalom :: "event list set"*
where

```
  Nil:  "[] ∈ yahalom"

| Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ yahalom;  X ∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsf))⟧
       ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ yahalom"

| Reception: "⟦evsr ∈ yahalom;  Says A B X ∈ set evsr⟧
            ⟹ Gets B X # evsr ∈ yahalom"

| YM1:  "⟦evs1 ∈ yahalom;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
       ⟹ Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} # evs1 ∈ yahalom"

| YM2:  "⟦evs2 ∈ yahalom;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
          Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ set evs2⟧
       ⟹ Says B Server
            {|Agent B, Nonce NB, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}|}
          # evs2 ∈ yahalom"

| YM3:  "⟦evs3 ∈ yahalom;  Key KAB ∉ used evs3;  KAB ∈ symKeys;
          Gets Server
```

```
                {|Agent B, Nonce NB, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}|}
              ∈ set evs3⟧
         ⟹ Says Server A
                {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key KAB, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                  Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key KAB|}|}
              # evs3 ∈ yahalom"


 | YM4:  "⟦evs4 ∈ yahalom;  A ≠ Server;  K ∈ symKeys;
            Gets A {|Crypt(shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, X|}
               ∈ set evs4;
            Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ set evs4⟧
         ⟹ Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} # evs4 ∈ yahalom"


declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body  [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
```

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

```
lemma "⟦A ≠ Server; Key K ∉ used []; K ∈ symKeys⟧
       ⟹ ∃X NB. ∃evs ∈ yahalom.
              Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] yahalom.Nil
                    [THEN yahalom.YM1, THEN yahalom.Reception,
                     THEN yahalom.YM2, THEN yahalom.Reception,
                     THEN yahalom.YM3, THEN yahalom.Reception,
                     THEN yahalom.YM4])
apply (possibility, simp add: used_Cons)
done
```

17.1 Regularity Lemmas for Yahalom

```
lemma Gets_imp_Says:
     "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ yahalom⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule yahalom.induct, auto)


lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy:
     "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ yahalom⟧  ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)

declare Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
```

17.2 For reasoning about the encrypted portion of messages

Lets us treat YM4 using a similar argument as for the Fake case.

```
lemma YM4_analz_knows_Spy:
     "⟦Gets A {|Crypt (shrK A) Y, X|} ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
```

by *blast*

lemmas *YM4_parts_knows_Spy =*
YM4_analz_knows_Spy [THEN analz_into_parts]

Theorems of the form *X ∉ parts (knows Spy evs)* imply that NOBODY sends messages containing X!

Spy never sees a good agent's shared key!

lemma *Spy_see_shrK [simp]:*
"evs ∈ yahalom ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
apply *(erule yahalom.induct, force,*
drule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)
done

lemma *Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:*
"evs ∈ yahalom ⟹ (Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by *auto*

lemma *Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:*
"⟦Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs); evs ∈ yahalom⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
by *(blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)*

Nobody can have used non-existent keys! Needed to apply *analz_insert_Key*

lemma *new_keys_not_used [simp]:*
"⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ yahalom⟧
⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule yahalom.induct, force,*
frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)

Fake

apply *(force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert, auto)*
done

17.3 Secrecy Theorems

17.4 Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys

lemma *analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:*
"evs ∈ yahalom ⟹
∀K KK. KK ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟶
(Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
(K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
by *(erule yahalom.induct,*
drule_tac [7] YM4_analz_knows_Spy, analz_freshK, spy_analz, blast)

lemma *analz_insert_freshK:*
"⟦evs ∈ yahalom; KAB ∉ range shrK⟧ ⟹
(Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs))) =
(K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
by *(simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)*

The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's message.

```
lemma unique_session_keys:
     "⟦Says Server A
          {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|}, X|} ∈ set evs;
        Says Server A'
          {|Crypt (shrK A') {|Agent B', Key K, na', nb'|}, X'|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ na=na' ∧ nb=nb'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, simp_all)
```

YM3, by freshness, and YM4

```
apply blast+
done
```

Crucial secrecy property: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg YM3

```
lemma secrecy_lemma:
     "⟦A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Says Server A
            {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},
              Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
           ∈ set evs ⟶
          Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force, drule_tac [6] YM4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (simp_all add: pushes analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK, spy_analz)

apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys)
done
```

Final version

```
lemma Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:
     "⟦Says Server A
            {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},
              Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
           ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest: secrecy_lemma)
```

17.5 Security Guarantee for A upon receiving YM3

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server

```
lemma A_trusts_YM3:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Says Server A
            {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},
              Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
           ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

Fake, YM3

```
apply blast+
done
```

The obvious combination of *A_trusts_YM3* with *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*

```
lemma A_gets_good_key:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: A_trusts_YM3 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
```

17.6 Security Guarantees for B upon receiving YM4

B knows, by the first part of A's message, that the Server distributed the key for A and B. But this part says nothing about nonces.

```
lemma B_trusts_YM4_shrK:
     "⟦Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ ∃NA NB. Says Server A
                     {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                       Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
                    ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
```

Fake, YM3

```
apply blast+
done
```

17.7 The Flaw in the Model

Up to now, the reasoning is similar to standard Yahalom. Now the doubtful reasoning occurs. We should not be assuming that an unknown key is secure, but the model allows us to: there is no Oops rule to let session keys become compromised.

B knows, by the second part of A's message, that the Server distributed the key quoting nonce NB. This part says nothing about agent names. Secrecy of K is assumed; the valid Yahalom proof uses (and later proves) the secrecy of NB.

```
lemma B_trusts_YM4_newK [rule_format]:
     "⟦Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
          (∃A B NA. Says Server A
                     {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K,
                                        Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                       Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
                    ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule yahalom.induct, force,
       frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy)
```

apply *(analz_mono_contra, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *blast*

YM3

apply *blast*

A is uncompromised because NB is secure A's certificate guarantees the existence of the Server message

```
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Crypt_Spy_analz_bad
            dest: Says_imp_spies
                  parts.Inj [THEN parts.Fst, THEN A_trusts_YM3])
done
```

B's session key guarantee from YM4. The two certificates contribute to a single conclusion about the Server's message.

```
lemma B_trusts_YM4:
     "⟦Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|},
                Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs;
        Says B Server
          {|Agent B, Nonce NB, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ ∃na nb. Says Server A
                  {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},
                    Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
          ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest: B_trusts_YM4_newK B_trusts_YM4_shrK Spy_not_see_encrypted_key
                unique_session_keys)
```

The obvious combination of *B_trusts_YM4* with *Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*

```
lemma B_gets_good_key:
     "⟦Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|},
                Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs;
        Says B Server
          {|Agent B, Nonce NB, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ yahalom⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest!: B_trusts_YM4 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
```

Assuming the session key is secure, if both certificates are present then A has said NB. We can't be sure about the rest of A's message, but only NB matters for freshness.

```
lemma A_Said_YM3_lemma [rule_format]:
     "evs ∈ yahalom
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs) ⟶
         Crypt K (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
         Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs) ⟶
         B ∉ bad ⟶
         (∃X. Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs)"
```

apply *(erule yahalom.induct, force,*
frule_tac [6] YM4_parts_knows_Spy)
apply *(analz_mono_contra, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *blast*

YM3: by *new_keys_not_used*, the message *Crypt K (Nonce NB)* could not exist

apply *(force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)*

YM4: was *Crypt K (Nonce NB)* the very last message? If not, use the induction hypothesis

apply *(simp add: ex_disj_distrib)*

yes: apply unicity of session keys

apply *(blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says A_trusts_YM3 B_trusts_YM4_shrK*
Crypt_Spy_analz_bad
dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj] unique_session_keys)
done

If B receives YM4 then A has used nonce NB (and therefore is alive). Moreover, A associates K with NB (thus is talking about the same run). Other premises guarantee secrecy of K.

lemma *YM4_imp_A_Said_YM3 [rule_format]:*
"⟦Gets B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|},
Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs;
Says B Server
{|Agent B, Nonce NB, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}|}
∈ set evs;
A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; evs ∈ yahalom⟧
⟹ ∃X. Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} ∈ set evs"
by *(blast intro!: A_Said_YM3_lemma*
dest: Spy_not_see_encrypted_key B_trusts_YM4 Gets_imp_Says)

end

theory *ZhouGollmann* **imports** *Public* **begin**

abbreviation
TTP :: agent **where** *"TTP == Server"*

abbreviation *f_sub :: nat* **where** *"f_sub == 5"*
abbreviation *f_nro :: nat* **where** *"f_nro == 2"*
abbreviation *f_nrr :: nat* **where** *"f_nrr == 3"*
abbreviation *f_con :: nat* **where** *"f_con == 4"*

definition *broken :: "agent set"* **where**
— the compromised honest agents; TTP is included as it's not allowed to use the protocol
"broken == bad - {Spy}"

```
declare broken_def [simp]

inductive_set zg :: "event list set"
  where

  Nil:  "[] ∈ zg"

| Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ zg;  X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧
         ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ zg"

| Reception:  "⟦evsr ∈ zg; Says A B X ∈ set evsr⟧ ⟹ Gets B X # evsr ∈ zg"


| ZG1: "⟦evs1 ∈ zg;  Nonce L ∉ used evs1; C = Crypt K (Number m);
           K ∈ symKeys;
           NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|}⟧
       ⟹ Says A B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} # evs1 ∈ zg"


| ZG2: "⟦evs2 ∈ zg;
           Gets B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} ∈ set evs2;
           NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|};
           NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|}⟧
       ⟹ Says B A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} # evs2  ∈  zg"


| ZG3: "⟦evs3 ∈ zg; C = Crypt K M; K ∈ symKeys;
           Says A B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} ∈ set evs3;
           Gets A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} ∈ set evs3;
           NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|};
           sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|}⟧
       ⟹ Says A TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|}
         # evs3 ∈ zg"


| ZG4: "⟦evs4 ∈ zg; K ∈ symKeys;
           Gets TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|}
             ∈ set evs4;
           sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
           con_K = Crypt (priK TTP) {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B,
                                      Nonce L, Key K|}⟧
       ⟹ Says TTP Spy con_K
           #
           Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, con_K|}
           # evs4 ∈ zg"


declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]

declare symKey_neq_priEK [simp]
declare symKey_neq_priEK [THEN not_sym, simp]
```

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

```
lemma "⟦A ≠ B; TTP ≠ A; TTP ≠ B; K ∈ symKeys⟧ ⟹
     ∃L. ∃evs ∈ zg.
           Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K,
               Crypt (priK TTP) {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L,
Key K|}|}
               ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] zg.Nil
                    [THEN zg.ZG1, THEN zg.Reception [of _ A B],
                     THEN zg.ZG2, THEN zg.Reception [of _ B A],
                     THEN zg.ZG3, THEN zg.Reception [of _ A TTP],
                     THEN zg.ZG4])
apply (basic_possibility, auto)
done
```

17.8 Basic Lemmas

```
lemma Gets_imp_Says:
     "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ zg⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct, auto)
done

lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy:
     "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ zg⟧  ⟹ X ∈ spies evs"
by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)
```

Lets us replace proofs about *used evs* by simpler proofs about *parts (knows Spy evs)*.

```
lemma Crypt_used_imp_spies:
     "⟦Crypt K X ∈ used evs; evs ∈ zg⟧
      ⟹ Crypt K X ∈ parts (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (simp_all add: parts_insert_knows_A)
done

lemma Notes_TTP_imp_Gets:
     "⟦Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, con_K|}
           ∈ set evs;
        sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
        evs ∈ zg⟧
    ⟹ Gets TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct, auto)
done
```

For reasoning about C, which is encrypted in message ZG2

```
lemma ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies:
     "⟦Gets B {|F, B', L, C, X|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ zg⟧
      ⟹ C ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: Gets_imp_Says)
```

```
lemma Spy_see_priK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ zg ⟹ (Key (priK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, auto)
done
```

So that blast can use it too

```
declare  Spy_see_priK [THEN [2] rev_iffD1, dest!]
```

```
lemma Spy_analz_priK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ zg ⟹ (Key (priK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto
```

17.9 About NRO: Validity for *B*

Below we prove that if *NRO* exists then *A* definitely sent it, provided *A* is not broken.

Strong conclusion for a good agent

```
lemma NRO_validity_good:
     "⟦NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|};
        NRO ∈ parts (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ zg⟧
     ⟹ Says A B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} ∈ set evs"
apply clarify
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, auto)
done
```

```
lemma NRO_sender:
     "⟦Says A' B {|n, b, l, C, Crypt (priK A) X|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ zg⟧
    ⟹ A' ∈ {A,Spy}"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct, simp_all)
done
```

Holds also for *A = Spy*!

```
theorem NRO_validity:
     "⟦Gets B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} ∈ set evs;
        NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|};
        A ∉ broken;  evs ∈ zg⟧
     ⟹ Says A B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} ∈ set evs"
apply (drule Gets_imp_Says, assumption)
apply clarify
apply (frule NRO_sender, auto)
```

We are left with the case where the sender is *Spy* and not equal to *A*, because *A* ∉ *bad*. Thus theorem *NRO_validity_good* applies.

```
apply (blast dest: NRO_validity_good [OF refl])
done
```

17.10 About NRR: Validity for A

Below we prove that if NRR exists then B definitely sent it, provided B is not broken.

Strong conclusion for a good agent

```
lemma NRR_validity_good:
     "⟦NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|};
        NRR ∈ parts (spies evs);
        B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ zg⟧
     ⟹ Says B A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} ∈ set evs"
apply clarify
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, auto)
done

lemma NRR_sender:
     "⟦Says B' A {|n, a, l, Crypt (priK B) X|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ zg⟧
    ⟹ B' ∈ {B,Spy}"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct, simp_all)
done
```

Holds also for B = Spy!

```
theorem NRR_validity:
     "⟦Says B' A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} ∈ set evs;
        NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|};
        B ∉ broken; evs ∈ zg⟧
    ⟹ Says B A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} ∈ set evs"
apply clarify
apply (frule NRR_sender, auto)
```

We are left with the case where B' = Spy and B' ≠ B, i.e. B ∉ bad, when we can apply NRR_validity_good.

```
 apply (blast dest: NRR_validity_good [OF refl])
done
```

17.11 Proofs About sub_K

Below we prove that if sub_K exists then A definitely sent it, provided A is not broken.

Strong conclusion for a good agent

```
lemma sub_K_validity_good:
     "⟦sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
        sub_K ∈ parts (spies evs);
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ zg⟧
     ⟹ Says A TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|} ∈ set evs"
apply clarify
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake

apply *(blast dest!: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un)*
done

lemma *sub_K_sender:*
```
"⟦Says A' TTP {|n, b, l, k, Crypt (priK A) X|} ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ zg⟧
 ⟹ A' ∈ {A,Spy}"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule zg.induct, simp_all)*
done

Holds also for `A = Spy`!

theorem *sub_K_validity:*
```
"⟦Gets TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|} ∈ set evs;
   sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
   A ∉ broken;  evs ∈ zg⟧
 ⟹ Says A TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|} ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(drule Gets_imp_Says, assumption)*
apply *clarify*
apply *(frule sub_K_sender, auto)*

We are left with the case where the sender is `Spy` and not equal to `A`, because `A ∉ bad`. Thus theorem `sub_K_validity_good` applies.

apply *(blast dest: sub_K_validity_good [OF refl])*
done

17.12 Proofs About *con_K*

Below we prove that if `con_K` exists, then `TTP` has it, and therefore `A` and `B`) can get it too. Moreover, we know that `A` sent `sub_K`

lemma *con_K_validity:*
```
"⟦con_K ∈ used evs;
   con_K = Crypt (priK TTP)
             {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
   evs ∈ zg⟧
 ⟹ Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, con_K|}
      ∈ set evs"
```
apply *clarify*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule zg.induct)*
apply *(frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *(blast dest!: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un)*

ZG2

apply *(blast dest: parts_cut)*
done

If `TTP` holds `con_K` then `A` sent `sub_K`. We assume that `A` is not broken. Importantly, nothing needs to be assumed about the form of `con_K`!

lemma *Notes_TTP_imp_Says_A:*

```
     "⟦Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, con_K|}
           ∈ set evs;
        sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
        A ∉ broken; evs ∈ zg⟧
     ⟹ Says A TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|} ∈ set evs"
apply clarify
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

ZG4

```
apply clarify
apply (rule sub_K_validity, auto)
done
```

If *con_K* exists, then *A* sent *sub_K*. We again assume that *A* is not broken.

```
theorem B_sub_K_validity:
     "⟦con_K ∈ used evs;
        con_K = Crypt (priK TTP) {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B,
                                   Nonce L, Key K|};
        sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
        A ∉ broken; evs ∈ zg⟧
     ⟹ Says A TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|} ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest: con_K_validity Notes_TTP_imp_Says_A)
```

17.13 Proving fairness

Cannot prove that, if *B* has NRO, then *A* has her NRR. It would appear that *B* has a small advantage, though it is useless to win disputes: *B* needs to present *con_K* as well.

Strange: unicity of the label protects *A*?

```
lemma A_unicity:
     "⟦NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
        NRO ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Says A B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, Crypt K M', NRO'|}
          ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad; evs ∈ zg⟧
     ⟹ M'=M"
apply clarify
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, auto)
```

ZG1: freshness

```
apply (blast dest: parts.Body)
done
```

Fairness lemma: if *sub_K* exists, then *A* holds NRR. Relies on unicity of labels.

```
lemma sub_K_implies_NRR:
     "⟦NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
```

```
        NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
        sub_K ∈ parts (spies evs);
        NRO ∈ parts (spies evs);
        sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ zg⟧
     ⟹ Gets A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} ∈ set evs"
apply clarify
apply hypsubst_thin
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

ZG1: freshness

```
apply (blast dest: parts.Body)
```

ZG3

```
apply (blast dest: A_unicity [OF refl])
done
```

```
lemma Crypt_used_imp_L_used:
     "⟦Crypt (priK TTP) {|F, A, B, L, K|} ∈ used evs; evs ∈ zg⟧
      ⟹ L ∈ used evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct, auto)
```

Fake

```
apply (blast dest!: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un)
```

ZG2: freshness

```
apply (blast dest: parts.Body)
done
```

Fairness for `A`: if `con_K` and `NRO` exist, then `A` holds NRR. `A` must be uncompromised, but there is no assumption about `B`.

```
theorem A_fairness_NRO:
     "⟦con_K ∈ used evs;
        NRO ∈ parts (spies evs);
        con_K = Crypt (priK TTP)
                      {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
        NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
        NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
        A ∉ bad;  evs ∈ zg⟧
    ⟹ Gets A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} ∈ set evs"
apply clarify
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (simp add: parts_insert_knows_A)
apply (blast dest: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un)
```

ZG1

```
apply (blast dest: Crypt_used_imp_L_used)
```

ZG2

```
apply (blast dest: parts_cut)
```

ZG4

```
apply (blast intro: sub_K_implies_NRR [OF refl]
             dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj])
done
```

Fairness for `B`: NRR exists at all, then `B` holds NRO. `B` must be uncompromised, but there is no assumption about `A`.

```
theorem B_fairness_NRR:
     "⟦NRR ∈ used evs;
        NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|};
        NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|};
        B ∉ bad; evs ∈ zg⟧
    ⟹ Gets B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} ∈ set evs"
apply clarify
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule zg.induct)
apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (blast dest!: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un)
```

ZG2

```
apply (blast dest: parts_cut)
done
```

If `con_K` exists at all, then `B` can get it, by `con_K_validity`. Cannot conclude that also NRO is available to `B`, because if `A` were unfair, `A` could build message 3 without building message 1, which contains NRO.

end

18 Conventional protocols: rely on conventional Message, Event and Public – Shared-key protocols

```
theory Auth_Shared
imports
  NS_Shared
  Kerberos_BAN
  Kerberos_BAN_Gets
```

```
  KerberosIV
  KerberosIV_Gets
  KerberosV
  OtwayRees
  OtwayRees_AN
  OtwayRees_Bad
  OtwayReesBella
  WooLam
  Recur
  Yahalom
  Yahalom2
  Yahalom_Bad
  ZhouGollmann
begin

end
```

19 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol (Flawed)

Flawed version, vulnerable to Lowe's attack. From Burrows, Abadi and Needham. A Logic of Authentication. Proc. Royal Soc. 426 (1989), p. 260

theory *NS_Public_Bad* **imports** *Public* **begin**

```
inductive_set ns_public :: "event list set"
  where
   Nil:  "[] ∈ ns_public"
   — Initial trace is empty
 | Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ ns_public;  X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧
         ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ ns_public"
   — The spy can say almost anything.
 | NS1:  "⟦evs1 ∈ ns_public;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
         ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|})
              # evs1  ∈  ns_public"
   — Alice initiates a protocol run, sending a nonce to Bob
 | NS2:  "⟦evs2 ∈ ns_public;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
          Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs2⟧
         ⟹ Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|})
              # evs2  ∈  ns_public"
   — Bob responds to Alice's message with a further nonce
 | NS3:  "⟦evs3 ∈ ns_public;
          Says A  B (Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs3;
          Says B' A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs3⟧
         ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) # evs3 ∈ ns_public"
   — Alice proves her existence by sending NB back to Bob.
```

declare *knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]*
declare *analz_into_parts [dest]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]*

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

lemma *"∃NB. ∃evs ∈ ns_public. Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set*

```
evs"
  apply (intro exI bexI)
   apply (rule_tac [2] ns_public.Nil [THEN ns_public.NS1, THEN ns_public.NS2,
THEN ns_public.NS3])
  by possibility
```

19.1 Inductive proofs about ns_public

Spy never sees another agent's private key! (unless it's bad at start)

```
lemma Spy_see_priEK [simp]:
  "evs ∈ ns_public ⟹ (Key (priEK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
  by (erule ns_public.induct, auto)

lemma Spy_analz_priEK [simp]:
  "evs ∈ ns_public ⟹ (Key (priEK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
  by auto
```

19.2 Authenticity properties obtained from term NS1

It is impossible to re-use a nonce in both term NS1 and term NS2, provided the nonce is secret. (Honest users generate fresh nonces.)

```
lemma no_nonce_NS1_NS2:
      "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
        Crypt (pubEK C) {|NA', Nonce NA|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs)⟧
       ⟹ Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evs)"
  by (induct rule: ns_public.induct) (auto intro: analz_insertI)
```

Unicity for term NS1: nonce term NA identifies agents term A and term B

```
lemma unique_NA:
  assumes NA: "Crypt(pubEK B)  {|Nonce NA, Agent A |} ∈ parts(spies evs)"
              "Crypt(pubEK B') {|Nonce NA, Agent A'|} ∈ parts(spies evs)"
              "Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs)"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "A=A' ∧ B=B'"
  using evs NA
  by (induction rule: ns_public.induct) (auto intro!: analz_insertI split:
if_split_asm)
```

Secrecy: Spy does not see the nonce sent in msg term NS1 if term A and term B are secure The major premise "Says A B ..." makes it a dest-rule, hence the given assumption order.

```
theorem Spy_not_see_NA:
  assumes NA: "Says A B (Crypt(pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs"
              "A ∉ bad" "B ∉ bad"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs)"
  using evs NA
proof (induction rule: ns_public.induct)
  case (Fake evsf X B)
  then show ?case
    by spy_analz
```

```
next
  case (NS2 evs2 NB A' B NA A)
  then show ?case
    by simp (metis Says_imp_analz_Spy analz_into_parts parts.simps unique_NA
usedI)
next
  case (NS3 evs3 A B NA B' NB)
  then show ?case
    by simp (meson Says_imp_analz_Spy analz_into_parts no_nonce_NS1_NS2)
qed auto
```

Authentication for term A: if she receives message 2 and has used term NA to start a run, then term B has sent message 2.

```
lemma A_trusts_NS2_lemma:
    "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
      Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
      Says A B (Crypt(pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs;
      A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧
     ⟹ Says B A (Crypt(pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs"
  by (induct rule: ns_public.induct) (auto dest: Spy_not_see_NA unique_NA)

theorem A_trusts_NS2:
     "⟦Says A  B (Crypt(pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs;
       Says B' A (Crypt(pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_public⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt(pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs"
  by (blast intro: A_trusts_NS2_lemma)
```

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with Alice in term NS1

```
lemma B_trusts_NS1:
     "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
       Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs)⟧
      ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs"
  by (induct evs rule: ns_public.induct) (use analz_insertI in ‹auto split:
if_split_asm›)
```

19.3 Authenticity properties obtained from term NS2

Unicity for term NS2: nonce term NB identifies nonce term NA and agent term A [proof closely follows that for `unique_NA`]

```
lemma unique_NB [dest]:
  assumes NB: "Crypt(pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts(spies evs)"
              "Crypt(pubEK A') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NB|} ∈ parts(spies evs)"
              "Nonce NB ∉ analz (spies evs)"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "A=A' ∧ NA=NA'"
  using evs NB
  by (induction rule: ns_public.induct) (auto intro!: analz_insertI split:
if_split_asm)
```

term NB remains secret *provided* Alice never responds with round 3

```
theorem Spy_not_see_NB [dest]:
```

```
  assumes NB: "Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs"
              "∀C. Says A C (Crypt (pubEK C) (Nonce NB)) ∉ set evs"
              "A ∉ bad" "B ∉ bad"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "Nonce NB ∉ analz (spies evs)"
  using evs NB evs
proof (induction rule: ns_public.induct)
  case Fake
  then show ?case by spy_analz
next
  case NS2
  then show ?case
    by (auto intro!: no_nonce_NS1_NS2)
qed auto
```

Authentication for term B: if he receives message 3 and has used term NB in message 2, then term A has sent message 3 (to somebody)

```
lemma B_trusts_NS3_lemma:
     "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
       Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ ∃C. Says A C (Crypt (pubEK C) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
proof (induction rule: ns_public.induct)
  case (NS3 evs3 A B NA B' NB)
  then show ?case
    by simp (blast intro: no_nonce_NS1_NS2)
qed auto

theorem B_trusts_NS3:
     "⟦Says B A  (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs;
       Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_public⟧
      ⟹ ∃C. Says A C (Crypt (pubEK C) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
  by (blast intro: B_trusts_NS3_lemma)
```

Can we strengthen the secrecy theorem `Spy_not_see_NB`? NO

```
lemma "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
        Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) ∈ set evs;
        A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧
       ⟹ Nonce NB ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (induction rule: ns_public.induct, simp_all, spy_analz)

apply blast

apply (blast intro: no_nonce_NS1_NS2)

apply clarify
apply (frule_tac A' = A in
       Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN unique_NB], auto)
apply (rename_tac evs3 B' C)
```

This is the attack!

```
1. ⋀evs3 B' C.
      ⟦evs3 ∈ ns_public; Nonce NB ∉ analz (knows Spy evs3);
       Says A B' (Crypt (pubEK B') {|Nonce NA, Agent A|})
       ∈ set evs3;
       Says C A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|})
       ∈ set evs3;
       Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|})
       ∈ set evs3;
       A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad; B' ∈ bad⟧
      ⟹ False
```

oops

end

20 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol

Flawed version, vulnerable to Lowe's attack. From Burrows, Abadi and Needham. A Logic of Authentication. Proc. Royal Soc. 426 (1989), p. 260

theory *NS_Public* **imports** *Public* **begin**

```
inductive_set ns_public :: "event list set"
  where
   Nil:  "[] ∈ ns_public"
   — Initial trace is empty
 | Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ ns_public;  X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧
         ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ ns_public"
   — The spy can say almost anything.
 | NS1:  "⟦evs1 ∈ ns_public;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
         ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|})
              # evs1  ∈  ns_public"
   — Alice initiates a protocol run, sending a nonce to Bob
 | NS2:  "⟦evs2 ∈ ns_public;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
          Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs2⟧
         ⟹ Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|})
              # evs2  ∈  ns_public"
   — Bob responds to Alice's message with a further nonce
 | NS3:  "⟦evs3 ∈ ns_public;
          Says A  B (Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs3;
          Says B' A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|}) ∈ set
evs3⟧
         ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) # evs3 ∈ ns_public"
   — Alice proves her existence by sending NB back to Bob.

declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]
```

A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end

lemma "∃NB. ∃evs ∈ ns_public. Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] ns_public.Nil [THEN ns_public.NS1, THEN ns_public.NS2, THEN ns_public.NS3])
by possibility

20.1 Inductive proofs about ns_public

Spy never sees another agent's private key! (unless it's bad at start)

lemma Spy_see_priEK [simp]:
"evs ∈ ns_public ⟹ (Key (priEK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by (erule ns_public.induct, auto)

lemma Spy_analz_priEK [simp]:
"evs ∈ ns_public ⟹ (Key (priEK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

20.2 Authenticity properties obtained from term NS1

It is impossible to re-use a nonce in both term NS1 and term NS2, provided the nonce is secret. (Honest users generate fresh nonces.)

lemma no_nonce_NS1_NS2:
"⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
Crypt (pubEK C) {|NA', Nonce NA, Agent D|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs)⟧
⟹ Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evs)"
by (induct rule: ns_public.induct) (auto intro: analz_insertI)

Unicity for term NS1: nonce term NA identifies agents term A and term B

lemma unique_NA:
assumes NA: "Crypt(pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A |} ∈ parts(spies evs)"
"Crypt(pubEK B') {|Nonce NA, Agent A'|} ∈ parts(spies evs)"
"Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs)"
and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
shows "A=A' ∧ B=B'"
using evs NA
by (induction rule: ns_public.induct) (auto intro!: analz_insertI split: if_split_asm)

Secrecy: Spy does not see the nonce sent in msg term NS1 if term A and term B are secure The major premise "Says A B ..." makes it a dest-rule, hence the given assumption order.

theorem Spy_not_see_NA:
assumes NA: "Says A B (Crypt(pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs"
"A ∉ bad" "B ∉ bad"
and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
shows "Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs)"
using evs NA
proof (induction rule: ns_public.induct)
case (Fake evsf X B)
then show ?case

```
    by spy_analz
next
  case (NS2 evs2 NB A' B NA A)
  then show ?case
    by simp (metis Says_imp_analz_Spy analz_into_parts parts.simps unique_NA
usedI)
next
  case (NS3 evs3 A B NA B' NB)
  then show ?case
    by simp (meson Says_imp_analz_Spy analz_into_parts no_nonce_NS1_NS2)
qed auto
```

Authentication for term A: if she receives message 2 and has used term NA to start a run, then term B has sent message 2.

```
lemma A_trusts_NS2_lemma:
    "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
      Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
      Says A B (Crypt(pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs;
      A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧
     ⟹ Says B A (Crypt(pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|}) ∈ set evs"
  by (induct rule: ns_public.induct) (auto dest: Spy_not_see_NA unique_NA)

theorem A_trusts_NS2:
     "⟦Says A  B (Crypt(pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs;
       Says B' A (Crypt(pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|}) ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_public⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt(pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|}) ∈ set evs"
  by (blast intro: A_trusts_NS2_lemma)
```

If the encrypted message appears then it originated with Alice in term NS1

```
lemma B_trusts_NS1:
     "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
       Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs)⟧
      ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs"
  by (induct evs rule: ns_public.induct) (use analz_insertI in ‹auto split:
if_split_asm›)
```

20.3 Authenticity properties obtained from term NS2

Unicity for term NS2: nonce term NB identifies nonce term NA and agent term A [proof closely follows that for `unique_NA`]

```
lemma unique_NB [dest]:
  assumes NB: "Crypt(pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|} ∈ parts(spies
evs)"
              "Crypt(pubEK A') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NB, Agent B'|} ∈ parts(spies
evs)"
              "Nonce NB ∉ analz (spies evs)"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "A=A' ∧ NA=NA' ∧ B=B'"
  using evs NB
  by (induction rule: ns_public.induct) (auto intro!: analz_insertI split:
if_split_asm)
```

term NB remains secret

```
theorem Spy_not_see_NB [dest]:
  assumes NB: "Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|}) ∈
set evs"
              "A ∉ bad" "B ∉ bad"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "Nonce NB ∉ analz (spies evs)"
  using evs NB evs
proof (induction rule: ns_public.induct)
  case Fake
  then show ?case by spy_analz
next
  case NS2
  then show ?case
    by (auto intro!: no_nonce_NS1_NS2)
qed auto
```

Authentication for term B: if he receives message 3 and has used term NB in message 2, then term A has sent message 3.

```
lemma B_trusts_NS3_lemma:
     "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
       Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|}) ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
proof (induction rule: ns_public.induct)
  case (NS3 evs3 A B NA B' NB)
  then show ?case
    by simp (blast intro: no_nonce_NS1_NS2)
qed auto

theorem B_trusts_NS3:
     "⟦Says B A  (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|}) ∈ set evs;
       Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_public⟧
      ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
  by (blast intro: B_trusts_NS3_lemma)
```

20.4 Overall guarantee for term B

If NS3 has been sent and the nonce NB agrees with the nonce B joined with NA, then A initiated the run using NA.

```
theorem B_trusts_protocol:
     "⟦A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_public⟧ ⟹
      Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
      Says B A  (Crypt (pubEK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|}) ∈ set evs
⟶
      Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs"
by (erule ns_public.induct, auto)

end
```

21 The TLS Protocol: Transport Layer Security

theory *TLS* **imports** *Public "HOL-Library.Nat_Bijection"* **begin**

definition *certificate :: "[agent,key] ⇒ msg"* **where**
"certificate A KA == Crypt (priSK Server) {|Agent A, Key KA|}"

TLS apparently does not require separate keypairs for encryption and signature. Therefore, we formalize signature as encryption using the private encryption key.

datatype *role = ClientRole | ServerRole*

consts

*PRF :: "nat*nat*nat ⇒ nat"*

*sessionK :: "(nat*nat*nat) * role ⇒ key"*

abbreviation
*clientK :: "nat*nat*nat ⇒ key"* **where**
"clientK X == sessionK(X, ClientRole)"

abbreviation
*serverK :: "nat*nat*nat ⇒ key"* **where**
"serverK X == sessionK(X, ServerRole)"

specification *(PRF)*
inj_PRF: "inj PRF"
— the pseudo-random function is collision-free
apply *(rule exI [of _ "λ(x,y,z). prod_encode(x, prod_encode(y,z))"])*
apply *(simp add: inj_on_def prod_encode_eq)*
done

specification *(sessionK)*
inj_sessionK: "inj sessionK"
— sessionK is collision-free; also, no clientK clashes with any serverK.
apply *(rule exI [of _*
"λ((x,y,z), r). prod_encode(case_role 0 1 r,
prod_encode(x, prod_encode(y,z)))"])
apply *(simp add: inj_on_def prod_encode_eq split: role.split)*
done

axiomatization where
— sessionK makes symmetric keys
isSym_sessionK: "sessionK nonces ∈ symKeys" **and**

— sessionK never clashes with a long-term symmetric key (they don't exist in TLS anyway)
sessionK_neq_shrK [iff]: "sessionK nonces ≠ shrK A"

inductive_set *tls :: "event list set"*
where

Nil: — The initial, empty trace
"[] ∈ tls"

| *Fake:* — The Spy may say anything he can say. The sender field is correct, but agents don't use that information.
"⟦evsf ∈ tls; X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧
⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ tls"

| *SpyKeys:* — The spy may apply *PRF* and *sessionK* to available nonces
"⟦evsSK ∈ tls;
{Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Nonce M} ⊆ analz (spies evsSK)⟧
⟹ Notes Spy {| Nonce (PRF(M,NA,NB)),
Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role)) |} # evsSK ∈ tls"

| *ClientHello:*
— (7.4.1.2) PA represents *CLIENT_VERSION*, *CIPHER_SUITES* and *COMPRESSION_METHODS*. It is uninterpreted but will be confirmed in the FINISHED messages. NA is CLIENT RANDOM, while SID is *SESSION_ID*. UNIX TIME is omitted because the protocol doesn't use it. May assume *NA ∉ range PRF* because CLIENT RANDOM is 28 bytes while MASTER SECRET is 48 bytes
"⟦evsCH ∈ tls; Nonce NA ∉ used evsCH; NA ∉ range PRF⟧
⟹ Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}
evsCH ∈ tls"

| *ServerHello:*
— 7.4.1.3 of the TLS Internet-Draft PB represents *CLIENT_VERSION*, *CIPHER_SUITE* and *COMPRESSION_METHOD*. SERVER CERTIFICATE (7.4.2) is always present. *CERTIFICATE_REQUEST* (7.4.4) is implied.
"⟦evsSH ∈ tls; Nonce NB ∉ used evsSH; NB ∉ range PRF;
Says A' B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}
∈ set evsSH⟧
⟹ Says B A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} # evsSH ∈ tls"

| *Certificate:*
— SERVER (7.4.2) or CLIENT (7.4.6) CERTIFICATE.
"evsC ∈ tls ⟹ Says B A (certificate B (pubK B)) # evsC ∈ tls"

| *ClientKeyExch:*
— CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE (7.4.7). The client, A, chooses PMS, the PREMASTER SECRET. She encrypts PMS using the supplied KB, which ought to be pubK B. We assume *PMS ∉ range PRF* because a clash betweem the PMS and another MASTER SECRET is highly unlikely (even though both items have the same length, 48 bytes). The Note event records in the trace that she knows PMS (see REMARK at top).
"⟦evsCX ∈ tls; Nonce PMS ∉ used evsCX; PMS ∉ range PRF;
Says B' A (certificate B KB) ∈ set evsCX⟧
⟹ Says A B (Crypt KB (Nonce PMS))
Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|}
evsCX ∈ tls"

| *CertVerify:*
— The optional Certificate Verify (7.4.8) message contains the specific components listed in the security analysis, F.1.1.2. It adds the pre-master-secret, which is also essential! Checking the signature, which is the only use of A's certificate, assures

B of A's presence

```
"⟦evsCV ∈ tls;
    Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} ∈ set evsCV;
    Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evsCV⟧
 ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|Nonce NB, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}))
     # evsCV  ∈  tls"
```

— Finally come the FINISHED messages (7.4.8), confirming PA and PB among other things. The master-secret is PRF(PMS,NA,NB). Either party may send its message first.

| ClientFinished:

— The occurrence of *Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|}* stops the rule's applying when the Spy has satisfied the *Says A B* by repaying messages sent by the true client; in that case, the Spy does not know PMS and could not send ClientFinished. One could simply put *A ≠ Spy* into the rule, but one should not expect the spy to be well-behaved.

```
"⟦evsCF ∈ tls;
    Says A  B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}
      ∈ set evsCF;
    Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} ∈ set evsCF;
    Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evsCF;
    M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB)⟧
 ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M))
              (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
                     Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
                     Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|}))
     # evsCF  ∈  tls"
```

| ServerFinished:

— Keeping A' and A" distinct means B cannot even check that the two messages originate from the same source.

```
"⟦evsSF ∈ tls;
    Says A' B  {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}
      ∈ set evsSF;
    Says B  A  {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} ∈ set evsSF;
    Says A'' B (Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS)) ∈ set evsSF;
    M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB)⟧
 ⟹ Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M))
              (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
                     Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
                     Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|}))
     # evsSF  ∈  tls"
```

| ClientAccepts:

— Having transmitted ClientFinished and received an identical message encrypted with serverK, the client stores the parameters needed to resume this session. The "Notes A ..." premise is used to prove *Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS*.

```
"⟦evsCA ∈ tls;
    Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evsCA;
    M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);
    X = Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
              Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
              Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|};
```

```
        Says A  B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) ∈ set evsCA;
        Says B' A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) ∈ set evsCA⟧
     ⟹
        Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} # evsCA  ∈  tls"
```

| ServerAccepts:

— Having transmitted ServerFinished and received an identical message encrypted with clientK, the server stores the parameters needed to resume this session. The "Says A" B ..." premise is used to prove *Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS*.

```
     "⟦evsSA ∈ tls;
        A ≠ B;
        Says A'' B (Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS)) ∈ set evsSA;
        M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);
        X = Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
                  Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
                  Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|};
        Says B  A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) ∈ set evsSA;
        Says A' B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) ∈ set evsSA⟧
     ⟹
        Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} # evsSA  ∈  tls"
```

| ClientResume:

— If A recalls the *SESSION_ID*, then she sends a FINISHED message using the new nonces and stored MASTER SECRET.

```
     "⟦evsCR ∈ tls;
        Says A  B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|} ∈ set evsCR;
        Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} ∈ set evsCR;
        Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} ∈ set evsCR⟧
     ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M))
                   (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
                          Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
                          Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|}))
         # evsCR  ∈  tls"
```

| ServerResume:

— Resumption (7.3): If B finds the *SESSION_ID* then he can send a FINISHED message using the recovered MASTER SECRET

```
     "⟦evsSR ∈ tls;
        Says A' B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|} ∈ set evsSR;
        Says B  A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} ∈ set evsSR;
        Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} ∈ set evsSR⟧
     ⟹ Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M))
                   (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
                          Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
                          Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|})) # evsSR
           ∈  tls"
```

| Oops:

— The most plausible compromise is of an old session key. Losing the MASTER SECRET or PREMASTER SECRET is more serious but rather unlikely. The assumption *A ≠ Spy* is essential: otherwise the Spy could learn session keys merely by replaying messages!

```
     "⟦evso ∈ tls;  A ≠ Spy;
        Says A B (Crypt (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role)) X) ∈ set evso⟧
```

```
        ⟹ Says A Spy (Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role))) # evso  ∈  tls"
```

declare *Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]*
declare *parts.Body [dest]*
declare *analz_into_parts [dest]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]*

Automatically unfold the definition of "certificate"

declare *certificate_def [simp]*

Injectiveness of key-generating functions

declare *inj_PRF [THEN inj_eq, iff]*
declare *inj_sessionK [THEN inj_eq, iff]*
declare *isSym_sessionK [simp]*

lemma *pubK_neq_sessionK [iff]: "publicKey b A ≠ sessionK arg"*
by *(simp add: symKeys_neq_imp_neq)*

declare *pubK_neq_sessionK [THEN not_sym, iff]*

lemma *priK_neq_sessionK [iff]: "invKey (publicKey b A) ≠ sessionK arg"*
by *(simp add: symKeys_neq_imp_neq)*

declare *priK_neq_sessionK [THEN not_sym, iff]*

lemmas *keys_distinct = pubK_neq_sessionK priK_neq_sessionK*

21.1 Protocol Proofs

Possibility properties state that some traces run the protocol to the end. Four paths and 12 rules are considered.

Possibility property ending with ClientAccepts.

```
lemma "⟦∀evs. (SOME N. Nonce N ∉ used evs) ∉ range PRF;  A ≠ B⟧
      ⟹ ∃SID M. ∃evs ∈ tls.
            Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] tls.Nil
                  [THEN tls.ClientHello, THEN tls.ServerHello,
                   THEN tls.Certificate, THEN tls.ClientKeyExch,
                   THEN tls.ClientFinished, THEN tls.ServerFinished,
                   THEN tls.ClientAccepts], possibility, blast+)
done
```

And one for ServerAccepts. Either FINISHED message may come first.

```
lemma "⟦∀evs. (SOME N. Nonce N ∉ used evs) ∉ range PRF; A ≠ B⟧
      ⟹ ∃SID NA PA NB PB M. ∃evs ∈ tls.
           Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} ∈ set evs"
```

```
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] tls.Nil
                    [THEN tls.ClientHello, THEN tls.ServerHello,
                     THEN tls.Certificate, THEN tls.ClientKeyExch,
                     THEN tls.ServerFinished, THEN tls.ClientFinished,
                     THEN tls.ServerAccepts], possibility, blast+)
done
```

Another one, for CertVerify (which is optional)

```
lemma "⟦∀evs. (SOME N. Nonce N ∉ used evs) ∉ range PRF;  A ≠ B⟧
       ⟹ ∃NB PMS. ∃evs ∈ tls.
             Says A B (Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|Nonce NB, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}))

               ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] tls.Nil
                    [THEN tls.ClientHello, THEN tls.ServerHello,
                     THEN tls.Certificate, THEN tls.ClientKeyExch,
                     THEN tls.CertVerify], possibility, blast+)
done
```

Another one, for session resumption (both ServerResume and ClientResume).
NO tls.Nil here: we refer to a previous session, not the empty trace.

```
lemma "⟦evs0 ∈ tls;
          Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} ∈ set evs0;
          Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} ∈ set evs0;
          ∀evs. (SOME N. Nonce N ∉ used evs) ∉ range PRF;
          A ≠ B⟧
      ⟹ ∃NA PA NB PB X. ∃evs ∈ tls.
                X = Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
                          Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
                          Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|}  ∧
                Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) ∈ set evs  ∧
                Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] tls.ClientHello
                    [THEN tls.ServerHello,
                     THEN tls.ServerResume, THEN tls.ClientResume], possibility,
blast+)
done
```

21.2 Inductive proofs about tls

Spy never sees a good agent's private key!

```
lemma Spy_see_priK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ tls ⟹ (Key (privateKey b A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by (erule tls.induct, force, simp_all, blast)

lemma Spy_analz_priK [simp]:
     "evs ∈ tls ⟹ (Key (privateKey b A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Spy_see_priK_D [dest!]:
```

```
    "⟦Key (privateKey b A) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);  evs ∈ tls⟧ ⟹ A ∈ bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_priK)
```

This lemma says that no false certificates exist. One might extend the model to include bogus certificates for the agents, but there seems little point in doing so: the loss of their private keys is a worse breach of security.

```
lemma certificate_valid:
    "⟦certificate B KB ∈ parts (spies evs);  evs ∈ tls⟧ ⟹ KB = pubK B"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule tls.induct, force, simp_all, blast)
done

lemmas CX_KB_is_pubKB = Says_imp_spies [THEN parts.Inj, THEN certificate_valid]
```

21.2.1 Properties of items found in Notes

```
lemma Notes_Crypt_parts_spies:
     "⟦Notes A {|Agent B, X|} ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ tls⟧
      ⟹ Crypt (pubK B) X ∈ parts (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule tls.induct,
       frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB, force, simp_all)
apply (blast intro: parts_insertI)
done
```

C may be either A or B

```
lemma Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS:
     "⟦Notes C {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ tls⟧
      ⟹ Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS) ∈ parts (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule tls.induct, force, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (blast intro: parts_insertI)
```

Client, Server Accept

```
apply (blast dest!: Notes_Crypt_parts_spies)+
done
```

Compared with the theorem above, both premise and conclusion are stronger

```
lemma Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS:
     "⟦Notes A {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ tls⟧
      ⟹ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule tls.induct, force, simp_all)
```

ServerAccepts

```
apply blast
done
```

21.2.2 Protocol goal: if B receives CertVerify, then A sent it

B can check A's signature if he has received A's certificate.

```
lemma TrustCertVerify_lemma:
     "⟦X ∈ parts (spies evs);
        X = Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|});
        evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Says A B X ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule ssubst)
apply (erule tls.induct, force, simp_all, blast)
done
```

Final version: B checks X using the distributed KA instead of priK A

```
lemma TrustCertVerify:
     "⟦X ∈ parts (spies evs);
        X = Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|});
        certificate A KA ∈ parts (spies evs);
        evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Says A B X ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: certificate_valid intro!: TrustCertVerify_lemma)
```

If CertVerify is present then A has chosen PMS.

```
lemma UseCertVerify_lemma:
     "⟦Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule tls.induct, force, simp_all, blast)
done
```

Final version using the distributed KA instead of priK A

```
lemma UseCertVerify:
     "⟦Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|})
          ∈ parts (spies evs);
        certificate A KA ∈ parts (spies evs);
        evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs"
by (blast dest!: certificate_valid intro!: UseCertVerify_lemma)


lemma no_Notes_A_PRF [simp]:
     "evs ∈ tls ⟹ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce (PRF x)|} ∉ set evs"
apply (erule tls.induct, force, simp_all)
```

ClientKeyExch: PMS is assumed to differ from any PRF.

```
apply blast
done


lemma MS_imp_PMS [dest!]:
     "⟦Nonce (PRF (PMS,NA,NB)) ∈ parts (spies evs);  evs ∈ tls⟧
      ⟹ Nonce PMS ∈ parts (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
```

apply *(erule tls.induct, force, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *(blast intro: parts_insertI)*

Easy, e.g. by freshness

apply *(blast dest: Notes_Crypt_parts_spies)+*
done

21.2.3 Unicity results for PMS, the pre-master-secret

PMS determines B.

lemma *Crypt_unique_PMS:*
"⟦*Crypt(pubK B) (Nonce PMS) ∈ parts (spies evs);*
Crypt(pubK B') (Nonce PMS) ∈ parts (spies evs);
Nonce PMS ∉ analz (spies evs);
evs ∈ tls⟧
⟹ *B=B'"*
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule tls.induct, analz_mono_contra, force, simp_all (no_asm_simp))*

Fake, ClientKeyExch

apply *blast+*
done

In A's internal Note, PMS determines A and B.

lemma *Notes_unique_PMS:*
"⟦*Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs;*
Notes A' {|Agent B', Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs;
evs ∈ tls⟧
⟹ *A=A' ∧ B=B'"*
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule tls.induct, force, simp_all)*

ClientKeyExch

apply *(blast dest!: Notes_Crypt_parts_spies)*
done

21.3 Secrecy Theorems

Key compromise lemma needed to prove *analz_image_keys*. No collection of keys can help the spy get new private keys.

lemma *analz_image_priK [rule_format]:*
"*evs ∈ tls*
⟹ ∀*KK. (Key(priK B) ∈ analz (Key'KK ∪ (spies evs))) =*
(priK B ∈ KK | B ∈ bad)"
apply *(erule tls.induct)*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp)*
del: image_insert
add: image_Un [THEN sym]
insert_Key_image Un_assoc [THEN sym])

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
done
```

slightly speeds up the big simplification below

```
lemma range_sessionkeys_not_priK:
     "KK ⊆ range sessionK ⟹ priK B ∉ KK"
by blast
```

Lemma for the trivial direction of the if-and-only-if

```
lemma analz_image_keys_lemma:
     "(X ∈ analz (G ∪ H)) ⟶ (X ∈ analz H)  ⟹
      (X ∈ analz (G ∪ H))  =  (X ∈ analz H)"
by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN subsetD])



lemma analz_image_keys [rule_format]:
     "evs ∈ tls ⟹
      ∀KK. KK ⊆ range sessionK ⟶
              (Nonce N ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (spies evs))) =
              (Nonce N ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)
apply (safe del: iffI)
apply (safe del: impI iffI intro!: analz_image_keys_lemma)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp)
                del: image_insert imp_disjL
                add: image_Un [THEN sym]  Un_assoc [THEN sym]
                     insert_Key_singleton
                     range_sessionkeys_not_priK analz_image_priK)
apply (simp_all add: insert_absorb)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
done
```

Knowing some session keys is no help in getting new nonces

```
lemma analz_insert_key [simp]:
     "evs ∈ tls ⟹
      (Nonce N ∈ analz (insert (Key (sessionK z)) (spies evs))) =
      (Nonce N ∈ analz (spies evs))"
by (simp del: image_insert
         add: insert_Key_singleton analz_image_keys)
```

21.3.1 Protocol goal: serverK(Na,Nb,M) and clientK(Na,Nb,M) remain secure

Lemma: session keys are never used if PMS is fresh. Nonces don't have to agree, allowing session resumption. Converse doesn't hold; revealing PMS doesn't force the keys to be sent. THEY ARE NOT SUITABLE AS SAFE ELIM RULES.

```
lemma PMS_lemma:
     "⟦Nonce PMS ∉ parts (spies evs);
```

```
        K = sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), role);
        evs ∈ tls⟧
   ⟹ Key K ∉ parts (spies evs) ∧ (∀Y. Crypt K Y ∉ parts (spies evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule ssubst)
apply (erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)
apply (force, simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

Fake

```
apply (blast intro: parts_insertI)
```

SpyKeys

```
apply blast
```

Many others

```
apply (force dest!: Notes_Crypt_parts_spies Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS)+
done
```

```
lemma PMS_sessionK_not_spied:
     "⟦Key (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), role)) ∈ parts (spies evs);
        evs ∈ tls⟧
      ⟹ Nonce PMS ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: PMS_lemma)
```

```
lemma PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied:
     "⟦Crypt (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), role)) Y
          ∈ parts (spies evs);  evs ∈ tls⟧
      ⟹ Nonce PMS ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by (blast dest: PMS_lemma)
```

Write keys are never sent if M (MASTER SECRET) is secure. Converse fails; betraying M doesn't force the keys to be sent! The strong Oops condition can be weakened later by unicity reasoning, with some effort. NO LONGER USED: see *clientK_not_spied* and *serverK_not_spied*

```
lemma sessionK_not_spied:
     "⟦∀A. Says A Spy (Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role))) ∉ set evs;
        Nonce M ∉ analz (spies evs);  evs ∈ tls⟧
      ⟹ Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role)) ∉ parts (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule tls.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (force, simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

Fake, SpyKeys

```
apply blast+
done
```

If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the PMS will stay secret.

```
lemma Spy_not_see_PMS:
     "⟦Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Nonce PMS ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)
apply (force, simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

Fake

apply *spy_analz*

SpyKeys

apply *force*
apply *(simp_all add: insert_absorb)*

ClientHello, ServerHello, ClientKeyExch: mostly freshness reasoning

apply *(blast dest: Notes_Crypt_parts_spies)*
apply *(blast dest: Notes_Crypt_parts_spies)*
apply *(blast dest: Notes_Crypt_parts_spies)*

ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because *PMS ∉ range PRF*

apply *force+*
done

If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the MASTER SECRET will stay secret.

lemma *Spy_not_see_MS:*
```
"⟦Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs;
   evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad⟧
 ⟹ Nonce (PRF(PMS,NA,NB)) ∉ analz (spies evs)"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)*
apply *(force, simp_all (no_asm_simp))*

Fake

apply *spy_analz*

SpyKeys: by secrecy of the PMS, Spy cannot make the MS

apply *(blast dest!: Spy_not_see_PMS)*
apply *(simp_all add: insert_absorb)*

ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because PMS was already visible; others, freshness etc.

apply *(blast dest: Notes_Crypt_parts_spies Spy_not_see_PMS*
Notes_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj])+
done

21.3.2 Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of clientK

If A created PMS then nobody else (except the Spy in replays) would send a message using a clientK generated from that PMS.

lemma *Says_clientK_unique:*
```
"⟦Says A' B' (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) ∈ set evs;
   Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs;
   evs ∈ tls;  A' ≠ Spy⟧
 ⟹ A = A'"
```
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)*
apply *(force, simp_all)*

ClientKeyExch

```
apply (blast dest!: PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied)
```

ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS

```
apply (blast dest!: Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS
            intro: Notes_unique_PMS [THEN conjunct1])+
done
```

If A created PMS and has not leaked her clientK to the Spy, then it is completely secure: not even in parts!

```
lemma clientK_not_spied:
     "⟦Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs;
        Says A Spy (Key (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;
        evs ∈ tls⟧
      ⟹ Key (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ∉ parts (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)
apply (force, simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

ClientKeyExch

```
apply blast
```

SpyKeys

```
apply (blast dest!: Spy_not_see_MS)
```

ClientKeyExch

```
apply (blast dest!: PMS_sessionK_not_spied)
```

Oops

```
apply (blast intro: Says_clientK_unique)
done
```

21.3.3 Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of serverK

If A created PMS for B, then nobody other than B or the Spy would send a message using a serverK generated from that PMS.

```
lemma Says_serverK_unique:
     "⟦Says B' A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) ∈ set evs;
        Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  B' ≠ Spy⟧
      ⟹ B = B'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)
apply (force, simp_all)
```

ClientKeyExch

```
apply (blast dest!: PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied)
```

ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS

```
apply (blast dest!: Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS
            dest: Spy_not_see_PMS Notes_Crypt_parts_spies Crypt_unique_PMS)+
```

done

If A created PMS for B, and B has not leaked his serverK to the Spy, then it is completely secure: not even in parts!

```
lemma serverK_not_spied:
     "⟦Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs;
        Says B Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ∉ set evs;
        A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ tls⟧
      ⟹ Key (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ∉ parts (spies evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp)
apply (erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)
apply (force, simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

Fake

```
apply blast
```

SpyKeys

```
apply (blast dest!: Spy_not_see_MS)
```

ClientKeyExch

```
apply (blast dest!: PMS_sessionK_not_spied)
```

Oops

```
apply (blast intro: Says_serverK_unique)
done
```

21.3.4 Protocol goals: if A receives ServerFinished, then B is present and has used the quoted values PA, PB, etc. Note that it is up to A to compare PA with what she originally sent.

The mention of her name (A) in X assures A that B knows who she is.

```
lemma TrustServerFinished [rule_format]:
     "⟦X = Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M))
               (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
                      Nonce Na, Number PA, Agent A,
                      Nonce Nb, Number PB, Agent B|});
        M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);
        evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Says B Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ∉ set evs ⟶
         Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs ⟶
         X ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶ Says B A X ∈ set evs"
apply (erule ssubst)+
apply (erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)
apply (force, simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!

```
apply (blast dest: serverK_not_spied)
```

ClientKeyExch

```
apply (blast dest!: PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied)
done
```

This version refers not to ServerFinished but to any message from B. We don't assume B has received CertVerify, and an intruder could have changed A's identity in all other messages, so we can't be sure that B sends his message to A. If CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE were augmented to bind A's identity with PMS, then we could replace A' by A below.

```
lemma TrustServerMsg [rule_format]:
     "⟦M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);  evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Says B Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ∉ set evs ⟶
          Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs ⟶
          Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y ∈ parts (spies evs)  ⟶
          (∃A'. Says B A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule ssubst)
apply (erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)
apply (force, simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: ex_disj_distrib)
```

Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!

```
apply (blast dest: serverK_not_spied)
```

ClientKeyExch

```
apply (clarify, blast dest!: PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied)
```

ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS

```
apply (blast dest!: Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS
            dest: Spy_not_see_PMS Notes_Crypt_parts_spies Crypt_unique_PMS)+
done
```

21.3.5 Protocol goal: if B receives any message encrypted with clientK then A has sent it

ASSUMING that A chose PMS. Authentication is assumed here; B cannot verify it. But if the message is ClientFinished, then B can then check the quoted values PA, PB, etc.

```
lemma TrustClientMsg [rule_format]:
     "⟦M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);  evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ∉ set evs ⟶
          Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs ⟶
          Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
          Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule ssubst)
apply (erule tls.induct, frule_tac [7] CX_KB_is_pubKB)
apply (force, simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!

```
apply (blast dest: clientK_not_spied)
```

ClientKeyExch

```
apply (blast dest!: PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied)
```

ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS

```
apply (blast dest!: Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS dest: Notes_unique_PMS)+
done
```

21.3.6 Protocol goal: if B receives ClientFinished, and if B is able to check a CertVerify from A, then A has used the quoted values PA, PB, etc. Even this one requires A to be uncompromised.

lemma *AuthClientFinished:*
```
"⟦M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);
   Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ∉ set evs;
   Says A' B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) ∈ set evs;
   certificate A KA ∈ parts (spies evs);
   Says A'' B (Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}))
     ∈ set evs;
   evs ∈ tls;  A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad⟧
 ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) ∈ set evs"
```
by *(blast intro!: TrustClientMsg UseCertVerify)*

end

22 The Certified Electronic Mail Protocol by Abadi et al.

theory *CertifiedEmail* **imports** *Public* **begin**

abbreviation
```
TTP :: agent where
"TTP == Server"
```

abbreviation
```
RPwd :: "agent ⇒ key" where
"RPwd == shrK"
```

consts
```
NoAuth   :: nat
TTPAuth  :: nat
SAuth    :: nat
BothAuth :: nat
```

We formalize a fixed way of computing responses. Could be better.

```
definition "response" :: "agent ⇒ agent ⇒ nat ⇒ msg" where
   "response S R q == Hash {|Agent S, Key (shrK R), Nonce q|}"


inductive_set certified_mail :: "event list set"
  where

  Nil: — The empty trace
     "[] ∈ certified_mail"

| Fake: — The Spy may say anything he can say. The sender field is correct, but
agents don't use that information.
       "⟦evsf ∈ certified_mail; X ∈ synth(analz(spies evsf))⟧
        ⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ certified_mail"

| FakeSSL: — The Spy may open SSL sessions with TTP, who is the only agent
equipped with the necessary credentials to serve as an SSL server.
          "⟦evsfssl ∈ certified_mail; X ∈ synth(analz(spies evsfssl))⟧
           ⟹ Notes TTP {|Agent Spy, Agent TTP, X|} # evsfssl ∈ certified_mail"

| CM1: — The sender approaches the recipient. The message is a number.
 "⟦evs1 ∈ certified_mail;
    Key K ∉ used evs1;
    K ∈ symKeys;
    Nonce q ∉ used evs1;
    hs = Hash{|Number cleartext, Nonce q, response S R q, Crypt K (Number m)|};
    S2TTP = Crypt(pubEK TTP) {|Agent S, Number BothAuth, Key K, Agent R, hs|}⟧
  ⟹ Says S R {|Agent S, Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m), Number BothAuth,
                Number cleartext, Nonce q, S2TTP|} # evs1
       ∈ certified_mail"

| CM2: — The recipient records S2TTP while transmitting it and her password to TTP
over an SSL channel.
 "⟦evs2 ∈ certified_mail;
    Gets R {|Agent S, Agent TTP, em, Number BothAuth, Number cleartext,
             Nonce q, S2TTP|} ∈ set evs2;
    TTP ≠ R;
    hr = Hash {|Number cleartext, Nonce q, response S R q, em|}⟧
  ⟹
   Notes TTP {|Agent R, Agent TTP, S2TTP, Key(RPwd R), hr|} # evs2
     ∈ certified_mail"

| CM3: — TTP simultaneously reveals the key to the recipient and gives a receipt to
the sender. The SSL channel does not authenticate the client (R), but TTP accepts the
message only if the given password is that of the claimed sender, R. He replies over the
established SSL channel.
 "⟦evs3 ∈ certified_mail;
    Notes TTP {|Agent R, Agent TTP, S2TTP, Key(RPwd R), hr|} ∈ set evs3;
    S2TTP = Crypt (pubEK TTP)
                    {|Agent S, Number BothAuth, Key k, Agent R, hs|};
    TTP ≠ R;  hs = hr;  k ∈ symKeys⟧
  ⟹
   Notes R {|Agent TTP, Agent R, Key k, hr|} #
   Gets S (Crypt (priSK TTP) S2TTP) #
```

```
   Says TTP S (Crypt (priSK TTP) S2TTP) # evs3 ∈ certified_mail"

| Reception:
 "⟦evsr ∈ certified_mail; Says A B X ∈ set evsr⟧
  ⟹ Gets B X#evsr ∈ certified_mail"


declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]


lemma "⟦Key K ∉ used []; K ∈ symKeys⟧ ⟹
       ∃S2TTP. ∃evs ∈ certified_mail.
           Says TTP S (Crypt (priSK TTP) S2TTP) ∈ set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] certified_mail.Nil
                    [THEN certified_mail.CM1, THEN certified_mail.Reception,
                     THEN certified_mail.CM2,
                     THEN certified_mail.CM3])
apply (possibility, auto)
done


lemma Gets_imp_Says:
 "⟦Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ certified_mail⟧ ⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule certified_mail.induct, auto)
done


lemma Gets_imp_parts_knows_Spy:
     "⟦Gets A X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ certified_mail⟧ ⟹ X ∈ parts(spies evs)"
apply (drule Gets_imp_Says, simp)
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy parts.Inj)
done

lemma CM2_S2TTP_analz_knows_Spy:
 "⟦Gets R {|Agent A, Agent B, em, Number AO, Number cleartext,
             Nonce q, S2TTP|} ∈ set evs;
    evs ∈ certified_mail⟧
  ⟹ S2TTP ∈ analz(spies evs)"
apply (drule Gets_imp_Says, simp)
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy analz.Inj)
done

lemmas CM2_S2TTP_parts_knows_Spy =
    CM2_S2TTP_analz_knows_Spy [THEN analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD]]

lemma hr_form_lemma [rule_format]:
 "evs ∈ certified_mail
  ⟹ hr ∉ synth (analz (spies evs)) ⟶
      (∀S2TTP. Notes TTP {|Agent R, Agent TTP, S2TTP, pwd, hr|}
          ∈ set evs ⟶
      (∃clt q S em. hr = Hash {|Number clt, Nonce q, response S R q, em|}))"
```

```
apply (erule certified_mail.induct)
apply (synth_analz_mono_contra, simp_all, blast+)
done
```

Cannot strengthen the first disjunct to $R \neq Spy$ because the fakessl rule allows Spy to spoof the sender's name. Maybe can strengthen the second disjunct with $R \neq Spy$.

```
lemma hr_form:
 "⟦Notes TTP {|Agent R, Agent TTP, S2TTP, pwd, hr|} ∈ set evs;
    evs ∈ certified_mail⟧
  ⟹ hr ∈ synth (analz (spies evs)) |
       (∃clt q S em. hr = Hash {|Number clt, Nonce q, response S R q, em|})"
by (blast intro: hr_form_lemma)

lemma Spy_dont_know_private_keys [dest!]:
    "⟦Key (privateKey b A) ∈ parts (spies evs); evs ∈ certified_mail⟧
     ⟹ A ∈ bad"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule certified_mail.induct, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (blast dest: Fake_parts_insert_in_Un)
```

Message 1

```
apply blast
```

Message 3

```
apply (frule_tac hr_form, assumption)
apply (elim disjE exE)
apply (simp_all add: parts_insert2)
 apply (force dest!: parts_insert_subset_Un [THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
                     analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD], blast)
done

lemma Spy_know_private_keys_iff [simp]:
    "evs ∈ certified_mail
     ⟹ (Key (privateKey b A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by blast

lemma Spy_dont_know_TTPKey_parts [simp]:
     "evs ∈ certified_mail ⟹ Key (privateKey b TTP) ∉ parts(spies evs)"

by simp

lemma Spy_dont_know_TTPKey_analz [simp]:
     "evs ∈ certified_mail ⟹ Key (privateKey b TTP) ∉ analz(spies evs)"
by auto
```

Thus, prove any goal that assumes that *Spy* knows a private key belonging to *TTP*

```
declare Spy_dont_know_TTPKey_parts [THEN [2] rev_notE, elim!]
```

lemma *CM3_k_parts_knows_Spy:*
"⟦evs ∈ certified_mail;
Notes TTP {|Agent A, Agent TTP,
Crypt (pubEK TTP) {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K,
Agent R, hs|}, Key (RPwd R), hs|} ∈ set evs⟧
⟹ Key K ∈ parts(spies evs)"
apply *(rotate_tac 1)*
apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule certified_mail.induct, simp_all)*
apply *(blast intro:parts_insertI)*

Fake SSL

apply *(blast dest: parts.Body)*

Message 2

apply *(blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says elim!: knows_Spy_partsEs)*

Message 3

apply *(metis parts_insertI)*
done

lemma *Spy_dont_know_RPwd [rule_format]:*
"evs ∈ certified_mail ⟹ Key (RPwd A) ∈ parts(spies evs) ⟶ A ∈ bad"
apply *(erule certified_mail.induct, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *(blast dest: Fake_parts_insert_in_Un)*

Message 1

apply *blast*

Message 3

apply *(frule CM3_k_parts_knows_Spy, assumption)*
apply *(frule_tac hr_form, assumption)*
apply *(elim disjE exE)*
apply *(simp_all add: parts_insert2)*
apply *(force dest!: parts_insert_subset_Un [THEN [2] rev_subsetD]*
analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])
done

lemma *Spy_know_RPwd_iff [simp]:*
"evs ∈ certified_mail ⟹ (Key (RPwd A) ∈ parts(spies evs)) = (A∈bad)"
by *(auto simp add: Spy_dont_know_RPwd)*

lemma *Spy_analz_RPwd_iff [simp]:*
"evs ∈ certified_mail ⟹ (Key (RPwd A) ∈ analz(spies evs)) = (A∈bad)"
by *(metis Spy_know_RPwd_iff Spy_spies_bad_shrK analz.Inj analz_into_parts)*

Unused, but a guarantee of sorts

theorem *CertAutenticity:*
"⟦Crypt (priSK TTP) X ∈ parts (spies evs); evs ∈ certified_mail⟧

```
      ⟹ ∃A. Says TTP A (Crypt (priSK TTP) X) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule certified_mail.induct, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (blast dest: Spy_dont_know_private_keys Fake_parts_insert_in_Un)
```

Message 1

```
apply blast
```

Message 3

```
apply (frule_tac hr_form, assumption)
apply (elim disjE exE)
apply (simp_all add: parts_insert2 parts_insert_knows_A)
 apply (blast dest!: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un, blast)
done
```

22.1 Proving Confidentiality Results

```
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
 "evs ∈ certified_mail ⟹
   ∀K KK. invKey (pubEK TTP) ∉ KK ⟶
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (spies evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
apply (erule certified_mail.induct)
apply (drule_tac [6] A=TTP in symKey_neq_priEK)
apply (erule_tac [6] disjE [OF hr_form])
apply (drule_tac [5] CM2_S2TTP_analz_knows_Spy)
prefer 9
apply (elim exE)
apply (simp_all add: synth_analz_insert_eq
                     subset_trans [OF _ subset_insertI]
                     subset_trans [OF _ Un_upper2]
                del: image_insert image_Un add: analz_image_freshK_simps)
done


lemma analz_insert_freshK:
  "⟦evs ∈ certified_mail;  KAB ≠ invKey (pubEK TTP)⟧ ⟹
      (Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs))) =
      (K = KAB | Key K ∈ analz (spies evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
```

S2TTP must have originated from a valid sender provided *K* is secure. Proof is surprisingly hard.

```
lemma Notes_SSL_imp_used:
     "⟦Notes B {|Agent A, Agent B, X|} ∈ set evs⟧ ⟹ X ∈ used evs"
by (blast dest!: Notes_imp_used)


lemma S2TTP_sender_lemma [rule_format]:
 "evs ∈ certified_mail ⟹
```

```
    Key K ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶
    (∀AO. Crypt (pubEK TTP)
           {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R, hs|} ∈ used evs ⟶
    (∃m ctxt q.
        hs = Hash{|Number ctxt, Nonce q, response S R q, Crypt K (Number m)|}
∧
        Says S R
           {|Agent S, Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m), Number AO,
             Number ctxt, Nonce q,
             Crypt (pubEK TTP)
              {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R, hs |}|} ∈ set evs))"
apply (erule certified_mail.induct, analz_mono_contra)
apply (drule_tac [5] CM2_S2TTP_parts_knows_Spy, simp)
apply (simp add: used_Nil Crypt_notin_initState, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (blast dest: Fake_parts_sing [THEN subsetD]
             dest!: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])
```

Fake SSL

```
apply (blast dest: Fake_parts_sing [THEN subsetD]
             dest: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])
```

Message 1

```
apply (clarsimp, blast)
```

Message 2

```
apply (simp add: parts_insert2, clarify)
apply (metis parts_cut Un_empty_left usedI)
```

Message 3

```
apply (blast dest: Notes_SSL_imp_used used_parts_subset_parts)
done
```

```
lemma S2TTP_sender:
 "⟦Crypt (pubEK TTP) {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R, hs|} ∈ used evs;
    Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
    evs ∈ certified_mail⟧
  ⟹ ∃m ctxt q.
        hs = Hash{|Number ctxt, Nonce q, response S R q, Crypt K (Number m)|}
∧
        Says S R
           {|Agent S, Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m), Number AO,
             Number ctxt, Nonce q,
             Crypt (pubEK TTP)
              {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R, hs|}|} ∈ set evs"
by (blast intro: S2TTP_sender_lemma)
```

Nobody can have used non-existent keys!

```
lemma new_keys_not_used [simp]:
    "⟦Key K ∉ used evs; K ∈ symKeys; evs ∈ certified_mail⟧
     ⟹ K ∉ keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
apply (erule rev_mp)
```

apply *(erule certified_mail.induct, simp_all)*

Fake

apply *(force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)*

Message 1

apply *blast*

Message 3

apply *(frule CM3_k_parts_knows_Spy, assumption)*
apply *(frule_tac hr_form, assumption)*
apply *(force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)*
done

Less easy to prove *m' = m*. Maybe needs a separate unicity theorem for ciphertexts of the form *Crypt K (Number m)*, where *K* is secure.

lemma *Key_unique_lemma [rule_format]:*
```
     "evs ∈ certified_mail ⟹
       Key K ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶
       (∀m cleartext q hs.
        Says S R
            {|Agent S, Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m), Number AO,
              Number cleartext, Nonce q,
              Crypt (pubEK TTP) {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R, hs|}|}
           ∈ set evs ⟶
       (∀m' cleartext' q' hs'.
       Says S' R'
           {|Agent S', Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m'), Number AO',
             Number cleartext', Nonce q',
             Crypt (pubEK TTP) {|Agent S', Number AO', Key K, Agent R', hs'|}|}
          ∈ set evs ⟶ R' = R ∧ S' = S ∧ AO' = AO ∧ hs' = hs))"
```
apply *(erule certified_mail.induct, analz_mono_contra, simp_all)*
prefer *2*

Message 1

apply *(blast dest!: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj] new_keys_not_used Crypt_imp_keysFor)*

Fake

apply *(auto dest!: usedI S2TTP_sender analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])*
done

The key determines the sender, recipient and protocol options.

lemma *Key_unique:*
```
      "⟦Says S R
           {|Agent S, Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m), Number AO,
             Number cleartext, Nonce q,
             Crypt (pubEK TTP) {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R, hs|}|}
          ∈ set evs;
        Says S' R'
          {|Agent S', Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m'), Number AO',
            Number cleartext', Nonce q',
```

```
           Crypt (pubEK TTP) {|Agent S', Number AO', Key K, Agent R', hs'|}|}
        ∈ set evs;
       Key K ∉ analz (spies evs);
       evs ∈ certified_mail⟧
     ⟹ R' = R ∧ S' = S ∧ AO' = AO ∧ hs' = hs"
by (rule Key_unique_lemma, assumption+)
```

22.2 The Guarantees for Sender and Recipient

A Sender's guarantee: If Spy gets the key then `R` is bad and `S` moreover gets his return receipt (and therefore has no grounds for complaint).

```
theorem S_fairness_bad_R:
     "⟦Says S R {|Agent S, Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m), Number AO,
                  Number cleartext, Nonce q, S2TTP|} ∈ set evs;
       S2TTP = Crypt (pubEK TTP) {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R, hs|};
       Key K ∈ analz (spies evs);
       evs ∈ certified_mail;
       S≠Spy⟧
     ⟹ R ∈ bad ∧ Gets S (Crypt (priSK TTP) S2TTP) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule ssubst)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule certified_mail.induct, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply spy_analz
```

Fake SSL

```
apply spy_analz
```

Message 3

```
apply (frule_tac hr_form, assumption)
apply (elim disjE exE)
apply (simp_all add: synth_analz_insert_eq
                     subset_trans [OF _ subset_insertI]
                     subset_trans [OF _ Un_upper2]
              del: image_insert image_Un add: analz_image_freshK_simps)
apply (simp_all add: symKey_neq_priEK analz_insert_freshK)
apply (blast dest: Notes_SSL_imp_used S2TTP_sender Key_unique)+
done
```

Confidentially for the symmetric key

```
theorem Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:
     "⟦Says S R {|Agent S, Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m), Number AO,
                  Number cleartext, Nonce q, S2TTP|} ∈ set evs;
       S2TTP = Crypt (pubEK TTP) {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R, hs|};
       evs ∈ certified_mail;
       S≠Spy; R ∉ bad⟧
     ⟹ Key K ∉ analz(spies evs)"
by (blast dest: S_fairness_bad_R)
```

Agent `R`, who may be the Spy, doesn't receive the key until `S` has access to the return receipt.

```
theorem S_guarantee:
     "⟦Says S R {|Agent S, Agent TTP, Crypt K (Number m), Number AO,
                   Number cleartext, Nonce q, S2TTP|} ∈ set evs;
        S2TTP = Crypt (pubEK TTP) {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R, hs|};
        Notes R {|Agent TTP, Agent R, Key K, hs|} ∈ set evs;
        S≠Spy;  evs ∈ certified_mail⟧
     ⟹ Gets S (Crypt (priSK TTP) S2TTP) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule ssubst)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule certified_mail.induct, simp_all)
```

Message 1

```
apply (blast dest: Notes_imp_used)
```

Message 3

```
apply (blast dest: Notes_SSL_imp_used S2TTP_sender Key_unique S_fairness_bad_R)
```

done

If `R` sends message 2, and a delivery certificate exists, then `R` receives the necessary key. This result is also important to `S`, as it confirms the validity of the return receipt.

```
theorem RR_validity:
  "⟦Crypt (priSK TTP) S2TTP ∈ used evs;
     S2TTP = Crypt (pubEK TTP)
               {|Agent S, Number AO, Key K, Agent R,
                 Hash {|Number cleartext, Nonce q, r, em|}|};
     hr = Hash {|Number cleartext, Nonce q, r, em|};
     R≠Spy;  evs ∈ certified_mail⟧
  ⟹ Notes R {|Agent TTP, Agent R, Key K, hr|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule ssubst)
apply (erule ssubst)
apply (erule certified_mail.induct, simp_all)
```

Fake

```
apply (blast dest: Fake_parts_sing [THEN subsetD]
             dest!: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])
```

Fake SSL

```
apply (blast dest: Fake_parts_sing [THEN subsetD]
            dest!: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])
```

Message 2

```
apply (drule CM2_S2TTP_parts_knows_Spy, assumption)
apply (force dest: parts_cut)
```

Message 3

```
apply (frule_tac hr_form, assumption)
apply (elim disjE exE, simp_all)
apply (blast dest: Fake_parts_sing [THEN subsetD]
```

```
            dest!: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])
done

end
```

23 Conventional protocols: rely on conventional Message, Event and Public – Public-key protocols

```
theory Auth_Public
imports
  NS_Public_Bad
  NS_Public
  TLS
  CertifiedEmail
begin

end
```

24 Theory of Events for Security Protocols that use smartcards

```
theory EventSC
imports
  "../Message"
  "HOL-Library.Simps_Case_Conv"
begin

consts
  initState :: "agent => msg set"

datatype card = Card agent
```

Four new events express the traffic between an agent and his card

```
datatype
  event = Says  agent agent msg
        | Notes agent       msg
        | Gets  agent       msg
        | Inputs agent card msg
        | C_Gets card       msg
        | Outpts card agent msg
        | A_Gets agent      msg

consts
 bad     :: "agent set"
 stolen    :: "card set"
 cloned  :: "card set"
 secureM :: "bool"

abbreviation
  insecureM :: bool where
```

```
  "insecureM == ¬secureM"
```

Spy has access to his own key for spoof messages, but Server is secure

```
specification (bad)
  Spy_in_bad     [iff]: "Spy ∈ bad"
  Server_not_bad [iff]: "Server ∉ bad"
  apply (rule exI [of _ "{Spy}"], simp) done

specification (stolen)

  Card_Server_not_stolen [iff]: "Card Server ∉ stolen"
  Card_Spy_not_stolen    [iff]: "Card Spy ∉ stolen"
  apply blast done

specification (cloned)

  Card_Server_not_cloned [iff]: "Card Server ∉ cloned"
  Card_Spy_not_cloned    [iff]: "Card Spy ∉ cloned"
  apply blast done

primrec
  knows   :: "agent => event list => msg set"  where
  knows_Nil:   "knows A [] = initState A" |
  knows_Cons:  "knows A (ev # evs) =
         (case ev of
            Says A' B X =>
                if (A=A' | A=Spy) then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A
evs
          | Notes A' X  =>
                if (A=A' | (A=Spy & A'∈bad)) then insert X (knows A evs)
                                             else knows A evs
          | Gets A' X   =>
                if (A=A' & A ≠ Spy) then insert X (knows A evs)
                                    else knows A evs
          | Inputs A' C X =>
              if secureM then
                if A=A' then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
              else
                if (A=A' | A=Spy) then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A
evs
          | C_Gets C X   => knows A evs
          | Outpts C A' X =>
              if secureM then
                if A=A' then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
              else
                if A=Spy then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
          | A_Gets A' X   =>
                if (A=A' & A ≠ Spy) then insert X (knows A evs)
                                    else knows A evs)"



primrec
```

```
  used :: "event list => msg set" where
  used_Nil:   "used []         = (UN B. parts (initState B))" |
  used_Cons:  "used (ev # evs) =
                 (case ev of
                    Says A B X => parts {X} ∪ (used evs)
                  | Notes A X  => parts {X} ∪ (used evs)
                  | Gets A X   => used evs
                  | Inputs A C X  => parts{X} ∪ (used evs)
                  | C_Gets C X   => used evs
                  | Outpts C A X  => parts{X} ∪ (used evs)
                  | A_Gets A X   => used evs)"
```

— `Gets` always follows `Says` in real protocols. Likewise, `C_Gets` will always have to follow `Inputs` and `A_Gets` will always have to follow `Outpts`

```
lemma Notes_imp_used [rule_format]: "Notes A X ∈ set evs ⟶ X ∈ used evs"
apply (induct_tac evs)
apply (auto split: event.split)
done

lemma Says_imp_used [rule_format]: "Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟶ X ∈ used evs"
apply (induct_tac evs)
apply (auto split: event.split)
done

lemma MPair_used [rule_format]:
     "MPair X Y ∈ used evs ⟶ X ∈ used evs & Y ∈ used evs"
apply (induct_tac evs)
apply (auto split: event.split)
done
```

24.1 Function *knows*

```
lemmas parts_insert_knows_A = parts_insert [of _ "knows A evs"] for A evs

lemma knows_Spy_Says [simp]:
     "knows Spy (Says A B X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy evs)"
by simp
```

Letting the Spy see "bad" agents' notes avoids redundant case-splits on whether `A = Spy` and whether `A ∈ bad`

```
lemma knows_Spy_Notes [simp]:
     "knows Spy (Notes A X # evs) =
          (if A∈bad then insert X (knows Spy evs) else knows Spy evs)"
by simp

lemma knows_Spy_Gets [simp]: "knows Spy (Gets A X # evs) = knows Spy evs"
by simp

lemma knows_Spy_Inputs_secureM [simp]:
     "secureM ⟹ knows Spy (Inputs A C X # evs) =
        (if A=Spy then insert X (knows Spy evs) else knows Spy evs)"
by simp

lemma knows_Spy_Inputs_insecureM [simp]:
```

```
    "insecureM ⟹ knows Spy (Inputs A C X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy evs)"
by simp

lemma knows_Spy_C_Gets [simp]: "knows Spy (C_Gets C X # evs) = knows Spy
evs"
by simp

lemma knows_Spy_Outpts_secureM [simp]:
     "secureM ⟹ knows Spy (Outpts C A X # evs) =
        (if A=Spy then insert X (knows Spy evs) else knows Spy evs)"
by simp

lemma knows_Spy_Outpts_insecureM [simp]:
     "insecureM ⟹ knows Spy (Outpts C A X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy
evs)"
by simp

lemma knows_Spy_A_Gets [simp]: "knows Spy (A_Gets A X # evs) = knows Spy
evs"
by simp



lemma knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Says:
    "knows Spy evs ⊆ knows Spy (Says A B X # evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)

lemma knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Notes:
    "knows Spy evs ⊆ knows Spy (Notes A X # evs)"
by force

lemma knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Gets:
    "knows Spy evs ⊆ knows Spy (Gets A X # evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)

lemma knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Inputs:
    "knows Spy evs ⊆ knows Spy (Inputs A C X # evs)"
by auto

lemma knows_Spy_equals_knows_Spy_Gets:
    "knows Spy evs = knows Spy (C_Gets C X # evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)

lemma knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_Outpts: "knows Spy evs ⊆ knows Spy (Outpts
C A X # evs)"
by auto

lemma knows_Spy_subset_knows_Spy_A_Gets: "knows Spy evs ⊆ knows Spy (A_Gets
A X # evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)
```

Spy sees what is sent on the traffic

```
lemma Says_imp_knows_Spy [rule_format]:
```

```
    "Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟶ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
done

lemma Notes_imp_knows_Spy [rule_format]:
    "Notes A X ∈ set evs ⟶ A∈ bad ⟶ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
done



lemma Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM [rule_format (no_asm)]:
    "Inputs Spy C X ∈ set evs ⟶ secureM ⟶ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
done

lemma Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_insecureM [rule_format (no_asm)]:
    "Inputs A C X ∈ set evs ⟶ insecureM ⟶ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
done



lemma Outpts_imp_knows_Spy_secureM [rule_format (no_asm)]:
    "Outpts C Spy X ∈ set evs ⟶ secureM ⟶ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
done

lemma Outpts_imp_knows_Spy_insecureM [rule_format (no_asm)]:
    "Outpts C A X ∈ set evs ⟶ insecureM ⟶ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
done
```

Elimination rules: derive contradictions from old Says events containing items known to be fresh

```
lemmas knows_Spy_partsEs =
    Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, elim_format]
    parts.Body [elim_format]
```

24.2 Knowledge of Agents

```
lemma knows_Inputs: "knows A (Inputs A C X # evs) = insert X (knows A evs)"
by simp

lemma knows_C_Gets: "knows A (C_Gets C X # evs) = knows A evs"
by simp

lemma knows_Outpts_secureM:
```

```
      "secureM ⟶ knows A (Outpts C A X # evs) = insert X (knows A evs)"
by simp

lemma knows_Outpts_insecureM:
      "insecureM ⟶ knows Spy (Outpts C A X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy
evs)"
by simp



lemma knows_subset_knows_Says: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Says A' B X # evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)

lemma knows_subset_knows_Notes: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Notes A' X # evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)

lemma knows_subset_knows_Gets: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Gets A' X # evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)

lemma knows_subset_knows_Inputs: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Inputs A' C X #
evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)

lemma knows_subset_knows_C_Gets: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (C_Gets C X # evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)

lemma knows_subset_knows_Outpts: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Outpts C A' X #
evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)

lemma knows_subset_knows_A_Gets: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (A_Gets A' X # evs)"
by (simp add: subset_insertI)
```

Agents know what they say

```
lemma Says_imp_knows [rule_format]: "Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟶ X ∈ knows
A evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
apply blast
done
```

Agents know what they note

```
lemma Notes_imp_knows [rule_format]: "Notes A X ∈ set evs ⟶ X ∈ knows
A evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
apply blast
done
```

Agents know what they receive

```
lemma Gets_imp_knows_agents [rule_format]:
```

```
    "A ≠ Spy ⟶ Gets A X ∈ set evs ⟶ X ∈ knows A evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
done


lemma Inputs_imp_knows_agents [rule_format (no_asm)]:
    "Inputs A (Card A) X ∈ set evs ⟶ X ∈ knows A evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
apply blast
done




lemma Outpts_imp_knows_agents_secureM [rule_format (no_asm)]:
    "secureM ⟶ Outpts (Card A) A X ∈ set evs ⟶ X ∈ knows A evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
done


lemma Outpts_imp_knows_agents_insecureM [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "insecureM ⟶ Outpts (Card A) A X ∈ set evs ⟶ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
done




lemma parts_knows_Spy_subset_used: "parts (knows Spy evs) ⊆ used evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs", force)
apply (simp add: parts_insert_knows_A add: event.split, blast)
done

lemmas usedI = parts_knows_Spy_subset_used [THEN subsetD, intro]

lemma initState_into_used: "X ∈ parts (initState B) ⟹ X ∈ used evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all add: parts_insert_knows_A split: event.split, blast)
done

simps_of_case used_Cons_simps[simp]: used_Cons

lemma used_nil_subset: "used [] ⊆ used evs"
apply simp
apply (blast intro: initState_into_used)
done
```

```
lemma Says_parts_used [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟶ (parts  {X}) ⊆ used evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
apply blast
done

lemma Notes_parts_used [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "Notes A X ∈ set evs ⟶ (parts  {X}) ⊆ used evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
apply blast
done

lemma Outpts_parts_used [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "Outpts C A X ∈ set evs ⟶ (parts  {X}) ⊆ used evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
apply blast
done

lemma Inputs_parts_used [rule_format (no_asm)]:
     "Inputs A C X ∈ set evs ⟶ (parts  {X}) ⊆ used evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) split: event.split)
apply blast
done
```

NOTE REMOVAL–laws above are cleaner, as they don't involve "case"

```
declare knows_Cons [simp del]
        used_Nil [simp del] used_Cons [simp del]


lemma knows_subset_knows_Cons: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (e # evs)"
by (cases e, auto simp: knows_Cons)

lemma initState_subset_knows: "initState A ⊆ knows A evs"
apply (induct_tac evs, simp)
apply (blast intro: knows_subset_knows_Cons [THEN subsetD])
done
```

For proving *new_keys_not_used*

```
lemma keysFor_parts_insert:
     "⟦ K ∈ keysFor (parts (insert X G));  X ∈ synth (analz H) ⟧
      ⟹ K ∈ keysFor (parts (G ∪ H)) ∨ Key (invKey K) ∈ parts H"
by (force
    dest!: parts_insert_subset_Un [THEN keysFor_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
           analz_subset_parts [THEN keysFor_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
    intro: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD] parts_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])

end
theory All_Symmetric
imports Message
```

begin

All keys are symmetric

overloading *all_symmetric* ≡ *all_symmetric*
begin
  definition *"all_symmetric ≡ True"*
end

lemma *isSym_keys: "K ∈ symKeys"*
  by *(simp add: symKeys_def all_symmetric_def invKey_symmetric)*

end

25 Theory of smartcards

theory *Smartcard*
imports *EventSC "../All_Symmetric"*
begin

As smartcards handle long-term (symmetric) keys, this theoy extends and supersedes theory Private.thy
An agent is bad if she reveals her PIN to the spy, not the shared key that is embedded in her card. An agent's being bad implies nothing about her smartcard, which independently may be stolen or cloned.

axiomatization
  shrK *:: "agent => key"* **and**
  crdK *:: "card => key"* **and**
  pin *:: "agent => key"* **and**

  *Pairkey :: "agent * agent => nat"* **and**
  pairK *:: "agent * agent => key"*
where
  inj_shrK: "inj shrK" **and** — No two smartcards store the same key
  inj_crdK: "inj crdK" **and** — Nor do two cards
  inj_pin : "inj pin" **and** — Nor do two agents have the same pin

  inj_pairK *[iff]: "(pairK(A,B) = pairK(A',B')) = (A = A' & B = B')"* **and**
  comm_Pairkey [iff]: "Pairkey(A,B) = Pairkey(B,A)" **and**

  pairK_disj_crdK [iff]: "pairK(A,B) ≠ crdK C" **and**
  pairK_disj_shrK [iff]: "pairK(A,B) ≠ shrK P" **and**
  pairK_disj_pin [iff]: "pairK(A,B) ≠ pin P" **and**
  shrK_disj_crdK [iff]: "shrK P ≠ crdK C" **and**
  shrK_disj_pin [iff]: "shrK P ≠ pin Q" **and**
  crdK_disj_pin [iff]: "crdK C ≠ pin P"

definition *legalUse :: "card => bool" (‹legalUse (_)›)* **where**
  "legalUse C == C ∉ stolen"

```
primrec illegalUse :: "card  => bool" where
  illegalUse_def: "illegalUse (Card A) = ( (Card A ∈ stolen ∧ A ∈ bad)  ∨
Card A ∈ cloned )"
```

initState must be defined with care

```
overloading
  initState ≡ initState
begin

primrec initState where

  initState_Server:  "initState Server =
        (Key‘(range shrK ∪ range crdK ∪ range pin ∪ range pairK)) ∪
        (Nonce‘(range Pairkey))" |


  initState_Friend:  "initState (Friend i) = {Key (pin (Friend i))}" |


  initState_Spy: "initState Spy  =
                 (Key‘((pin‘bad) ∪ (pin ‘{A. Card A ∈ cloned}) ∪
                                   (shrK‘{A. Card A ∈ cloned}) ∪
                        (crdK‘cloned) ∪
                        (pairK‘{(X,A). Card A ∈ cloned})))
           ∪ (Nonce‘(Pairkey‘{(A,B). Card A ∈ cloned & Card B ∈ cloned}))"

end
```

Still relying on axioms

```
axiomatization where
  Key_supply_ax:  "finite KK ⟹ ∃ K. K ∉ KK & Key K ∉ used evs" and


  Nonce_supply_ax: "finite NN ⟹ ∃ N. N ∉ NN & Nonce N ∉ used evs"
```

25.1 Basic properties of shrK

```
declare inj_shrK [THEN inj_eq, iff]
declare inj_crdK [THEN inj_eq, iff]
declare inj_pin  [THEN inj_eq, iff]

lemma invKey_K [simp]: "invKey K = K"
apply (insert isSym_keys)
apply (simp add: symKeys_def)
done


lemma analz_Decrypt' [dest]:
     "⟦ Crypt K X ∈ analz H;  Key K  ∈ analz H ⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
by auto
```

Now cancel the `dest` attribute given to `analz.Decrypt` in its declaration.

```
declare analz.Decrypt [rule del]
```

Rewrites should not refer to `initState (Friend i)` because that expression is not in normal form.

Added to extend initstate with set of nonces

```
lemma parts_image_Nonce [simp]: "parts (Nonce`N) = Nonce`N"
  by auto

lemma keysFor_parts_initState [simp]: "keysFor (parts (initState C)) = {}"
unfolding keysFor_def
apply (induct_tac "C", auto)
done


lemma keysFor_parts_insert:
     "⟦ K ∈ keysFor (parts (insert X G));  X ∈ synth (analz H) ⟧
     ⟹ K ∈ keysFor (parts (G ∪ H)) | Key K ∈ parts H"
by (force dest: EventSC.keysFor_parts_insert)

lemma Crypt_imp_keysFor: "Crypt K X ∈ H ⟹ K ∈ keysFor H"
by (drule Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor, simp)
```

25.2 Function "knows"

```
lemma Spy_knows_bad [intro!]: "A ∈ bad ⟹ Key (pin A) ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)
done


lemma Spy_knows_cloned [intro!]:
     "Card A ∈ cloned ⟹  Key (crdK (Card A)) ∈ knows Spy evs &
                         Key (shrK A) ∈ knows Spy evs &
                         Key (pin A)  ∈ knows Spy evs &
                        (∀ B. Key (pairK(B,A)) ∈ knows Spy evs)"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)
done

lemma Spy_knows_cloned1 [intro!]: "C ∈ cloned ⟹ Key (crdK C) ∈ knows Spy
evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)
done

lemma Spy_knows_cloned2 [intro!]: "⟦ Card A ∈ cloned; Card B ∈ cloned ⟧

   ⟹ Nonce (Pairkey(A,B))∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)
done


lemma Spy_knows_Spy_bad [intro!]: "A∈ bad ⟹ Key (pin A) ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
```

```
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)
done
```

```
lemma Crypt_Spy_analz_bad:
  "⟦ Crypt (pin A) X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs);  A∈bad ⟧
      ⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (force dest!: analz.Decrypt)
done
```

```
lemma shrK_in_initState [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ initState Server"
apply (induct_tac "A")
apply auto
done

lemma shrK_in_used [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ used evs"
apply (rule initState_into_used)
apply blast
done

lemma crdK_in_initState [iff]: "Key (crdK A) ∈ initState Server"
apply (induct_tac "A")
apply auto
done

lemma crdK_in_used [iff]: "Key (crdK A) ∈ used evs"
apply (rule initState_into_used)
apply blast
done

lemma pin_in_initState [iff]: "Key (pin A) ∈ initState A"
apply (induct_tac "A")
apply auto
done

lemma pin_in_used [iff]: "Key (pin A) ∈ used evs"
apply (rule initState_into_used)
apply blast
done

lemma pairK_in_initState [iff]: "Key (pairK X) ∈ initState Server"
apply (induct_tac "X")
apply auto
done

lemma pairK_in_used [iff]: "Key (pairK X) ∈ used evs"
apply (rule initState_into_used)
apply blast
done
```

lemma *Key_not_used [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ K ∉ range shrK"*
by *blast*

lemma *shrK_neq [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ shrK B ≠ K"*
by *blast*

lemma *crdK_not_used [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ K ∉ range crdK"*
apply *clarify*
done

lemma *crdK_neq [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ crdK C ≠ K"*
apply *clarify*
done

lemma *pin_not_used [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ K ∉ range pin"*
apply *clarify*
done

lemma *pin_neq [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ pin A ≠ K"*
apply *clarify*
done

lemma *pairK_not_used [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ K ∉ range pairK"*
apply *clarify*
done

lemma *pairK_neq [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ pairK(A,B) ≠ K"*
apply *clarify*
done

declare *shrK_neq [THEN not_sym, simp]*
declare *crdK_neq [THEN not_sym, simp]*
declare *pin_neq [THEN not_sym, simp]*
declare *pairK_neq [THEN not_sym, simp]*

25.3 Fresh nonces

lemma *Nonce_notin_initState [iff]: "Nonce N ∉ parts (initState (Friend i))"*
by *auto*

25.4 Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems.

lemma *Nonce_supply1: "∃N. Nonce N ∉ used evs"*
apply *(rule finite.emptyI [THEN Nonce_supply_ax, THEN exE], blast)*
done

lemma *Nonce_supply2:*
"∃N N'. Nonce N ∉ used evs & Nonce N' ∉ used evs' & N ≠ N'"
apply *(cut_tac evs = evs* **in** *finite.emptyI [THEN Nonce_supply_ax])*
apply *(erule exE)*
apply *(cut_tac evs = evs'* **in** *finite.emptyI [THEN finite.insertI, THEN Nonce_supply_ax])*

apply *auto*
done

lemma *Nonce_supply3: "∃N N' N''. Nonce N ∉ used evs & Nonce N' ∉ used evs' &*
Nonce N'' ∉ used evs'' & N ≠ N' & N' ≠ N'' & N ≠ N''"
apply *(cut_tac evs = evs* **in** *finite.emptyI [THEN Nonce_supply_ax])*
apply *(erule exE)*
apply *(cut_tac evs = evs'* **and** *a1 = N* **in** *finite.emptyI [THEN finite.insertI, THEN Nonce_supply_ax])*
apply *(erule exE)*
apply *(cut_tac evs = evs''* **and** *a1 = Na* **and** *a2 = N* **in** *finite.emptyI [THEN finite.insertI, THEN finite.insertI, THEN Nonce_supply_ax])*
apply *blast*
done

lemma *Nonce_supply: "Nonce (SOME N. Nonce N ∉ used evs) ∉ used evs"*
apply *(rule finite.emptyI [THEN Nonce_supply_ax, THEN exE])*
apply *(rule someI, blast)*
done

Unlike the corresponding property of nonces, we cannot prove *finite KK ⟹ ∃K. K ∉ KK ∧ Key K ∉ used evs*. We have infinitely many agents and there is nothing to stop their long-term keys from exhausting all the natural numbers. Instead, possibility theorems must assume the existence of a few keys.

25.5 Specialized Rewriting for Theorems About *analz* and Image

lemma *subset_Compl_range_shrK: "A ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟹ shrK x ∉ A"*
by *blast*

lemma *subset_Compl_range_crdK: "A ⊆ - (range crdK) ⟹ crdK x ∉ A"*
apply *blast*
done

lemma *subset_Compl_range_pin: "A ⊆ - (range pin) ⟹ pin x ∉ A"*
apply *blast*
done

lemma *subset_Compl_range_pairK: "A ⊆ - (range pairK) ⟹ pairK x ∉ A"*
apply *blast*
done
lemma *insert_Key_singleton: "insert (Key K) H = Key ‘ {K} ∪ H"*
by *blast*

lemma *insert_Key_image: "insert (Key K) (Key‘KK ∪ C) = Key‘(insert K KK) ∪ C"*
by *blast*

lemmas *analz_image_freshK_simps =*
simp_thms mem_simps — these two allow its use with *only:*
disj_comms
image_insert [THEN sym] image_Un [THEN sym] empty_subsetI insert_subset
analz_insert_eq Un_upper2 [THEN analz_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
insert_Key_singleton subset_Compl_range_shrK subset_Compl_range_crdK
subset_Compl_range_pin subset_Compl_range_pairK
Key_not_used insert_Key_image Un_assoc [THEN sym]

lemma *analz_image_freshK_lemma:*
"(Key K ∈ analz (Key‘nE ∪ H)) ⟶ (K ∈ nE | Key K ∈ analz H) ⟹
(Key K ∈ analz (Key‘nE ∪ H)) = (K ∈ nE | Key K ∈ analz H)"
by *(blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])*

25.6 Tactics for possibility theorems

ML

```
<
structure Smartcard =
struct

(*Omitting used_Says makes the tactic much faster: it leaves expressions
    such as  Nonce ?N ∉ used evs that match Nonce_supply*)
fun possibility_tac ctxt =
   (REPEAT
    (ALLGOALS (simp_tac (ctxt
      |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms used_Cons_simps}
      |> Simplifier.set_unsafe_solver safe_solver))
     THEN
     REPEAT_FIRST (eq_assume_tac ORELSE'
                   resolve_tac ctxt [refl, conjI, @{thm Nonce_supply}])))

(*For harder protocols (such as Recur) where we have to set up some
  nonces and keys initially*)
fun basic_possibility_tac ctxt =
    REPEAT
    (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (ctxt |> Simplifier.set_unsafe_solver safe_solver))
     THEN
     REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt [refl, conjI]))

val analz_image_freshK_ss =
  context
  |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms image_insert image_Un}
  |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms imp_disjL}    (*reduces blow-up*)
  |> Simplifier.add_simps @{thms analz_image_freshK_simps}
  |> Simplifier.simpset_of

end
>
```

lemma *invKey_shrK_iff [iff]:*

```
     "(Key (invKey K) ∈ X) = (Key K ∈ X)"
by auto


method_setup analz_freshK = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt =>
     (SIMPLE_METHOD
      (EVERY [REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms allI ballI impI}),
          REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms analz_image_freshK_lemma}),
          ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (put_simpset Smartcard.analz_image_freshK_ss
ctxt))])))›
    "for proving the Session Key Compromise theorem"

method_setup possibility = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt =>
        SIMPLE_METHOD (Smartcard.possibility_tac ctxt))›
    "for proving possibility theorems"

method_setup basic_possibility = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt =>
        SIMPLE_METHOD (Smartcard.basic_possibility_tac ctxt))›
    "for proving possibility theorems"

lemma knows_subset_knows_Cons: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (e # evs)"
by (induct e) (auto simp: knows_Cons)


declare shrK_disj_crdK[THEN not_sym, iff]
declare shrK_disj_pin[THEN not_sym, iff]
declare pairK_disj_shrK[THEN not_sym, iff]
declare pairK_disj_crdK[THEN not_sym, iff]
declare pairK_disj_pin[THEN not_sym, iff]
declare crdK_disj_pin[THEN not_sym, iff]

declare legalUse_def [iff] illegalUse_def [iff]

end
```

26 Original Shoup-Rubin protocol

```
theory ShoupRubin imports Smartcard begin

axiomatization sesK :: "nat*key => key"
where

   inj_sesK [iff]: "(sesK(m,k) = sesK(m',k')) = (m = m' ∧ k = k')" and

   shrK_disj_sesK [iff]: "shrK A ≠ sesK(m,pk)" and
   crdK_disj_sesK [iff]: "crdK C ≠ sesK(m,pk)" and
   pin_disj_sesK  [iff]: "pin P ≠ sesK(m,pk)" and
   pairK_disj_sesK[iff]:"pairK(A,B) ≠ sesK(m,pk)" and
```

```
  Atomic_distrib [iff]: "Atomic‘(KEY‘K ∪ NONCE‘N) =
                         Atomic‘(KEY‘K) ∪ Atomic‘(NONCE‘N)" and


  shouprubin_assumes_securemeans [iff]: "evs ∈ sr ⟹ secureM"

definition Unique :: "[event, event list] => bool" (<Unique _ on _>) where
  "Unique ev on evs ==
     ev ∉ set (tl (dropWhile (% z. z ≠ ev) evs))"


inductive_set sr :: "event list set"
 where

   Nil:  "[]∈ sr"


 | Fake: "⟦ evsF∈ sr;  X∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsF));
            illegalUse(Card B) ⟧
          ⟹ Says Spy A X #
             Inputs Spy (Card B) X # evsF ∈ sr"


 | Forge:
        "⟦ evsFo ∈ sr; Nonce Nb ∈ analz (knows Spy evsFo);
            Key (pairK(A,B)) ∈ knows Spy evsFo ⟧
          ⟹ Notes Spy (Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B)))) # evsFo ∈ sr"


 | Reception: "⟦ evsR∈ sr; Says A B X ∈ set evsR ⟧
              ⟹ Gets B X # evsR ∈ sr"


 | SR1:  "⟦ evs1∈ sr; A ≠ Server⟧
          ⟹ Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|}
               # evs1 ∈ sr"

 | SR2:  "⟦ evs2∈ sr;
            Gets Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs2 ⟧
          ⟹ Says Server A {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                            Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Agent B|}
                   |}
               # evs2 ∈ sr"
```

```
| SR3:  "⟦ evs3∈ sr; legalUse(Card A);
           Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs3;
           Gets A {|Nonce Pk, Certificate|} ∈ set evs3 ⟧
         ⟹ Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A)
              # evs3 ∈ sr"


| SR4:  "⟦ evs4∈ sr;  A ≠ Server;
           Nonce Na ∉ used evs4; legalUse(Card A);
           Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs4 ⟧
       ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
            # evs4 ∈ sr"


| SR4Fake: "⟦ evs4F∈ sr; Nonce Na ∉ used evs4F;
              illegalUse(Card A);
              Inputs Spy (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs4F ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card A) Spy {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
          # evs4F ∈ sr"


| SR5:  "⟦ evs5∈ sr;
           Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Certificate|} ∈ set evs5;
           ∀ p q. Certificate ≠ {|p, q|} ⟧
         ⟹ Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} # evs5 ∈ sr"


| SR6:  "⟦ evs6∈ sr; legalUse(Card B);
           Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs6 ⟧
         ⟹ Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|}
              # evs6 ∈ sr"


| SR7:  "⟦ evs7∈ sr;
           Nonce Nb ∉ used evs7; legalUse(Card B); B ≠ Server;
           K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B));
           Key K ∉ used evs7;
           Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs7⟧
   ⟹ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K,
                          Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                          Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
              # evs7 ∈ sr"


| SR7Fake:  "⟦ evs7F∈ sr; Nonce Nb ∉ used evs7F;
```

```
        illegalUse(Card B);
        K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B));
        Key K ∉ used evs7F;
        Inputs Spy (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs7F ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card B) Spy {|Nonce Nb, Key K,
                  Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                  Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
       # evs7F ∈ sr"


| SR8:  "⟦ evs8∈ sr;
         Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs8;
         Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K,
                             Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs8 ⟧
     ⟹ Says B A {|Nonce Nb, Cert1|} # evs8 ∈ sr"


| SR9:  "⟦ evs9∈ sr; legalUse(Card A);
         Gets A {|Nonce Pk, Cert1|} ∈ set evs9;
         Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Cert2|} ∈ set evs9;
         Gets A {|Nonce Nb, Cert3|} ∈ set evs9;
         ∀ p q. Cert2 ≠ {|p, q|} ⟧
     ⟹ Inputs A (Card A)
          {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
            Cert1, Cert3, Cert2|}
        # evs9 ∈ sr"


| SR10: "⟦ evs10∈ sr; legalUse(Card A); A ≠ Server;
         K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B));
         Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb,
                             Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                             Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                                              Agent B|},
                             Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},

                             Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
          ∈ set evs10 ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A {|Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
          # evs10 ∈ sr"


| SR10Fake: "⟦ evs10F∈ sr;
          illegalUse(Card A);
          K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B));
```

```
                Inputs Spy (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb,
                                      Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                                      Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),

                                                       Agent B|},
                                      Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce
Nb|},
                                      Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
                  ∈ set evs10F ⟧
           ⟹ Outpts (Card A) Spy {|Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
                # evs10F ∈ sr"
```

```
  | SR11: "⟦ evs11∈ sr;
             Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs11;
             Outpts (Card A) A {|Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs11 ⟧
          ⟹ Says A B (Certificate)
                # evs11 ∈ sr"
```

```
  | Oops1:
     "⟦ evsO1 ∈ sr;
         Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate,
                             Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evsO1 ⟧
     ⟹ Notes Spy {|Key K, Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|} # evsO1 ∈ sr"

  | Oops2:
     "⟦ evsO2 ∈ sr;
         Outpts (Card A) A {|Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
           ∈ set evsO2 ⟧
    ⟹ Notes Spy {|Key K, Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|} # evsO2 ∈ sr"
```

declare *Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]*
declare *analz_into_parts [dest]*

lemma *Gets_imp_Says:*
"⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧ ⟹ ∃ A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)*

apply *auto*
done

lemma *Gets_imp_knows_Spy:*
"⟦ *Gets B X* ∈ *set evs; evs* ∈ *sr* ⟧ ⟹ *X* ∈ *knows Spy evs*"
apply *(blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)*
done

lemma *Gets_imp_knows_Spy_parts_Snd:*
"⟦ *Gets B* {|*X, Y*|} ∈ *set evs; evs* ∈ *sr* ⟧ ⟹ *Y* ∈ *parts (knows Spy evs)*"
apply *(blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy parts.Inj parts.Snd)*
done

lemma *Gets_imp_knows_Spy_analz_Snd:*
"⟦ *Gets B* {|*X, Y*|} ∈ *set evs; evs* ∈ *sr* ⟧ ⟹ *Y* ∈ *analz (knows Spy evs)*"
apply *(blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy analz.Inj analz.Snd)*
done

lemma *Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_sr:*
"⟦ *Inputs Spy C X* ∈ *set evs; evs* ∈ *sr* ⟧ ⟹ *X* ∈ *knows Spy evs*"
apply *(simp (no_asm_simp) add: Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM)*
done

lemma *knows_Spy_Inputs_secureM_sr_Spy:*
"*evs* ∈*sr* ⟹ *knows Spy (Inputs Spy C X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy evs)*"
apply *(simp (no_asm_simp))*
done

lemma *knows_Spy_Inputs_secureM_sr:*
"⟦ *A* ≠ *Spy; evs* ∈*sr* ⟧ ⟹ *knows Spy (Inputs A C X # evs) = knows Spy evs*"
apply *(simp (no_asm_simp))*
done

lemma *knows_Spy_Outpts_secureM_sr_Spy:*
"*evs* ∈*sr* ⟹ *knows Spy (Outpts C Spy X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy evs)*"
apply *(simp (no_asm_simp))*
done

lemma *knows_Spy_Outpts_secureM_sr:*
"⟦ *A* ≠ *Spy; evs* ∈*sr* ⟧ ⟹ *knows Spy (Outpts C A X # evs) = knows Spy evs*"
apply *(simp (no_asm_simp))*
done

```
lemma Inputs_A_Card_3:
    "⟦ Inputs A C (Agent A) ∈ set evs; A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧
      (∃ Pk Certificate. Gets A {|Pk, Certificate|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Inputs_B_Card_6:
     "⟦ Inputs B C {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs; B ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card B) ∧ Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Inputs_A_Card_9:
     "⟦ Inputs A C {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
                                          Cert1, Cert2, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;

         A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
  ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧
     Gets A {|Nonce Pk, Cert1|} ∈ set evs     ∧
     Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Cert3|} ∈ set evs        ∧
     Gets A {|Nonce Nb, Cert2|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done



lemma Outpts_A_Card_4:
     "⟦ Outpts C A {|Nonce Na, (Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na))|} ∈ set evs;

         evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧
         Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done



lemma Outpts_B_Card_7:
      "⟦ Outpts C B {|Nonce Nb, Key K,
                      Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                      Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
```

```
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card B) ∧
        Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_A_Card_10:
     "⟦ Outpts C A {|Key K, (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb))|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧
        (∃ Na Ver1 Ver2 Ver3.
       Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),

                           Ver1, Ver2, Ver3|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done



lemma Outpts_A_Card_10_imp_Inputs:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ (∃ B Na Nb Ver1 Ver2 Ver3.
       Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),

                           Ver1, Ver2, Ver3|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply simp_all
apply blast+
done



lemma Outpts_honest_A_Card_4:
     "⟦ Outpts C A {|Nonce Na, Crypt K X|} ∈set evs;
        A ≠ Spy;  evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧
        Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done



lemma Outpts_honest_B_Card_7:
     "⟦ Outpts C B {|Nonce Nb, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        B ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card B) ∧
        (∃ A Na. Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs)"
```

```
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_honest_A_Card_10:
     "⟦ Outpts C A {|Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
         A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse (C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧
         (∃ B Na Nb Pk Ver1 Ver2 Ver3.
          Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Pk,
                              Ver1, Ver2, Ver3|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply simp_all
apply blast+
done



lemma Outpts_which_Card_4:
    "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Crypt K X|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧
    ⟹ Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
apply clarify
done

lemma Outpts_which_Card_7:
  "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ A Na. Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_which_Card_10:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))),
                            Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb) |} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ sr ⟧
    ⟹ ∃ Na. Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),

                            Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Agent B|},

                            Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                            Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na) |} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done
```

```
lemma Outpts_A_Card_form_4:
  "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
        ∀ p q. Certificate ≠ {|p, q|}; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ Certificate = (Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
done

lemma Outpts_B_Card_form_7:
   "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ ∃ A Na.
          K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B)) ∧
          Cert1 = (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|}) ∧
          Cert2 = (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_A_Card_form_10:
   "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ ∃ B Nb.
          K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B)) ∧
          Certificate = (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
done

lemma Outpts_A_Card_form_bis:
  "⟦ Outpts (Card A') A' {|Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))), Certificate|} ∈ set evs;

         evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ A' = A ∧
          Certificate = (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
done



lemma Inputs_A_Card_form_9:
     "⟦ Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
                            Cert1, Cert2, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ sr ⟧
  ⟹     Cert3 = Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule sr.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))

apply force

apply (blast dest!: Outpts_A_Card_form_4)
done
```

```
lemma Inputs_Card_legalUse:
  "⟦ Inputs A (Card A) X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧ ⟹ legalUse(Card A)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_Card_legalUse:
  "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧ ⟹ legalUse(Card A)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done



lemma Inputs_Card: "⟦ Inputs A C X ∈ set evs; A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ C = (Card A) ∧ legalUse(C)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_Card: "⟦ Outpts C A X ∈ set evs; A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ C = (Card A) ∧ legalUse(C)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Inputs_Outpts_Card:
     "⟦ Inputs A C X ∈ set evs ∨ Outpts C A Y ∈ set evs;
         A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ C = (Card A) ∧ legalUse(Card A)"
apply (blast dest: Inputs_Card Outpts_Card)
done



lemma Inputs_Card_Spy:
  "⟦ Inputs Spy C X ∈ set evs ∨ Outpts C Spy X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ C = (Card Spy) ∧ legalUse(Card Spy) ∨
          (∃ A. C = (Card A) ∧ illegalUse(Card A))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done
```

```
lemma Outpts_A_Card_unique_nonce:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
           ∈ set evs;
        Outpts (Card A') A' {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A')) (Nonce Na)|}

           ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ sr ⟧ ⟹ A=A'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct, simp_all)
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
done


lemma Outpts_B_Card_unique_nonce:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key SK, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        Outpts (Card B') B' {|Nonce Nb, Key SK', Cert1', Cert2'|} ∈ set evs;

        evs ∈ sr ⟧ ⟹ B=B' ∧ SK=SK' ∧ Cert1=Cert1' ∧ Cert2=Cert2'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct, simp_all)
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
done



lemma Outpts_B_Card_unique_key:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key SK, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        Outpts (Card B') B' {|Nonce Nb', Key SK, Cert1', Cert2'|} ∈ set evs;

        evs ∈ sr ⟧ ⟹ B=B' ∧ Nb=Nb' ∧ Cert1=Cert1' ∧ Cert2=Cert2'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct, simp_all)
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
done

lemma Outpts_A_Card_unique_key: "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Key K, V|} ∈ set evs;

        Outpts (Card A') A' {|Key K, V'|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ sr ⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ V=V'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct, simp_all)
apply (blast dest: Outpts_A_Card_form_bis)
apply blast
done
```

```
lemma Outpts_A_Card_Unique:
  "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, rest|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ Unique (Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, rest|}) on evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct, simp_all add: Unique_def)
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
done
```

```
lemma Spy_knows_Na:
      "⟦ Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ Nonce Na ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd])
done

lemma Spy_knows_Nb:
      "⟦ Says B A {|Nonce Nb, Certificate|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ Nonce Nb ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Fst])
done
```

```
lemma Pairkey_Gets_analz_knows_Spy:
      "⟦ Gets A {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Certificate|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧

      ⟹ Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj])
done

lemma Pairkey_Inputs_imp_Gets:
     "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
           {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
             Cert1, Cert3, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ Gets A {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Cert1|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
apply force
done

lemma Pairkey_Inputs_analz_knows_Spy:
```

```
    "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
          {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
            Cert1, Cert3, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
    ⟹ Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (case_tac "A = Spy")
apply (fastforce dest!: Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM [THEN analz.Inj])
apply (blast dest!: Pairkey_Inputs_imp_Gets [THEN Pairkey_Gets_analz_knows_Spy])
done
```

```
declare shrK_disj_sesK [THEN not_sym, iff]
declare pin_disj_sesK [THEN not_sym, iff]
declare crdK_disj_sesK [THEN not_sym, iff]
declare pairK_disj_sesK [THEN not_sym, iff]
```

ML

```
‹
structure ShoupRubin =
struct

fun prepare_tac ctxt =
 (*SR8*)   forward_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_B_Card_form_7}] 14 THEN
           eresolve_tac ctxt [exE] 15 THEN eresolve_tac ctxt [exE] 15 THEN

 (*SR9*)   forward_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_A_Card_form_4}] 16 THEN
 (*SR11*)  forward_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_A_Card_form_10}] 21 THEN
           eresolve_tac ctxt [exE] 22 THEN eresolve_tac ctxt [exE] 22

fun parts_prepare_tac ctxt =
           prepare_tac ctxt THEN
 (*SR9*)   dresolve_tac ctxt [@{thm Gets_imp_knows_Spy_parts_Snd}] 18 THEN

 (*SR9*)   dresolve_tac ctxt [@{thm Gets_imp_knows_Spy_parts_Snd}] 19 THEN

 (*Oops1*) dresolve_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_B_Card_form_7}] 25    THEN
 (*Oops2*) dresolve_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_A_Card_form_10}] 27 THEN
 (*Base*)  (force_tac ctxt) 1

fun analz_prepare_tac ctxt =
         prepare_tac ctxt THEN
         dresolve_tac ctxt @{thms Gets_imp_knows_Spy_analz_Snd} 18 THEN
 (*SR9*) dresolve_tac ctxt @{thms Gets_imp_knows_Spy_analz_Snd} 19 THEN
         REPEAT_FIRST (eresolve_tac ctxt [asm_rl, conjE] ORELSE' hyp_subst_tac
ctxt)
```

```
end
›

method_setup prepare = ‹
    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD o ShoupRubin.prepare_tac)›
  "to launch a few simple facts that will help the simplifier"

method_setup parts_prepare = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (ShoupRubin.parts_prepare_tac ctxt))›
  "additional facts to reason about parts"

method_setup analz_prepare = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (ShoupRubin.analz_prepare_tac ctxt))›
  "additional facts to reason about analz"



lemma Spy_parts_keys [simp]: "evs ∈ sr ⟹
  (Key (shrK P) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (Card P ∈ cloned) ∧
  (Key (pin P) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (P ∈ bad ∨ Card P ∈ cloned) ∧

  (Key (crdK C) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (C ∈ cloned) ∧
  (Key (pairK(A,B)) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (Card B ∈ cloned)"
apply (erule sr.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply simp_all
apply (blast intro: parts_insertI)
done



lemma Spy_analz_shrK[simp]: "evs ∈ sr ⟹
  (Key (shrK P) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (Card P ∈ cloned)"
apply (auto dest!: Spy_knows_cloned)
done

lemma Spy_analz_crdK[simp]: "evs ∈ sr ⟹
  (Key (crdK C) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (C ∈ cloned)"
apply (auto dest!: Spy_knows_cloned)
done

lemma Spy_analz_pairK[simp]: "evs ∈ sr ⟹
  (Key (pairK(A,B)) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (Card B ∈ cloned)"
apply (auto dest!: Spy_knows_cloned)
done



lemma analz_image_Key_Un_Nonce:
  "analz (Key ‘ K ∪ Nonce ‘ N) = Key ‘ K ∪ Nonce ‘ N"
```

```
  by (auto simp del: parts_image)

method_setup sc_analz_freshK = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt =>
     (SIMPLE_METHOD
      (EVERY [REPEAT_FIRST
       (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms allI ballI impI}),
        REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms analz_image_freshK_lemma}),
        ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (put_simpset Smartcard.analz_image_freshK_ss
ctxt
          |> Simplifier.add_simps [@{thm knows_Spy_Inputs_secureM_sr_Spy},
                    @{thm knows_Spy_Outpts_secureM_sr_Spy},
                    @{thm shouprubin_assumes_securemeans},
                    @{thm analz_image_Key_Un_Nonce}])])))›
    "for proving the Session Key Compromise theorem for smartcard protocols"


lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
     "evs ∈ sr ⟹      ∀ K KK.
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK ∨ Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule sr.induct)
apply analz_prepare
apply sc_analz_freshK
apply spy_analz
done


lemma analz_insert_freshK: "evs ∈ sr ⟹
         Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key K') (knows Spy evs)) =
         (K = K' ∨ Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (simp only: analz_image_freshK_simps analz_image_freshK)
done




lemma Na_Nb_certificate_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))),
               Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
               Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply simp_all
```

```
apply spy_analz

apply clarify
done


lemma Nb_certificate_authentic:
      "⟦ Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
         B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
         evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A {|Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))),
                           Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply (case_tac [17] "Aa = Spy")
apply simp_all

apply spy_analz

apply clarify+
done




lemma Outpts_A_Card_imp_pairK_parts:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A
         {|Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ Na. Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy
evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply simp_all

apply (blast dest: parts_insertI)

apply force

apply force

apply blast

apply (blast dest: Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_sr parts.Inj Inputs_A_Card_9
Gets_imp_knows_Spy elim: knows_Spy_partsEs)

apply (blast dest: Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_sr [THEN parts.Inj]
                   Inputs_A_Card_9 Gets_imp_knows_Spy
             elim: knows_Spy_partsEs)
done
```

```
lemma Nb_certificate_authentic_bis:
     "⟦ Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ Na. Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))),
                   Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                   Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))

apply spy_analz

apply blast

apply blast

apply (blast dest: Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_sr
[THEN parts.Inj] elim: knows_Spy_partsEs)

apply (blast dest: Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_sr
[THEN parts.Inj] elim: knows_Spy_partsEs)

apply (blast dest: Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Outpts_A_Card_imp_pairK_parts)
done


lemma Pairkey_certificate_authentic:
    "⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        Card A ∉ cloned; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ Pk = Pairkey(A,B) ∧
        Says Server A {|Nonce Pk,
                        Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|}|}
          ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))

apply spy_analz
done



lemma sesK_authentic:
     "⟦ Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        A ≠ Spy; B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
      ⟹ Notes Spy {|Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))), Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|}

          ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

apply *spy_analz*

apply *(fastforce dest: analz.Inj)*

apply *clarify*

apply *clarify*

apply *simp_all*
done

lemma *Confidentiality:*
"⟦ *Notes Spy {|Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))), Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|}*
∉ set evs;
A ≠ Spy; B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
evs ∈ sr ⟧
⟹ Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))) ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply *(blast intro: sesK_authentic)*
done

lemma *Confidentiality_B:*
"⟦ *Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate,*
Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs;
Notes Spy {|Key K, Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|} ∉ set evs;
A ≠ Spy; B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); Card B ∉ cloned;
evs ∈ sr ⟧
⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule sr.induct)*
apply *analz_prepare*
apply *(simp_all add: analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK pushes split_ifs)*

apply *spy_analz*

apply *(rotate_tac 7)*
apply *(drule parts.Inj)*
apply *(fastforce dest: Outpts_B_Card_form_7)*

apply *(blast dest!: Outpts_B_Card_form_7)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(drule Outpts_parts_used)*
apply *simp*

apply *(fastforce dest: Outpts_B_Card_form_7)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(drule Outpts_B_Card_form_7, assumption)*
apply *simp*

apply *(blast dest!: Outpts_B_Card_form_7)*

apply *(blast dest!: Outpts_B_Card_form_7 Outpts_A_Card_form_10)*
done

lemma *A_authenticates_B:*
```
"⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs;

   ¬illegalUse(Card B);
   evs ∈ sr ⟧
⟹ ∃ Na.
     Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K,
         Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
         Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(blast dest: Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Outpts_A_Card_form_10 Outpts_A_Card_imp_pairK_parts)*
done

lemma *A_authenticates_B_Gets:*
```
"⟦ Gets A {|Nonce Nb, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|}|}
     ∈ set evs;
   ¬illegalUse(Card B);
   evs ∈ sr ⟧
⟹ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key (sesK(Nb, pairK (A, B))),
                      Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                      Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(blast dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd, THEN Na_Nb_certificate_authentic])*
done

lemma *B_authenticates_A:*
```
"⟦ Gets B (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)) ∈ set evs;
   B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
   evs ∈ sr ⟧
 ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A
  {|Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))), Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
```

```
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule sr.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj] Nb_certificate_authentic)
done
```

```
lemma Confidentiality_A: "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A
          {|Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|Key K, Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|} ∉ set evs;
        A ≠ Spy; B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
    ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (drule A_authenticates_B)
prefer 3
apply (erule exE)
apply (drule Confidentiality_B)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_imp_knows_agents_secureM_sr:
   "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ sr ⟧ ⟹ X ∈ knows A evs"
apply (simp (no_asm_simp) add: Outpts_imp_knows_agents_secureM)
done
```

```
lemma A_keydist_to_B:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A
           {|Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs;
        ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ Key K ∈ analz (knows B evs)"
apply (drule A_authenticates_B)
prefer 3
apply (erule exE)
apply (rule Outpts_imp_knows_agents_secureM_sr [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd,
THEN analz.Fst])
apply assumption+
done
```

```
lemma B_keydist_to_A:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate,
                            (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb))|} ∈ set evs;
        Gets B (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)) ∈ set evs;
        B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
```

```
    ⟹ Key K ∈ analz (knows A evs)"
apply (frule B_authenticates_A)
apply (drule_tac [5] Outpts_B_Card_form_7)
apply (rule_tac [6] Outpts_imp_knows_agents_secureM_sr [THEN analz.Inj, THEN
analz.Fst])
prefer 6 apply force
apply assumption+
done
```

```
lemma Nb_certificate_authentic_B:
     "⟦ Gets B (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)) ∈ set evs;
        B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ sr ⟧
    ⟹ ∃ Na.
          Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))),
              Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
              Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN Nb_certificate_authentic_bis])
done
```

```
lemma Pairkey_certificate_authentic_A_Card:
     "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
            {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
              Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|},
              Cert2, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;
        A ≠ Spy; Card A ∉ cloned; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ Pk = Pairkey(A,B) ∧
        Says Server A {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                 Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Agent B|}|}
          ∈ set evs "
apply (blast dest: Inputs_A_Card_9 Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN
parts.Snd] Pairkey_certificate_authentic)
done
```

```
lemma Na_Nb_certificate_authentic_A_Card:
```

```
      "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
            {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
              Cert1,
              Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|}, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;

      A ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card B); evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key (sesK(Nb, pairK (A, B))),
                            Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                            Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
          ∈ set evs "
apply (blast dest: Inputs_A_Card_9 Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN
parts.Snd, THEN Na_Nb_certificate_authentic])
done

lemma Na_authentic_A_Card:
     "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
            {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
               Cert1, Cert2, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;
        A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Cert3|}
          ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Inputs_A_Card_9)
done




lemma Inputs_A_Card_9_authentic:
  "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
            {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
              Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|},
              Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|}, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;

    A ≠ Spy; Card A ∉ cloned;¬illegalUse(Card B); evs ∈ sr ⟧
    ⟹  Says Server A {|Nonce Pk, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|}|}
          ∈ set evs  ∧
        Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key (sesK(Nb, pairK (A, B))),
                            Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                            Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
          ∈ set evs  ∧
        Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Cert3|}
          ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Inputs_A_Card_9 Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Gets_imp_knows_Spy
[THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd] Pairkey_certificate_authentic)
done
```

lemma *SR4_imp:*
```
"⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
      ∈ set evs;
   A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
⟹ ∃ Pk V. Gets A {|Pk, V|} ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(blast dest: Outpts_A_Card_4 Inputs_A_Card_3)*
done

lemma *SR7_imp:*
```
"⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K,
                       Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                       Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
   B ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
⟹ Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(blast dest: Outpts_B_Card_7 Inputs_B_Card_6)*
done

lemma *SR10_imp:*
```
"⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
      ∈ set evs;
   A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
⟹ ∃ Cert1 Cert2.
            Gets A {|Nonce (Pairkey (A, B)), Cert1|} ∈ set evs ∧
            Gets A {|Nonce Nb, Cert2|} ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(blast dest: Outpts_A_Card_10 Inputs_A_Card_9)*
done

lemma *Outpts_Server_not_evs: "evs ∈ sr ⟹ Outpts (Card Server) P X ∉ set evs"*
apply *(erule sr.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

step2_integrity also is a reliability theorem

lemma *Says_Server_message_form:*
```
"⟦ Says Server A {|Pk, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
   evs ∈ sr ⟧
⟹ ∃ B. Pk = Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)) ∧
   Certificate = Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Agent B|}"
```

```
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule sr.induct)
apply auto
apply (blast dest!: Outpts_Server_not_evs)+
done
```

step4integrity is *Outpts_A_Card_form_4*

step7integrity is *Outpts_B_Card_form_7*

```
lemma step8_integrity:
     "⟦ Says B A {|Nonce Nb, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
         B ≠ Server; B ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ Cert2 K.
          Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate, Cert2|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule sr.induct)
prefer 18 apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_A_Card_form_10)
apply auto
done
```

step9integrity is *Inputs_A_Card_form_9*

step10integrity is *Outpts_A_Card_form_10*.

```
lemma step11_integrity:
     "⟦ Says A B (Certificate) ∈ set evs;
         ∀ p q. Certificate ≠ {|p, q|};
         A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ sr ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ K.
            Outpts (Card A) A {|Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule sr.induct)
apply auto
done
```

end

27 Bella's modification of the Shoup-Rubin protocol

theory *ShoupRubinBella* **imports** *Smartcard* **begin**

The modifications are that message 7 now mentions A, while message 10 now mentions Nb and B. The lack of explicitness of the original version was discovered by investigating adherence to the principle of Goal Availability. Only the updated version makes the goals of confidentiality, authentication and key distribution available to both peers.

```
axiomatization sesK :: "nat*key => key"
where

   inj_sesK [iff]: "(sesK(m,k) = sesK(m',k')) = (m = m' ∧ k = k')" and


   shrK_disj_sesK [iff]: "shrK A ≠ sesK(m,pk)" and
```

```
  crdK_disj_sesK [iff]: "crdK C ≠ sesK(m,pk)" and
  pin_disj_sesK  [iff]: "pin P ≠ sesK(m,pk)" and
  pairK_disj_sesK[iff]: "pairK(A,B) ≠ sesK(m,pk)" and


  Atomic_distrib [iff]: "Atomic‘(KEY‘K ∪ NONCE‘N) =
                         Atomic‘(KEY‘K) ∪ Atomic‘(NONCE‘N)" and


  shouprubin_assumes_securemeans [iff]: "evs ∈ srb ⟹ secureM"

definition Unique :: "[event, event list] => bool" (‹Unique _ on _›) where
  "Unique ev on evs ==
     ev ∉ set (tl (dropWhile (% z. z ≠ ev) evs))"


inductive_set srb :: "event list set"
  where

   Nil:  "[]∈ srb"


 | Fake: "⟦ evsF ∈ srb;  X ∈ synth (analz (knows Spy evsF));
            illegalUse(Card B) ⟧
          ⟹ Says Spy A X #
              Inputs Spy (Card B) X # evsF ∈ srb"


 | Forge:
        "⟦ evsFo ∈ srb; Nonce Nb ∈ analz (knows Spy evsFo);
            Key (pairK(A,B)) ∈ knows Spy evsFo ⟧
          ⟹ Notes Spy (Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B)))) # evsFo ∈ srb"


 | Reception: "⟦ evsrb∈ srb; Says A B X ∈ set evsrb ⟧
              ⟹ Gets B X # evsrb ∈ srb"


 | SR_U1:  "⟦ evs1 ∈ srb; A ≠ Server ⟧
          ⟹ Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|}
               # evs1 ∈ srb"

 | SR_U2:  "⟦ evs2 ∈ srb;
            Gets Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs2 ⟧
          ⟹ Says Server A {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                            Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Agent B|}
                      |}
               # evs2 ∈ srb"
```

```
| SR_U3:  "⟦ evs3 ∈ srb; legalUse(Card A);
           Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs3;
           Gets A {|Nonce Pk, Certificate|} ∈ set evs3 ⟧
         ⟹ Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A)
              # evs3 ∈ srb"


| SR_U4:  "⟦ evs4 ∈ srb;
           Nonce Na ∉ used evs4; legalUse(Card A); A ≠ Server;
           Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs4 ⟧
       ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
            # evs4 ∈ srb"


| SR_U4Fake: "⟦ evs4F ∈ srb; Nonce Na ∉ used evs4F;
           illegalUse(Card A);
           Inputs Spy (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs4F ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card A) Spy {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
          # evs4F ∈ srb"


| SR_U5:  "⟦ evs5 ∈ srb;
           Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Certificate|} ∈ set evs5;
           ∀ p q. Certificate ≠ {|p, q|} ⟧
         ⟹ Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} # evs5 ∈ srb"


| SR_U6:  "⟦ evs6 ∈ srb; legalUse(Card B);
           Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs6 ⟧
         ⟹ Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|}
              # evs6 ∈ srb"

| SR_U7:  "⟦ evs7 ∈ srb;
           Nonce Nb ∉ used evs7; legalUse(Card B); B ≠ Server;
           K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B));
           Key K ∉ used evs7;
           Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs7⟧
   ⟹ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K,
                          Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                          Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
              # evs7 ∈ srb"
```

```
| SR_U7Fake:  "⟦ evs7F ∈ srb; Nonce Nb ∉ used evs7F;
           illegalUse(Card B);
           K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B));
           Key K ∉ used evs7F;
           Inputs Spy (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs7F ⟧
        ⟹ Outpts (Card B) Spy {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K,
                        Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                        Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
             # evs7F ∈ srb"


| SR_U8:  "⟦ evs8 ∈ srb;
           Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs8;
           Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K,
                               Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs8 ⟧
        ⟹ Says B A {|Nonce Nb, Cert1|} # evs8 ∈ srb"


| SR_U9:  "⟦ evs9 ∈ srb; legalUse(Card A);
           Gets A {|Nonce Pk, Cert1|} ∈ set evs9;
           Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Cert2|} ∈ set evs9;
           Gets A {|Nonce Nb, Cert3|} ∈ set evs9;
           ∀ p q. Cert2 ≠ {|p, q|} ⟧
        ⟹ Inputs A (Card A)
              {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
                Cert1, Cert3, Cert2|}
             # evs9 ∈ srb"

| SR_U10: "⟦ evs10 ∈ srb; legalUse(Card A); A ≠ Server;
           K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B));
           Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb,
                               Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                               Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                                                Agent B|},
                               Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},

                               Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
             ∈ set evs10 ⟧
        ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb,
                               Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
              # evs10 ∈ srb"


| SR_U10Fake: "⟦ evs10F ∈ srb;
           illegalUse(Card A);
```

```
          K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B));
          Inputs Spy (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb,
                                 Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                                 Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                                                  Agent B|},
                                 Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},

                                 Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
            ∈ set evs10F ⟧
        ⟹ Outpts (Card A) Spy {|Agent B, Nonce Nb,
                                 Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
             # evs10F ∈ srb"
```

```
| SR_U11: "⟦ evs11 ∈ srb;
          Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B|} ∈ set evs11;
          Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate|}
            ∈ set evs11 ⟧
        ⟹ Says A B (Certificate)
             # evs11 ∈ srb"
```

```
| Oops1:
   "⟦ evsO1 ∈ srb;
       Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|}
         ∈ set evsO1 ⟧
   ⟹ Notes Spy {|Key K, Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|} # evsO1 ∈ srb"

| Oops2:
   "⟦ evsO2 ∈ srb;
       Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate|}
         ∈ set evsO2 ⟧
  ⟹ Notes Spy {|Key K, Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|} # evsO2 ∈ srb"
```

declare *Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]*
declare *analz_into_parts [dest]*

lemma *Gets_imp_Says:*

```
      "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ ∃ A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy:
     "⟦ Gets B X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)
done

lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy_parts_Snd:
     "⟦ Gets B {|X, Y|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy parts.Inj parts.Snd)
done

lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy_analz_Snd:
     "⟦ Gets B {|X, Y|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy analz.Inj analz.Snd)
done
```

```
lemma Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_srb:
      "⟦ Inputs Spy C X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ X ∈ knows Spy evs"
apply (simp (no_asm_simp) add: Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM)
done

lemma knows_Spy_Inputs_secureM_srb_Spy:
      "evs ∈srb ⟹ knows Spy (Inputs Spy C X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy
evs)"
apply (simp (no_asm_simp))
done

lemma knows_Spy_Inputs_secureM_srb:
    "⟦ A ≠ Spy; evs ∈srb ⟧ ⟹ knows Spy (Inputs A C X # evs) =  knows Spy
evs"
apply (simp (no_asm_simp))
done

lemma knows_Spy_Outpts_secureM_srb_Spy:
      "evs ∈srb ⟹ knows Spy (Outpts C Spy X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy
evs)"
apply (simp (no_asm_simp))
done

lemma knows_Spy_Outpts_secureM_srb:
     "⟦ A ≠ Spy; evs ∈srb ⟧ ⟹ knows Spy (Outpts C A X # evs) =  knows Spy
evs"
apply (simp (no_asm_simp))
```

done

lemma *Inputs_A_Card_3:*
"⟦ *Inputs A C (Agent A) ∈ set evs; A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb* ⟧
⟹ *legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧*
(∃ *Pk Certificate. Gets A {|Pk, Certificate|} ∈ set evs)*"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *Inputs_B_Card_6:*
"⟦ *Inputs B C {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs; B ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb* ⟧
⟹ *legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card B) ∧ Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs*"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *Inputs_A_Card_9:*
"⟦ *Inputs A C {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,*
Cert1, Cert2, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;

A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
⟹ *legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧*
Gets A {|Nonce Pk, Cert1|} ∈ set evs ∧
Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Cert3|} ∈ set evs ∧
Gets A {|Nonce Nb, Cert2|} ∈ set evs"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *Outpts_A_Card_4:*
"⟦ *Outpts C A {|Nonce Na, (Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na))|} ∈ set evs;*

evs ∈ srb ⟧
⟹ *legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧*
Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *Outpts_B_Card_7:*
"⟦ *Outpts C B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K,*

```
                    Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                    Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card B) ∧
        Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_A_Card_10:
     "⟦ Outpts C A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb,
                  Key K, (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb))|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧
        (∃ Na Ver1 Ver2 Ver3.
       Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),

                           Ver1, Ver2, Ver3|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done



lemma Outpts_A_Card_10_imp_Inputs:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate|}
         ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ (∃ Na Ver1 Ver2 Ver3.
       Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),

                           Ver1, Ver2, Ver3|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply simp_all
apply blast+
done



lemma Outpts_honest_A_Card_4:
     "⟦ Outpts C A {|Nonce Na, Crypt K X|} ∈set evs;
        A ≠ Spy;  evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧
        Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done



lemma Outpts_honest_B_Card_7:
```

```
    "⟦ Outpts C B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
       B ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
   ⟹ legalUse(C) ∧ C = (Card B) ∧
       (∃ Na. Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_honest_A_Card_10:
     "⟦ Outpts C A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
         A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ legalUse (C) ∧ C = (Card A) ∧
         (∃ Na Pk Ver1 Ver2 Ver3.
          Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Pk,
                              Ver1, Ver2, Ver3|} ∈ set evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply simp_all
apply blast+
done



lemma Outpts_which_Card_4:
    "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Crypt K X|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧
    ⟹ Inputs A (Card A) (Agent A) ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
apply clarify
done

lemma Outpts_which_Card_7:
  "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|}
       ∈ set evs;  evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ Na. Inputs B (Card B) {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done


lemma Outpts_which_Card_10:
    "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate |} ∈ set evs;
       evs ∈ srb ⟧
    ⟹ ∃ Na. Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),

                            Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Agent B|},

                            Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                            Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na) |} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done
```

```
lemma Outpts_A_Card_form_4:
  "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
        ∀ p q. Certificate ≠ {|p, q|}; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Certificate = (Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
done

lemma Outpts_B_Card_form_7:
   "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|}
        ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ ∃ Na.
          K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B)) ∧
          Cert1 = (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|}) ∧
          Cert2 = (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma Outpts_A_Card_form_10:
   "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate|}
        ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ K = sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B)) ∧
          Certificate = (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
done

lemma Outpts_A_Card_form_bis:
  "⟦ Outpts (Card A') A' {|Agent B', Nonce Nb', Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))),

     Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ A' = A ∧ B' = B ∧ Nb = Nb' ∧
          Certificate = (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
done



lemma Inputs_A_Card_form_9:

     "⟦ Inputs A (Card A) {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
                            Cert1, Cert2, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ srb ⟧
  ⟹     Cert3 = Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule srb.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
```

apply *force*

apply *(blast dest!: Outpts_A_Card_form_4)*
done

lemma *Inputs_Card_legalUse:*
"⟦ *Inputs A (Card A) X* ∈ *set evs; evs* ∈ *srb* ⟧ ⟹ *legalUse(Card A)*"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *Outpts_Card_legalUse:*
"⟦ *Outpts (Card A) A X* ∈ *set evs; evs* ∈ *srb* ⟧ ⟹ *legalUse(Card A)*"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *Inputs_Card:* "⟦ *Inputs A C X* ∈ *set evs; A* ≠ *Spy; evs* ∈ *srb* ⟧
⟹ *C = (Card A)* ∧ *legalUse(C)*"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *Outpts_Card:* "⟦ *Outpts C A X* ∈ *set evs; A* ≠ *Spy; evs* ∈ *srb* ⟧
⟹ *C = (Card A)* ∧ *legalUse(C)*"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

lemma *Inputs_Outpts_Card:*
"⟦ *Inputs A C X* ∈ *set evs* ∨ *Outpts C A Y* ∈ *set evs;*
A ≠ *Spy; evs* ∈ *srb* ⟧
⟹ *C = (Card A)* ∧ *legalUse(Card A)*"
apply *(blast dest: Inputs_Card Outpts_Card)*
done

lemma *Inputs_Card_Spy:*
"⟦ *Inputs Spy C X* ∈ *set evs* ∨ *Outpts C Spy X* ∈ *set evs; evs* ∈ *srb* ⟧
⟹ *C = (Card Spy)* ∧ *legalUse(Card Spy)* ∨

```
          (∃ A. C = (Card A) ∧ illegalUse(Card A))"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done
```

```
lemma Outpts_A_Card_unique_nonce:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
           ∈ set evs;
         Outpts (Card A') A' {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A')) (Nonce Na)|}

           ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ A=A'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct, simp_all)
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
done
```

```
lemma Outpts_B_Card_unique_nonce:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key SK, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set
evs;
      Outpts (Card B') B' {|Nonce Nb, Agent A', Key SK', Cert1', Cert2'|} ∈
set evs;
       evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ B=B' ∧ A=A' ∧ SK=SK' ∧ Cert1=Cert1' ∧ Cert2=Cert2'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct, simp_all)
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
done
```

```
lemma Outpts_B_Card_unique_key:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key SK, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set
evs;
      Outpts (Card B') B' {|Nonce Nb', Agent A', Key SK, Cert1', Cert2'|} ∈
set evs;
       evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ B=B' ∧ A=A' ∧ Nb=Nb' ∧ Cert1=Cert1' ∧ Cert2=Cert2'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct, simp_all)
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
done

lemma Outpts_A_Card_unique_key:
```

```
   "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, V|} ∈ set evs;
      Outpts (Card A') A' {|Agent B', Nonce Nb', Key K, V'|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ Nb=Nb' ∧ V=V'"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct, simp_all)
apply (blast dest: Outpts_A_Card_form_bis)
apply blast
done


lemma Outpts_A_Card_Unique:
  "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, rest|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Unique (Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, rest|}) on evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct, simp_all add: Unique_def)
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_parts_used)
apply blast
done


lemma Spy_knows_Na:
      "⟦ Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ Nonce Na ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd])
done

lemma Spy_knows_Nb:
      "⟦ Says B A {|Nonce Nb, Certificate|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ Nonce Nb ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Fst])
done


lemma Pairkey_Gets_analz_knows_Spy:
      "⟦ Gets A {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Certificate|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb
⟧
      ⟹ Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj])
done

lemma Pairkey_Inputs_imp_Gets:
     "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
```

```
          {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
            Cert1, Cert3, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Gets A {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Cert1|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
apply force
done

lemma Pairkey_Inputs_analz_knows_Spy:
     "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
          {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
            Cert1, Cert3, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (case_tac "A = Spy")
apply (fastforce dest!: Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM [THEN analz.Inj])
apply (blast dest!: Pairkey_Inputs_imp_Gets [THEN Pairkey_Gets_analz_knows_Spy])
done
```

```
declare shrK_disj_sesK [THEN not_sym, iff]
declare pin_disj_sesK [THEN not_sym, iff]
declare crdK_disj_sesK [THEN not_sym, iff]
declare pairK_disj_sesK [THEN not_sym, iff]
```

ML

```
<
structure ShoupRubinBella =
struct

fun prepare_tac ctxt =
 (*SR_U8*)   forward_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_B_Card_form_7}] 14 THEN
 (*SR_U8*)   clarify_tac ctxt 15 THEN
 (*SR_U9*)   forward_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_A_Card_form_4}] 16 THEN
 (*SR_U11*)  forward_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_A_Card_form_10}] 21

fun parts_prepare_tac ctxt =
           prepare_tac ctxt THEN
 (*SR_U9*)   dresolve_tac ctxt [@{thm Gets_imp_knows_Spy_parts_Snd}] 18 THEN

 (*SR_U9*)   dresolve_tac ctxt [@{thm Gets_imp_knows_Spy_parts_Snd}] 19 THEN

 (*Oops1*) dresolve_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_B_Card_form_7}] 25    THEN
 (*Oops2*) dresolve_tac ctxt [@{thm Outpts_A_Card_form_10}] 27 THEN
 (*Base*)  (force_tac ctxt) 1
```

```
fun analz_prepare_tac ctxt =
         prepare_tac ctxt THEN
         dresolve_tac ctxt @{thms Gets_imp_knows_Spy_analz_Snd} 18 THEN
 (*SR_U9*) dresolve_tac ctxt @{thms Gets_imp_knows_Spy_analz_Snd} 19 THEN
         REPEAT_FIRST (eresolve_tac ctxt [asm_rl, conjE] ORELSE' hyp_subst_tac
ctxt)

end
›

method_setup prepare = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (ShoupRubinBella.prepare_tac ctxt))›
  "to launch a few simple facts that will help the simplifier"

method_setup parts_prepare = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (ShoupRubinBella.parts_prepare_tac
ctxt))›
  "additional facts to reason about parts"

method_setup analz_prepare = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (ShoupRubinBella.analz_prepare_tac
ctxt))›
  "additional facts to reason about analz"



lemma Spy_parts_keys [simp]: "evs ∈ srb ⟹
  (Key (shrK P) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (Card P ∈ cloned) ∧
  (Key (pin P) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (P ∈ bad ∨ Card P ∈ cloned) ∧

  (Key (crdK C) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (C ∈ cloned) ∧
  (Key (pairK(A,B)) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)) = (Card B ∈ cloned)"
apply (erule srb.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply simp_all
apply (blast intro: parts_insertI)
done




lemma Spy_analz_shrK[simp]: "evs ∈ srb ⟹
  (Key (shrK P) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (Card P ∈ cloned)"
apply (auto dest!: Spy_knows_cloned)
done

lemma Spy_analz_crdK[simp]: "evs ∈ srb ⟹
  (Key (crdK C) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (C ∈ cloned)"
apply (auto dest!: Spy_knows_cloned)
done
```

```
lemma Spy_analz_pairK[simp]: "evs ∈ srb ⟹
  (Key (pairK(A,B)) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = (Card B ∈ cloned)"
apply (auto dest!: Spy_knows_cloned)
done
```

```
lemma analz_image_Key_Un_Nonce:
  "analz (Key ‘ K ∪ Nonce ‘ N) = Key ‘ K ∪ Nonce ‘ N"
  by (auto simp del: parts_image)

method_setup sc_analz_freshK = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt =>
     (SIMPLE_METHOD
      (EVERY [REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms allI ballI impI}),
          REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms analz_image_freshK_lemma}),
          ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (put_simpset Smartcard.analz_image_freshK_ss
ctxt
              |> Simplifier.add_simps [@{thm knows_Spy_Inputs_secureM_srb_Spy},
                  @{thm knows_Spy_Outpts_secureM_srb_Spy},
                  @{thm shouprubin_assumes_securemeans},
                  @{thm analz_image_Key_Un_Nonce}]))])))›
    "for proving the Session Key Compromise theorem for smartcard protocols"
```

```
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
     "evs ∈ srb ⟹       ∀ K KK.
          (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘KK ∪ (knows Spy evs))) =
          (K ∈ KK ∨ Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule srb.induct)
apply analz_prepare
apply sc_analz_freshK
apply spy_analz
done
```

```
lemma analz_insert_freshK: "evs ∈ srb ⟹
         Key K ∈ analz (insert (Key K') (knows Spy evs)) =
         (K = K' ∨ Key K ∈ analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (simp only: analz_image_freshK_simps analz_image_freshK)
done
```

```
lemma Na_Nb_certificate_authentic:
     "⟦ Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
         ¬illegalUse(Card B);
```

```
         evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))),

                Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply simp_all

apply spy_analz

apply clarify

apply clarify
done

lemma Nb_certificate_authentic:
      "⟦ Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
         B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
         evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))),

                              Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply (case_tac [17] "Aa = Spy")
apply simp_all

apply spy_analz

apply clarify+
done




lemma Outpts_A_Card_imp_pairK_parts:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A  {|Agent B, Nonce Nb,
                    Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
    ⟹ ∃ Na. Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|} ∈ parts (knows Spy
evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply simp_all

apply (blast dest: parts_insertI)

apply force

apply force

apply blast
```

apply *(blast dest: Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_srb parts.Inj Inputs_A_Card_9 Gets_imp_knows_Spy elim: knows_Spy_partsEs)*

apply *(blast dest: Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_srb [THEN parts.Inj] Inputs_A_Card_9 Gets_imp_knows_Spy elim: knows_Spy_partsEs)*
done

lemma *Nb_certificate_authentic_bis:*
"⟦ Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs); B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card B); evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ ∃ Na. Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))), Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|}, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *parts_prepare*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp))*

apply *spy_analz*

apply *blast*

apply *blast*

apply *force*

apply *(blast dest: Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_srb [THEN parts.Inj] elim: knows_Spy_partsEs)*

apply *(blast dest: Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Inputs_imp_knows_Spy_secureM_srb [THEN parts.Inj] elim: knows_Spy_partsEs)*

apply *(blast dest: Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Outpts_A_Card_imp_pairK_parts)*
done

lemma *Pairkey_certificate_authentic:*
"⟦ Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|} ∈ parts (knows Spy evs); Card A ∉ cloned; evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ Pk = Pairkey(A,B) ∧ Says Server A {|Nonce Pk, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|}|} ∈ set evs"
apply *(erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)*
apply *parts_prepare*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp))*

apply *spy_analz*

apply *force*
done

```
lemma sesK_authentic:
     "⟦ Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))) ∈ parts (knows Spy evs);
        A ≠ Spy; B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ Notes Spy {|Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))), Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|}

          ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply parts_prepare
apply (simp_all)

apply spy_analz

apply (fastforce dest: analz.Inj)


apply clarify


apply clarify
done
```

```
lemma Confidentiality:
     "⟦ Notes Spy {|Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))), Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|}

          ∉ set evs;
        A ≠ Spy; B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))) ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (blast intro: sesK_authentic)
done

lemma Confidentiality_B:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|}
          ∈ set evs;
        Notes Spy {|Key K, Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|} ∉ set evs;
        A ≠ Spy; B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); Card B ∉ cloned;
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule srb.induct)
apply analz_prepare
apply (simp_all add: analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK pushes split_ifs)

apply spy_analz
```

```
apply (rotate_tac 7)
apply (drule parts.Inj)
apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_B_Card_form_7)

apply (blast dest!: Outpts_B_Card_form_7)

apply clarify
apply (drule Outpts_parts_used)
apply simp


apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_B_Card_form_7)

apply clarify
apply (drule Outpts_B_Card_form_7, assumption)
apply simp

apply (blast dest!: Outpts_B_Card_form_7)

apply (blast dest!: Outpts_B_Card_form_7 Outpts_A_Card_form_10)
done
```

```
lemma A_authenticates_B:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A  {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
        ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
 ⟹ ∃ Na. Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K,
                 Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                 Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Outpts_A_Card_form_10 Outpts_A_Card_imp_pairK_parts)
done

lemma A_authenticates_B_Gets:
     "⟦ Gets A {|Nonce Nb, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|}|}
           ∈ set evs;
         ¬illegalUse(Card B);
         evs ∈ srb ⟧
    ⟹ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key (sesK(Nb, pairK (A, B))),

                            Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                            Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd, THEN
Na_Nb_certificate_authentic])
done


lemma A_authenticates_B_bis:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A  {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
```

```
        ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
 ⟹ ∃ Cert1. Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|}

                ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Outpts_A_Card_form_10 Outpts_A_Card_imp_pairK_p
done
```

```
lemma B_authenticates_A:
     "⟦ Gets B (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)) ∈ set evs;
         B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
         evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A  {|Agent B, Nonce Nb,
         Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))), Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule srb.induct)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp))
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj] Nb_certificate_authentic)
done
```

```
lemma B_authenticates_A_bis:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        Gets B (Cert2) ∈ set evs;
         B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
         evs ∈ srb ⟧
      ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A  {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Cert2|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Outpts_B_Card_form_7 B_authenticates_A)
done
```

```
lemma Confidentiality_A:
      "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb,
                        Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
         Notes Spy {|Key K, Nonce Nb, Agent A, Agent B|} ∉ set evs;
         A ≠ Spy; B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
         evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Key K ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (drule A_authenticates_B)
prefer 3
apply (erule exE)
apply (drule Confidentiality_B)
apply auto
done
```

```
lemma Outpts_imp_knows_agents_secureM_srb:
   "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A X ∈ set evs; evs ∈ srb ⟧ ⟹ X ∈ knows A evs"
apply (simp (no_asm_simp) add: Outpts_imp_knows_agents_secureM)
done


lemma A_keydist_to_B:
   "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;

         ¬illegalUse(Card B);
         evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Key K ∈ analz (knows B evs)"
apply (drule A_authenticates_B)
prefer 3
apply (erule exE)
apply (rule Outpts_imp_knows_agents_secureM_srb [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd,
THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Fst])
apply assumption+
done


lemma B_keydist_to_A:
"⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K, Cert1, Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
   Gets B (Cert2) ∈ set evs;
   B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card A); ¬illegalUse(Card B);
   evs ∈ srb ⟧
 ⟹ Key K ∈ analz (knows A evs)"
apply (frule Outpts_B_Card_form_7)
apply assumption apply simp
apply (frule B_authenticates_A)
apply (rule_tac [5] Outpts_imp_knows_agents_secureM_srb [THEN analz.Inj, THEN
analz.Snd, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Fst])
apply simp+
done


lemma Nb_certificate_authentic_B:
     "⟦ Gets B (Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)) ∈ set evs;
        B ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card B);
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ Na.
           Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key (sesK(Nb,pairK(A,B))),

               Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
               Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN Nb_certificate_authentic_bis])
```

done

lemma *Pairkey_certificate_authentic_A_Card:*
```
     "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
            {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
              Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|},
              Cert2, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;
         A ≠ Spy; Card A ∉ cloned; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Pk = Pairkey(A,B) ∧
         Says Server A {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)),
                  Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Agent B|}|}
           ∈ set evs "
```
apply *(blast dest: Inputs_A_Card_9 Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd] Pairkey_certificate_authentic)*
done

lemma *Na_Nb_certificate_authentic_A_Card:*
```
      "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
            {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
          Cert1, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|}, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;

      A ≠ Spy; ¬illegalUse(Card B); evs ∈ srb ⟧
   ⟹ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key (sesK(Nb, pairK (A, B))),

                              Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                              Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
           ∈ set evs "
```
apply *(frule Inputs_A_Card_9)*
apply *assumption+*
apply *(blast dest: Inputs_A_Card_9 Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd, THEN Na_Nb_certificate_authentic])*
done

lemma *Na_authentic_A_Card:*
```
     "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
            {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
               Cert1, Cert2, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;
         A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Cert3|}
           ∈ set evs"
```
apply *(blast dest: Inputs_A_Card_9)*
done

lemma *Inputs_A_Card_9_authentic:*
```
  "⟦ Inputs A (Card A)
```

```
            {|Agent B, Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Nonce Pk,
              Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|},
              Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|}, Cert3|} ∈ set evs;

    A ≠ Spy; Card A ∉ cloned; ¬illegalUse(Card B); evs ∈ srb ⟧
    ⟹  Says Server A {|Nonce Pk, Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce Pk, Agent B|}|}
          ∈ set evs  ∧
       Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A,  Key (sesK(Nb, pairK (A, B))),

                           Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                           Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
          ∈ set evs  ∧
         Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Cert3|}
          ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Inputs_A_Card_9 Na_Nb_certificate_authentic Gets_imp_knows_Spy
[THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd] Pairkey_certificate_authentic)
done
```

```
lemma SR_U4_imp:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Nonce Na, Crypt (crdK (Card A)) (Nonce Na)|}
          ∈ set evs;
        A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ Pk V. Gets A {|Pk, V|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Outpts_A_Card_4 Inputs_A_Card_3)
done
```

```
lemma SR_U7_imp:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K,
                     Crypt (pairK(A,B)) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb|},
                     Cert2|} ∈ set evs;
        B ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce Na|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Outpts_B_Card_7 Inputs_B_Card_6)
done
```

```
lemma SR_U10_imp:
     "⟦ Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb,
                           Key K, Crypt (pairK(A,B)) (Nonce Nb)|}
```

```
        ∈ set evs;
       A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
    ⟹ ∃ Cert1 Cert2.
                Gets A {|Nonce (Pairkey (A, B)), Cert1|} ∈ set evs ∧
                Gets A {|Nonce Nb, Cert2|} ∈ set evs"
apply (blast dest: Outpts_A_Card_10 Inputs_A_Card_9)
done
```

```
lemma Outpts_Server_not_evs:
      "evs ∈ srb ⟹ Outpts (Card Server) P X ∉ set evs"
apply (erule srb.induct)
apply auto
done
```

step2_integrity also is a reliability theorem

```
lemma Says_Server_message_form:
     "⟦ Says Server A {|Pk, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
        evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ B. Pk = Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)) ∧
        Certificate = Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce (Pairkey(A,B)), Agent B|}"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule srb.induct)
apply auto
apply (blast dest!: Outpts_Server_not_evs)+
done
```

step4integrity is *Outpts_A_Card_form_4*

step7integrity is *Outpts_B_Card_form_7*

```
lemma step8_integrity:
     "⟦ Says B A {|Nonce Nb, Certificate|} ∈ set evs;
        B ≠ Server; B ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ Cert2 K.
    Outpts (Card B) B {|Nonce Nb, Agent A, Key K, Certificate, Cert2|} ∈ set
evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule srb.induct)
prefer 18 apply (fastforce dest: Outpts_A_Card_form_10)
apply auto
done
```

step9integrity is *Inputs_A_Card_form_9* step10integrity is *Outpts_A_Card_form_10*.

```
lemma step11_integrity:
     "⟦ Says A B (Certificate) ∈ set evs;
        ∀ p q. Certificate ≠ {|p, q|};
        A ≠ Spy; evs ∈ srb ⟧
     ⟹ ∃ K Nb.
      Outpts (Card A) A {|Agent B, Nonce Nb, Key K, Certificate|} ∈ set evs"
```

apply *(erule rev_mp)*
apply *(erule srb.induct)*
apply *auto*
done

end

28 Smartcard protocols: rely on conventional Message and on new EventSC and Smartcard

theory *Auth_Smartcard*
imports
ShoupRubin
ShoupRubinBella
begin

end

29 Extensions to Standard Theories

theory *Extensions*
imports *"../Event"*
begin

29.1 Extensions to Theory *Set*

lemma *eq: "⟦⋀x. x∈A ⟹ x∈B; ⋀x. x∈B ⟹ x∈A⟧ ⟹ A=B"*
by *auto*

lemma *insert_Un: "P ({x} ∪ A) ⟹ P (insert x A)"*
by *simp*

lemma *in_sub: "x∈A ⟹ {x}⊆A"*
by *auto*

29.2 Extensions to Theory *List*

29.2.1 "remove l x" erase the first element of "l" equal to "x"

primrec *remove :: "'a list => 'a => 'a list"* **where**
"remove [] y = []" |
"remove (x#xs) y = (if x=y then xs else x # remove xs y)"

lemma *set_remove: "set (remove l x) <= set l"*
by *(induct l, auto)*

29.3 Extensions to Theory *Message*

29.3.1 declarations for tactics

declare *analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD, dest]*
declare *parts_insert2 [simp]*
declare *analz_cut [dest]*

declare *if_split_asm [split]*
declare *analz_insertI [intro]*
declare *Un_Diff [simp]*

29.3.2 extract the agent number of an Agent message

primrec *agt_nb :: "msg => agent"* **where**
"agt_nb (Agent A) = A"

29.3.3 messages that are pairs

definition *is_MPair :: "msg => bool"* **where**
"is_MPair X == ∃Y Z. X = {|Y,Z|}"

declare *is_MPair_def [simp]*

lemma *MPair_is_MPair [iff]: "is_MPair {|X,Y|}"*
by *simp*

lemma *Agent_isnt_MPair [iff]: "~ is_MPair (Agent A)"*
by *simp*

lemma *Number_isnt_MPair [iff]: "~ is_MPair (Number n)"*
by *simp*

lemma *Key_isnt_MPair [iff]: "~ is_MPair (Key K)"*
by *simp*

lemma *Nonce_isnt_MPair [iff]: "~ is_MPair (Nonce n)"*
by *simp*

lemma *Hash_isnt_MPair [iff]: "~ is_MPair (Hash X)"*
by *simp*

lemma *Crypt_isnt_MPair [iff]: "~ is_MPair (Crypt K X)"*
by *simp*

abbreviation
not_MPair :: "msg => bool" **where**
"not_MPair X == ~ is_MPair X"

lemma *is_MPairE: "⟦is_MPair X ⟹ P; not_MPair X ⟹ P⟧ ⟹ P"*
by *auto*

declare *is_MPair_def [simp del]*

definition *has_no_pair :: "msg set => bool"* **where**
"has_no_pair H == ∀X Y. {|X,Y|} ∉ H"

declare *has_no_pair_def [simp]*

29.3.4 well-foundedness of messages

lemma *wf_Crypt1 [iff]: "Crypt K X ~= X"*
by *(induct X, auto)*

lemma *wf_Crypt2 [iff]: "X ~= Crypt K X"*
by *(induct X, auto)*

lemma *parts_size: "X ∈ parts {Y} ⟹ X=Y ∨ size X < size Y"*
by *(erule parts.induct, auto)*

lemma *wf_Crypt_parts [iff]: "Crypt K X ∉ parts {X}"*
by *(auto dest: parts_size)*

29.3.5 lemmas on keysFor

definition *usekeys :: "msg set => key set"* **where**
"usekeys G ≡ {K. ∃Y. Crypt K Y ∈ G}"

lemma *finite_keysFor [intro]: "finite G ⟹ finite (keysFor G)"*
apply *(simp add: keysFor_def)*
apply *(rule finite_imageI)*
apply *(induct G rule: finite_induct)*
apply *auto*
apply *(case_tac "∃K X. x = Crypt K X", clarsimp)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "{Ka. ∃Xa. (Ka=K ∧ Xa=X) ∨ Crypt Ka Xa ∈ F}*
= insert K (usekeys F)", auto simp: usekeys_def)
by *(subgoal_tac "{K. ∃X. Crypt K X = x ∨ Crypt K X ∈ F} = usekeys F",*
auto simp: usekeys_def)

29.3.6 lemmas on parts

lemma *parts_sub: "⟦X ∈ parts G; G ⊆ H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ parts H"*
by *(auto dest: parts_mono)*

lemma *parts_Diff [dest]: "X ∈ parts (G - H) ⟹ X ∈ parts G"*
by *(erule parts_sub, auto)*

lemma *parts_Diff_notin: "⟦Y ∉ H; Nonce n ∉ parts (H - {Y})⟧*
⟹ Nonce n ∉ parts H"
by *simp*

lemmas *parts_insert_substI = parts_insert [THEN ssubst]*
lemmas *parts_insert_substD = parts_insert [THEN sym, THEN ssubst]*

lemma *finite_parts_msg [iff]: "finite (parts {X})"*
by *(induct X, auto)*

lemma *finite_parts [intro]: "finite H ⟹ finite (parts H)"*
apply *(erule finite_induct, simp)*
by *(rule parts_insert_substI, simp)*

lemma *parts_parts: "⟦X ∈ parts {Y}; Y ∈ parts G⟧ ⟹ X ∈ parts G"*
by *(frule parts_cut, auto)*

lemma *parts_parts_parts: "⟦X ∈ parts {Y}; Y ∈ parts {Z}; Z ∈ parts G⟧ ⟹*
X ∈ parts G"
by *(auto dest: parts_parts)*

lemma *parts_parts_Crypt: "⟦Crypt K X ∈ parts G; Nonce n ∈ parts {X}⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∈ parts G"*
by *(blast intro: parts.Body dest: parts_parts)*

29.3.7 lemmas on synth

lemma *synth_sub: "⟦X ∈ synth G; G ⊆ H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ synth H"*
by *(auto dest: synth_mono)*

lemma *Crypt_synth [rule_format]: "⟦X ∈ synth G; Key K ∉ G⟧ ⟹ Crypt K Y ∈ parts {X} ⟶ Crypt K Y ∈ parts G"*
by *(erule synth.induct, auto dest: parts_sub)*

29.3.8 lemmas on analz

lemma *analz_UnI1 [intro]: "X ∈ analz G ⟹ X ∈ analz (G ∪ H)"*
by *(subgoal_tac "G <= G Un H") (blast dest: analz_mono)+*

lemma *analz_sub: "⟦X ∈ analz G; G ⊆ H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"*
by *(auto dest: analz_mono)*

lemma *analz_Diff [dest]: "X ∈ analz (G - H) ⟹ X ∈ analz G"*
by *(erule analz.induct, auto)*

lemmas *in_analz_subset_cong = analz_subset_cong [THEN subsetD]*

lemma *analz_eq: "A=A' ⟹ analz A = analz A'"*
by *auto*

lemmas *insert_commute_substI = insert_commute [THEN ssubst]*

lemma *analz_insertD:*
"⟦Crypt K Y ∈ H; Key (invKey K) ∈ H⟧ ⟹ analz (insert Y H) = analz H"
by *(blast intro: analz.Decrypt analz_insert_eq)*

lemma *must_decrypt [rule_format,dest]: "⟦X ∈ analz H; has_no_pair H⟧ ⟹ X ∉ H ⟶ (∃K Y. Crypt K Y ∈ H ∧ Key (invKey K) ∈ H)"*
by *(erule analz.induct, auto)*

lemma *analz_needs_only_finite: "X ∈ analz H ⟹ ∃G. G ⊆ H ∧ finite G"*
by *(erule analz.induct, auto)*

lemma *notin_analz_insert: "X ∉ analz (insert Y G) ⟹ X ∉ analz G"*
by *auto*

29.3.9 lemmas on parts, synth and analz

lemma *parts_invKey [rule_format,dest]:"X ∈ parts {Y} ⟹ X ∈ analz (insert (Crypt K Y) H) ⟶ X ∉ analz H ⟶ Key (invKey K) ∈ analz H"*
by *(erule parts.induct, auto dest: parts.Fst parts.Snd parts.Body)*

lemma *in_analz: "Y ∈ analz H ⟹ ∃X. X ∈ H ∧ Y ∈ parts {X}"*
by *(erule analz.induct, auto intro: parts.Fst parts.Snd parts.Body)*

lemmas *in_analz_subset_parts = analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD]*

lemma *Crypt_synth_insert: "⟦Crypt K X ∈ parts (insert Y H); Y ∈ synth (analz H); Key K ∉ analz H⟧ ⟹ Crypt K X ∈ parts H"*
apply *(drule parts_insert_substD, clarify)*
apply *(frule in_sub)*
apply *(frule parts_mono)*
apply *auto*
done

29.3.10 greatest nonce used in a message

fun *greatest_msg :: "msg => nat"*
where
"greatest_msg (Nonce n) = n"
| "greatest_msg {|X,Y|} = max (greatest_msg X) (greatest_msg Y)"
| "greatest_msg (Crypt K X) = greatest_msg X"
| "greatest_msg other = 0"

lemma *greatest_msg_is_greatest: "Nonce n ∈ parts {X} ⟹ n ≤ greatest_msg X"*
by *(induct X, auto)*

29.3.11 sets of keys

definition *keyset :: "msg set => bool"* **where**
"keyset G ≡ ∀X. X ∈ G ⟶ (∃K. X = Key K)"

lemma *keyset_in [dest]: "⟦keyset G; X ∈ G⟧ ⟹ ∃K. X = Key K"*
by *(auto simp: keyset_def)*

lemma *MPair_notin_keyset [simp]: "keyset G ⟹ {|X,Y|} ∉ G"*
by *auto*

lemma *Crypt_notin_keyset [simp]: "keyset G ⟹ Crypt K X ∉ G"*
by *auto*

lemma *Nonce_notin_keyset [simp]: "keyset G ⟹ Nonce n ∉ G"*
by *auto*

lemma *parts_keyset [simp]: "keyset G ⟹ parts G = G"*
by *(auto, erule parts.induct, auto)*

29.3.12 keys a priori necessary for decrypting the messages of G

definition *keysfor :: "msg set => msg set"* **where**
"keysfor G == Key ‘ keysFor (parts G)"

lemma *keyset_keysfor [iff]: "keyset (keysfor G)"*
by *(simp add: keyset_def keysfor_def, blast)*

lemma *keyset_Diff_keysfor [simp]: "keyset H ⟹ keyset (H - keysfor G)"*
by *(auto simp: keyset_def)*

lemma *keysfor_Crypt: "Crypt K X ∈ parts G ⟹ Key (invKey K) ∈ keysfor G"*
by *(auto simp: keysfor_def Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor)*

lemma *no_key_no_Crypt: "Key K ∉ keysfor G ⟹ Crypt (invKey K) X ∉ parts G"*
by *(auto dest: keysfor_Crypt)*

lemma *finite_keysfor [intro]: "finite G ⟹ finite (keysfor G)"*
by *(auto simp: keysfor_def intro: finite_UN_I)*

29.3.13 only the keys necessary for G are useful in analz

lemma *analz_keyset: "keyset H ⟹*
analz (G Un H) = H - keysfor G Un (analz (G Un (H Int keysfor G)))"
apply *(rule eq)*
apply *(erule analz.induct, blast)*
apply *(simp, blast)*
apply *(simp, blast)*
apply *(case_tac "Key (invKey K) ∈ H - keysfor G", clarsimp)*
apply *(drule_tac X=X* **in** *no_key_no_Crypt)*
by *(auto intro: analz_sub)*

lemmas *analz_keyset_substD = analz_keyset [THEN sym, THEN ssubst]*

29.4 Extensions to Theory *Event*

29.4.1 general protocol properties

definition *is_Says :: "event => bool"* **where**
"is_Says ev == (∃A B X. ev = Says A B X)"

lemma *is_Says_Says [iff]: "is_Says (Says A B X)"*
by *(simp add: is_Says_def)*

definition *Gets_correct :: "event list set => bool"* **where**
"Gets_correct p == ∀evs B X. evs ∈ p ⟶ Gets B X ∈ set evs
⟶ (∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs)"

lemma *Gets_correct_Says: "⟦Gets_correct p; Gets B X # evs ∈ p⟧*
⟹ ∃A. Says A B X ∈ set evs"
apply *(simp add: Gets_correct_def)*
by *(drule_tac x="Gets B X # evs"* **in** *spec, auto)*

definition *one_step :: "event list set => bool"* **where**
"one_step p == ∀evs ev. ev#evs ∈ p ⟶ evs ∈ p"

lemma *one_step_Cons [dest]: "⟦one_step p; ev#evs ∈ p⟧ ⟹ evs ∈ p"*
unfolding *one_step_def* **by** *blast*

lemma *one_step_app: "⟦evs@evs' ∈ p; one_step p; [] ∈ p⟧ ⟹ evs' ∈ p"*
by *(induct evs, auto)*

lemma *trunc: "⟦evs @ evs' ∈ p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ evs' ∈ p"*
by *(induct evs, auto)*

definition *has_only_Says :: "event list set => bool"* **where**
"has_only_Says p ≡ ∀evs ev. evs ∈ p ⟶ ev ∈ set evs
⟶ (∃A B X. ev = Says A B X)"

lemma *has_only_SaysD: "⟦ev ∈ set evs; evs ∈ p; has_only_Says p⟧*
⟹ ∃A B X. ev = Says A B X"
unfolding *has_only_Says_def* **by** *blast*

lemma *in_has_only_Says [dest]: "⟦has_only_Says p; evs ∈ p; ev ∈ set evs⟧*
⟹ ∃A B X. ev = Says A B X"
by *(auto simp: has_only_Says_def)*

lemma *has_only_Says_imp_Gets_correct [simp]: "has_only_Says p*
⟹ Gets_correct p"
by *(auto simp: has_only_Says_def Gets_correct_def)*

29.4.2 lemma on knows

lemma *Says_imp_spies2: "Says A B {|X,Y|} ∈ set evs ⟹ Y ∈ parts (spies evs)"*
by *(drule Says_imp_spies, drule parts.Inj, drule parts.Snd, simp)*

lemma *Says_not_parts: "⟦Says A B X ∈ set evs; Y ∉ parts (spies evs)⟧*
⟹ Y ∉ parts {X}"
by *(auto dest: Says_imp_spies parts_parts)*

29.4.3 knows without initState

primrec *knows' :: "agent => event list => msg set"* **where**
knows'_Nil: "knows' A [] = {}" |
knows'_Cons0:
"knows' A (ev # evs) = (
if A = Spy then (
case ev of
Says A' B X => insert X (knows' A evs)
| Gets A' X => knows' A evs
| Notes A' X => if A' ∈ bad then insert X (knows' A evs) else knows'
A evs
) else (
case ev of
Says A' B X => if A=A' then insert X (knows' A evs) else knows' A evs
| Gets A' X => if A=A' then insert X (knows' A evs) else knows' A evs
| Notes A' X => if A=A' then insert X (knows' A evs) else knows' A evs
))"

abbreviation
spies' :: "event list => msg set" **where**
"spies' == knows' Spy"

29.4.4 decomposition of knows into knows' and initState

lemma *knows_decomp: "knows A evs = knows' A evs Un (initState A)"*
by *(induct evs, auto split: event.split simp: knows.simps)*

lemmas *knows_decomp_substI = knows_decomp [THEN ssubst]*

lemmas *knows_decomp_substD = knows_decomp [THEN sym, THEN ssubst]*

lemma *knows'_sub_knows: "knows' A evs <= knows A evs"*
by *(auto simp: knows_decomp)*

lemma *knows'_Cons: "knows' A (ev#evs) = knows' A [ev] Un knows' A evs"*
by *(induct ev, auto)*

lemmas *knows'_Cons_substI = knows'_Cons [THEN ssubst]*
lemmas *knows'_Cons_substD = knows'_Cons [THEN sym, THEN ssubst]*

lemma *knows_Cons: "knows A (ev#evs) = initState A Un knows' A [ev]*
Un knows A evs"
apply *(simp only: knows_decomp)*
apply *(rule_tac s="(knows' A [ev] Un knows' A evs) Un initState A"* **in** *trans)*
apply *(simp only: knows'_Cons [of A ev evs] Un_ac)*
apply *blast*
done

lemmas *knows_Cons_substI = knows_Cons [THEN ssubst]*
lemmas *knows_Cons_substD = knows_Cons [THEN sym, THEN ssubst]*

lemma *knows'_sub_spies': "⟦evs ∈ p; has_only_Says p; one_step p⟧*
⟹ knows' A evs ⊆ spies' evs"
by *(induct evs, auto split: event.splits)*

29.4.5 knows' is finite

lemma *finite_knows' [iff]: "finite (knows' A evs)"*
by *(induct evs, auto split: event.split simp: knows.simps)*

29.4.6 monotonicity of knows

lemma *knows_sub_Cons: "knows A evs <= knows A (ev#evs)"*
by*(cases A, induct evs, auto simp: knows.simps split:event.split)*

lemma *knows_ConsI: "X ∈ knows A evs ⟹ X ∈ knows A (ev#evs)"*
by *(auto dest: knows_sub_Cons [THEN subsetD])*

lemma *knows_sub_app: "knows A evs <= knows A (evs @ evs')"*
apply *(induct evs, auto)*
apply *(simp add: knows_decomp)*
apply *(rename_tac a b c)*
by *(case_tac a, auto simp: knows.simps)*

29.4.7 maximum knowledge an agent can have includes messages sent to the agent

primrec *knows_max' :: "agent => event list => msg set"* **where**
knows_max'_def_Nil: "knows_max' A [] = {}" |
knows_max'_def_Cons: "knows_max' A (ev # evs) = (
if A=Spy then (
case ev of
Says A' B X => insert X (knows_max' A evs)

```
    | Gets A' X => knows_max' A evs
    | Notes A' X =>
      if A' ∈ bad then insert X (knows_max' A evs) else knows_max' A evs
  ) else (
    case ev of
      Says A' B X =>
      if A=A' | A=B then insert X (knows_max' A evs) else knows_max' A evs
    | Gets A' X =>
      if A=A' then insert X (knows_max' A evs) else knows_max' A evs
    | Notes A' X =>
      if A=A' then insert X (knows_max' A evs) else knows_max' A evs
  ))"

definition knows_max :: "agent => event list => msg set" where
"knows_max A evs == knows_max' A evs Un initState A"

abbreviation
  spies_max :: "event list => msg set" where
  "spies_max evs == knows_max Spy evs"
```

29.4.8 basic facts about *knows_max*

```
lemma spies_max_spies [iff]: "spies_max evs = spies evs"
by (induct evs, auto simp: knows_max_def split: event.splits)

lemma knows_max'_Cons: "knows_max' A (ev#evs)
= knows_max' A [ev] Un knows_max' A evs"
by (auto split: event.splits)

lemmas knows_max'_Cons_substI = knows_max'_Cons [THEN ssubst]
lemmas knows_max'_Cons_substD = knows_max'_Cons [THEN sym, THEN ssubst]

lemma knows_max_Cons: "knows_max A (ev#evs)
= knows_max' A [ev] Un knows_max A evs"
apply (simp add: knows_max_def del: knows_max'_def_Cons)
apply (rule_tac evs=evs in knows_max'_Cons_substI)
by blast

lemmas knows_max_Cons_substI = knows_max_Cons [THEN ssubst]
lemmas knows_max_Cons_substD = knows_max_Cons [THEN sym, THEN ssubst]

lemma finite_knows_max' [iff]: "finite (knows_max' A evs)"
by (induct evs, auto split: event.split)

lemma knows_max'_sub_spies': "⟦evs ∈ p; has_only_Says p; one_step p⟧
⟹ knows_max' A evs ⊆ spies' evs"
by (induct evs, auto split: event.splits)

lemma knows_max'_in_spies' [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; X ∈ knows_max' A evs;
has_only_Says p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ X ∈ spies' evs"
by (rule knows_max'_sub_spies' [THEN subsetD], auto)

lemma knows_max'_app: "knows_max' A (evs @ evs')
= knows_max' A evs Un knows_max' A evs'"
```

by *(induct evs, auto split: event.splits)*

lemma *Says_to_knows_max': "Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ knows_max' B evs"*
by *(simp add: in_set_conv_decomp, clarify, simp add: knows_max'_app)*

lemma *Says_from_knows_max': "Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ knows_max' A evs"*
by *(simp add: in_set_conv_decomp, clarify, simp add: knows_max'_app)*

29.4.9 used without initState

primrec *used' :: "event list => msg set"* **where**
"used' [] = {}" |
"used' (ev # evs) = (
case ev of
Says A B X => parts {X} Un used' evs
| Gets A X => used' evs
| Notes A X => parts {X} Un used' evs
)"

definition *init :: "msg set"* **where**
"init == used []"

lemma *used_decomp: "used evs = init Un used' evs"*
by *(induct evs, auto simp: init_def split: event.split)*

lemma *used'_sub_app: "used' evs ⊆ used' (evs@evs')"*
by *(induct evs, auto split: event.split)*

lemma *used'_parts [rule_format]: "X ∈ used' evs ⟹ Y ∈ parts {X} ⟶ Y ∈ used' evs"*
apply *(induct evs, simp)*
apply *(rename_tac a b)*
apply *(case_tac a, simp_all)*
apply *(blast dest: parts_trans)+*
done

29.4.10 monotonicity of used

lemma *used_sub_Cons: "used evs <= used (ev#evs)"*
by *(induct evs, (induct ev, auto)+)*

lemma *used_ConsI: "X ∈ used evs ⟹ X ∈ used (ev#evs)"*
by *(auto dest: used_sub_Cons [THEN subsetD])*

lemma *notin_used_ConsD: "X ∉ used (ev#evs) ⟹ X ∉ used evs"*
by *(auto dest: used_sub_Cons [THEN subsetD])*

lemma *used_appD [dest]: "X ∈ used (evs @ evs') ⟹ X ∈ used evs ∨ X ∈ used evs'"*
by *(induct evs, auto, rename_tac a b, case_tac a, auto)*

lemma *used_ConsD: "X ∈ used (ev#evs) ⟹ X ∈ used [ev] ∨ X ∈ used evs"*
by *(case_tac ev, auto)*

lemma *used_sub_app: "used evs <= used (evs@evs')"*

by *(auto simp: used_decomp dest: used'_sub_app [THEN subsetD])*

lemma *used_appIL: "X ∈ used evs ⟹ X ∈ used (evs' @ evs)"*
by *(induct evs', auto intro: used_ConsI)*

lemma *used_appIR: "X ∈ used evs ⟹ X ∈ used (evs @ evs')"*
by *(erule used_sub_app [THEN subsetD])*

lemma *used_parts: "⟦X ∈ parts {Y}; Y ∈ used evs⟧ ⟹ X ∈ used evs"*
apply *(auto simp: used_decomp dest: used'_parts)*
by *(auto simp: init_def used_Nil dest: parts_trans)*

lemma *parts_Says_used: "⟦Says A B X ∈ set evs; Y ∈ parts {X}⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ used evs"*
by *(induct evs, simp_all, safe, auto intro: used_ConsI)*

lemma *parts_used_app: "X ∈ parts {Y} ⟹ X ∈ used (evs @ Says A B Y # evs')"*
apply *(drule_tac evs="[Says A B Y]"* **in** *used_parts, simp, blast)*
apply *(drule_tac evs'=evs'* **in** *used_appIR)*
apply *(drule_tac evs'=evs* **in** *used_appIL)*
by *simp*

29.4.11 lemmas on used and knows

lemma *initState_used: "X ∈ parts (initState A) ⟹ X ∈ used evs"*
by *(induct evs, auto simp: used.simps split: event.split)*

lemma *Says_imp_used: "Says A B X ∈ set evs ⟹ parts {X} ⊆ used evs"*
by *(induct evs, auto intro: used_ConsI)*

lemma *not_used_not_spied: "X ∉ used evs ⟹ X ∉ parts (spies evs)"*
by *(induct evs, auto simp: used_Nil)*

lemma *not_used_not_parts: "⟦Y ∉ used evs; Says A B X ∈ set evs⟧*
⟹ Y ∉ parts {X}"
by *(induct evs, auto intro: used_ConsI)*

lemma *not_used_parts_false: "⟦X ∉ used evs; Y ∈ parts (spies evs)⟧*
⟹ X ∉ parts {Y}"
by *(auto dest: parts_parts)*

lemma *known_used [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧*
⟹ X ∈ parts (knows A evs) ⟶ X ∈ used evs"
apply *(case_tac "A=Spy", blast)*
apply *(induct evs)*
apply *(simp add: used.simps, blast)*
apply *(rename_tac a evs)*
apply *(frule_tac ev=a* **and** *evs=evs* **in** *one_step_Cons, simp, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. X ∈ parts G"* **in** *knows_Cons_substD, safe)*
apply *(erule initState_used)*
apply *(case_tac a, auto)*
apply *(rename_tac msg)*
apply *(drule_tac B=A* **and** *X=msg* **and** *evs=evs* **in** *Gets_correct_Says)*
by *(auto dest: Says_imp_used intro: used_ConsI)*

lemma *known_max_used [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧*
⟹ X ∈ parts (knows_max A evs) ⟶ X ∈ used evs"
apply *(case_tac "A=Spy")*
apply *force*
apply *(induct evs)*
apply *(simp add: knows_max_def used.simps, blast)*
apply *(rename_tac a evs)*
apply *(frule_tac ev=a* **and** *evs=evs* **in** *one_step_Cons, simp, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. X ∈ parts G"* **in** *knows_max_Cons_substD, safe)*
apply *(case_tac a, auto)*
apply *(rename_tac msg)*
apply *(drule_tac B=A* **and** *X=msg* **and** *evs=evs* **in** *Gets_correct_Says)*
by *(auto simp: knows_max'_Cons dest: Says_imp_used intro: used_ConsI)*

lemma *not_used_not_known: "⟦evs ∈ p; X ∉ used evs;*
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ X ∉ parts (knows A evs)"
by *(case_tac "A=Spy", auto dest: not_used_not_spied known_used)*

lemma *not_used_not_known_max: "⟦evs ∈ p; X ∉ used evs;*
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ X ∉ parts (knows_max A evs)"
by *(case_tac "A=Spy", auto dest: not_used_not_spied known_max_used)*

29.4.12 a nonce or key in a message cannot equal a fresh nonce or key

lemma *Nonce_neq [dest]: "⟦Nonce n' ∉ used evs;*
Says A B X ∈ set evs; Nonce n ∈ parts {X}⟧ ⟹ n ≠ n'"
by *(drule not_used_not_spied, auto dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy parts_sub)*

lemma *Key_neq [dest]: "⟦Key n' ∉ used evs;*
Says A B X ∈ set evs; Key n ∈ parts {X}⟧ ⟹ n ~= n'"
by *(drule not_used_not_spied, auto dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy parts_sub)*

29.4.13 message of an event

primrec *msg :: "event => msg"*
where
"msg (Says A B X) = X"
| "msg (Gets A X) = X"
| "msg (Notes A X) = X"

lemma *used_sub_parts_used: "X ∈ used (ev # evs) ⟹ X ∈ parts {msg ev} ∪ used evs"*
by *(induct ev, auto)*

end

30 Decomposition of Analz into two parts

theory *Analz* **imports** *Extensions* **begin**

decomposition of *analz* into two parts: *pparts* (for pairs) and analz of *kparts*

30.1 messages that do not contribute to analz

inductive_set
  pparts :: "msg set => msg set"
  for *H :: "msg set"*
where
  Inj [intro]: "⟦X ∈ H; is_MPair X⟧ ⟹ X ∈ pparts H"
| *Fst [dest]: "⟦{|X,Y|} ∈ pparts H; is_MPair X⟧ ⟹ X ∈ pparts H"*
| *Snd [dest]: "⟦{|X,Y|} ∈ pparts H; is_MPair Y⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ pparts H"*

30.2 basic facts about *pparts*

lemma *pparts_is_MPair [dest]: "X ∈ pparts H ⟹ is_MPair X"*
by *(erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *Crypt_notin_pparts [iff]: "Crypt K X ∉ pparts H"*
by *auto*

lemma *Key_notin_pparts [iff]: "Key K ∉ pparts H"*
by *auto*

lemma *Nonce_notin_pparts [iff]: "Nonce n ∉ pparts H"*
by *auto*

lemma *Number_notin_pparts [iff]: "Number n ∉ pparts H"*
by *auto*

lemma *Agent_notin_pparts [iff]: "Agent A ∉ pparts H"*
by *auto*

lemma *pparts_empty [iff]: "pparts {} = {}"*
by *(auto, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insertI [intro]: "X ∈ pparts H ⟹ X ∈ pparts (insert Y H)"*
by *(erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_sub: "⟦X ∈ pparts G; G ⊆ H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ pparts H"*
by *(erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insert2 [iff]: "pparts (insert X (insert Y H))*
= pparts {X} Un pparts {Y} Un pparts H"
by *(rule eq, (erule pparts.induct, auto)+)*

lemma *pparts_insert_MPair [iff]: "pparts (insert {|X,Y|} H)*
= insert {|X,Y|} (pparts ({X,Y} ∪ H))"
apply *(rule eq, (erule pparts.induct, auto)+)*
apply *(rule_tac Y=Y* **in** *pparts.Fst, auto)*
apply *(erule pparts.induct, auto)*
by *(rule_tac X=X* **in** *pparts.Snd, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insert_Nonce [iff]: "pparts (insert (Nonce n) H) = pparts H"*
by *(rule eq, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insert_Crypt [iff]: "pparts (insert (Crypt K X) H) = pparts*
H"

by *(rule eq, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insert_Key [iff]: "pparts (insert (Key K) H) = pparts H"*
by *(rule eq, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insert_Agent [iff]: "pparts (insert (Agent A) H) = pparts H"*
by *(rule eq, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insert_Number [iff]: "pparts (insert (Number n) H) = pparts H"*
by *(rule eq, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insert_Hash [iff]: "pparts (insert (Hash X) H) = pparts H"*
by *(rule eq, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insert: "X ∈ pparts (insert Y H) ⟹ X ∈ pparts {Y} ∪ pparts H"*
by *(erule pparts.induct, blast+)*

lemma *insert_pparts: "X ∈ pparts {Y} ∪ pparts H ⟹ X ∈ pparts (insert Y H)"*
by *(safe, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_Un [iff]: "pparts (G ∪ H) = pparts G ∪ pparts H"*
by *(rule eq, erule pparts.induct, auto dest: pparts_sub)*

lemma *pparts_pparts [iff]: "pparts (pparts H) = pparts H"*
by *(rule eq, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_insert_eq: "pparts (insert X H) = pparts {X} Un pparts H"*
by *(rule_tac A=H* **in** *insert_Un, rule pparts_Un)*

lemmas *pparts_insert_substI = pparts_insert_eq [THEN ssubst]*

lemma *in_pparts: "Y ∈ pparts H ⟹ ∃X. X ∈ H ∧ Y ∈ pparts {X}"*
by *(erule pparts.induct, auto)*

30.3 facts about *pparts* and *parts*

lemma *pparts_no_Nonce [dest]: "⟦X ∈ pparts {Y}; Nonce n ∉ parts {Y}⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∉ parts {X}"*
by *(erule pparts.induct, simp_all)*

30.4 facts about *pparts* and *analz*

lemma *pparts_analz: "X ∈ pparts H ⟹ X ∈ analz H"*
by *(erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *pparts_analz_sub: "⟦X ∈ pparts G; G ⊆ H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"*
by *(auto dest: pparts_sub pparts_analz)*

30.5 messages that contribute to analz

inductive_set

```
  kparts :: "msg set => msg set"
  for H :: "msg set"
where
  Inj [intro]: "⟦X ∈ H; not_MPair X⟧ ⟹ X ∈ kparts H"
| Fst [intro]: "⟦{|X,Y|} ∈ pparts H; not_MPair X⟧ ⟹ X ∈ kparts H"
| Snd [intro]: "⟦{|X,Y|} ∈ pparts H; not_MPair Y⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ kparts H"
```

30.6 basic facts about *kparts*

lemma *kparts_not_MPair [dest]: "X ∈ kparts H ⟹ not_MPair X"*
by *(erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_empty [iff]: "kparts {} = {}"*
by *(rule eq, erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_insertI [intro]: "X ∈ kparts H ⟹ X ∈ kparts (insert Y H)"*
by *(erule kparts.induct, auto dest: pparts_insertI)*

lemma *kparts_insert2 [iff]: "kparts (insert X (insert Y H))*
= kparts {X} ∪ kparts {Y} ∪ kparts H"
by *(rule eq, (erule kparts.induct, auto)+)*

lemma *kparts_insert_MPair [iff]: "kparts (insert {|X,Y|} H)*
= kparts ({X,Y} ∪ H)"
by *(rule eq, (erule kparts.induct, auto)+)*

lemma *kparts_insert_Nonce [iff]: "kparts (insert (Nonce n) H)*
= insert (Nonce n) (kparts H)"
by *(rule eq, erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_insert_Crypt [iff]: "kparts (insert (Crypt K X) H)*
= insert (Crypt K X) (kparts H)"
by *(rule eq, erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_insert_Key [iff]: "kparts (insert (Key K) H)*
= insert (Key K) (kparts H)"
by *(rule eq, erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_insert_Agent [iff]: "kparts (insert (Agent A) H)*
= insert (Agent A) (kparts H)"
by *(rule eq, erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_insert_Number [iff]: "kparts (insert (Number n) H)*
= insert (Number n) (kparts H)"
by *(rule eq, erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_insert_Hash [iff]: "kparts (insert (Hash X) H)*
= insert (Hash X) (kparts H)"
by *(rule eq, erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_insert: "X ∈ kparts (insert X H) ⟹ X ∈ kparts {X} ∪ kparts*
H"
by *(erule kparts.induct, (blast dest: pparts_insert)+)*

lemma *kparts_insert_fst [rule_format,dest]: "X ∈ kparts (insert Z H) ⟹ X ∉ kparts H ⟶ X ∈ kparts {Z}"*
by *(erule kparts.induct, (blast dest: pparts_insert)+)*

lemma *kparts_sub: "⟦X ∈ kparts G; G ⊆ H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ kparts H"*
by *(erule kparts.induct, auto dest: pparts_sub)*

lemma *kparts_Un [iff]: "kparts (G ∪ H) = kparts G ∪ kparts H"*
by *(rule eq, erule kparts.induct, auto dest: kparts_sub)*

lemma *pparts_kparts [iff]: "pparts (kparts H) = {}"*
by *(rule eq, erule pparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_kparts [iff]: "kparts (kparts H) = kparts H"*
by *(rule eq, erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_insert_eq: "kparts (insert X H) = kparts {X} ∪ kparts H"*
by *(rule_tac A=H* **in** *insert_Un, rule kparts_Un)*

lemmas *kparts_insert_substI = kparts_insert_eq [THEN ssubst]*

lemma *in_kparts: "Y ∈ kparts H ⟹ ∃X. X ∈ H ∧ Y ∈ kparts {X}"*
by *(erule kparts.induct, auto dest: in_pparts)*

lemma *kparts_has_no_pair [iff]: "has_no_pair (kparts H)"*
by *auto*

30.7 facts about *kparts* and *parts*

lemma *kparts_no_Nonce [dest]: "⟦X ∈ kparts {Y}; Nonce n ∉ parts {Y}⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∉ parts {X}"*
by *(erule kparts.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_parts: "X ∈ kparts H ⟹ X ∈ parts H"*
by *(erule kparts.induct, auto dest: pparts_analz)*

lemma *parts_kparts: "X ∈ parts (kparts H) ⟹ X ∈ parts H"*
by *(erule parts.induct, auto dest: kparts_parts intro: parts.Fst parts.Snd parts.Body)*

lemma *Crypt_kparts_Nonce_parts [dest]: "⟦Crypt K Y ∈ kparts {Z}; Nonce n ∈ parts {Y}⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∈ parts {Z}"*
by *auto*

30.8 facts about *kparts* and *analz*

lemma *kparts_analz: "X ∈ kparts H ⟹ X ∈ analz H"*
by *(erule kparts.induct, auto dest: pparts_analz)*

lemma *kparts_analz_sub: "⟦X ∈ kparts G; G ⊆ H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"*
by *(erule kparts.induct, auto dest: pparts_analz_sub)*

lemma *analz_kparts [rule_format,dest]: "X ∈ analz H ⟹ Y ∈ kparts {X} ⟶ Y ∈ analz H"*

by *(erule analz.induct, auto dest: kparts_analz_sub)*

lemma *analz_kparts_analz: "X ∈ analz (kparts H) ⟹ X ∈ analz H"*
by *(erule analz.induct, auto dest: kparts_analz)*

lemma *analz_kparts_insert: "X ∈ analz (kparts (insert Z H)) ⟹ X ∈ analz (kparts {Z} ∪ kparts H)"*
by *(rule analz_sub, auto)*

lemma *Nonce_kparts_synth [rule_format]: "Y ∈ synth (analz G) ⟹ Nonce n ∈ kparts {Y} ⟶ Nonce n ∈ analz G"*
by *(erule synth.induct, auto)*

lemma *kparts_insert_synth: "⟦Y ∈ parts (insert X G); X ∈ synth (analz G); Nonce n ∈ kparts {Y}; Nonce n ∉ analz G⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ parts G"*
apply *(drule parts_insert_substD, clarify)*
apply *(drule in_sub, drule_tac X=Y* **in** *parts_sub, simp)*
apply *(auto dest: Nonce_kparts_synth)*
done

lemma *Crypt_insert_synth:*
"⟦Crypt K Y ∈ parts (insert X G); X ∈ synth (analz G); Nonce n ∈ kparts {Y}; Nonce n ∉ analz G⟧
⟹ Crypt K Y ∈ parts G"
by *(metis Fake_parts_insert_in_Un Nonce_kparts_synth UnE analz_conj_parts synth_simps(5))*

30.9 analz is pparts + analz of kparts

lemma *analz_pparts_kparts: "X ∈ analz H ⟹ X ∈ pparts H ∨ X ∈ analz (kparts H)"*
by *(erule analz.induct, auto)*

lemma *analz_pparts_kparts_eq: "analz H = pparts H Un analz (kparts H)"*
by *(rule eq, auto dest: analz_pparts_kparts pparts_analz analz_kparts_analz)*

lemmas *analz_pparts_kparts_substI = analz_pparts_kparts_eq [THEN ssubst]*
lemmas *analz_pparts_kparts_substD = analz_pparts_kparts_eq [THEN sym, THEN ssubst]*

end

31 Protocol-Independent Confidentiality Theorem on Nonces

theory *Guard* **imports** *Analz Extensions* **begin**

inductive_set
guard :: "nat ⇒ key set ⇒ msg set"
for *n :: nat* **and** *Ks :: "key set"*
where

```
  No_Nonce [intro]: "Nonce n ∉ parts {X} ⟹ X ∈ guard n Ks"
| Guard_Nonce [intro]: "invKey K ∈ Ks ⟹ Crypt K X ∈ guard n Ks"
| Crypt [intro]: "X ∈ guard n Ks ⟹ Crypt K X ∈ guard n Ks"
| Pair [intro]: "⟦X ∈ guard n Ks; Y ∈ guard n Ks⟧ ⟹ {|X,Y|} ∈ guard n Ks"
```

31.1 basic facts about *guard*

lemma *Key_is_guard [iff]: "Key K ∈ guard n Ks"*
by *auto*

lemma *Agent_is_guard [iff]: "Agent A ∈ guard n Ks"*
by *auto*

lemma *Number_is_guard [iff]: "Number r ∈ guard n Ks"*
by *auto*

lemma *Nonce_notin_guard: "X ∈ guard n Ks ⟹ X ≠ Nonce n"*
by *(erule guard.induct, auto)*

lemma *Nonce_notin_guard_iff [iff]: "Nonce n ∉ guard n Ks"*
by *(auto dest: Nonce_notin_guard)*

lemma *guard_has_Crypt [rule_format]: "X ∈ guard n Ks ⟹ Nonce n ∈ parts {X}*
⟶ (∃K Y. Crypt K Y ∈ kparts {X} ∧ Nonce n ∈ parts {Y})"
by *(erule guard.induct, auto)*

lemma *Nonce_notin_kparts_msg: "X ∈ guard n Ks ⟹ Nonce n ∉ kparts {X}"*
by *(erule guard.induct, auto)*

lemma *Nonce_in_kparts_imp_no_guard: "Nonce n ∈ kparts H*
⟹ ∃X. X ∈ H ∧ X ∉ guard n Ks"
apply *(drule in_kparts, clarify)*
apply *(rule_tac x=X* **in** *exI, clarify)*
by *(auto dest: Nonce_notin_kparts_msg)*

lemma *guard_kparts [rule_format]: "X ∈ guard n Ks ⟹*
Y ∈ kparts {X} ⟶ Y ∈ guard n Ks"
by *(erule guard.induct, auto)*

lemma *guard_Crypt: "⟦Crypt K Y ∈ guard n Ks; K ∉ invKey`Ks⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ guard n Ks"*
  by *(ind_cases "Crypt K Y ∈ guard n Ks") (auto intro!: image_eqI)*

lemma *guard_MPair [iff]: "({|X,Y|} ∈ guard n Ks) = (X ∈ guard n Ks ∧ Y ∈ guard n Ks)"*
by *(auto, (ind_cases "{|X,Y|} ∈ guard n Ks", auto)+)*

lemma *guard_not_guard [rule_format]: "X ∈ guard n Ks ⟹*
Crypt K Y ∈ kparts {X} ⟶ Nonce n ∈ kparts {Y} ⟶ Y ∉ guard n Ks"
by *(erule guard.induct, auto dest: guard_kparts)*

lemma *guard_extand: "⟦X ∈ guard n Ks; Ks ⊆ Ks'⟧ ⟹ X ∈ guard n Ks'"*
by *(erule guard.induct, auto)*

31.2 guarded sets

definition *Guard :: "nat ⇒ key set ⇒ msg set ⇒ bool"* **where**
"Guard n Ks H ≡ ∀X. X ∈ H ⟶ X ∈ guard n Ks"

31.3 basic facts about *Guard*

lemma *Guard_empty [iff]: "Guard n Ks {}"*
by *(simp add: Guard_def)*

lemma *notin_parts_Guard [intro]: "Nonce n ∉ parts G ⟹ Guard n Ks G"*
apply *(unfold Guard_def, clarify)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "Nonce n ∉ parts {X}")*
by *(auto dest: parts_sub)*

lemma *Nonce_notin_kparts [simplified]: "Guard n Ks H ⟹ Nonce n ∉ kparts H"*
by *(auto simp: Guard_def dest: in_kparts Nonce_notin_kparts_msg)*

lemma *Guard_must_decrypt: "⟦Guard n Ks H; Nonce n ∈ analz H⟧ ⟹*
∃K Y. Crypt K Y ∈ kparts H ∧ Key (invKey K) ∈ kparts H"
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Nonce n ∈ G"* **in** *analz_pparts_kparts_substD, simp)*
by *(drule must_decrypt, auto dest: Nonce_notin_kparts)*

lemma *Guard_kparts [intro]: "Guard n Ks H ⟹ Guard n Ks (kparts H)"*
by *(auto simp: Guard_def dest: in_kparts guard_kparts)*

lemma *Guard_mono: "⟦Guard n Ks H; G <= H⟧ ⟹ Guard n Ks G"*
by *(auto simp: Guard_def)*

lemma *Guard_insert [iff]: "Guard n Ks (insert X H)*
= (Guard n Ks H ∧ X ∈ guard n Ks)"
by *(auto simp: Guard_def)*

lemma *Guard_Un [iff]: "Guard n Ks (G Un H) = (Guard n Ks G & Guard n Ks H)"*
by *(auto simp: Guard_def)*

lemma *Guard_synth [intro]: "Guard n Ks G ⟹ Guard n Ks (synth G)"*
by *(auto simp: Guard_def, erule synth.induct, auto)*

lemma *Guard_analz [intro]: "⟦Guard n Ks G; ∀K. K ∈ Ks ⟶ Key K ∉ analz G⟧*
⟹ Guard n Ks (analz G)"
apply *(auto simp: Guard_def)*
apply *(erule analz.induct, auto)*
by *(ind_cases "Crypt K Xa ∈ guard n Ks"* **for** *K Xa, auto)*

lemma *in_Guard [dest]: "⟦X ∈ G; Guard n Ks G⟧ ⟹ X ∈ guard n Ks"*
by *(auto simp: Guard_def)*

lemma *in_synth_Guard: "⟦X ∈ synth G; Guard n Ks G⟧ ⟹ X ∈ guard n Ks"*
by *(drule Guard_synth, auto)*

lemma *in_analz_Guard: "⟦X ∈ analz G; Guard n Ks G;*
∀K. K ∈ Ks ⟶ Key K ∉ analz G⟧ ⟹ X ∈ guard n Ks"

by *(drule Guard_analz, auto)*

lemma *Guard_keyset [simp]: "keyset G ⟹ Guard n Ks G"*
by *(auto simp: Guard_def)*

lemma *Guard_Un_keyset: "⟦Guard n Ks G; keyset H⟧ ⟹ Guard n Ks (G ∪ H)"*
by *auto*

lemma *in_Guard_kparts: "⟦X ∈ G; Guard n Ks G; Y ∈ kparts {X}⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ guard n Ks"*
by *blast*

lemma *in_Guard_kparts_neq: "⟦X ∈ G; Guard n Ks G; Nonce n' ∈ kparts {X}⟧ ⟹ n ≠ n'"*
by *(blast dest: in_Guard_kparts)*

lemma *in_Guard_kparts_Crypt: "⟦X ∈ G; Guard n Ks G; is_MPair X; Crypt K Y ∈ kparts {X}; Nonce n ∈ kparts {Y}⟧ ⟹ invKey K ∈ Ks"*
apply *(drule in_Guard, simp)*
apply *(frule guard_not_guard, simp+)*
apply *(drule guard_kparts, simp)*
by *(ind_cases "Crypt K Y ∈ guard n Ks", auto)*

lemma *Guard_extand: "⟦Guard n Ks G; Ks ⊆ Ks'⟧ ⟹ Guard n Ks' G"*
by *(auto simp: Guard_def dest: guard_extand)*

lemma *guard_invKey [rule_format]: "⟦X ∈ guard n Ks; Nonce n ∈ kparts {Y}⟧ ⟹ Crypt K Y ∈ kparts {X} ⟶ invKey K ∈ Ks"*
by *(erule guard.induct, auto)*

lemma *Crypt_guard_invKey [rule_format]: "⟦Crypt K Y ∈ guard n Ks; Nonce n ∈ kparts {Y}⟧ ⟹ invKey K ∈ Ks"*
by *(auto dest: guard_invKey)*

31.4 set obtained by decrypting a message

abbreviation *(input)*
  decrypt :: "msg set => key => msg => msg set" **where**
  "decrypt H K Y == insert Y (H - {Crypt K Y})"

lemma *analz_decrypt: "⟦Crypt K Y ∈ H; Key (invKey K) ∈ H; Nonce n ∈ analz H⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∈ analz (decrypt H K Y)"*
apply *(drule_tac P="λH. Nonce n ∈ analz H"* **in** *ssubst [OF insert_Diff])*
apply *assumption*
apply *(simp only: analz_Crypt_if, simp)*
done

lemma *parts_decrypt: "⟦Crypt K Y ∈ H; X ∈ parts (decrypt H K Y)⟧ ⟹ X ∈ parts H"*
by *(erule parts.induct, auto intro: parts.Fst parts.Snd parts.Body)*

31.5 number of Crypt's in a message

fun *crypt_nb :: "msg => nat"*
where
"crypt_nb (Crypt K X) = Suc (crypt_nb X)"
| "crypt_nb {|X,Y|} = crypt_nb X + crypt_nb Y"
| "crypt_nb X = 0"

31.6 basic facts about *crypt_nb*

lemma *non_empty_crypt_msg: "Crypt K Y ∈ parts {X} ⟹ crypt_nb X ≠ 0"*
by *(induct X, simp_all, safe, simp_all)*

31.7 number of Crypt's in a message list

primrec *cnb :: "msg list => nat"*
where
"cnb [] = 0"
| "cnb (X#l) = crypt_nb X + cnb l"

31.8 basic facts about *cnb*

lemma *cnb_app [simp]: "cnb (l @ l') = cnb l + cnb l'"*
by *(induct l, auto)*

lemma *mem_cnb_minus: "x ∈ set l ⟹ cnb l = crypt_nb x + (cnb l - crypt_nb x)"*
by *(induct l) auto*

lemmas *mem_cnb_minus_substI = mem_cnb_minus [THEN ssubst]*

lemma *cnb_minus [simp]: "x ∈ set l ⟹ cnb (remove l x) = cnb l - crypt_nb x"*
apply *(induct l, auto)*
apply *(erule_tac l=l* **and** *x=x* **in** *mem_cnb_minus_substI)*
apply *simp*
done

lemma *parts_cnb: "Z ∈ parts (set l) ⟹*
cnb l = (cnb l - crypt_nb Z) + crypt_nb Z"
by *(erule parts.induct, auto simp: in_set_conv_decomp)*

lemma *non_empty_crypt: "Crypt K Y ∈ parts (set l) ⟹ cnb l ≠ 0"*
by *(induct l, auto dest: non_empty_crypt_msg parts_insert_substD)*

31.9 list of kparts

lemma *kparts_msg_set: "∃l. kparts {X} = set l ∧ cnb l = crypt_nb X"*
apply *(induct X, simp_all)*
apply *(rename_tac agent, rule_tac x="[Agent agent]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rename_tac nat, rule_tac x="[Number nat]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rename_tac nat, rule_tac x="[Nonce nat]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rename_tac nat, rule_tac x="[Key nat]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rename_tac X, rule_tac x="[Hash X]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(clarify, rule_tac x="l@la"* **in** *exI, simp)*

by *(clarify, rename_tac nat X y, rule_tac x="[Crypt nat X]"* **in** *exI, simp)*

lemma *kparts_set: "∃l'. kparts (set l) = set l' ∧ cnb l' = cnb l"*
apply *(induct l)*
apply *(rule_tac x="[]"* **in** *exI, simp, clarsimp)*
apply *(rename_tac a b l')*
apply *(subgoal_tac "∃l''. kparts {a} = set l'' ∧ cnb l'' = crypt_nb a", clarify)*
apply *(rule_tac x="l''@l'"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rule kparts_insert_substI, simp)*
by *(rule kparts_msg_set)*

31.10 list corresponding to "decrypt"

definition *decrypt' :: "msg list => key => msg => msg list"* **where**
"decrypt' l K Y == Y # remove l (Crypt K Y)"

declare *decrypt'_def [simp]*

31.11 basic facts about *decrypt'*

lemma *decrypt_minus: "decrypt (set l) K Y <= set (decrypt' l K Y)"*
by *(induct l, auto)*

31.12 if the analyse of a finite guarded set gives n then it must also gives one of the keys of Ks

lemma *Guard_invKey_by_list [rule_format]: "∀l. cnb l = p*
⟶ Guard n Ks (set l) ⟶ Nonce n ∈ analz (set l)
⟶ (∃K. K ∈ Ks ∧ Key K ∈ analz (set l))"
apply *(induct p)*

apply *(clarify, drule Guard_must_decrypt, simp, clarify)*
apply *(drule kparts_parts, drule non_empty_crypt, simp)*

apply *(clarify, frule Guard_must_decrypt, simp, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Nonce n ∈ G"* **in** *analz_pparts_kparts_substD, simp)*
apply *(frule analz_decrypt, simp_all)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "∃l'. kparts (set l) = set l' ∧ cnb l' = cnb l", clarsimp)*
apply *(drule_tac G="insert Y (set l' - {Crypt K Y})"*
and *H="set (decrypt' l' K Y)"* **in** *analz_sub, rule decrypt_minus)*
apply *(rule_tac analz_pparts_kparts_substI, simp)*
apply *(case_tac "K ∈ invKey‘Ks")*

apply *(clarsimp, blast)*

apply *(subgoal_tac "Guard n Ks (set (decrypt' l' K Y))")*
apply *(drule_tac x="decrypt' l' K Y"* **in** *spec, simp)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "Crypt K Y ∈ parts (set l)")*
apply *(drule parts_cnb, rotate_tac -1, simp)*
apply *(clarify, drule_tac X="Key Ka"* **and** *H="insert Y (set l')"* **in** *analz_sub)*
apply *(rule insert_mono, rule set_remove)*
apply *(simp add: analz_insertD, blast)*

apply *(blast dest: kparts_parts)*

apply *(rule_tac H="insert Y (set l')"* **in** *Guard_mono)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "Guard n Ks (set l')", simp)*
apply *(rule_tac K=K* **in** *guard_Crypt, simp add: Guard_def, simp)*
apply *(drule_tac t="set l'"* **in** *sym, simp)*
apply *(rule Guard_kparts, simp, simp)*
apply *(rule_tac B="set l'"* **in** *subset_trans, rule set_remove, blast)*
by *(rule kparts_set)*

lemma *Guard_invKey_finite: "⟦Nonce n ∈ analz G; Guard n Ks G; finite G⟧*
⟹ ∃K. K ∈ Ks ∧ Key K ∈ analz G"
apply *(drule finite_list, clarify)*
by *(rule Guard_invKey_by_list, auto)*

lemma *Guard_invKey: "⟦Nonce n ∈ analz G; Guard n Ks G⟧*
⟹ ∃K. K ∈ Ks ∧ Key K ∈ analz G"
by *(auto dest: analz_needs_only_finite Guard_invKey_finite)*

31.13 if the analyse of a finite guarded set and a (possibly infinite) set of keys gives n then it must also gives Ks

lemma *Guard_invKey_keyset: "⟦Nonce n ∈ analz (G ∪ H); Guard n Ks G; finite*
G;
keyset H⟧ ⟹ ∃K. K ∈ Ks ∧ Key K ∈ analz (G ∪ H)"
apply *(frule_tac P="λG. Nonce n ∈ G"* **and** *G=G* **in** *analz_keyset_substD, simp_all)*
apply *(drule_tac G="G Un (H Int keysfor G)"* **in** *Guard_invKey_finite)*
by *(auto simp: Guard_def intro: analz_sub)*

end

32 protocol-independent confidentiality theorem on keys

theory *GuardK*
imports *Analz Extensions*
begin

inductive_set
  guardK :: "nat => key set => msg set"
  for *n :: nat* **and** *Ks :: "key set"*
where
  No_Key [intro]: "Key n ∉ parts {X} ⟹ X ∈ guardK n Ks"
| Guard_Key [intro]: "invKey K ∈ Ks ⟹ Crypt K X ∈ guardK n Ks"
| Crypt [intro]: "X ∈ guardK n Ks ⟹ Crypt K X ∈ guardK n Ks"
| Pair [intro]: "⟦X ∈ guardK n Ks; Y ∈ guardK n Ks⟧ ⟹ {|X,Y|} ∈ guardK n
Ks"

32.1 basic facts about *guardK*

lemma *Nonce_is_guardK [iff]: "Nonce p ∈ guardK n Ks"*
by *auto*

lemma *Agent_is_guardK [iff]: "Agent A ∈ guardK n Ks"*
by *auto*

lemma *Number_is_guardK [iff]: "Number r ∈ guardK n Ks"*
by *auto*

lemma *Key_notin_guardK: "X ∈ guardK n Ks ⟹ X ≠ Key n"*
by *(erule guardK.induct, auto)*

lemma *Key_notin_guardK_iff [iff]: "Key n ∉ guardK n Ks"*
by *(auto dest: Key_notin_guardK)*

lemma *guardK_has_Crypt [rule_format]: "X ∈ guardK n Ks ⟹ Key n ∈ parts {X}*
⟶ (∃K Y. Crypt K Y ∈ kparts {X} ∧ Key n ∈ parts {Y})"
by *(erule guardK.induct, auto)*

lemma *Key_notin_kparts_msg: "X ∈ guardK n Ks ⟹ Key n ∉ kparts {X}"*
by *(erule guardK.induct, auto dest: kparts_parts)*

lemma *Key_in_kparts_imp_no_guardK: "Key n ∈ kparts H*
⟹ ∃X. X ∈ H ∧ X ∉ guardK n Ks"
apply *(drule in_kparts, clarify)*
apply *(rule_tac x=X* **in** *exI, clarify)*
by *(auto dest: Key_notin_kparts_msg)*

lemma *guardK_kparts [rule_format]: "X ∈ guardK n Ks ⟹*
Y ∈ kparts {X} ⟶ Y ∈ guardK n Ks"
by *(erule guardK.induct, auto dest: kparts_parts parts_sub)*

lemma *guardK_Crypt: "⟦Crypt K Y ∈ guardK n Ks; K ∉ invKey‘Ks⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ guardK*
n Ks"
by *(ind_cases "Crypt K Y ∈ guardK n Ks") (auto intro!: image_eqI)*

lemma *guardK_MPair [iff]: "({|X,Y|} ∈ guardK n Ks)*
= (X ∈ guardK n Ks ∧ Y ∈ guardK n Ks)"
by *(auto, (ind_cases "{|X,Y|} ∈ guardK n Ks", auto)+)*

lemma *guardK_not_guardK [rule_format]: "X ∈guardK n Ks ⟹*
Crypt K Y ∈ kparts {X} ⟶ Key n ∈ kparts {Y} ⟶ Y ∉ guardK n Ks"
by *(erule guardK.induct, auto dest: guardK_kparts)*

lemma *guardK_extand: "⟦X ∈ guardK n Ks; Ks ⊆ Ks’;*
⟦K ∈ Ks’; K ∉ Ks⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ parts {X}⟧ ⟹ X ∈ guardK n Ks’"
by *(erule guardK.induct, auto)*

32.2 guarded sets

definition *GuardK :: "nat ⇒ key set ⇒ msg set ⇒ bool"* **where**
"GuardK n Ks H ≡ ∀X. X ∈ H ⟶ X ∈ guardK n Ks"

32.3 basic facts about *GuardK*

lemma *GuardK_empty [iff]: "GuardK n Ks {}"*
by *(simp add: GuardK_def)*

lemma *Key_notin_kparts [simplified]: "GuardK n Ks H ⟹ Key n ∉ kparts H"*
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def dest: in_kparts Key_notin_kparts_msg)*

lemma *GuardK_must_decrypt: "⟦GuardK n Ks H; Key n ∈ analz H⟧ ⟹*
∃K Y. Crypt K Y ∈ kparts H ∧ Key (invKey K) ∈ kparts H"
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Key n ∈ G"* **in** *analz_pparts_kparts_substD, simp)*
by *(drule must_decrypt, auto dest: Key_notin_kparts)*

lemma *GuardK_kparts [intro]: "GuardK n Ks H ⟹ GuardK n Ks (kparts H)"*
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def dest: in_kparts guardK_kparts)*

lemma *GuardK_mono: "⟦GuardK n Ks H; G ⊆ H⟧ ⟹ GuardK n Ks G"*
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def)*

lemma *GuardK_insert [iff]: "GuardK n Ks (insert X H)*
= (GuardK n Ks H ∧ X ∈ guardK n Ks)"
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def)*

lemma *GuardK_Un [iff]: "GuardK n Ks (G Un H) = (GuardK n Ks G & GuardK n*
Ks H)"
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def)*

lemma *GuardK_synth [intro]: "GuardK n Ks G ⟹ GuardK n Ks (synth G)"*
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def, erule synth.induct, auto)*

lemma *GuardK_analz [intro]: "⟦GuardK n Ks G; ∀K. K ∈ Ks ⟶ Key K ∉ analz*
G⟧
⟹ GuardK n Ks (analz G)"
apply *(auto simp: GuardK_def)*
apply *(erule analz.induct, auto)*
by *(ind_cases "Crypt K Xa ∈ guardK n Ks"* **for** *K Xa, auto)*

lemma *in_GuardK [dest]: "⟦X ∈ G; GuardK n Ks G⟧ ⟹ X ∈ guardK n Ks"*
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def)*

lemma *in_synth_GuardK: "⟦X ∈ synth G; GuardK n Ks G⟧ ⟹ X ∈ guardK n Ks"*
by *(drule GuardK_synth, auto)*

lemma *in_analz_GuardK: "⟦X ∈ analz G; GuardK n Ks G;*
∀K. K ∈ Ks ⟶ Key K ∉ analz G⟧ ⟹ X ∈ guardK n Ks"
by *(drule GuardK_analz, auto)*

lemma *GuardK_keyset [simp]: "⟦keyset G; Key n ∉ G⟧ ⟹ GuardK n Ks G"*
by *(simp only: GuardK_def, clarify, drule keyset_in, auto)*

lemma *GuardK_Un_keyset: "⟦GuardK n Ks G; keyset H; Key n ∉ H⟧*
⟹ GuardK n Ks (G Un H)"
by *auto*

lemma *in_GuardK_kparts:* "⟦X ∈ G; GuardK n Ks G; Y ∈ kparts {X}⟧ ⟹ Y ∈ guardK n Ks"
by *blast*

lemma *in_GuardK_kparts_neq:* "⟦X ∈ G; GuardK n Ks G; Key n' ∈ kparts {X}⟧ ⟹ n ≠ n'"
by *(blast dest: in_GuardK_kparts)*

lemma *in_GuardK_kparts_Crypt:* "⟦X ∈ G; GuardK n Ks G; is_MPair X; Crypt K Y ∈ kparts {X}; Key n ∈ kparts {Y}⟧ ⟹ invKey K ∈ Ks"
apply *(drule in_GuardK, simp)*
apply *(frule guardK_not_guardK, simp+)*
apply *(drule guardK_kparts, simp)*
by *(ind_cases "Crypt K Y ∈ guardK n Ks", auto)*

lemma *GuardK_extand:* "⟦GuardK n Ks G; Ks ⊆ Ks'; ⟦K ∈ Ks'; K ∉ Ks⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ parts G⟧ ⟹ GuardK n Ks' G"
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def dest: guardK_extand parts_sub)*

32.4 set obtained by decrypting a message

abbreviation *(input)*
decrypt :: "msg set ⇒ key ⇒ msg ⇒ msg set" **where**
"decrypt H K Y ≡ insert Y (H - {Crypt K Y})"

lemma *analz_decrypt:* "⟦Crypt K Y ∈ H; Key (invKey K) ∈ H; Key n ∈ analz H⟧
⟹ Key n ∈ analz (decrypt H K Y)"
apply *(drule_tac P="λH. Key n ∈ analz H"* **in** *ssubst [OF insert_Diff])*
apply *assumption*
apply *(simp only: analz_Crypt_if, simp)*
done

lemma *parts_decrypt:* "⟦Crypt K Y ∈ H; X ∈ parts (decrypt H K Y)⟧ ⟹ X ∈ parts H"
by *(erule parts.induct, auto intro: parts.Fst parts.Snd parts.Body)*

32.5 number of Crypt's in a message

fun *crypt_nb :: "msg => nat"* **where**
"crypt_nb (Crypt K X) = Suc (crypt_nb X)" |
"crypt_nb {|X,Y|} = crypt_nb X + crypt_nb Y" |
"crypt_nb X = 0"

32.6 basic facts about *crypt_nb*

lemma *non_empty_crypt_msg: "Crypt K Y ∈ parts {X} ⟹ crypt_nb X ≠ 0"*
by *(induct X, simp_all, safe, simp_all)*

32.7 number of Crypt's in a message list

primrec *cnb :: "msg list => nat"* **where**
"cnb [] = 0" |
"cnb (X#l) = crypt_nb X + cnb l"

32.8 basic facts about *cnb*

lemma *cnb_app [simp]: "cnb (l @ l') = cnb l + cnb l'"*
by *(induct l, auto)*

lemma *mem_cnb_minus: "x ∈ set l ⟹ cnb l = crypt_nb x + (cnb l - crypt_nb x)"*
by *(induct l, auto)*

lemmas *mem_cnb_minus_substI = mem_cnb_minus [THEN ssubst]*

lemma *cnb_minus [simp]: "x ∈ set l ⟹ cnb (remove l x) = cnb l - crypt_nb x"*
apply *(induct l, auto)*
by *(erule_tac l=l* **and** *x=x* **in** *mem_cnb_minus_substI, simp)*

lemma *parts_cnb: "Z ∈ parts (set l) ⟹*
cnb l = (cnb l - crypt_nb Z) + crypt_nb Z"
by *(erule parts.induct, auto simp: in_set_conv_decomp)*

lemma *non_empty_crypt: "Crypt K Y ∈ parts (set l) ⟹ cnb l ≠ 0"*
by *(induct l, auto dest: non_empty_crypt_msg parts_insert_substD)*

32.9 list of kparts

lemma *kparts_msg_set: "∃l. kparts {X} = set l ∧ cnb l = crypt_nb X"*
apply *(induct X, simp_all)*
apply *(rename_tac agent, rule_tac x="[Agent agent]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rename_tac nat, rule_tac x="[Number nat]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rename_tac nat, rule_tac x="[Nonce nat]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rename_tac nat, rule_tac x="[Key nat]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rule_tac x="[Hash X]"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(clarify, rule_tac x="l@la"* **in** *exI, simp)*
by *(clarify, rename_tac nat X y, rule_tac x="[Crypt nat X]"* **in** *exI, simp)*

lemma *kparts_set: "∃l'. kparts (set l) = set l' & cnb l' = cnb l"*
apply *(induct l)*
apply *(rule_tac x="[]"* **in** *exI, simp, clarsimp)*
apply *(rename_tac a b l')*
apply *(subgoal_tac "∃l''. kparts {a} = set l'' & cnb l'' = crypt_nb a", clarify)*
apply *(rule_tac x="l''@l'"* **in** *exI, simp)*
apply *(rule kparts_insert_substI, simp)*
by *(rule kparts_msg_set)*

32.10 list corresponding to "decrypt"

definition *decrypt' :: "msg list => key => msg => msg list"* **where**
"decrypt' l K Y == Y # remove l (Crypt K Y)"

declare *decrypt'_def [simp]*

32.11 basic facts about *decrypt'*

lemma *decrypt_minus: "decrypt (set l) K Y <= set (decrypt' l K Y)"*

by *(induct l, auto)*

if the analysis of a finite guarded set gives n then it must also give one of the keys of Ks

lemma *GuardK_invKey_by_list [rule_format]: "∀l. cnb l = p*
⟶ GuardK n Ks (set l) ⟶ Key n ∈ analz (set l)
⟶ (∃K. K ∈ Ks ∧ Key K ∈ analz (set l))"
apply *(induct p)*

apply *(clarify, drule GuardK_must_decrypt, simp, clarify)*
apply *(drule kparts_parts, drule non_empty_crypt, simp)*

apply *(clarify, frule GuardK_must_decrypt, simp, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Key n ∈ G"* **in** *analz_pparts_kparts_substD, simp)*
apply *(frule analz_decrypt, simp_all)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "∃l'. kparts (set l) = set l' ∧ cnb l' = cnb l", clarsimp)*
apply *(drule_tac G="insert Y (set l' - {Crypt K Y})"*
and *H="set (decrypt' l' K Y)"* **in** *analz_sub, rule decrypt_minus)*
apply *(rule_tac analz_pparts_kparts_substI, simp)*
apply *(case_tac "K ∈ invKey‘Ks")*

apply *(clarsimp, blast)*

apply *(subgoal_tac "GuardK n Ks (set (decrypt' l' K Y))")*
apply *(drule_tac x="decrypt' l' K Y"* **in** *spec, simp)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "Crypt K Y ∈ parts (set l)")*
apply *(drule parts_cnb, rotate_tac -1, simp)*
apply *(clarify, drule_tac X="Key Ka"* **and** *H="insert Y (set l')"* **in** *analz_sub)*
apply *(rule insert_mono, rule set_remove)*
apply *(simp add: analz_insertD, blast)*

apply *(blast dest: kparts_parts)*

apply *(rule_tac H="insert Y (set l')"* **in** *GuardK_mono)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "GuardK n Ks (set l')", simp)*
apply *(rule_tac K=K* **in** *guardK_Crypt, simp add: GuardK_def, simp)*
apply *(drule_tac t="set l'"* **in** *sym, simp)*
apply *(rule GuardK_kparts, simp, simp)*
apply *(rule_tac B="set l'"* **in** *subset_trans, rule set_remove, blast)*
by *(rule kparts_set)*

lemma *GuardK_invKey_finite: "⟦Key n ∈ analz G; GuardK n Ks G; finite G⟧*
⟹ ∃K. K ∈ Ks ∧ Key K ∈ analz G"
apply *(drule finite_list, clarify)*
by *(rule GuardK_invKey_by_list, auto)*

lemma *GuardK_invKey: "⟦Key n ∈ analz G; GuardK n Ks G⟧*
⟹ ∃K. K ∈ Ks ∧ Key K ∈ analz G"
by *(auto dest: analz_needs_only_finite GuardK_invKey_finite)*

if the analyse of a finite guarded set and a (possibly infinite) set of keys gives n then it must also gives Ks

lemma *GuardK_invKey_keyset: "⟦Key n ∈ analz (G ∪ H); GuardK n Ks G; finite G;*

```
keyset H; Key n ∉ H⟧ ⟹ ∃K. K ∈ Ks ∧ Key K ∈ analz (G ∪ H)"
apply (frule_tac P="λG. Key n ∈ G" and G=G in analz_keyset_substD, simp_all)
apply (drule_tac G="G Un (H Int keysfor G)" in GuardK_invKey_finite)
apply (auto simp: GuardK_def intro: analz_sub)
by (drule keyset_in, auto)

end


theory Shared
imports Event All_Symmetric
begin

consts
  shrK    :: "agent ⇒ key"

specification (shrK)
  inj_shrK: "inj shrK"
  — No two agents have the same long-term key
   apply (rule exI [of _ "case_agent 0 (λn. n + 2) 1"])
   apply (simp add: inj_on_def split: agent.split)
   done
```

Server knows all long-term keys; other agents know only their own

```
overloading
  initState ≡ initState
begin

primrec initState where
  initState_Server:  "initState Server     = Key ‘ range shrK"
| initState_Friend:  "initState (Friend i) = {Key (shrK (Friend i))}"
| initState_Spy:     "initState Spy        = Key‘shrK‘bad"

end
```

32.12 Basic properties of shrK

```
lemmas shrK_injective = inj_shrK [THEN inj_eq]
declare shrK_injective [iff]

lemma invKey_K [simp]: "invKey K = K"
apply (insert isSym_keys)
apply (simp add: symKeys_def)
done


lemma analz_Decrypt' [dest]:
     "⟦Crypt K X ∈ analz H;  Key K  ∈ analz H⟧ ⟹ X ∈ analz H"
by auto
```

Now cancel the *dest* attribute given to *analz.Decrypt* in its declaration.

```
declare analz.Decrypt [rule del]
```

Rewrites should not refer to *initState (Friend i)* because that expression is

not in normal form.

lemma *keysFor_parts_initState [simp]: "keysFor (parts (initState C)) = {}"*
unfolding *keysFor_def*
apply *(induct_tac "C", auto)*
done

lemma *keysFor_parts_insert:*
"⟦K ∈ keysFor (parts (insert X G)); X ∈ synth (analz H)⟧
⟹ K ∈ keysFor (parts (G ∪ H)) | Key K ∈ parts H"
by *(metis invKey_K keysFor_parts_insert)*

lemma *Crypt_imp_keysFor: "Crypt K X ∈ H ⟹ K ∈ keysFor H"*
by *(metis Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor invKey_K)*

32.13 Function "knows"

lemma *Spy_knows_Spy_bad [intro!]: "A ∈ bad ⟹ Key (shrK A) ∈ knows Spy evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)*
done

lemma *Crypt_Spy_analz_bad: "⟦Crypt (shrK A) X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs); A ∈ bad⟧*
⟹ X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by *(metis Spy_knows_Spy_bad analz.Inj analz_Decrypt')*

lemma *shrK_in_initState [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ initState A"*
by *(induct_tac "A", auto)*

lemma *shrK_in_used [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ used evs"*
by *(rule initState_into_used, blast)*

lemma *Key_not_used [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ K ∉ range shrK"*
by *blast*

lemma *shrK_neq [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ⟹ shrK B ≠ K"*
by *blast*

lemmas *shrK_sym_neq = shrK_neq [THEN not_sym]*
declare *shrK_sym_neq [simp]*

32.14 Fresh nonces

lemma *Nonce_notin_initState [iff]: "Nonce N ∉ parts (initState B)"*
by *(induct_tac "B", auto)*

lemma *Nonce_notin_used_empty [simp]: "Nonce N ∉ used []"*
by *(simp add: used_Nil)*

32.15 Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems.

lemma *Nonce_supply_lemma: "∃N. ∀n. N ≤ n ⟶ Nonce n ∉ used evs"*
apply *(induct_tac "evs")*
apply *(rule_tac x = 0* **in** *exI)*
apply *(simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: used_Cons split: event.split)*
apply *(metis le_sup_iff msg_Nonce_supply)*
done

lemma *Nonce_supply1: "∃N. Nonce N ∉ used evs"*
by *(metis Nonce_supply_lemma order_eq_iff)*

lemma *Nonce_supply2: "∃N N'. Nonce N ∉ used evs ∧ Nonce N' ∉ used evs'*
∧ N ≠ N'"
apply *(cut_tac evs = evs* **in** *Nonce_supply_lemma)*
apply *(cut_tac evs = "evs'"* **in** *Nonce_supply_lemma, clarify)*
apply *(metis Suc_n_not_le_n nat_le_linear)*
done

lemma *Nonce_supply3: "∃N N' N''. Nonce N ∉ used evs ∧ Nonce N' ∉ used evs'*
∧
Nonce N'' ∉ used evs'' ∧ N ≠ N' ∧ N' ≠ N'' ∧ N ≠ N''"
apply *(cut_tac evs = evs* **in** *Nonce_supply_lemma)*
apply *(cut_tac evs = "evs'"* **in** *Nonce_supply_lemma)*
apply *(cut_tac evs = "evs''"* **in** *Nonce_supply_lemma, clarify)*
apply *(rule_tac x = N* **in** *exI)*
apply *(rule_tac x = "Suc (N+Na)"* **in** *exI)*
apply *(rule_tac x = "Suc (Suc (N+Na+Nb))"* **in** *exI)*
apply *(simp (no_asm_simp) add: less_not_refl3 le_add1 le_add2 less_Suc_eq_le)*
done

lemma *Nonce_supply: "Nonce (SOME N. Nonce N ∉ used evs) ∉ used evs"*
apply *(rule Nonce_supply_lemma [THEN exE])*
apply *(rule someI, blast)*
done

Unlike the corresponding property of nonces, we cannot prove *finite KK ⟹ ∃K. K ∉ KK ∧ Key K ∉ used evs*. We have infinitely many agents and there is nothing to stop their long-term keys from exhausting all the natural numbers. Instead, possibility theorems must assume the existence of a few keys.

32.16 Specialized Rewriting for Theorems About *analz* and Image

lemma *subset_Compl_range: "A ⊆ - (range shrK) ⟹ shrK x ∉ A"*
by *blast*

lemma *insert_Key_singleton: "insert (Key K) H = Key ‘ {K} ∪ H"*
by *blast*

lemma *insert_Key_image: "insert (Key K) (Key‘KK ∪ C) = Key‘(insert K KK) ∪ C"*
by *blast*

lemmas *analz_image_freshK_simps =*
simp_thms mem_simps — these two allow its use with *only:*
disj_comms
image_insert [THEN sym] image_Un [THEN sym] empty_subsetI insert_subset
analz_insert_eq Un_upper2 [THEN analz_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
insert_Key_singleton subset_Compl_range
Key_not_used insert_Key_image Un_assoc [THEN sym]

lemma *analz_image_freshK_lemma:*
"(Key K ∈ analz (Key‘nE ∪ H)) ⟶ (K ∈ nE | Key K ∈ analz H) ⟹ (Key K ∈ analz (Key‘nE ∪ H)) = (K ∈ nE | Key K ∈ analz H)"
by *(blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])*

32.17 Tactics for possibility theorems

ML

```
<
structure Shared =
struct

(*Omitting used_Says makes the tactic much faster: it leaves expressions
    such as  Nonce ?N ∉ used evs that match Nonce_supply*)
fun possibility_tac ctxt =
   (REPEAT
    (ALLGOALS (simp_tac (ctxt
          |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms used_Says used_Notes used_Gets}
          |> Simplifier.set_unsafe_solver safe_solver))
     THEN
     REPEAT_FIRST (eq_assume_tac ORELSE'
                   resolve_tac ctxt [refl, conjI, @{thm Nonce_supply}])))

(*For harder protocols (such as Recur) where we have to set up some
  nonces and keys initially*)
fun basic_possibility_tac ctxt =
    REPEAT
    (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (ctxt |> Simplifier.set_unsafe_solver safe_solver))
     THEN
     REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt [refl, conjI]))


val analz_image_freshK_ss =
  context
  |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms image_insert image_Un}
  |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms imp_disjL}    (*reduces blow-up*)
  |> Simplifier.add_simps @{thms analz_image_freshK_simps}
  |> Simplifier.simpset_of
```

```
end
›
```

lemma *invKey_shrK_iff [iff]:*
```
     "(Key (invKey K) ∈ X) = (Key K ∈ X)"
```
by *auto*

method_setup *analz_freshK* = ‹
```
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt =>
     (SIMPLE_METHOD
      (EVERY [REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms allI ballI impI}),
          REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms analz_image_freshK_lemma}),
          ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (put_simpset Shared.analz_image_freshK_ss
ctxt))])))›
    "for proving the Session Key Compromise theorem"

method_setup possibility = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (Shared.possibility_tac ctxt))›
    "for proving possibility theorems"

method_setup basic_possibility = ‹
    Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (Shared.basic_possibility_tac ctxt))›
    "for proving possibility theorems"

lemma knows_subset_knows_Cons: "knows A evs ⊆ knows A (e # evs)"
by (cases e) (auto simp: knows_Cons)

end
```

33 lemmas on guarded messages for protocols with symmetric keys

theory *Guard_Shared* **imports** *Guard GuardK "../Shared"* **begin**

33.1 Extensions to Theory *Shared*

declare *initState.simps [simp del]*

33.1.1 a little abbreviation

abbreviation
```
  Ciph :: "agent => msg => msg" where
  "Ciph A X == Crypt (shrK A) X"
```

33.1.2 agent associated to a key

definition *agt :: "key => agent"* **where**
```
"agt K == SOME A. K = shrK A"
```

lemma *agt_shrK [simp]: "agt (shrK A) = A"*
by *(simp add: agt_def)*

33.1.3 basic facts about *initState*

lemma *no_Crypt_in_parts_init [simp]: "Crypt K X ∉ parts (initState A)"*
by *(cases A, auto simp: initState.simps)*

lemma *no_Crypt_in_analz_init [simp]: "Crypt K X ∉ analz (initState A)"*
by *auto*

lemma *no_shrK_in_analz_init [simp]: "A ∉ bad*
⟹ Key (shrK A) ∉ analz (initState Spy)"
by *(auto simp: initState.simps)*

lemma *shrK_notin_initState_Friend [simp]: "A ≠ Friend C*
⟹ Key (shrK A) ∉ parts (initState (Friend C))"
by *(auto simp: initState.simps)*

lemma *keyset_init [iff]: "keyset (initState A)"*
by *(cases A, auto simp: keyset_def initState.simps)*

33.1.4 sets of symmetric keys

definition *shrK_set :: "key set => bool"* **where**
"shrK_set Ks ≡ ∀K. K ∈ Ks ⟶ (∃A. K = shrK A)"

lemma *in_shrK_set: "⟦shrK_set Ks; K ∈ Ks⟧ ⟹ ∃A. K = shrK A"*
by *(simp add: shrK_set_def)*

lemma *shrK_set1 [iff]: "shrK_set {shrK A}"*
by *(simp add: shrK_set_def)*

lemma *shrK_set2 [iff]: "shrK_set {shrK A, shrK B}"*
by *(simp add: shrK_set_def)*

33.1.5 sets of good keys

definition *good :: "key set ⇒ bool"* **where**
"good Ks ≡ ∀K. K ∈ Ks ⟶ agt K ∉ bad"

lemma *in_good: "⟦good Ks; K ∈ Ks⟧ ⟹ agt K ∉ bad"*
by *(simp add: good_def)*

lemma *good1 [simp]: "A ∉ bad ⟹ good {shrK A}"*
by *(simp add: good_def)*

lemma *good2 [simp]: "⟦A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ good {shrK A, shrK B}"*
by *(simp add: good_def)*

33.2 Proofs About Guarded Messages

33.2.1 small hack

lemma *shrK_is_invKey_shrK: "shrK A = invKey (shrK A)"*
by *simp*

lemmas *shrK_is_invKey_shrK_substI = shrK_is_invKey_shrK [THEN ssubst]*

lemmas *invKey_invKey_substI = invKey [THEN ssubst]*

lemma *"Nonce n ∈ parts {X} ⟹ Crypt (shrK A) X ∈ guard n {shrK A}"*
apply *(rule shrK_is_invKey_shrK_substI, rule invKey_invKey_substI)*
by *(rule Guard_Nonce, simp+)*

33.2.2 guardedness results on nonces

lemma *guard_ciph [simp]: "shrK A ∈ Ks ⟹ Ciph A X ∈ guard n Ks"*
by *(rule Guard_Nonce, simp)*

lemma *guardK_ciph [simp]: "shrK A ∈ Ks ⟹ Ciph A X ∈ guardK n Ks"*
by *(rule Guard_Key, simp)*

lemma *Guard_init [iff]: "Guard n Ks (initState B)"*
by *(induct B, auto simp: Guard_def initState.simps)*

lemma *Guard_knows_max': "Guard n Ks (knows_max' C evs)*
⟹ Guard n Ks (knows_max C evs)"
by *(simp add: knows_max_def)*

lemma *Nonce_not_used_Guard_spies [dest]: "Nonce n ∉ used evs*
⟹ Guard n Ks (spies evs)"
by *(auto simp: Guard_def dest: not_used_not_known parts_sub)*

lemma *Nonce_not_used_Guard [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Nonce n ∉ used evs;*
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ Guard n Ks (knows (Friend C) evs)"
by *(auto simp: Guard_def dest: known_used parts_trans)*

lemma *Nonce_not_used_Guard_max [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Nonce n ∉ used evs;*
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ Guard n Ks (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
by *(auto simp: Guard_def dest: known_max_used parts_trans)*

lemma *Nonce_not_used_Guard_max' [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Nonce n ∉ used evs;*
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ Guard n Ks (knows_max' (Friend C) evs)"
apply *(rule_tac H="knows_max (Friend C) evs"* **in** *Guard_mono)*
by *(auto simp: knows_max_def)*

33.2.3 guardedness results on keys

lemma *GuardK_init [simp]: "n ∉ range shrK ⟹ GuardK n Ks (initState B)"*
by *(induct B, auto simp: GuardK_def initState.simps)*

lemma *GuardK_knows_max': "⟦GuardK n A (knows_max' C evs); n ∉ range shrK⟧*
⟹ GuardK n A (knows_max C evs)"
by *(simp add: knows_max_def)*

lemma *Key_not_used_GuardK_spies [dest]: "Key n ∉ used evs*
⟹ GuardK n A (spies evs)"
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def dest: not_used_not_known parts_sub)*

lemma *Key_not_used_GuardK [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Key n ∉ used evs;*
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ GuardK n A (knows (Friend C) evs)"
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def dest: known_used parts_trans)*

lemma *Key_not_used_GuardK_max [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Key n ∉ used evs;*
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ GuardK n A (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
by *(auto simp: GuardK_def dest: known_max_used parts_trans)*

lemma *Key_not_used_GuardK_max' [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Key n ∉ used evs;*
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ GuardK n A (knows_max' (Friend C) evs)"
apply *(rule_tac H="knows_max (Friend C) evs"* **in** *GuardK_mono)*
by *(auto simp: knows_max_def)*

33.2.4 regular protocols

definition *regular :: "event list set => bool"* **where**
"regular p ≡ ∀ evs A. evs ∈ p ⟶ (Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A
∈ bad)"

lemma *shrK_parts_iff_bad [simp]: "⟦evs ∈ p; regular p⟧ ⟹*
(Key (shrK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by *(auto simp: regular_def)*

lemma *shrK_analz_iff_bad [simp]: "⟦evs ∈ p; regular p⟧ ⟹*
(Key (shrK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by *auto*

lemma *Guard_Nonce_analz: "⟦Guard n Ks (spies evs); evs ∈ p;*
shrK_set Ks; good Ks; regular p⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply *(clarify, simp only: knows_decomp)*
apply *(drule Guard_invKey_keyset, simp+, safe)*
apply *(drule in_good, simp)*
apply *(drule in_shrK_set, simp+, clarify)*
apply *(frule_tac A=A* **in** *shrK_analz_iff_bad)*
by *(simp add: knows_decomp)+*

lemma *GuardK_Key_analz:*
  assumes *"GuardK n Ks (spies evs)" "evs ∈ p" "shrK_set Ks"*
    "good Ks" "regular p" "n ∉ range shrK"
  shows *"Key n ∉ analz (spies evs)"*
proof *(rule ccontr)*
  assume *"¬ Key n ∉ analz (knows Spy evs)"*
  then have *∗: "Key n ∈ analz (spies' evs ∪ initState Spy)"*
    by *(simp add: knows_decomp)*
  from *‹GuardK n Ks (spies evs)›*
  have *"GuardK n Ks (spies' evs ∪ initState Spy)"*
    by *(simp add: knows_decomp)*
  then have *"GuardK n Ks (spies' evs)"*
    and *"finite (spies' evs)" "keyset (initState Spy)"*

```
    by simp_all
  moreover have "Key n ∉ initState Spy"
    using ‹n ∉ range shrK› by (simp add: image_iff initState_Spy)
  ultimately obtain K
    where "K ∈ Ks" and **: "Key K ∈ analz (spies' evs ∪ initState Spy)"
    using * by (auto dest: GuardK_invKey_keyset)
  from ‹K ∈ Ks› and ‹good Ks› have "agt K ∉ bad"
    by (auto dest: in_good)
  from ‹K ∈ Ks› ‹shrK_set Ks› obtain A
    where "K = shrK A"
    by (auto dest: in_shrK_set)
  then have "agt K ∈ bad"
    using ** ‹evs ∈ p› ‹regular p› shrK_analz_iff_bad [of evs p "agt K"]
    by (simp add: knows_decomp)
  with ‹agt K ∉ bad› show False by simp
qed

end
```

34 Otway-Rees Protocol

```
theory Guard_OtwayRees imports Guard_Shared begin
```

34.1 messages used in the protocol

```
abbreviation
  nil :: "msg" where
  "nil == Number 0"

abbreviation
  or1 :: "agent => agent => nat => event" where
  "or1 A B NA ==
    Says A B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, Ciph A {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent
B|}|}"

abbreviation
  or1' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => msg => event" where
  "or1' A' A B NA X == Says A' B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|}"

abbreviation
  or2 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => msg => event" where
  "or2 A B NA NB X ==
    Says B Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X,
                    Ciph B {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}"

abbreviation
  or2' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => nat => event" where
  "or2' B' A B NA NB ==
    Says B' Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                     Ciph A {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|},
                     Ciph B {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}"

abbreviation
```

```
  or3 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event" where
  "or3 A B NA NB K ==
    Says Server B {|Nonce NA, Ciph A {|Nonce NA, Key K|},
                    Ciph B {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}"

abbreviation
  or3' :: "agent => msg => agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event" where
  "or3' S Y A B NA NB K ==
    Says S B {|Nonce NA, Y, Ciph B {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}"

abbreviation
  or4 :: "agent => agent => nat => msg => event" where
  "or4 A B NA X == Says B A {|Nonce NA, X, nil|}"

abbreviation
  or4' :: "agent => agent => nat => key => event" where
  "or4' B' A NA K == Says B' A {|Nonce NA, Ciph A {|Nonce NA, Key K|}, nil|}"
```

34.2 definition of the protocol

```
inductive_set or :: "event list set"
where

  Nil: "[] ∈ or"

| Fake: "⟦evs ∈ or; X ∈ synth (analz (spies evs))⟧ ⟹ Says Spy B X # evs
∈ or"

| OR1: "⟦evs1 ∈ or; Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧ ⟹ or1 A B NA # evs1 ∈ or"

| OR2: "⟦evs2 ∈ or; or1' A' A B NA X ∈ set evs2; Nonce NB ∉ used evs2⟧
  ⟹ or2 A B NA NB X # evs2 ∈ or"

| OR3: "⟦evs3 ∈ or; or2' B' A B NA NB ∈ set evs3; Key K ∉ used evs3⟧
  ⟹ or3 A B NA NB K # evs3 ∈ or"

| OR4: "⟦evs4 ∈ or; or2 A B NA NB X ∈ set evs4; or3' S Y A B NA NB K ∈ set
evs4⟧
  ⟹ or4 A B NA X # evs4 ∈ or"
```

34.3 declarations for tactics

```
declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]
declare Fake_parts_insert [THEN subsetD, dest]
declare initState.simps [simp del]
```

34.4 general properties of or

```
lemma or_has_no_Gets: "evs ∈ or ⟹ ∀A X. Gets A X ∉ set evs"
by (erule or.induct, auto)

lemma or_is_Gets_correct [iff]: "Gets_correct or"
by (auto simp: Gets_correct_def dest: or_has_no_Gets)
```

lemma *or_is_one_step [iff]: "one_step or"*
unfolding *one_step_def* **by** *(clarify, ind_cases "ev#evs ∈ or"* **for** *ev evs, auto)*

lemma *or_has_only_Says' [rule_format]: "evs ∈ or ⟹ ev ∈ set evs ⟶ (∃A B X. ev=Says A B X)"*
by *(erule or.induct, auto)*

lemma *or_has_only_Says [iff]: "has_only_Says or"*
by *(auto simp: has_only_Says_def dest: or_has_only_Says')*

34.5 or is regular

lemma *or1'_parts_spies [dest]: "or1' A' A B NA X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ parts (spies evs)"*
by *blast*

lemma *or2_parts_spies [dest]: "or2 A B NA NB X ∈ set evs ⟹ X ∈ parts (spies evs)"*
by *blast*

lemma *or3_parts_spies [dest]: "Says S B {|NA, Y, Ciph B {|NB, K|}|} ∈ set evs ⟹ K ∈ parts (spies evs)"*
by *blast*

lemma *or_is_regular [iff]: "regular or"*
apply *(simp only: regular_def, clarify)*
apply *(erule or.induct, simp_all add: initState.simps knows.simps)*
by *(auto dest: parts_sub)*

34.6 guardedness of KAB

lemma *Guard_KAB [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ or; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ or3 A B NA NB K ∈ set evs ⟶ GuardK K {shrK A,shrK B} (spies evs)"*
apply *(erule or.induct)*

apply *simp_all*

apply *(clarify, erule in_synth_GuardK, erule GuardK_analz, simp)*

apply *blast*

apply *safe*
apply *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies, blast)*

apply *blast*
apply *(drule_tac A=Server* **in** *Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)*
apply *(drule_tac A=Server* **in** *Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)*

by *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies in_GuardK_kparts)*

34.7 guardedness of NB

lemma *Guard_NB [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ or; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*

```
or2 A B NA NB X ∈ set evs ⟶ Guard NB {shrK B} (spies evs)"
apply (erule or.induct)

apply simp_all

apply safe
apply (erule in_synth_Guard, erule Guard_analz, simp)

apply (drule_tac n=NB in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
apply (drule_tac n=NB in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)

apply blast
apply (drule_tac n=NA in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
apply (blast intro!: No_Nonce dest: used_parts)
apply (drule_tac n=NA in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
apply (blast intro!: No_Nonce dest: used_parts)
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)
apply (case_tac "Ba=B", clarsimp)
apply (drule_tac n=NB and A=B in Nonce_neq, simp+)
apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
apply (drule_tac n'=NAa in in_Guard_kparts_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)

apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
apply (frule_tac n'=NAa in in_Guard_kparts_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
apply (case_tac "Aa=B", clarsimp)
apply (case_tac "NAa=NB", clarsimp)
apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
apply (drule_tac Y="{|Nonce NB, Agent Aa, Agent Ba|}"
                and K="shrK Aa" in in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)
apply (simp add: No_Nonce)
apply (case_tac "Ba=B", clarsimp)
apply (case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)
apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
apply (drule_tac Y="{|Nonce NAa, Nonce NB, Agent Aa, Agent Ba|}"
                and K="shrK Ba" in in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)
apply (simp add: No_Nonce)

by (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)+

end
```

35 Yahalom Protocol

```
theory Guard_Yahalom imports "../Shared" Guard_Shared begin
```

35.1 messages used in the protocol

```
abbreviation (input)
  ya1 :: "agent => agent => nat => event" where
  "ya1 A B NA == Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}"

abbreviation (input)
```

```
  ya1' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => event" where
  "ya1' A' A B NA == Says A' B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}"

abbreviation (input)
  ya2 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => event" where
  "ya2 A B NA NB == Says B Server {|Agent B, Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce
NB|}|}"

abbreviation (input)
  ya2' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => nat => event" where
  "ya2' B' A B NA NB == Says B' Server {|Agent B, Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA,
Nonce NB|}|}"

abbreviation (input)
  ya3 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event" where
  "ya3 A B NA NB K ==
    Says Server A {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                    Ciph B {|Agent A, Key K|}|}"

abbreviation (input)
  ya3':: "agent => msg => agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event" where
  "ya3' S Y A B NA NB K ==
    Says S A {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, Y|}"

abbreviation (input)
  ya4 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => msg => event" where
  "ya4 A B K NB Y == Says A B {|Y, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|}"

abbreviation (input)
  ya4' :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => msg => event" where
  "ya4' A' B K NB Y == Says A' B {|Y, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|}"
```

35.2 definition of the protocol

```
inductive_set ya :: "event list set"
where

  Nil: "[] ∈ ya"

| Fake: "⟦evs ∈ ya; X ∈ synth (analz (spies evs))⟧ ⟹ Says Spy B X # evs
∈ ya"

| YA1: "⟦evs1 ∈ ya; Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧ ⟹ ya1 A B NA # evs1 ∈ ya"

| YA2: "⟦evs2 ∈ ya; ya1' A' A B NA ∈ set evs2; Nonce NB ∉ used evs2⟧
  ⟹ ya2 A B NA NB # evs2 ∈ ya"

| YA3: "⟦evs3 ∈ ya; ya2' B' A B NA NB ∈ set evs3; Key K ∉ used evs3⟧
  ⟹ ya3 A B NA NB K # evs3 ∈ ya"

| YA4: "⟦evs4 ∈ ya; ya1 A B NA ∈ set evs4; ya3' S Y A B NA NB K ∈ set evs4⟧
  ⟹ ya4 A B K NB Y # evs4 ∈ ya"
```

35.3 declarations for tactics

declare *knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert [THEN subsetD, dest]*
declare *initState.simps [simp del]*

35.4 general properties of ya

lemma *ya_has_no_Gets: "evs ∈ ya ⟹ ∀A X. Gets A X ∉ set evs"*
by *(erule ya.induct, auto)*

lemma *ya_is_Gets_correct [iff]: "Gets_correct ya"*
by *(auto simp: Gets_correct_def dest: ya_has_no_Gets)*

lemma *ya_is_one_step [iff]: "one_step ya"*
unfolding *one_step_def* **by** *(clarify, ind_cases "ev#evs ∈ ya"* **for** *ev evs, auto)*

lemma *ya_has_only_Says' [rule_format]: "evs ∈ ya ⟹*
ev ∈ set evs ⟶ (∃A B X. ev=Says A B X)"
by *(erule ya.induct, auto)*

lemma *ya_has_only_Says [iff]: "has_only_Says ya"*
by *(auto simp: has_only_Says_def dest: ya_has_only_Says')*

lemma *ya_is_regular [iff]: "regular ya"*
apply *(simp only: regular_def, clarify)*
apply *(erule ya.induct, simp_all add: initState.simps knows.simps)*
by *(auto dest: parts_sub)*

35.5 guardedness of KAB

lemma *Guard_KAB [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
ya3 A B NA NB K ∈ set evs ⟶ GuardK K {shrK A,shrK B} (spies evs)"
apply *(erule ya.induct)*

apply *simp_all*

apply *(clarify, erule in_synth_GuardK, erule GuardK_analz, simp)*

apply *safe*
apply *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies)*

apply *blast*
apply *(drule_tac A=Server* **in** *Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)*
apply *(drule_tac A=Server* **in** *Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)*

apply *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies in_GuardK_kparts)*
by *blast*

35.6 session keys are not symmetric keys

lemma *KAB_isnt_shrK [rule_format]: "evs ∈ ya ⟹*
ya3 A B NA NB K ∈ set evs ⟶ K ∉ range shrK"

by *(erule ya.induct, auto)*

lemma *ya3_shrK: "evs ∈ ya ⟹ ya3 A B NA NB (shrK C) ∉ set evs"*
by *(blast dest: KAB_isnt_shrK)*

35.7 ya2' implies ya1'

lemma *ya2'_parts_imp_ya1'_parts [rule_format]:*
"⟦evs ∈ ya; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹
Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
{|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ spies evs"
by *(erule ya.induct, auto dest: Says_imp_spies intro: parts_parts)*

lemma *ya2'_imp_ya1'_parts: "⟦ya2' B' A B NA NB ∈ set evs; evs ∈ ya; B ∉ bad⟧*
⟹ {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ spies evs"
by *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies ya2'_parts_imp_ya1'_parts)*

35.8 uniqueness of NB

lemma *NB_is_uniq_in_ya2'_parts [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ ya; B ∉ bad; B' ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
Ciph B' {|Agent A', Nonce NA', Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ NA=NA'"
apply *(erule ya.induct, simp_all, clarify)*
apply *(drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+)*
apply *(drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+, safe)*
apply *(drule not_used_parts_false, simp+)+*
by *(drule Says_not_parts, simp+)+*

lemma *NB_is_uniq_in_ya2': "⟦ya2' C A B NA NB ∈ set evs;*
ya2' C' A' B' NA' NB ∈ set evs; evs ∈ ya; B ∉ bad; B' ∉ bad⟧
⟹ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ NA=NA'"
by *(drule NB_is_uniq_in_ya2'_parts, auto dest: Says_imp_spies)*

35.9 ya3' implies ya2'

lemma *ya3'_parts_imp_ya2'_parts [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs)"
apply *(erule ya.induct, simp_all)*
apply *(clarify, drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+)*
apply *(blast intro: parts_sub, blast)*
by *(auto dest: Says_imp_spies parts_parts)*

lemma *ya3'_parts_imp_ya2' [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ (∃B'. ya2' B' A B NA NB ∈ set evs)"
apply *(erule ya.induct, simp_all, safe)*
apply *(drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+)*
apply *(drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+, blast)*
apply *blast*
apply *blast*

by *(auto dest: Says_imp_spies2 parts_parts)*

lemma *ya3'_imp_ya2': "⟦ya3' S Y A B NA NB K ∈ set evs; evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ (∃B'. ya2' B' A B NA NB ∈ set evs)"*
by *(drule ya3'_parts_imp_ya2', auto dest: Says_imp_spies)*

35.10 ya3' implies ya3

lemma *ya3'_parts_imp_ya3 [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts(spies evs) ⟶ ya3 A B NA NB K ∈ set evs"*
apply *(erule ya.induct, simp_all, safe)*
apply *(drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+)*
by *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies2 parts_parts)*

lemma *ya3'_imp_ya3: "⟦ya3' S Y A B NA NB K ∈ set evs; evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ ya3 A B NA NB K ∈ set evs"*
by *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies ya3'_parts_imp_ya3)*

35.11 guardedness of NB

definition *ya_keys :: "agent ⇒ agent ⇒ nat ⇒ nat ⇒ event list ⇒ key set"*
where
"ya_keys A B NA NB evs ≡ {shrK A,shrK B} ∪ {K. ya3 A B NA NB K ∈ set evs}"

lemma *Guard_NB [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ ya2 A B NA NB ∈ set evs ⟶ Guard NB (ya_keys A B NA NB evs) (spies evs)"*
apply *(erule ya.induct)*

apply *(simp_all add: ya_keys_def)*

apply *safe*
apply *(erule in_synth_Guard, erule Guard_analz, simp, clarify)*
apply *(frule_tac B=B* **in** *Guard_KAB, simp+)*
apply *(drule_tac p=ya* **in** *GuardK_Key_analz, simp+)*
apply *(blast dest: KAB_isnt_shrK, simp)*

apply *(drule_tac n=NB* **in** *Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)*

apply *blast*
apply *(drule Says_imp_spies)*
apply *(drule_tac n=NB* **in** *Nonce_neq, simp+)*
apply *(drule_tac n'=NAa* **in** *in_Guard_kparts_neq, simp+)*
apply *(rule No_Nonce, simp)*

apply *(rule Guard_extand, simp, blast)*
apply *(case_tac "NAa=NB", clarify)*
apply *(frule Says_imp_spies)*
apply *(frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)*
apply *(frule_tac A=A* **and** *B=B* **and** *NA=NA* **and** *NB=NB* **and** *C=Ba* **in** *ya3_shrK, simp)*
apply *(drule ya2'_imp_ya1'_parts, simp, blast, blast)*
apply *(case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)*
apply *(frule Says_imp_spies)*

apply *(frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)*
apply *(frule_tac A=A* **and** *B=B* **and** *NA=NA* **and** *NB=NB* **and** *C=Ba* **in** *ya3_shrK, simp)*
apply *(drule NB_is_uniq_in_ya2', simp+, blast, simp+)*
apply *(simp add: No_Nonce, blast)*

apply *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies)*
apply *(case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)*
apply *(frule_tac A=S* **in** *Says_imp_spies)*
apply *(frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)*
apply *(blast dest: Says_imp_spies)*
apply *(case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)*
apply *(frule_tac A=S* **in** *Says_imp_spies)*
apply *(frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+, blast, simp+)*
apply *(frule_tac A=A* **and** *B=B* **and** *NA=NA* **and** *NB=NB* **and** *C=Aa* **in** *ya3_shrK, simp)*
apply *(frule ya3'_imp_ya2', simp+, blast, clarify)*
apply *(frule_tac A=B'* **in** *Says_imp_spies)*
apply *(rotate_tac -1, frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)*
apply *(frule_tac A=A* **and** *B=B* **and** *NA=NA* **and** *NB=NB* **and** *C=Ba* **in** *ya3_shrK, simp)*
apply *(drule NB_is_uniq_in_ya2', simp+, blast, clarify)*
apply *(drule ya3'_imp_ya3, simp+)*
apply *(simp add: Guard_Nonce)*
apply *(simp add: No_Nonce)*
done

end

36 Blanqui's "guard" concept: protocol-independent secrecy

theory *Auth_Guard_Shared*
imports
  Guard_OtwayRees
  Guard_Yahalom
begin

end

theory *Guard_Public* **imports** *Guard "../Public" Extensions* **begin**

36.1 Extensions to Theory *Public*

declare *initState.simps [simp del]*

36.1.1 signature

definition *sign :: "agent => msg => msg"* **where**
"sign A X == {|Agent A, X, Crypt (priK A) (Hash X)|}"

lemma *sign_inj [iff]: "(sign A X = sign A' X') = (A=A' & X=X')"*

by *(auto simp: sign_def)*

36.1.2 agent associated to a key

definition *agt :: "key => agent"* **where**
"agt K == SOME A. K = priK A | K = pubK A"

lemma *agt_priK [simp]: "agt (priK A) = A"*
by *(simp add: agt_def)*

lemma *agt_pubK [simp]: "agt (pubK A) = A"*
by *(simp add: agt_def)*

36.1.3 basic facts about *initState*

lemma *no_Crypt_in_parts_init [simp]: "Crypt K X ∉ parts (initState A)"*
by *(cases A, auto simp: initState.simps)*

lemma *no_Crypt_in_analz_init [simp]: "Crypt K X ∉ analz (initState A)"*
by *auto*

lemma *no_priK_in_analz_init [simp]: "A ∉ bad*
⟹ Key (priK A) ∉ analz (initState Spy)"
by *(auto simp: initState.simps)*

lemma *priK_notin_initState_Friend [simp]: "A ≠ Friend C*
⟹ Key (priK A) ∉ parts (initState (Friend C))"
by *(auto simp: initState.simps)*

lemma *keyset_init [iff]: "keyset (initState A)"*
by *(cases A, auto simp: keyset_def initState.simps)*

36.1.4 sets of private keys

definition *priK_set :: "key set => bool"* **where**
"priK_set Ks ≡ ∀K. K ∈ Ks ⟶ (∃A. K = priK A)"

lemma *in_priK_set: "⟦priK_set Ks; K ∈ Ks⟧ ⟹ ∃A. K = priK A"*
by *(simp add: priK_set_def)*

lemma *priK_set1 [iff]: "priK_set {priK A}"*
by *(simp add: priK_set_def)*

lemma *priK_set2 [iff]: "priK_set {priK A, priK B}"*
by *(simp add: priK_set_def)*

36.1.5 sets of good keys

definition *good :: "key set => bool"* **where**
"good Ks == ∀K. K ∈ Ks ⟶ agt K ∉ bad"

lemma *in_good: "⟦good Ks; K ∈ Ks⟧ ⟹ agt K ∉ bad"*
by *(simp add: good_def)*

lemma *good1 [simp]: "A ∉ bad ⟹ good {priK A}"*

by *(simp add: good_def)*

lemma *good2 [simp]: "⟦A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ good {priK A, priK B}"*
by *(simp add: good_def)*

36.1.6 greatest nonce used in a trace, 0 if there is no nonce

primrec *greatest :: "event list => nat"*
where
"greatest [] = 0"
| "greatest (ev # evs) = max (greatest_msg (msg ev)) (greatest evs)"

lemma *greatest_is_greatest: "Nonce n ∈ used evs ⟹ n ≤ greatest evs"*
apply *(induct evs, auto simp: initState.simps)*
apply *(drule used_sub_parts_used, safe)*
apply *(drule greatest_msg_is_greatest, arith)*
by *simp*

36.1.7 function giving a new nonce

definition *new :: "event list ⇒ nat"* **where**
"new evs ≡ Suc (greatest evs)"

lemma *new_isnt_used [iff]: "Nonce (new evs) ∉ used evs"*
by *(clarify, drule greatest_is_greatest, auto simp: new_def)*

36.2 Proofs About Guarded Messages

36.2.1 small hack necessary because priK is defined as the inverse of pubK

lemma *pubK_is_invKey_priK: "pubK A = invKey (priK A)"*
by *simp*

lemmas *pubK_is_invKey_priK_substI = pubK_is_invKey_priK [THEN ssubst]*

lemmas *invKey_invKey_substI = invKey [THEN ssubst]*

lemma *"Nonce n ∈ parts {X} ⟹ Crypt (pubK A) X ∈ guard n {priK A}"*
apply *(rule pubK_is_invKey_priK_substI, rule invKey_invKey_substI)*
by *(rule Guard_Nonce, simp+)*

36.2.2 guardedness results

lemma *sign_guard [intro]: "X ∈ guard n Ks ⟹ sign A X ∈ guard n Ks"*
by *(auto simp: sign_def)*

lemma *Guard_init [iff]: "Guard n Ks (initState B)"*
by *(induct B, auto simp: Guard_def initState.simps)*

lemma *Guard_knows_max': "Guard n Ks (knows_max' C evs)*
⟹ Guard n Ks (knows_max C evs)"
by *(simp add: knows_max_def)*

lemma *Nonce_not_used_Guard_spies [dest]: "Nonce n ∉ used evs*

```
⟹ Guard n Ks (spies evs)"
by (auto simp: Guard_def dest: not_used_not_known parts_sub)

lemma Nonce_not_used_Guard [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Nonce n ∉ used evs;
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ Guard n Ks (knows (Friend C) evs)"
by (auto simp: Guard_def dest: known_used parts_trans)

lemma Nonce_not_used_Guard_max [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Nonce n ∉ used evs;
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ Guard n Ks (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
by (auto simp: Guard_def dest: known_max_used parts_trans)

lemma Nonce_not_used_Guard_max' [dest]: "⟦evs ∈ p; Nonce n ∉ used evs;
Gets_correct p; one_step p⟧ ⟹ Guard n Ks (knows_max' (Friend C) evs)"
apply (rule_tac H="knows_max (Friend C) evs" in Guard_mono)
by (auto simp: knows_max_def)
```

36.2.3 regular protocols

```
definition regular :: "event list set ⇒ bool" where
"regular p ≡ ∀evs A. evs ∈ p ⟶ (Key (priK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A
∈ bad)"

lemma priK_parts_iff_bad [simp]: "⟦evs ∈ p; regular p⟧ ⟹
(Key (priK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by (auto simp: regular_def)

lemma priK_analz_iff_bad [simp]: "⟦evs ∈ p; regular p⟧ ⟹
(Key (priK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma Guard_Nonce_analz: "⟦Guard n Ks (spies evs); evs ∈ p;
priK_set Ks; good Ks; regular p⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∉ analz (spies evs)"
apply (clarify, simp only: knows_decomp)
apply (drule Guard_invKey_keyset, simp+, safe)
apply (drule in_good, simp)
apply (drule in_priK_set, simp+, clarify)
apply (frule_tac A=A in priK_analz_iff_bad)
by (simp add: knows_decomp)+

end
```

37 Lists of Messages and Lists of Agents

```
theory List_Msg imports Extensions begin
```

37.1 Implementation of Lists by Messages

37.1.1 nil is represented by any message which is not a pair

```
abbreviation (input)
  cons :: "msg => msg => msg" where
  "cons x l == {|x,l|}"
```

37.1.2 induction principle

lemma *lmsg_induct: "⟦!!x. not_MPair x ⟹ P x; !!x l. P l ⟹ P (cons x l)⟧*
⟹ P l"
by *(induct l) auto*

37.1.3 head

primrec *head :: "msg => msg"* **where**
"head (cons x l) = x"

37.1.4 tail

primrec *tail :: "msg => msg"* **where**
"tail (cons x l) = l"

37.1.5 length

fun *len :: "msg => nat"* **where**
"len (cons x l) = Suc (len l)" |
"len other = 0"

lemma *len_not_empty: "n < len l ⟹ ∃x l'. l = cons x l'"*
by *(cases l) auto*

37.1.6 membership

fun *isin :: "msg * msg => bool"* **where**
"isin (x, cons y l) = (x=y | isin (x,l))" |
"isin (x, other) = False"

37.1.7 delete an element

fun *del :: "msg * msg => msg"* **where**
"del (x, cons y l) = (if x=y then l else cons y (del (x,l)))" |
"del (x, other) = other"

lemma *notin_del [simp]: "~ isin (x,l) ⟹ del (x,l) = l"*
by *(induct l) auto*

lemma *isin_del [rule_format]: "isin (y, del (x,l)) --> isin (y,l)"*
by *(induct l) auto*

37.1.8 concatenation

fun *app :: "msg * msg => msg"* **where**
"app (cons x l, l') = cons x (app (l,l'))" |
"app (other, l') = l'"

lemma *isin_app [iff]: "isin (x, app(l,l')) = (isin (x,l) | isin (x,l'))"*
by *(induct l) auto*

37.1.9 replacement

fun *repl :: "msg * nat * msg => msg"* **where**

```
"repl (cons x l, Suc i, x') = cons x (repl (l,i,x'))" |
"repl (cons x l, 0, x') = cons x' l" |
"repl (other, i, M') = other"
```

37.1.10 ith element

fun *ith :: "msg * nat => msg"* **where**
```
"ith (cons x l, Suc i) = ith (l,i)" |
"ith (cons x l, 0) = x" |
"ith (other, i) = other"
```

lemma *ith_head: "0 < len l ⟹ ith (l,0) = head l"*
by *(cases l) auto*

37.1.11 insertion

fun *ins :: "msg * nat * msg => msg"* **where**
```
"ins (cons x l, Suc i, y) = cons x (ins (l,i,y))" |
"ins (l, 0, y) = cons y l"
```

lemma *ins_head [simp]: "ins (l,0,y) = cons y l"*
by *(cases l) auto*

37.1.12 truncation

fun *trunc :: "msg * nat => msg"* **where**
```
"trunc (l,0) = l" |
"trunc (cons x l, Suc i) = trunc (l,i)"
```

lemma *trunc_zero [simp]: "trunc (l,0) = l"*
by *(cases l) auto*

37.2 Agent Lists

37.2.1 set of well-formed agent-list messages

abbreviation
nil :: msg **where**
"nil == Number 0"

inductive_set *agl :: "msg set"*
where
Nil[intro]: "nil ∈ agl"
| Cons[intro]: "⟦A ∈ agent; I ∈ agl⟧ ⟹ cons (Agent A) I ∈ agl"

37.2.2 basic facts about agent lists

lemma *del_in_agl [intro]: "I ∈ agl ⟹ del (a,I) ∈ agl"*
by *(erule agl.induct, auto)*

lemma *app_in_agl [intro]: "⟦I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl⟧ ⟹ app (I,J) ∈ agl"*
by *(erule agl.induct, auto)*

lemma *no_Key_in_agl: "I ∈ agl ⟹ Key K ∉ parts {I}"*
by *(erule agl.induct, auto)*

lemma *no_Nonce_in_agl: "I ∈ agl ⟹ Nonce n ∉ parts {I}"*
by *(erule agl.induct, auto)*

lemma *no_Key_in_appdel: "⟦I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl⟧ ⟹*
Key K ∉ parts {app (J, del (Agent B, I))}"
by *(rule no_Key_in_agl, auto)*

lemma *no_Nonce_in_appdel: "⟦I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl⟧ ⟹*
Nonce n ∉ parts {app (J, del (Agent B, I))}"
by *(rule no_Nonce_in_agl, auto)*

lemma *no_Crypt_in_agl: "I ∈ agl ⟹ Crypt K X ∉ parts {I}"*
by *(erule agl.induct, auto)*

lemma *no_Crypt_in_appdel: "⟦I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl⟧ ⟹*
Crypt K X ∉ parts {app (J, del (Agent B,I))}"
by *(rule no_Crypt_in_agl, auto)*

end

38 Protocol P1

theory *P1* **imports** *"../Public" Guard_Public List_Msg* **begin**

38.1 Protocol Definition

38.1.1 offer chaining: B chains his offer for A with the head offer of L for sending it to C

definition *chain :: "agent => nat => agent => msg => agent => msg"* **where**
"chain B ofr A L C ==
let m1= Crypt (pubK A) (Nonce ofr) in
let m2= Hash {|head L, Agent C|} in
sign B {|m1,m2|}"

declare *Let_def [simp]*

lemma *chain_inj [iff]: "(chain B ofr A L C = chain B' ofr' A' L' C')*
= (B=B' & ofr=ofr' & A=A' & head L = head L' & C=C')"
by *(auto simp: chain_def Let_def)*

lemma *Nonce_in_chain [iff]: "Nonce ofr ∈ parts {chain B ofr A L C}"*
by *(auto simp: chain_def sign_def)*

38.1.2 agent whose key is used to sign an offer

fun *shop :: "msg => msg"* **where**
"shop {|B,X,Crypt K H|} = Agent (agt K)"

lemma *shop_chain [simp]: "shop (chain B ofr A L C) = Agent B"*
by *(simp add: chain_def sign_def)*

38.1.3 nonce used in an offer

fun *nonce :: "msg => msg"* **where**
"nonce {|B,{|Crypt K ofr,m2|},CryptH|} = ofr"

lemma *nonce_chain [simp]: "nonce (chain B ofr A L C) = Nonce ofr"*
by *(simp add: chain_def sign_def)*

38.1.4 next shop

fun *next_shop :: "msg => agent"* **where**
"next_shop {|B,{|m1,Hash{|headL,Agent C|}|},CryptH|} = C"

lemma *next_shop_chain [iff]: "next_shop (chain B ofr A L C) = C"*
by *(simp add: chain_def sign_def)*

38.1.5 anchor of the offer list

definition *anchor :: "agent => nat => agent => msg"* **where**
"anchor A n B == chain A n A (cons nil nil) B"

lemma *anchor_inj [iff]: "(anchor A n B = anchor A' n' B')*
= (A=A' & n=n' & B=B')"
by *(auto simp: anchor_def)*

lemma *Nonce_in_anchor [iff]: "Nonce n ∈ parts {anchor A n B}"*
by *(auto simp: anchor_def)*

lemma *shop_anchor [simp]: "shop (anchor A n B) = Agent A"*
by *(simp add: anchor_def)*

lemma *nonce_anchor [simp]: "nonce (anchor A n B) = Nonce n"*
by *(simp add: anchor_def)*

lemma *next_shop_anchor [iff]: "next_shop (anchor A n B) = B"*
by *(simp add: anchor_def)*

38.1.6 request event

definition *reqm :: "agent => nat => nat => msg => agent => msg"* **where**
"reqm A r n I B == {|Agent A, Number r, cons (Agent A) (cons (Agent B) I),
cons (anchor A n B) nil|}"

lemma *reqm_inj [iff]: "(reqm A r n I B = reqm A' r' n' I' B')*
= (A=A' & r=r' & n=n' & I=I' & B=B')"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def)*

lemma *Nonce_in_reqm [iff]: "Nonce n ∈ parts {reqm A r n I B}"*
by *(auto simp: reqm_def)*

definition *req :: "agent => nat => nat => msg => agent => event"* **where**
"req A r n I B == Says A B (reqm A r n I B)"

lemma *req_inj [iff]: "(req A r n I B = req A' r' n' I' B')*
= (A=A' & r=r' & n=n' & I=I' & B=B')"

by *(auto simp: req_def)*

38.1.7 propose event

definition *prom :: "agent => nat => agent => nat => msg => msg => msg => agent => msg"* **where**
"prom B ofr A r I L J C == {|Agent A, Number r, app (J, del (Agent B, I)), cons (chain B ofr A L C) L|}"

lemma *prom_inj [dest]: "prom B ofr A r I L J C = prom B' ofr' A' r' I' L' J' C' ⟹ B=B' & ofr=ofr' & A=A' & r=r' & L=L' & C=C'"*
by *(auto simp: prom_def)*

lemma *Nonce_in_prom [iff]: "Nonce ofr ∈ parts {prom B ofr A r I L J C}"*
by *(auto simp: prom_def)*

definition *pro :: "agent => nat => agent => nat => msg => msg => msg => agent => event"* **where**
"pro B ofr A r I L J C == Says B C (prom B ofr A r I L J C)"

lemma *pro_inj [dest]: "pro B ofr A r I L J C = pro B' ofr' A' r' I' L' J' C' ⟹ B=B' & ofr=ofr' & A=A' & r=r' & L=L' & C=C'"*
by *(auto simp: pro_def dest: prom_inj)*

38.1.8 protocol

inductive_set *p1 :: "event list set"*
where

Nil: "[] ∈ p1"

| Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ p1; X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧ ⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ p1"

| Request: "⟦evsr ∈ p1; Nonce n ∉ used evsr; I ∈ agl⟧ ⟹ req A r n I B # evsr ∈ p1"

| Propose: "⟦evsp ∈ p1; Says A' B {|Agent A,Number r,I,cons M L|} ∈ set evsp; I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl; isin (Agent C, app (J, del (Agent B, I))); Nonce ofr ∉ used evsp⟧ ⟹ pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C # evsp ∈ p1"

38.1.9 Composition of Traces

lemma *"evs' ∈ p1 ⟹ evs ∈ p1 ∧ (∀n. Nonce n ∈ used evs' ⟶ Nonce n ∉ used evs) ⟶ evs' @ evs ∈ p1"*
apply *(erule p1.induct, safe)*
apply *(simp_all add: used_ConsI)*
apply *(erule p1.Fake, erule synth_sub, rule analz_mono, rule knows_sub_app)*
apply *(erule p1.Request, safe, simp_all add: req_def, force)*
apply *(erule_tac A'=A' in p1.Propose, simp_all)*
apply *(drule_tac x=ofr in spec, simp add: pro_def, blast)*
apply *(erule_tac A'=A' in p1.Propose, auto simp: pro_def)*

done

38.1.10 Valid Offer Lists

inductive_set
valid :: "agent ⇒ nat ⇒ agent ⇒ msg set"
for *A :: agent* **and** *n :: nat* **and** *B :: agent*
where
Request [intro]: "cons (anchor A n B) nil ∈ valid A n B"

| Propose [intro]: "L ∈ valid A n B
⟹ cons (chain (next_shop (head L)) ofr A L C) L ∈ valid A n B"

38.1.11 basic properties of valid

lemma *valid_not_empty: "L ∈ valid A n B ⟹ ∃M L'. L = cons M L'"*
by *(erule valid.cases, auto)*

lemma *valid_pos_len: "L ∈ valid A n B ⟹ 0 < len L"*
by *(erule valid.induct, auto)*

38.1.12 offers of an offer list

definition *offer_nonces :: "msg ⇒ msg set"* **where**
"offer_nonces L ≡ {X. X ∈ parts {L} ∧ (∃n. X = Nonce n)}"

38.1.13 the originator can get the offers

lemma *"L ∈ valid A n B ⟹ offer_nonces L ⊆ analz (insert L (initState A))"*
by *(erule valid.induct, auto simp: anchor_def chain_def sign_def offer_nonces_def initState.simps)*

38.1.14 list of offers

fun *offers :: "msg => msg"* **where**
"offers (cons M L) = cons {|shop M, nonce M|} (offers L)" |
"offers other = nil"

38.1.15 list of agents whose keys are used to sign a list of offers

fun *shops :: "msg => msg"* **where**
"shops (cons M L) = cons (shop M) (shops L)" |
"shops other = other"

lemma *shops_in_agl: "L ∈ valid A n B ⟹ shops L ∈ agl"*
by *(erule valid.induct, auto simp: anchor_def chain_def sign_def)*

38.1.16 builds a trace from an itinerary

fun *offer_list :: "agent × nat × agent × msg × nat ⇒ msg"* **where**
"offer_list (A,n,B,nil,ofr) = cons (anchor A n B) nil" |
"offer_list (A,n,B,cons (Agent C) I,ofr) = (
let L = offer_list (A,n,B,I,Suc ofr) in
cons (chain (next_shop (head L)) ofr A L C) L)"

lemma *"I ∈ agl ⟹ ∀ofr. offer_list (A,n,B,I,ofr) ∈ valid A n B"*
by *(erule agl.induct, auto)*

fun *trace :: "agent × nat × agent × nat × msg × msg × msg*
⇒ event list" **where**
"trace (B,ofr,A,r,I,L,nil) = []" |
"trace (B,ofr,A,r,I,L,cons (Agent D) K) = (
let C = (if K=nil then B else agt_nb (head K)) in
let I' = (if K=nil then cons (Agent A) (cons (Agent B) I)
else cons (Agent A) (app (I, cons (head K) nil))) in
let I'' = app (I, cons (head K) nil) in
pro C (Suc ofr) A r I' L nil D
 # trace (B,Suc ofr,A,r,I'',tail L,K))"

definition *trace' :: "agent ⇒ nat ⇒ nat ⇒ msg ⇒ agent ⇒ nat ⇒ event*
list" **where**
"trace' A r n I B ofr ≡ (
let AI = cons (Agent A) I in
let L = offer_list (A,n,B,AI,ofr) in
trace (B,ofr,A,r,nil,L,AI))"

declare *trace'_def [simp]*

38.1.17 there is a trace in which the originator receives a valid answer

lemma *p1_not_empty: "evs ∈ p1 ⟹ req A r n I B ∈ set evs ⟶*
(∃evs'. evs' @ evs ∈ p1 ∧ pro B' ofr A r I' L J A ∈ set evs' ∧ L ∈ valid
A n B)"
oops

38.2 properties of protocol P1

publicly verifiable forward integrity: anyone can verify the validity of an offer list

38.2.1 strong forward integrity: except the last one, no offer can be modified

lemma *strong_forward_integrity: "∀L. Suc i < len L*
⟶ L ∈ valid A n B ∧ repl (L,Suc i,M) ∈ valid A n B ⟶ M = ith (L,Suc i)"
apply *(induct i)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,xa,l'a|} ∈ valid A n B"* **for** *x xa l'a)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,M,l'a|} ∈ valid A n B"* **for** *x l'a)*
apply *(simp add: chain_def)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,repl(l',Suc na,M)|} ∈ valid A n B"* **for** *x l' na)*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*

apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l')*
by *(drule_tac x=l' in spec, simp, blast)*

38.2.2 insertion resilience: except at the beginning, no offer can be inserted

lemma *chain_isnt_head [simp]: "L ∈ valid A n B ⟹*
head L ≠ chain (next_shop (head L)) ofr A L C"
by *(erule valid.induct, auto simp: chain_def sign_def anchor_def)*

lemma *insertion_resilience: "∀L. L ∈ valid A n B ⟶ Suc i < len L*
⟶ ins (L,Suc i,M) ∉ valid A n B"
supply *[[simproc del: defined_all]]*
apply *(induct i)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l', simp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,M,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l', clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|head l',l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for l', simp, simp)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l')*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,ins(l',Suc na,M)|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l' na)*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
by *(drule_tac x=l' in spec, clarsimp)*

38.2.3 truncation resilience: only shop i can truncate at offer i

lemma *truncation_resilience: "∀L. L ∈ valid A n B ⟶ Suc i < len L*
⟶ cons M (trunc (L,Suc i)) ∈ valid A n B ⟶ shop M = shop (ith (L,i))"
apply *(induct i)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l')*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|M,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for l')*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp, simp)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l')*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
by *(drule_tac x=l' in spec, clarsimp)*

38.2.4 declarations for tactics

declare *knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert [THEN subsetD, dest]*
declare *initState.simps [simp del]*

38.2.5 get components of a message

lemma *get_ML [dest]: "Says A' B {|A,r,I,M,L|} ∈ set evs ⟹*
M ∈ parts (spies evs) ∧ L ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by *blast*

38.2.6 general properties of p1

lemma *reqm_neq_prom [iff]:*
"reqm A r n I B ≠ prom B' ofr A' r' I' (cons M L) J C"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def prom_def)*

lemma *prom_neq_reqm [iff]:*
"prom B' ofr A' r' I' (cons M L) J C ≠ reqm A r n I B"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def prom_def)*

lemma *req_neq_pro [iff]: "req A r n I B ≠ pro B' ofr A' r' I' (cons M L) J C"*
by *(auto simp: req_def pro_def)*

lemma *pro_neq_req [iff]: "pro B' ofr A' r' I' (cons M L) J C ≠ req A r n I B"*
by *(auto simp: req_def pro_def)*

lemma *p1_has_no_Gets: "evs ∈ p1 ⟹ ∀A X. Gets A X ∉ set evs"*
by *(erule p1.induct, auto simp: req_def pro_def)*

lemma *p1_is_Gets_correct [iff]: "Gets_correct p1"*
by *(auto simp: Gets_correct_def dest: p1_has_no_Gets)*

lemma *p1_is_one_step [iff]: "one_step p1"*
unfolding *one_step_def* **by** *(clarify, ind_cases "ev#evs ∈ p1"* **for** *ev evs, auto)*

lemma *p1_has_only_Says' [rule_format]: "evs ∈ p1 ⟹*
ev ∈ set evs ⟶ (∃A B X. ev=Says A B X)"
by *(erule p1.induct, auto simp: req_def pro_def)*

lemma *p1_has_only_Says [iff]: "has_only_Says p1"*
by *(auto simp: has_only_Says_def dest: p1_has_only_Says')*

lemma *p1_is_regular [iff]: "regular p1"*
apply *(simp only: regular_def, clarify)*
apply *(erule_tac p1.induct)*
apply *(simp_all add: initState.simps knows.simps pro_def prom_def*
req_def reqm_def anchor_def chain_def sign_def)
by *(auto dest: no_Key_in_agl no_Key_in_appdel parts_trans)*

38.2.7 private keys are safe

lemma *priK_parts_Friend_imp_bad [rule_format,dest]:*
"⟦evs ∈ p1; Friend B ≠ A⟧
⟹ (Key (priK A) ∈ parts (knows (Friend B) evs)) ⟶ (A ∈ bad)"
apply *(erule p1.induct)*
apply *(simp_all add: initState.simps knows.simps pro_def prom_def*

```
              req_def reqm_def anchor_def chain_def sign_def)
apply (blast dest: no_Key_in_agl)
apply (auto del: parts_invKey disjE  dest: parts_trans
            simp add: no_Key_in_appdel)
done

lemma priK_analz_Friend_imp_bad [rule_format,dest]:
     "⟦evs ∈ p1; Friend B ≠ A⟧
⟹ (Key (priK A) ∈ analz (knows (Friend B) evs)) ⟶ (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma priK_notin_knows_max_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p1; A ∉ bad; A ≠ Friend C⟧
⟹ Key (priK A) ∉ analz (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
apply (rule not_parts_not_analz, simp add: knows_max_def, safe)
apply (drule_tac H="spies' evs" in parts_sub)
apply (rule_tac p=p1 in knows_max'_sub_spies', simp+)
apply (drule_tac H="spies evs" in parts_sub)
by (auto dest: knows'_sub_knows [THEN subsetD] priK_notin_initState_Friend)
```

38.2.8 general guardedness properties

```
lemma agl_guard [intro]: "I ∈ agl ⟹ I ∈ guard n Ks"
by (erule agl.induct, auto)

lemma Says_to_knows_max'_guard: "⟦Says A' C {|A'',r,I,L|} ∈ set evs;
Guard n Ks (knows_max' C evs)⟧ ⟹ L ∈ guard n Ks"
by (auto dest: Says_to_knows_max')

lemma Says_from_knows_max'_guard: "⟦Says C A' {|A'',r,I,L|} ∈ set evs;
Guard n Ks (knows_max' C evs)⟧ ⟹ L ∈ guard n Ks"
by (auto dest: Says_from_knows_max')

lemma Says_Nonce_not_used_guard: "⟦Says A' B {|A'',r,I,L|} ∈ set evs;
Nonce n ∉ used evs⟧ ⟹ L ∈ guard n Ks"
by (drule not_used_not_parts, auto)
```

38.2.9 guardedness of messages

```
lemma chain_guard [iff]: "chain B ofr A L C ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by (case_tac "ofr=n", auto simp: chain_def sign_def)

lemma chain_guard_Nonce_neq [intro]: "n ≠ ofr
⟹ chain B ofr A' L C ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by (auto simp: chain_def sign_def)

lemma anchor_guard [iff]: "anchor A n' B ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by (case_tac "n'=n", auto simp: anchor_def)

lemma anchor_guard_Nonce_neq [intro]: "n ≠ n'
⟹ anchor A' n' B ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by (auto simp: anchor_def)

lemma reqm_guard [intro]: "I ∈ agl ⟹ reqm A r n' I B ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by (case_tac "n'=n", auto simp: reqm_def)
```

lemma *reqm_guard_Nonce_neq [intro]: "⟦n ≠ n'; I ∈ agl⟧*
⟹ reqm A' r n' I B ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def)*

lemma *prom_guard [intro]: "⟦I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl; L ∈ guard n {priK A}⟧*
⟹ prom B ofr A r I L J C ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by *(auto simp: prom_def)*

lemma *prom_guard_Nonce_neq [intro]: "⟦n ≠ ofr; I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl;*
L ∈ guard n {priK A}⟧ ⟹ prom B ofr A' r I L J C ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by *(auto simp: prom_def)*

38.2.10 Nonce uniqueness

lemma *uniq_Nonce_in_chain [dest]: "Nonce k ∈ parts {chain B ofr A L C} ⟹*
k=ofr"
by *(auto simp: chain_def sign_def)*

lemma *uniq_Nonce_in_anchor [dest]: "Nonce k ∈ parts {anchor A n B} ⟹ k=n"*
by *(auto simp: anchor_def chain_def sign_def)*

lemma *uniq_Nonce_in_reqm [dest]: "⟦Nonce k ∈ parts {reqm A r n I B};*
I ∈ agl⟧ ⟹ k=n"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def dest: no_Nonce_in_agl)*

lemma *uniq_Nonce_in_prom [dest]: "⟦Nonce k ∈ parts {prom B ofr A r I L J*
C};
I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl; Nonce k ∉ parts {L}⟧ ⟹ k=ofr"
by *(auto simp: prom_def dest: no_Nonce_in_agl no_Nonce_in_appdel)*

38.2.11 requests are guarded

lemma *req_imp_Guard [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ p1; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
req A r n I B ∈ set evs ⟶ Guard n {priK A} (spies evs)"
apply *(erule p1.induct, simp)*
apply *(simp add: req_def knows.simps, safe)*
apply *(erule in_synth_Guard, erule Guard_analz, simp)*
by *(auto simp: req_def pro_def dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy)*

lemma *req_imp_Guard_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p1; A ∉ bad; req A r n I B ∈ set evs⟧*
⟹ Guard n {priK A} (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
apply *(rule Guard_knows_max')*
apply *(rule_tac H="spies evs"* **in** *Guard_mono)*
apply *(rule req_imp_Guard, simp+)*
apply *(rule_tac B="spies' evs"* **in** *subset_trans)*
apply *(rule_tac p=p1* **in** *knows_max'_sub_spies', simp+)*
by *(rule knows'_sub_knows)*

38.2.12 propositions are guarded

lemma *pro_imp_Guard [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ p1; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs ⟶ Guard ofr {priK A} (spies evs)"
supply *[[simproc del: defined_all]]*
apply *(erule p1.induct)*

apply *simp*

apply *(simp add: pro_def, safe)*

apply *(erule in_synth_Guard, drule Guard_analz, simp, simp)*

apply *simp*

apply *(simp, simp add: req_def pro_def, blast)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: prom_inj Says_Nonce_not_used_guard Nonce_not_used_Guard)*

apply *simp*
apply *safe*
apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: prom_inj Says_Nonce_not_used_guard)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: prom_inj Says_Nonce_not_used_guard Nonce_not_used_Guard)*

apply *simp*
apply *safe*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: prom_inj Says_Nonce_not_used_guard)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
by *(blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy)*

lemma *pro_imp_Guard_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p1; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad;*
pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs⟧
⟹ Guard ofr {priK A} (knows_max (Friend D) evs)"
apply *(rule Guard_knows_max')*
apply *(rule_tac H="spies evs"* **in** *Guard_mono)*
apply *(rule pro_imp_Guard, simp+)*
apply *(rule_tac B="spies' evs"* **in** *subset_trans)*
apply *(rule_tac p=p1* **in** *knows_max'_sub_spies', simp+)*
by *(rule knows'_sub_knows)*

38.2.13 data confidentiality: no one other than the originator can decrypt the offers

lemma *Nonce_req_notin_spies: "⟦evs ∈ p1; req A r n I B ∈ set evs; A ∉ bad⟧*
⟹ Nonce n ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by *(frule req_imp_Guard, simp+, erule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+)*

lemma *Nonce_req_notin_knows_max_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p1; req A r n I B ∈ set*
evs;
A ∉ bad; A ≠ Friend C⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∉ analz (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
apply *(clarify, frule_tac C=C* **in** *req_imp_Guard_Friend, simp+)*

apply *(simp add: knows_max_def, drule Guard_invKey_keyset, simp+)*
by *(drule priK_notin_knows_max_Friend, auto simp: knows_max_def)*

lemma *Nonce_pro_notin_spies: "⟦evs ∈ p1; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad;*
pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs⟧ ⟹ Nonce ofr ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by *(frule pro_imp_Guard, simp+, erule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+)*

lemma *Nonce_pro_notin_knows_max_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p1; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad;*
A ≠ Friend D; pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs⟧
⟹ Nonce ofr ∉ analz (knows_max (Friend D) evs)"
apply *(clarify, frule_tac A=A* **in** *pro_imp_Guard_Friend, simp+)*
apply *(simp add: knows_max_def, drule Guard_invKey_keyset, simp+)*
by *(drule priK_notin_knows_max_Friend, auto simp: knows_max_def)*

38.2.14 non repudiability: an offer signed by B has been sent by B

lemma *Crypt_reqm: "⟦Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts {reqm A' r n I B}; I ∈ agl⟧*
⟹ A=A'"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def anchor_def chain_def sign_def dest: no_Crypt_in_agl)*

lemma *Crypt_prom: "⟦Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts {prom B ofr A' r I L J C};*
I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl⟧ ⟹ A=B ∨ Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts {L}"
apply *(simp add: prom_def anchor_def chain_def sign_def)*
by *(blast dest: no_Crypt_in_agl no_Crypt_in_appdel)*

lemma *Crypt_safeness: "⟦evs ∈ p1; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts*
(spies evs)
⟶ (∃B Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs ∧ Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts {Y})"
apply *(erule p1.induct)*

apply *simp*

apply *clarsimp*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) X ∈ G"* **in** *parts_insert_substD, simp)*
apply *(erule disjE)*
apply *(drule_tac K="priK A"* **in** *Crypt_synth, simp+, blast, blast)*

apply *(simp add: req_def, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) X ∈ G"* **in** *parts_insert_substD, simp)*
apply *(erule disjE)*
apply *(frule Crypt_reqm, simp, clarify)*
apply *(rule_tac x=B* **in** *exI, rule_tac x="reqm A r n I B"* **in** *exI, simp, blast)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) X ∈ G"* **in** *parts_insert_substD, simp)*
apply *(rotate_tac -1, erule disjE)*
apply *(frule Crypt_prom, simp, simp)*
apply *(rotate_tac -1, erule disjE)*
apply *(rule_tac x=C* **in** *exI)*
apply *(rule_tac x="prom B ofr Aa r I (cons M L) J C"* **in** *exI, blast)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "cons M L ∈ parts (spies evsp)")*
apply *(drule_tac G="{cons M L}"* **and** *H="spies evsp"* **in** *parts_trans, blast,*
blast)
apply *(drule Says_imp_spies, rotate_tac -1, drule parts.Inj)*

```
apply (drule parts.Snd, drule parts.Snd, drule parts.Snd)
by auto

lemma Crypt_Hash_imp_sign: "⟦evs ∈ p1; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹
Crypt (priK A) (Hash X) ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ (∃B Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs ∧ sign A X ∈ parts {Y})"
apply (erule p1.induct)

apply simp

apply clarsimp
apply (drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) (Hash X) ∈ G" in parts_insert_substD)
apply simp
apply (erule disjE)
apply (drule_tac K="priK A" in Crypt_synth, simp+, blast, blast)

apply (simp add: req_def, clarify)
apply (drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) (Hash X) ∈ G" in parts_insert_substD)
apply simp
apply (erule disjE)
apply (frule Crypt_reqm, simp+)
apply (rule_tac x=B in exI, rule_tac x="reqm Aa r n I B" in exI)
apply (simp add: reqm_def sign_def anchor_def no_Crypt_in_agl)
apply (simp add: chain_def sign_def, blast)

apply (simp add: pro_def, clarify)
apply (drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) (Hash X) ∈ G" in parts_insert_substD)
apply simp
apply (rotate_tac -1, erule disjE)
apply (simp add: prom_def sign_def no_Crypt_in_agl no_Crypt_in_appdel)
apply (simp add: chain_def sign_def)
apply (rotate_tac -1, erule disjE)
apply (rule_tac x=C in exI)
apply (rule_tac x="prom B ofr Aa r I (cons M L) J C" in exI)
apply (simp add: prom_def chain_def sign_def)
apply (erule impE)
apply (blast dest: get_ML parts_sub)
apply (blast del: MPair_parts)+
done

lemma sign_safeness: "⟦evs ∈ p1; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ sign A X ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ (∃B Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs ∧ sign A X ∈ parts {Y})"
apply (clarify, simp add: sign_def, frule parts.Snd)
apply (blast dest: Crypt_Hash_imp_sign [unfolded sign_def])
done

end
```

39 Protocol P2

```
theory P2 imports Guard_Public List_Msg begin
```

39.1 Protocol Definition

Like P1 except the definitions of *chain*, *shop*, *next_shop* and *nonce*

39.1.1 offer chaining: B chains his offer for A with the head offer of L for sending it to C

definition *chain :: "agent => nat => agent => msg => agent => msg"* **where**
"chain B ofr A L C ==
let m1= sign B (Nonce ofr) in
let m2= Hash {|head L, Agent C|} in
{|Crypt (pubK A) m1, m2|}"

declare *Let_def [simp]*

lemma *chain_inj [iff]: "(chain B ofr A L C = chain B' ofr' A' L' C')*
= (B=B' & ofr=ofr' & A=A' & head L = head L' & C=C')"
by *(auto simp: chain_def Let_def)*

lemma *Nonce_in_chain [iff]: "Nonce ofr ∈ parts {chain B ofr A L C}"*
by *(auto simp: chain_def sign_def)*

39.1.2 agent whose key is used to sign an offer

fun *shop :: "msg => msg"* **where**
"shop {|Crypt K {|B,ofr,Crypt K' H|},m2|} = Agent (agt K')"

lemma *shop_chain [simp]: "shop (chain B ofr A L C) = Agent B"*
by *(simp add: chain_def sign_def)*

39.1.3 nonce used in an offer

fun *nonce :: "msg => msg"* **where**
"nonce {|Crypt K {|B,ofr,CryptH|},m2|} = ofr"

lemma *nonce_chain [simp]: "nonce (chain B ofr A L C) = Nonce ofr"*
by *(simp add: chain_def sign_def)*

39.1.4 next shop

fun *next_shop :: "msg => agent"* **where**
"next_shop {|m1,Hash {|headL,Agent C|}|} = C"

lemma *"next_shop (chain B ofr A L C) = C"*
by *(simp add: chain_def sign_def)*

39.1.5 anchor of the offer list

definition *anchor :: "agent => nat => agent => msg"* **where**
"anchor A n B == chain A n A (cons nil nil) B"

lemma *anchor_inj [iff]:*
"(anchor A n B = anchor A' n' B') = (A=A' ∧ n=n' ∧ B=B')"
by *(auto simp: anchor_def)*

lemma *Nonce_in_anchor [iff]: "Nonce n ∈ parts {anchor A n B}"*
by *(auto simp: anchor_def)*

lemma *shop_anchor [simp]: "shop (anchor A n B) = Agent A"*
by *(simp add: anchor_def)*

39.1.6 request event

definition *reqm :: "agent => nat => nat => msg => agent => msg"* **where**
"reqm A r n I B == {|Agent A, Number r, cons (Agent A) (cons (Agent B) I), cons (anchor A n B) nil|}"

lemma *reqm_inj [iff]: "(reqm A r n I B = reqm A' r' n' I' B')*
= (A=A' & r=r' & n=n' & I=I' & B=B')"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def)*

lemma *Nonce_in_reqm [iff]: "Nonce n ∈ parts {reqm A r n I B}"*
by *(auto simp: reqm_def)*

definition *req :: "agent => nat => nat => msg => agent => event"* **where**
"req A r n I B == Says A B (reqm A r n I B)"

lemma *req_inj [iff]: "(req A r n I B = req A' r' n' I' B')*
= (A=A' & r=r' & n=n' & I=I' & B=B')"
by *(auto simp: req_def)*

39.1.7 propose event

definition *prom :: "agent => nat => agent => nat => msg => msg =>*
msg => agent => msg" **where**
"prom B ofr A r I L J C == {|Agent A, Number r,
app (J, del (Agent B, I)), cons (chain B ofr A L C) L|}"

lemma *prom_inj [dest]: "prom B ofr A r I L J C = prom B' ofr' A' r' I' L' J' C'*
⟹ B=B' & ofr=ofr' & A=A' & r=r' & L=L' & C=C'"
by *(auto simp: prom_def)*

lemma *Nonce_in_prom [iff]: "Nonce ofr ∈ parts {prom B ofr A r I L J C}"*
by *(auto simp: prom_def)*

definition *pro :: "agent => nat => agent => nat => msg => msg =>*
msg => agent => event" **where**
"pro B ofr A r I L J C == Says B C (prom B ofr A r I L J C)"

lemma *pro_inj [dest]: "pro B ofr A r I L J C = pro B' ofr' A' r' I' L' J' C'*
⟹ B=B' & ofr=ofr' & A=A' & r=r' & L=L' & C=C'"
by *(auto simp: pro_def dest: prom_inj)*

39.1.8 protocol

inductive_set *p2 :: "event list set"*
where

```
  Nil: "[] ∈ p2"

| Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ p2; X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧ ⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf
∈ p2"

| Request: "⟦evsr ∈ p2; Nonce n ∉ used evsr; I ∈ agl⟧ ⟹ req A r n I B #
evsr ∈ p2"

| Propose: "⟦evsp ∈ p2; Says A' B {|Agent A,Number r,I,cons M L|} ∈ set evsp;
  I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl; isin (Agent C, app (J, del (Agent B, I)));
  Nonce ofr ∉ used evsp⟧ ⟹ pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C # evsp ∈ p2"
```

39.1.9 valid offer lists

inductive_set
```
  valid :: "agent ⇒ nat ⇒ agent ⇒ msg set"
  for A :: agent and  n :: nat and B :: agent
```
where
```
  Request [intro]: "cons (anchor A n B) nil ∈ valid A n B"

| Propose [intro]: "L ∈ valid A n B
  ⟹ cons (chain (next_shop (head L)) ofr A L C) L ∈ valid A n B"
```

39.1.10 basic properties of valid

lemma *valid_not_empty: "L ∈ valid A n B ⟹ ∃M L'. L = cons M L'"*
by *(erule valid.cases, auto)*

lemma *valid_pos_len: "L ∈ valid A n B ⟹ 0 < len L"*
by *(erule valid.induct, auto)*

39.1.11 list of offers

fun *offers :: "msg ⇒ msg"*
where
```
  "offers (cons M L) = cons {|shop M, nonce M|} (offers L)"
| "offers other = nil"
```

39.2 Properties of Protocol P2

same as *P1_Prop* except that publicly verifiable forward integrity is replaced by forward privacy

39.3 strong forward integrity: except the last one, no offer can be modified

lemma *strong_forward_integrity: "∀L. Suc i < len L*
⟶ L ∈ valid A n B ⟶ repl (L,Suc i,M) ∈ valid A n B ⟶ M = ith (L,Suc i)"
apply *(induct i)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*

apply *(ind_cases "{|x,xa,l'a|} ∈ valid A n B" for x xa l'a)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,M,l'a|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l'a)*
apply *(simp add: chain_def)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,repl(l',Suc na,M)|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l' na)*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l')*
by *(drule_tac x=l' in spec, simp, blast)*

39.4 insertion resilience: except at the beginning, no offer can be inserted

lemma *chain_isnt_head [simp]: "L ∈ valid A n B ⟹*
head L ≠ chain (next_shop (head L)) ofr A L C"
by *(erule valid.induct, auto simp: chain_def sign_def anchor_def)*

lemma *insertion_resilience: "∀L. L ∈ valid A n B ⟶ Suc i < len L*
⟶ ins (L,Suc i,M) ∉ valid A n B"
supply *[[simproc del: defined_all]]*
apply *(induct i)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l', simp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,M,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l', clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|head l',l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for l', simp, simp)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l')*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,ins(l',Suc na,M)|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l' na)*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
by *(drule_tac x=l' in spec, clarsimp)*

39.5 truncation resilience: only shop i can truncate at offer i

lemma *truncation_resilience: "∀L. L ∈ valid A n B ⟶ Suc i < len L*
⟶ cons M (trunc (L,Suc i)) ∈ valid A n B ⟶ shop M = shop (ith (L,i))"
apply *(induct i)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l')*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|M,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for l')*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp, simp)*

apply *clarify*
apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
apply *(ind_cases "{|x,l'|} ∈ valid A n B" for x l')*

apply *(frule len_not_empty, clarsimp)*
by *(drule_tac x=l' in spec, clarsimp)*

39.6 declarations for tactics

declare *knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert [THEN subsetD, dest]*
declare *initState.simps [simp del]*

39.7 get components of a message

lemma *get_ML [dest]: "Says A' B {|A,R,I,M,L|} ∈ set evs ⟹*
M ∈ parts (spies evs) ∧ L ∈ parts (spies evs)"
by *blast*

39.8 general properties of p2

lemma *reqm_neq_prom [iff]:*
"reqm A r n I B ≠ prom B' ofr A' r' I' (cons M L) J C"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def prom_def)*

lemma *prom_neq_reqm [iff]:*
"prom B' ofr A' r' I' (cons M L) J C ≠ reqm A r n I B"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def prom_def)*

lemma *req_neq_pro [iff]: "req A r n I B ≠ pro B' ofr A' r' I' (cons M L)*
J C"
by *(auto simp: req_def pro_def)*

lemma *pro_neq_req [iff]: "pro B' ofr A' r' I' (cons M L) J C ≠ req A r n*
I B"
by *(auto simp: req_def pro_def)*

lemma *p2_has_no_Gets: "evs ∈ p2 ⟹ ∀A X. Gets A X ∉ set evs"*
by *(erule p2.induct, auto simp: req_def pro_def)*

lemma *p2_is_Gets_correct [iff]: "Gets_correct p2"*
by *(auto simp: Gets_correct_def dest: p2_has_no_Gets)*

lemma *p2_is_one_step [iff]: "one_step p2"*
unfolding *one_step_def* **by** *(clarify, ind_cases "ev#evs ∈ p2"* **for** *ev evs,*
auto)

lemma *p2_has_only_Says' [rule_format]: "evs ∈ p2 ⟹*
ev ∈ set evs ⟶ (∃A B X. ev=Says A B X)"
by *(erule p2.induct, auto simp: req_def pro_def)*

lemma *p2_has_only_Says [iff]: "has_only_Says p2"*
by *(auto simp: has_only_Says_def dest: p2_has_only_Says')*

lemma *p2_is_regular [iff]: "regular p2"*
apply *(simp only: regular_def, clarify)*
apply *(erule_tac p2.induct)*
apply *(simp_all add: initState.simps knows.simps pro_def prom_def*

```
req_def reqm_def anchor_def chain_def sign_def)
by (auto dest: no_Key_in_agl no_Key_in_appdel parts_trans)
```

39.9 private keys are safe

```
lemma priK_parts_Friend_imp_bad [rule_format,dest]:
     "⟦evs ∈ p2; Friend B ≠ A⟧
      ⟹ (Key (priK A) ∈ parts (knows (Friend B) evs)) ⟶ (A ∈ bad)"
apply (erule p2.induct)
apply (simp_all add: initState.simps knows.simps pro_def prom_def
                req_def reqm_def anchor_def chain_def sign_def)
apply (blast dest: no_Key_in_agl)
apply (auto del: parts_invKey disjE  dest: parts_trans
            simp add: no_Key_in_appdel)
done

lemma priK_analz_Friend_imp_bad [rule_format,dest]:
     "⟦evs ∈ p2; Friend B ≠ A⟧
⟹ (Key (priK A) ∈ analz (knows (Friend B) evs)) ⟶ (A ∈ bad)"
by auto

lemma priK_notin_knows_max_Friend:
     "⟦evs ∈ p2; A ∉ bad; A ≠ Friend C⟧
      ⟹ Key (priK A) ∉ analz (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
apply (rule not_parts_not_analz, simp add: knows_max_def, safe)
apply (drule_tac H="spies' evs" in parts_sub)
apply (rule_tac p=p2 in knows_max'_sub_spies', simp+)
apply (drule_tac H="spies evs" in parts_sub)
by (auto dest: knows'_sub_knows [THEN subsetD] priK_notin_initState_Friend)
```

39.10 general guardedness properties

```
lemma agl_guard [intro]: "I ∈ agl ⟹ I ∈ guard n Ks"
by (erule agl.induct, auto)

lemma Says_to_knows_max'_guard: "⟦Says A' C {|A'',r,I,L|} ∈ set evs;
Guard n Ks (knows_max' C evs)⟧ ⟹ L ∈ guard n Ks"
by (auto dest: Says_to_knows_max')

lemma Says_from_knows_max'_guard: "⟦Says C A' {|A'',r,I,L|} ∈ set evs;
Guard n Ks (knows_max' C evs)⟧ ⟹ L ∈ guard n Ks"
by (auto dest: Says_from_knows_max')

lemma Says_Nonce_not_used_guard: "⟦Says A' B {|A'',r,I,L|} ∈ set evs;
Nonce n ∉ used evs⟧ ⟹ L ∈ guard n Ks"
by (drule not_used_not_parts, auto)
```

39.11 guardedness of messages

```
lemma chain_guard [iff]: "chain B ofr A L C ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by (case_tac "ofr=n", auto simp: chain_def sign_def)

lemma chain_guard_Nonce_neq [intro]: "n ≠ ofr
⟹ chain B ofr A' L C ∈ guard n {priK A}"
```

by *(auto simp: chain_def sign_def)*

lemma *anchor_guard [iff]: "anchor A n' B ∈ guard n {priK A}"*
by *(case_tac "n'=n", auto simp: anchor_def)*

lemma *anchor_guard_Nonce_neq [intro]: "n ≠ n'*
⟹ anchor A' n' B ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by *(auto simp: anchor_def)*

lemma *reqm_guard [intro]: "I ∈ agl ⟹ reqm A r n' I B ∈ guard n {priK A}"*
by *(case_tac "n'=n", auto simp: reqm_def)*

lemma *reqm_guard_Nonce_neq [intro]: "⟦n ≠ n'; I ∈ agl⟧*
⟹ reqm A' r n' I B ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def)*

lemma *prom_guard [intro]: "⟦I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl; L ∈ guard n {priK A}⟧*
⟹ prom B ofr A r I L J C ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by *(auto simp: prom_def)*

lemma *prom_guard_Nonce_neq [intro]: "⟦n ≠ ofr; I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl;*
L ∈ guard n {priK A}⟧ ⟹ prom B ofr A' r I L J C ∈ guard n {priK A}"
by *(auto simp: prom_def)*

39.12 Nonce uniqueness

lemma *uniq_Nonce_in_chain [dest]: "Nonce k ∈ parts {chain B ofr A L C} ⟹*
k=ofr"
by *(auto simp: chain_def sign_def)*

lemma *uniq_Nonce_in_anchor [dest]: "Nonce k ∈ parts {anchor A n B} ⟹ k=n"*
by *(auto simp: anchor_def chain_def sign_def)*

lemma *uniq_Nonce_in_reqm [dest]: "⟦Nonce k ∈ parts {reqm A r n I B};*
I ∈ agl⟧ ⟹ k=n"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def dest: no_Nonce_in_agl)*

lemma *uniq_Nonce_in_prom [dest]: "⟦Nonce k ∈ parts {prom B ofr A r I L J*
C};
I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl; Nonce k ∉ parts {L}⟧ ⟹ k=ofr"
by *(auto simp: prom_def dest: no_Nonce_in_agl no_Nonce_in_appdel)*

39.13 requests are guarded

lemma *req_imp_Guard [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ p2; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
req A r n I B ∈ set evs ⟶ Guard n {priK A} (spies evs)"
apply *(erule p2.induct, simp)*
apply *(simp add: req_def knows.simps, safe)*
apply *(erule in_synth_Guard, erule Guard_analz, simp)*
by *(auto simp: req_def pro_def dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy)*

lemma *req_imp_Guard_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p2; A ∉ bad; req A r n I B ∈ set evs⟧*
⟹ Guard n {priK A} (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
apply *(rule Guard_knows_max')*

apply *(rule_tac H="spies evs"* **in** *Guard_mono)*
apply *(rule req_imp_Guard, simp+)*
apply *(rule_tac B="spies' evs"* **in** *subset_trans)*
apply *(rule_tac p=p2* **in** *knows_max'_sub_spies', simp+)*
by *(rule knows'_sub_knows)*

39.14 propositions are guarded

lemma *pro_imp_Guard [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ p2; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs ⟶ Guard ofr {priK A} (spies evs)"
supply *[[simproc del: defined_all]]*
apply *(erule p2.induct)*

apply *simp*

apply *(simp add: pro_def, safe)*

apply *(erule in_synth_Guard, drule Guard_analz, simp, simp)*

apply *simp*

apply *(simp, simp add: req_def pro_def, blast)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: prom_inj Says_Nonce_not_used_guard Nonce_not_used_Guard)*

apply *simp*
apply *safe*
apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: prom_inj Says_Nonce_not_used_guard)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: prom_inj Says_Nonce_not_used_guard Nonce_not_used_Guard)*

apply *simp*
apply *safe*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
apply *(blast dest: prom_inj Says_Nonce_not_used_guard)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def)*
by *(blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy)*

lemma *pro_imp_Guard_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p2; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad;*
pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs⟧
⟹ Guard ofr {priK A} (knows_max (Friend D) evs)"
apply *(rule Guard_knows_max')*
apply *(rule_tac H="spies evs"* **in** *Guard_mono)*
apply *(rule pro_imp_Guard, simp+)*
apply *(rule_tac B="spies' evs"* **in** *subset_trans)*
apply *(rule_tac p=p2* **in** *knows_max'_sub_spies', simp+)*

by *(rule knows'_sub_knows)*

39.15 data confidentiality: no one other than the originator can decrypt the offers

lemma *Nonce_req_notin_spies: "⟦evs ∈ p2; req A r n I B ∈ set evs; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∉ analz (spies evs)"*
by *(frule req_imp_Guard, simp+, erule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+)*

lemma *Nonce_req_notin_knows_max_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p2; req A r n I B ∈ set evs;*
A ∉ bad; A ≠ Friend C⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∉ analz (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
apply *(clarify, frule_tac C=C* **in** *req_imp_Guard_Friend, simp+)*
apply *(simp add: knows_max_def, drule Guard_invKey_keyset, simp+)*
by *(drule priK_notin_knows_max_Friend, auto simp: knows_max_def)*

lemma *Nonce_pro_notin_spies: "⟦evs ∈ p2; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad;*
pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs⟧ ⟹ Nonce ofr ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by *(frule pro_imp_Guard, simp+, erule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+)*

lemma *Nonce_pro_notin_knows_max_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p2; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad;*
A ≠ Friend D; pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs⟧
⟹ Nonce ofr ∉ analz (knows_max (Friend D) evs)"
apply *(clarify, frule_tac A=A* **in** *pro_imp_Guard_Friend, simp+)*
apply *(simp add: knows_max_def, drule Guard_invKey_keyset, simp+)*
by *(drule priK_notin_knows_max_Friend, auto simp: knows_max_def)*

39.16 forward privacy: only the originator can know the identity of the shops

lemma *forward_privacy_Spy: "⟦evs ∈ p2; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad;*
pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs⟧
⟹ sign B (Nonce ofr) ∉ analz (spies evs)"
by *(auto simp:sign_def dest: Nonce_pro_notin_spies)*

lemma *forward_privacy_Friend: "⟦evs ∈ p2; B ∉ bad; A ∉ bad; A ≠ Friend D;*
pro B ofr A r I (cons M L) J C ∈ set evs⟧
⟹ sign B (Nonce ofr) ∉ analz (knows_max (Friend D) evs)"
by *(auto simp:sign_def dest:Nonce_pro_notin_knows_max_Friend)*

39.17 non repudiability: an offer signed by B has been sent by B

lemma *Crypt_reqm: "⟦Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts {reqm A' r n I B}; I ∈ agl⟧*
⟹ A=A'"
by *(auto simp: reqm_def anchor_def chain_def sign_def dest: no_Crypt_in_agl)*

lemma *Crypt_prom: "⟦Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts {prom B ofr A' r I L J C};*
I ∈ agl; J ∈ agl⟧ ⟹ A=B | Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts {L}"
apply *(simp add: prom_def anchor_def chain_def sign_def)*
by *(blast dest: no_Crypt_in_agl no_Crypt_in_appdel)*

lemma *Crypt_safeness: "⟦evs ∈ p2; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts (spies evs)*
⟶ (∃B Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs & Crypt (priK A) X ∈ parts {Y})"
apply *(erule p2.induct)*

apply *simp*

apply *clarsimp*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) X ∈ G"* **in** *parts_insert_substD, simp)*
apply *(erule disjE)*
apply *(drule_tac K="priK A"* **in** *Crypt_synth, simp+, blast, blast)*

apply *(simp add: req_def, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) X ∈ G"* **in** *parts_insert_substD, simp)*
apply *(erule disjE)*
apply *(frule Crypt_reqm, simp, clarify)*
apply *(rule_tac x=B* **in** *exI, rule_tac x="reqm A r n I B"* **in** *exI, simp, blast)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) X ∈ G"* **in** *parts_insert_substD, simp)*
apply *(rotate_tac -1, erule disjE)*
apply *(frule Crypt_prom, simp, simp)*
apply *(rotate_tac -1, erule disjE)*
apply *(rule_tac x=C* **in** *exI)*
apply *(rule_tac x="prom B ofr Aa r I (cons M L) J C"* **in** *exI, blast)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "cons M L ∈ parts (spies evsp)")*
apply *(drule_tac G="{cons M L}"* **and** *H="spies evsp"* **in** *parts_trans, blast, blast)*
apply *(drule Says_imp_spies, rotate_tac -1, drule parts.Inj)*
apply *(drule parts.Snd, drule parts.Snd, drule parts.Snd)*
by *auto*

lemma *Crypt_Hash_imp_sign: "⟦evs ∈ p2; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
Crypt (priK A) (Hash X) ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ (∃B Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs ∧ sign A X ∈ parts {Y})"
apply *(erule p2.induct)*

apply *simp*

apply *clarsimp*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) (Hash X) ∈ G"* **in** *parts_insert_substD)*
apply *simp*
apply *(erule disjE)*
apply *(drule_tac K="priK A"* **in** *Crypt_synth, simp+, blast, blast)*

apply *(simp add: req_def, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) (Hash X) ∈ G"* **in** *parts_insert_substD)*
apply *simp*
apply *(erule disjE)*
apply *(frule Crypt_reqm, simp+)*
apply *(rule_tac x=B* **in** *exI, rule_tac x="reqm Aa r n I B"* **in** *exI)*
apply *(simp add: reqm_def sign_def anchor_def no_Crypt_in_agl)*
apply *(simp add: chain_def sign_def, blast)*

apply *(simp add: pro_def, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac P="λG. Crypt (priK A) (Hash X) ∈ G"* **in** *parts_insert_substD)*
apply *simp*
apply *(rotate_tac -1, erule disjE)*
apply *(simp add: prom_def sign_def no_Crypt_in_agl no_Crypt_in_appdel)*
apply *(simp add: chain_def sign_def)*
apply *(rotate_tac -1, erule disjE)*
apply *(rule_tac x=C* **in** *exI)*
apply *(rule_tac x="prom B ofr Aa r I (cons M L) J C"* **in** *exI)*
apply *(simp add: prom_def chain_def sign_def)*
apply *(erule impE)*
apply *(blast dest: get_ML parts_sub)*
apply *(blast del: MPair_parts)+*
done

lemma *sign_safeness: "⟦evs ∈ p2; A ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ sign A X ∈ parts (spies evs)*
⟶ (∃B Y. Says A B Y ∈ set evs ∧ sign A X ∈ parts {Y})"
apply *(clarify, simp add: sign_def, frule parts.Snd)*
apply *(blast dest: Crypt_Hash_imp_sign [unfolded sign_def])*
done

end

40 Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public-Key Protocol

theory *Guard_NS_Public* **imports** *Guard_Public* **begin**

40.1 messages used in the protocol

abbreviation *(input)*
ns1 :: "agent => agent => nat => event" **where**
"ns1 A B NA == Says A B (Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|})"

abbreviation *(input)*
ns1' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => event" **where**
"ns1' A' A B NA == Says A' B (Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|})"

abbreviation *(input)*
ns2 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => event" **where**
"ns2 B A NA NB == Says B A (Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|})"

abbreviation *(input)*
ns2' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => nat => event" **where**
"ns2' B' B A NA NB == Says B' A (Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|})"

abbreviation *(input)*
ns3 :: "agent => agent => nat => event" **where**
"ns3 A B NB == Says A B (Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce NB))"

40.2 definition of the protocol

inductive_set *nsp :: "event list set"*
where

Nil: "[] ∈ nsp"

| Fake: "⟦evs ∈ nsp; X ∈ synth (analz (spies evs))⟧ ⟹ Says Spy B X # evs ∈ nsp"

| NS1: "⟦evs1 ∈ nsp; Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧ ⟹ ns1 A B NA # evs1 ∈ nsp"

| NS2: "⟦evs2 ∈ nsp; Nonce NB ∉ used evs2; ns1' A' A B NA ∈ set evs2⟧ ⟹ ns2 B A NA NB # evs2 ∈ nsp"

| NS3: "⋀A B B' NA NB evs3. ⟦evs3 ∈ nsp; ns1 A B NA ∈ set evs3; ns2' B' B A NA NB ∈ set evs3⟧ ⟹ ns3 A B NB # evs3 ∈ nsp"

40.3 declarations for tactics

declare *knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]*
declare *Fake_parts_insert [THEN subsetD, dest]*
declare *initState.simps [simp del]*

40.4 general properties of nsp

lemma *nsp_has_no_Gets: "evs ∈ nsp ⟹ ∀A X. Gets A X ∉ set evs"*
by *(erule nsp.induct, auto)*

lemma *nsp_is_Gets_correct [iff]: "Gets_correct nsp"*
by *(auto simp: Gets_correct_def dest: nsp_has_no_Gets)*

lemma *nsp_is_one_step [iff]: "one_step nsp"*
unfolding *one_step_def* **by** *(clarify, ind_cases "ev#evs ∈ nsp"* **for** *ev evs, auto)*

lemma *nsp_has_only_Says' [rule_format]: "evs ∈ nsp ⟹ ev ∈ set evs ⟶ (∃A B X. ev=Says A B X)"*
by *(erule nsp.induct, auto)*

lemma *nsp_has_only_Says [iff]: "has_only_Says nsp"*
by *(auto simp: has_only_Says_def dest: nsp_has_only_Says')*

lemma *nsp_is_regular [iff]: "regular nsp"*
apply *(simp only: regular_def, clarify)*
by *(erule nsp.induct, auto simp: initState.simps knows.simps)*

40.5 nonce are used only once

lemma *NA_is_uniq [rule_format]: "evs ∈ nsp ⟹ Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶ Crypt (pubK B') {|Nonce NA, Agent A'|} ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶ Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶ A=A' ∧ B=B'"*
apply *(erule nsp.induct, simp_all)*

by *(blast intro: analz_insertI)+*

lemma *no_Nonce_NS1_NS2 [rule_format]: "evs ∈ nsp ⟹*
Crypt (pubK B') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NA, Agent A'|} ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evs)"
apply *(erule nsp.induct, simp_all)*
by *(blast intro: analz_insertI)+*

lemma *no_Nonce_NS1_NS2' [rule_format]:*
"⟦Crypt (pubK B') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NA, Agent A'|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs); evs ∈ nsp⟧
⟹ Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evs)"
by *(rule no_Nonce_NS1_NS2, auto)*

lemma *NB_is_uniq [rule_format]: "evs ∈ nsp ⟹*
Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|} ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ Crypt (pubK A') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NB, Agent B'|} ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ Nonce NB ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶ A=A' ∧ B=B' ∧ NA=NA'"
apply *(erule nsp.induct, simp_all)*
by *(blast intro: analz_insertI)+*

40.6 guardedness of NA

lemma *ns1_imp_Guard [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ nsp; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
ns1 A B NA ∈ set evs ⟶ Guard NA {priK A,priK B} (spies evs)"
apply *(erule nsp.induct)*

apply *simp_all*

apply *safe*
apply *(erule in_synth_Guard, erule Guard_analz, simp)*

apply *blast*
apply *blast*
apply *blast*
apply *(drule Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)*

apply *(frule_tac A=A* **in** *Nonce_neq, simp+)*
apply *(case_tac "NAa=NA")*
apply *(drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+)*
apply *(drule Says_imp_knows_Spy)+*
apply *(drule_tac B=B* **and** *A'=Aa* **in** *NA_is_uniq, auto)*

apply *(case_tac "NB=NA", clarify)*
apply *(drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+)*
apply *(drule Says_imp_knows_Spy)+*
by *(drule no_Nonce_NS1_NS2, auto)*

40.7 guardedness of NB

lemma *ns2_imp_Guard [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ nsp; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
ns2 B A NA NB ∈ set evs ⟶ Guard NB {priK A,priK B} (spies evs)"
apply *(erule nsp.induct)*

apply *simp_all*

apply *safe*
apply *(erule in_synth_Guard, erule Guard_analz, simp)*

apply *(frule Nonce_neq, simp+, blast, rule No_Nonce, simp)*

apply *blast*
apply *blast*
apply *blast*
apply *(frule_tac A=B* **and** *n=NB* **in** *Nonce_neq, simp+)*
apply *(case_tac "NAa=NB")*
apply *(drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+)*
apply *(drule Says_imp_knows_Spy)+*
apply *(drule no_Nonce_NS1_NS2, auto)*

apply *(case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)*
apply *(drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+)*
apply *(drule Says_imp_knows_Spy)+*
apply *(drule_tac A=Aa* **and** *A'=A* **in** *NB_is_uniq)*
apply *auto[1]*
apply *(auto simp add: guard.No_Nonce)*
done

40.8 Agents' Authentication

lemma *B_trusts_NS1: "⟦evs ∈ nsp; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹*
Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶ ns1 A B NA ∈ set evs"
apply *(erule nsp.induct, simp_all)*
by *(blast intro: analz_insertI)+*

lemma *A_trusts_NS2: "⟦evs ∈ nsp; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ ns1 A B NA ∈ set evs*
⟶ Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|} ∈ parts (spies evs)
⟶ ns2 B A NA NB ∈ set evs"
apply *(erule nsp.induct, simp_all, safe)*
apply *(frule_tac B=B* **in** *ns1_imp_Guard, simp+)*
apply *(drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+, blast)*
apply *(frule_tac B=B* **in** *ns1_imp_Guard, simp+)*
apply *(drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+, blast)*
apply *(frule_tac B=B* **in** *ns1_imp_Guard, simp+)*
by *(drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+, blast+)*

lemma *B_trusts_NS3: "⟦evs ∈ nsp; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧ ⟹ ns2 B A NA NB ∈ set evs*
⟶ Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶ ns3 A B NB ∈ set evs"
apply *(erule nsp.induct, simp_all, safe)*
apply *(frule_tac B=B* **in** *ns2_imp_Guard, simp+)*
apply *(drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+, blast)*
apply *(frule_tac B=B* **in** *ns2_imp_Guard, simp+)*
apply *(drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+, blast)*
apply *(frule_tac B=B* **in** *ns2_imp_Guard, simp+)*

```
apply (drule Guard_Nonce_analz, simp+, blast, blast)
apply (frule_tac B=B in ns2_imp_Guard, simp+)
by (drule Guard_Nonce_analz, auto dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy NB_is_uniq)

end
```

41 Other Protocol-Independent Results

```
theory Proto imports Guard_Public begin
```

41.1 protocols

```
type_synonym rule = "event set * event"

abbreviation
  msg' :: "rule => msg" where
  "msg' R == msg (snd R)"

type_synonym proto = "rule set"

definition wdef :: "proto => bool" where
"wdef p ≡ ∀R k. R ∈ p ⟶ Number k ∈ parts {msg' R}
⟶ Number k ∈ parts (msg‘(fst R))"
```

41.2 substitutions

```
record subs =
  agent  :: "agent => agent"
  nonce :: "nat => nat"
  nb    :: "nat => msg"
  key   :: "key => key"

primrec apm :: "subs => msg => msg" where
  "apm s (Agent A) = Agent (agent s A)"
| "apm s (Nonce n) = Nonce (nonce s n)"
| "apm s (Number n) = nb s n"
| "apm s (Key K) = Key (key s K)"
| "apm s (Hash X) = Hash (apm s X)"
| "apm s (Crypt K X) = (
if (∃A. K = pubK A) then Crypt (pubK (agent s (agt K))) (apm s X)
else if (∃A. K = priK A) then Crypt (priK (agent s (agt K))) (apm s X)
else Crypt (key s K) (apm s X))"
| "apm s {|X,Y|} = {|apm s X, apm s Y|}"

lemma apm_parts: "X ∈ parts {Y} ⟹ apm s X ∈ parts {apm s Y}"
apply (erule parts.induct, simp_all, blast)
apply (erule parts.Fst)
apply (erule parts.Snd)
by (erule parts.Body)+

lemma Nonce_apm [rule_format]: "Nonce n ∈ parts {apm s X} ⟹
(∀k. Number k ∈ parts {X} ⟶ Nonce n ∉ parts {nb s k}) ⟶
(∃k. Nonce k ∈ parts {X} ∧ nonce s k = n)"
by (induct X, simp_all, blast)
```

lemma *wdef_Nonce: "⟦Nonce n ∈ parts {apm s X}; R ∈ p; msg' R = X; wdef p; Nonce n ∉ parts (apm s `(msg `(fst R)))⟧ ⟹ (∃k. Nonce k ∈ parts {X} ∧ nonce s k = n)"*
apply *(erule Nonce_apm, unfold wdef_def)*
apply *(drule_tac x=R* **in** *spec, drule_tac x=k* **in** *spec, clarsimp)*
apply *(drule_tac x=x* **in** *bspec, simp)*
apply *(drule_tac Y="msg x"* **and** *s=s* **in** *apm_parts, simp)*
by *(blast dest: parts_parts)*

primrec *ap :: "subs ⇒ event ⇒ event"* **where**
"ap s (Says A B X) = Says (agent s A) (agent s B) (apm s X)"
| "ap s (Gets A X) = Gets (agent s A) (apm s X)"
| "ap s (Notes A X) = Notes (agent s A) (apm s X)"

abbreviation
ap' :: "subs ⇒ rule ⇒ event" **where**
"ap' s R ≡ ap s (snd R)"

abbreviation
apm' :: "subs ⇒ rule ⇒ msg" **where**
"apm' s R ≡ apm s (msg' R)"

abbreviation
priK' :: "subs ⇒ agent ⇒ key" **where**
"priK' s A ≡ priK (agent s A)"

abbreviation
pubK' :: "subs ⇒ agent ⇒ key" **where**
"pubK' s A ≡ pubK (agent s A)"

41.3 nonces generated by a rule

definition *newn :: "rule ⇒ nat set"* **where**
"newn R ≡ {n. Nonce n ∈ parts {msg (snd R)} ∧ Nonce n ∉ parts (msg`(fst R))}"

lemma *newn_parts: "n ∈ newn R ⟹ Nonce (nonce s n) ∈ parts {apm' s R}"*
by *(auto simp: newn_def dest: apm_parts)*

41.4 traces generated by a protocol

definition *ok :: "event list ⇒ rule ⇒ subs ⇒ bool"* **where**
"ok evs R s ≡ ((∀x. x ∈ fst R ⟶ ap s x ∈ set evs) ∧ (∀n. n ∈ newn R ⟶ Nonce (nonce s n) ∉ used evs))"

inductive_set
tr :: "proto => event list set"
for *p :: proto*
where

Nil [intro]: "[] ∈ tr p"

| Fake [intro]: "⟦evsf ∈ tr p; X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧

```
  ⟹ Says Spy B X # evsf ∈ tr p"

| Proto [intro]: "⟦evs ∈ tr p; R ∈ p; ok evs R s⟧ ⟹ ap' s R # evs ∈ tr
p"
```

41.5 general properties

lemma *one_step_tr [iff]: "one_step (tr p)"*
apply *(unfold one_step_def, clarify)*
by *(ind_cases "ev # evs ∈ tr p" for ev evs, auto)*

definition *has_only_Says' :: "proto => bool"* **where**
"has_only_Says' p ≡ ∀R. R ∈ p ⟶ is_Says (snd R)"

lemma *has_only_Says'D: "⟦R ∈ p; has_only_Says' p⟧*
⟹ (∃A B X. snd R = Says A B X)"
by *(unfold has_only_Says'_def is_Says_def, blast)*

lemma *has_only_Says_tr [simp]: "has_only_Says' p ⟹ has_only_Says (tr p)"*
unfolding *has_only_Says_def*
apply *(rule allI, rule allI, rule impI)*
apply *(erule tr.induct)*
apply *(auto simp: has_only_Says'_def ok_def)*
by *(drule_tac x=a* **in** *spec, auto simp: is_Says_def)*

lemma *has_only_Says'_in_trD: "⟦has_only_Says' p; list @ ev # evs1 ∈ tr p⟧*
⟹ (∃A B X. ev = Says A B X)"
by *(drule has_only_Says_tr, auto)*

lemma *ok_not_used: "⟦Nonce n ∉ used evs; ok evs R s;*
∀x. x ∈ fst R ⟶ is_Says x⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∉ parts (apm s `(msg `(fst R)))"
apply *(unfold ok_def, clarsimp)*
apply *(drule_tac x=x* **in** *spec, drule_tac x=x* **in** *spec)*
by *(auto simp: is_Says_def dest: Says_imp_spies not_used_not_spied parts_parts)*

lemma *ok_is_Says: "⟦evs' @ ev # evs ∈ tr p; ok evs R s; has_only_Says' p;*
R ∈ p; x ∈ fst R⟧ ⟹ is_Says x"
apply *(unfold ok_def is_Says_def, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac x=x* **in** *spec, simp)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "one_step (tr p)")*
apply *(drule trunc, simp, drule one_step_Cons, simp)*
apply *(drule has_only_SaysD, simp+)*
by *(clarify, case_tac x, auto)*

41.6 types

type_synonym *keyfun = "rule ⇒ subs ⇒ nat ⇒ event list ⇒ key set"*

type_synonym *secfun = "rule ⇒ nat ⇒ subs ⇒ key set ⇒ msg"*

41.7 introduction of a fresh guarded nonce

definition *fresh :: "proto ⇒ rule ⇒ subs ⇒ nat ⇒ key set ⇒ event list*
⇒ bool" **where**

```
"fresh p R s n Ks evs ≡ (∃evs1 evs2. evs = evs2 @ ap' s R # evs1
∧ Nonce n ∉ used evs1 ∧ R ∈ p ∧ ok evs1 R s ∧ Nonce n ∈ parts {apm' s R}
∧ apm' s R ∈ guard n Ks)"

lemma freshD: "fresh p R s n Ks evs ⟹ (∃evs1 evs2.
evs = evs2 @ ap' s R # evs1 ∧ Nonce n ∉ used evs1 ∧ R ∈ p ∧ ok evs1 R s
∧ Nonce n ∈ parts {apm' s R} ∧ apm' s R ∈ guard n Ks)"
  unfolding fresh_def by blast

lemma freshI [intro]: "⟦Nonce n ∉ used evs1; R ∈ p; Nonce n ∈ parts {apm'
s R};
ok evs1 R s; apm' s R ∈ guard n Ks⟧
⟹ fresh p R s n Ks (list @ ap' s R # evs1)"
  unfolding fresh_def by blast

lemma freshI': "⟦Nonce n ∉ used evs1; (l,r) ∈ p;
Nonce n ∈ parts {apm s (msg r)}; ok evs1 (l,r) s; apm s (msg r) ∈ guard n
Ks⟧
⟹ fresh p (l,r) s n Ks (evs2 @ ap s r # evs1)"
by (drule freshI, simp+)

lemma fresh_used: "⟦fresh p R' s' n Ks evs; has_only_Says' p⟧
⟹ Nonce n ∈ used evs"
apply (unfold fresh_def, clarify)
apply (drule has_only_Says'D)
by (auto intro: parts_used_app)

lemma fresh_newn: "⟦evs' @ ap' s R # evs ∈ tr p; wdef p; has_only_Says'
p;
Nonce n ∉ used evs; R ∈ p; ok evs R s; Nonce n ∈ parts {apm' s R}⟧
⟹ ∃k. k ∈ newn R ∧ nonce s k = n"
apply (drule wdef_Nonce, simp+)
apply (frule ok_not_used, simp+)
apply (clarify, erule ok_is_Says, simp+)
apply (clarify, rule_tac x=k in exI, simp add: newn_def)
apply (clarify, drule_tac Y="msg x" and s=s in apm_parts)
apply (drule ok_not_used, simp+)
by (clarify, erule ok_is_Says, simp_all)

lemma fresh_rule: "⟦evs' @ ev # evs ∈ tr p; wdef p; Nonce n ∉ used evs;
Nonce n ∈ parts {msg ev}⟧ ⟹ ∃R s. R ∈ p ∧ ap' s R = ev"
apply (drule trunc, simp, ind_cases "ev # evs ∈ tr p", simp)
by (drule_tac x=X in in_sub, drule parts_sub, simp, simp, blast+)

lemma fresh_ruleD: "⟦fresh p R' s' n Ks evs; keys R' s' n evs ⊆ Ks; wdef
p;
has_only_Says' p; evs ∈ tr p; ∀R k s. nonce s k = n ⟶ Nonce n ∈ used evs
⟶
R ∈ p ⟶ k ∈ newn R ⟶ Nonce n ∈ parts {apm' s R} ⟶ apm' s R ∈ guard
n Ks ⟶
apm' s R ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶ keys R s n evs ⊆ Ks ⟶ P⟧ ⟹ P"
apply (frule fresh_used, simp)
apply (unfold fresh_def, clarify)
apply (drule_tac x=R' in spec)
```

apply *(drule fresh_newn, simp+, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac x=k* **in** *spec)*
apply *(drule_tac x=s'* **in** *spec)*
apply *(subgoal_tac "apm' s' R' ∈ parts (spies (evs2 @ ap' s' R' # evs1))")*
apply *(case_tac R', drule has_only_Says'D, simp, clarsimp)*
apply *(case_tac R', drule has_only_Says'D, simp, clarsimp)*
apply *(rule_tac Y="apm s' X"* **in** *parts_parts, blast)*
by *(rule parts.Inj, rule Says_imp_spies, simp, blast)*

41.8 safe keys

definition *safe :: "key set ⇒ msg set ⇒ bool"* **where**
"safe Ks G ≡ ∀K. K ∈ Ks ⟶ Key K ∉ analz G"

lemma *safeD [dest]: "⟦safe Ks G; K ∈ Ks⟧ ⟹ Key K ∉ analz G"*
unfolding *safe_def* **by** *blast*

lemma *safe_insert: "safe Ks (insert X G) ⟹ safe Ks G"*
unfolding *safe_def* **by** *blast*

lemma *Guard_safe: "⟦Guard n Ks G; safe Ks G⟧ ⟹ Nonce n ∉ analz G"*
by *(blast dest: Guard_invKey)*

41.9 guardedness preservation

definition *preserv :: "proto ⇒ keyfun ⇒ nat ⇒ key set ⇒ bool"* **where**
"preserv p keys n Ks ≡ (∀evs R' s' R s. evs ∈ tr p ⟶
Guard n Ks (spies evs) ⟶ safe Ks (spies evs) ⟶ fresh p R' s' n Ks evs
⟶
keys R' s' n evs ⊆ Ks ⟶ R ∈ p ⟶ ok evs R s ⟶ apm' s R ∈ guard n Ks)"

lemma *preservD: "⟦preserv p keys n Ks; evs ∈ tr p; Guard n Ks (spies evs);*
safe Ks (spies evs); fresh p R' s' n Ks evs; R ∈ p; ok evs R s;
keys R' s' n evs ⊆ Ks⟧ ⟹ apm' s R ∈ guard n Ks"
unfolding *preserv_def* **by** *blast*

lemma *preservD': "⟦preserv p keys n Ks; evs ∈ tr p; Guard n Ks (spies evs);*
safe Ks (spies evs); fresh p R' s' n Ks evs; (l,Says A B X) ∈ p;
ok evs (l,Says A B X) s; keys R' s' n evs ⊆ Ks⟧ ⟹ apm s X ∈ guard n Ks"
by *(drule preservD, simp+)*

41.10 monotonic keyfun

definition *monoton :: "proto => keyfun => bool"* **where**
"monoton p keys ≡ ∀R' s' n ev evs. ev # evs ∈ tr p ⟶
keys R' s' n evs ⊆ keys R' s' n (ev # evs)"

lemma *monotonD [dest]: "⟦keys R' s' n (ev # evs) ⊆ Ks; monoton p keys;*
ev # evs ∈ tr p⟧ ⟹ keys R' s' n evs ⊆ Ks"
unfolding *monoton_def* **by** *blast*

41.11 guardedness theorem

lemma *Guard_tr [rule_format]: "⟦evs ∈ tr p; has_only_Says' p;*

preserv p keys n Ks; monoton p keys; Guard n Ks (initState Spy)⟧ ⟹
safe Ks (spies evs) ⟶ *fresh p R' s' n Ks evs* ⟶ *keys R' s' n evs* ⊆ *Ks*
⟶
Guard n Ks (spies evs)"
apply *(erule tr.induct)*

apply *simp*

apply *(clarify, drule freshD, clarsimp)*
apply *(case_tac evs2)*

apply *(frule has_only_Says'D, simp)*
apply *(clarsimp, blast)*

apply *(clarsimp, rule conjI)*
apply *(blast dest: safe_insert)*

apply *(rule in_synth_Guard, simp, rule Guard_analz)*
apply *(blast dest: safe_insert)*
apply *(drule safe_insert, simp add: safe_def)*

apply *(clarify, drule freshD, clarify)*
apply *(case_tac evs2)*

apply *(frule has_only_Says'D, simp)*
apply *(frule_tac R=R'* **in** *has_only_Says'D, simp)*
apply *(case_tac R', clarsimp, blast)*

apply *(frule has_only_Says'D, simp)*
apply *(clarsimp, rule conjI)*
apply *(drule Proto, simp+, blast dest: safe_insert)*

apply *(frule Proto, simp+)*
apply *(erule preservD', simp+)*
apply *(blast dest: safe_insert)*
apply *(blast dest: safe_insert)*
by *(blast, simp, simp, blast)*

41.12 useful properties for guardedness

lemma *newn_neq_used: "*⟦*Nonce n* ∈ *used evs; ok evs R s; k* ∈ *newn R*⟧
⟹ *n* ≠ *nonce s k"*
by *(auto simp: ok_def)*

lemma *ok_Guard: "*⟦*ok evs R s; Guard n Ks (spies evs); x* ∈ *fst R; is_Says x*⟧
⟹ *apm s (msg x)* ∈ *parts (spies evs)* ∧ *apm s (msg x)* ∈ *guard n Ks"*
apply *(unfold ok_def is_Says_def, clarify)*
apply *(drule_tac x="Says A B X"* **in** *spec, simp)*
by *(drule Says_imp_spies, auto intro: parts_parts)*

lemma *ok_parts_not_new: "*⟦*Y* ∈ *parts (spies evs); Nonce (nonce s n)* ∈ *parts {Y};*
ok evs R s⟧ ⟹ *n* ∉ *newn R"*

by *(auto simp: ok_def dest: not_used_not_spied parts_parts)*

41.13 unicity

definition *uniq :: "proto ⇒ secfun ⇒ bool"* **where**
"uniq p secret ≡ ∀evs R R' n n' Ks s s'. R ∈ p ⟶ R' ∈ p ⟶
n ∈ newn R ⟶ n' ∈ newn R' ⟶ nonce s n = nonce s' n' ⟶
Nonce (nonce s n) ∈ parts {apm' s R} ⟶ Nonce (nonce s n) ∈ parts {apm' s'
R'} ⟶
apm' s R ∈ guard (nonce s n) Ks ⟶ apm' s' R' ∈ guard (nonce s n) Ks ⟶
evs ∈ tr p ⟶ Nonce (nonce s n) ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶
secret R n s Ks ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶ secret R' n' s' Ks ∈ parts (spies
evs) ⟶
secret R n s Ks = secret R' n' s' Ks"

lemma *uniqD: "⟦uniq p secret; evs ∈ tr p; R ∈ p; R' ∈ p; n ∈ newn R; n'*
∈ newn R';
nonce s n = nonce s' n'; Nonce (nonce s n) ∉ analz (spies evs);
Nonce (nonce s n) ∈ parts {apm' s R}; Nonce (nonce s n) ∈ parts {apm' s' R'};
secret R n s Ks ∈ parts (spies evs); secret R' n' s' Ks ∈ parts (spies evs);
apm' s R ∈ guard (nonce s n) Ks; apm' s' R' ∈ guard (nonce s n) Ks⟧ ⟹
secret R n s Ks = secret R' n' s' Ks"
unfolding *uniq_def* **by** *blast*

definition *ord :: "proto ⇒ (rule ⇒ rule ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool"* **where**
"ord p inff ≡ ∀R R'. R ∈ p ⟶ R' ∈ p ⟶ ¬ inff R R' ⟶ inff R' R"

lemma *ordD: "⟦ord p inff; ¬ inff R R'; R ∈ p; R' ∈ p⟧ ⟹ inff R' R"*
unfolding *ord_def* **by** *blast*

definition *uniq' :: "proto ⇒ (rule ⇒ rule ⇒ bool) ⇒ secfun ⇒ bool"* **where**
"uniq' p inff secret ≡ ∀evs R R' n n' Ks s s'. R ∈ p ⟶ R' ∈ p ⟶
inff R R' ⟶ n ∈ newn R ⟶ n' ∈ newn R' ⟶ nonce s n = nonce s' n' ⟶
Nonce (nonce s n) ∈ parts {apm' s R} ⟶ Nonce (nonce s n) ∈ parts {apm' s'
R'} ⟶
apm' s R ∈ guard (nonce s n) Ks ⟶ apm' s' R' ∈ guard (nonce s n) Ks ⟶
evs ∈ tr p ⟶ Nonce (nonce s n) ∉ analz (spies evs) ⟶
secret R n s Ks ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶ secret R' n' s' Ks ∈ parts (spies
evs) ⟶
secret R n s Ks = secret R' n' s' Ks"

lemma *uniq'D: "⟦uniq' p inff secret; evs ∈ tr p; inff R R'; R ∈ p; R' ∈*
p; n ∈ newn R;
n' ∈ newn R'; nonce s n = nonce s' n'; Nonce (nonce s n) ∉ analz (spies evs);
Nonce (nonce s n) ∈ parts {apm' s R}; Nonce (nonce s n) ∈ parts {apm' s' R'};
secret R n s Ks ∈ parts (spies evs); secret R' n' s' Ks ∈ parts (spies evs);
apm' s R ∈ guard (nonce s n) Ks; apm' s' R' ∈ guard (nonce s n) Ks⟧ ⟹
secret R n s Ks = secret R' n' s' Ks"
by *(unfold uniq'_def, blast)*

lemma *uniq'_imp_uniq: "⟦uniq' p inff secret; ord p inff⟧ ⟹ uniq p secret"*
unfolding *uniq_def*
apply *(rule allI)+*
apply *(case_tac "inff R R'")*

```
apply (blast dest: uniq'D)
by (auto dest: ordD uniq'D intro: sym)
```

41.14 Needham-Schroeder-Lowe

```
definition a :: agent where "a == Friend 0"
definition b :: agent where "b == Friend 1"
definition a' :: agent where "a' == Friend 2"
definition b' :: agent where "b' == Friend 3"
definition Na :: nat where "Na == 0"
definition Nb :: nat where "Nb == 1"

abbreviation
  ns1 :: rule where
  "ns1 == ({}, Says a b (Crypt (pubK b) {|Nonce Na, Agent a|}))"

abbreviation
  ns2 :: rule where
  "ns2 == ({Says a' b (Crypt (pubK b) {|Nonce Na, Agent a|})},
    Says b a (Crypt (pubK a) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Agent b|}))"

abbreviation
  ns3 :: rule where
  "ns3 == ({Says a b (Crypt (pubK b) {|Nonce Na, Agent a|}),
    Says b' a (Crypt (pubK a) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Agent b|})},
    Says a b (Crypt (pubK b) (Nonce Nb)))"

inductive_set ns :: proto where
  [iff]: "ns1 ∈ ns"
| [iff]: "ns2 ∈ ns"
| [iff]: "ns3 ∈ ns"

abbreviation (input)
  ns3a :: event where
  "ns3a == Says a b (Crypt (pubK b) {|Nonce Na, Agent a|})"

abbreviation (input)
  ns3b :: event where
  "ns3b == Says b' a (Crypt (pubK a) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Agent b|})"

definition keys :: "keyfun" where
"keys R' s' n evs == {priK' s' a, priK' s' b}"

lemma "monoton ns keys"
by (simp add: keys_def monoton_def)

definition secret :: "secfun" where
"secret R n s Ks ==
(if R=ns1 then apm s (Crypt (pubK b) {|Nonce Na, Agent a|})
else if R=ns2 then apm s (Crypt (pubK a) {|Nonce Na, Nonce Nb, Agent b|})
else Number 0)"

definition inf :: "rule => rule => bool" where
"inf R R' == (R=ns1 | (R=ns2 & R'~=ns1) | (R=ns3 & R'=ns3))"
```

```
lemma inf_is_ord [iff]: "ord ns inf"
apply (unfold ord_def inf_def)
apply (rule allI)+
apply (rule impI)
apply (simp add: split_paired_all)
by (rule impI, erule ns.cases, simp_all)+
```

41.15 general properties

```
lemma ns_has_only_Says' [iff]: "has_only_Says' ns"
apply (unfold has_only_Says'_def)
apply (rule allI, rule impI)
apply (simp add: split_paired_all)
by (erule ns.cases, auto)

lemma newn_ns1 [iff]: "newn ns1 = {Na}"
by (simp add: newn_def)

lemma newn_ns2 [iff]: "newn ns2 = {Nb}"
by (auto simp: newn_def Na_def Nb_def)

lemma newn_ns3 [iff]: "newn ns3 = {}"
by (auto simp: newn_def)

lemma ns_wdef [iff]: "wdef ns"
by (auto simp: wdef_def elim: ns.cases)
```

41.16 guardedness for NSL

```
lemma "uniq ns secret ⟹ preserv ns keys n Ks"
unfolding preserv_def
apply (rule allI)+
apply (rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)
apply (erule fresh_ruleD, simp, simp, simp, simp)
apply (rule allI)+
apply (rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)
apply (simp add: split_paired_all)
apply (erule ns.cases)

apply (rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)
apply (erule ns.cases)

apply clarsimp
apply (frule newn_neq_used, simp, simp)
apply (rule No_Nonce, simp)

apply clarsimp
apply (frule newn_neq_used, simp, simp)
apply (case_tac "nonce sa Na = nonce s Na")
apply (frule Guard_safe, simp)
apply (frule Crypt_guard_invKey, simp)
apply (frule ok_Guard, simp, simp, simp, clarsimp)
apply (frule_tac K="pubK' s Proto.b" in Crypt_guard_invKey, simp)
```

```
apply (frule_tac R=ns1 and R'=ns1 and Ks=Ks and s=sa and s'=s in uniqD,
simp+)
apply (simp add: secret_def, simp add: secret_def, force, force)
apply (simp add: secret_def keys_def, blast)
apply (rule No_Nonce, simp)

apply clarsimp
apply (case_tac "nonce sa Na = nonce s Nb")
apply (frule Guard_safe, simp)
apply (frule Crypt_guard_invKey, simp)
apply (frule_tac x=ns3b in ok_Guard, simp, simp, simp, clarsimp)
apply (frule_tac K="pubK' s Proto.a" in Crypt_guard_invKey, simp)
apply (frule_tac R=ns1 and R'=ns2 and Ks=Ks and s=sa and s'=s in uniqD,
simp+)
apply (simp add: secret_def, simp add: secret_def, force, force)
apply (simp add: secret_def, rule No_Nonce, simp)

apply (rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)
apply (erule ns.cases)

apply clarsimp
apply (frule newn_neq_used, simp, simp)
apply (rule No_Nonce, simp)

apply clarsimp
apply (frule newn_neq_used, simp, simp)
apply (case_tac "nonce sa Nb = nonce s Na")
apply (frule Guard_safe, simp)
apply (frule Crypt_guard_invKey, simp)
apply (frule ok_Guard, simp, simp, simp, clarsimp)
apply (frule_tac K="pubK' s Proto.b" in Crypt_guard_invKey, simp)
apply (frule_tac R=ns2 and R'=ns1 and Ks=Ks and s=sa and s'=s in uniqD,
simp+)
apply (simp add: secret_def, simp add: secret_def, force, force)
apply (simp add: secret_def, rule No_Nonce, simp)

apply clarsimp
apply (case_tac "nonce sa Nb = nonce s Nb")
apply (frule Guard_safe, simp)
apply (frule Crypt_guard_invKey, simp)
apply (frule_tac x=ns3b in ok_Guard, simp, simp, simp, clarsimp)
apply (frule_tac K="pubK' s Proto.a" in Crypt_guard_invKey, simp)
apply (frule_tac R=ns2 and R'=ns2 and Ks=Ks and s=sa and s'=s in uniqD,
simp+)
apply (simp add: secret_def, simp add: secret_def, force, force)
apply (simp add: secret_def keys_def, blast)
apply (rule No_Nonce, simp)

by simp
```

41.17 unicity for NSL

```
lemma "uniq' ns inf secret"
apply (unfold uniq'_def)
```

```
apply (rule allI)+
apply (simp add: split_paired_all)
apply (rule impI, erule ns.cases)

apply (rule impI, erule ns.cases)

apply (rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)
apply (rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)
apply (rule impI, erule tr.induct)

apply (simp add: secret_def)

apply (clarify, simp add: secret_def)
apply (drule notin_analz_insert)
apply (drule Crypt_insert_synth, simp, simp, simp)
apply (drule Crypt_insert_synth, simp, simp, simp, simp)

apply (erule_tac P="ok evsa R sa" in rev_mp)
apply (simp add: split_paired_all)
apply (erule ns.cases)

apply (clarify, simp add: secret_def)
apply (erule disjE, erule disjE, clarsimp)
apply (drule ok_parts_not_new, simp, simp, simp)
apply (clarify, drule ok_parts_not_new, simp, simp, simp)

apply (simp add: secret_def)

apply (simp add: secret_def)

apply (rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)
apply (rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)
apply (rule impI, erule tr.induct)

apply (simp add: secret_def)

apply (clarify, simp add: secret_def)
apply (drule notin_analz_insert)
apply (drule Crypt_insert_synth, simp, simp, simp)
apply (drule_tac n="nonce s' Nb" in Crypt_insert_synth, simp, simp, simp,
simp)

apply (erule_tac P="ok evsa R sa" in rev_mp)
apply (simp add: split_paired_all)
apply (erule ns.cases)

apply (clarify, simp add: secret_def)
apply (drule_tac s=sa and n=Na in ok_parts_not_new, simp, simp, simp)

apply (clarify, simp add: secret_def)
apply (drule_tac s=sa and n=Nb in ok_parts_not_new, simp, simp, simp)

apply (simp add: secret_def)
```

apply *simp*

apply *(rule impI, erule ns.cases)*

apply *(simp only: inf_def, blast)*

apply *(rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)*
apply *(rule impI, rule impI, rule impI, rule impI)*
apply *(rule impI, erule tr.induct)*

apply *(simp add: secret_def)*

apply *(clarify, simp add: secret_def)*
apply *(drule notin_analz_insert)*
apply *(drule_tac n="nonce s' Nb"* **in** *Crypt_insert_synth, simp, simp, simp)*
apply *(drule_tac n="nonce s' Nb"* **in** *Crypt_insert_synth, simp, simp, simp, simp)*

apply *(erule_tac P="ok evsa R sa"* **in** *rev_mp)*
apply *(simp add: split_paired_all)*
apply *(erule ns.cases)*

apply *(simp add: secret_def)*

apply *(clarify, simp add: secret_def)*
apply *(erule disjE, erule disjE, clarsimp, clarsimp)*
apply *(drule_tac s=sa* **and** *n=Nb* **in** *ok_parts_not_new, simp, simp, simp)*
apply *(erule disjE, clarsimp)*
apply *(drule_tac s=sa* **and** *n=Nb* **in** *ok_parts_not_new, simp, simp, simp)*
by *(simp_all add: secret_def)*

end

42 Blanqui's "guard" concept: protocol-independent secrecy

theory *Auth_Guard_Public*
imports
P1
P2
Guard_NS_Public
Proto
begin

end